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Preface

When most people talk about the civil-rights revolution, they
speak of it as something that began in the mid 1950s or the early 1960s.
They talk of its origins in terms of the Supreme Court's school desegregation decision, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the sit-ins, or the Student
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. Yet the drive for minority rights
in the United States had roots. It did not start from scratch.
These roots can be traced back to the early contacts between
Indians and European settlers and the coming of black men to America; they are embedded in the subsequent development of relations
among the races. Let there be no mistake, however. The quest of
racial minorities for equal rights and opportunities for advancement
has never been a smoothly growing, coordinated movement either in
intensity or in success. Despite occasional excitements and successes,
it was a scattered, scraggy movement until the beginning of the Second
World War. It reflected the weaknesses of black-, brown-, red-, and
yellow-skinned Americans, who were largely segregated and intimidated, poverty-ridden and undernourished.
We contend that this situation changed to an unprecedented extent
during the years between 1945 and 1953. The change was inadequate
in bringing equal rights and opportunities to the people of racial
minorities, but it did bend patterns of thought and behavior and did
confer tangible benefits. Under President Harry S. Truman, the executive branch of the federal government listened to minority groups as
never before-and they spoke as never before-and often responded to
their entreaties and pressures. Civil-rights victories were also won in
the courts. Educational levels rose, and employment opportunities
and the types of work undertaken increased. Legal segregation began
to crumble, and the campaign for better housing inched forward.
Leadership and individual accomplishment, political activity and
organization, and pride and a sense of purpose grew markedly, at least
among Negroes. Somewhat effective alliances were forged among
racial minorities, Jews, organized labor, and political and religious
liberals, in the search for ways to increase minority rights and opportunities in America.
vii

Of course, the impact of these and other developments varied
among and within minority groups. Oriental-Americans stood well in
front of the racial minorities in all areas, and blacks forged ahead of
the bulk of Indians and Spanish-speaking Americans. Within groups,
the small middle class expanded and probably profited the most; but
substantial segments of the lower classes experienced progress, and
their aspirations heightened. In all, for the first time, sizable elements
among racial minorities developed a modicum of economic power and
political influence, and they often skillfully applied it for their own
advantage. This rudimentary power-along with the frustration at not
gaining more-and increasing pride, purpose, knowledge, and leadership were among the bases for civil-rights and racial developments
after 1953.
Our goals are to detail and to analyze the advances and frustrations of the quest for minority rights and the response of American
society, particularly the Truman administration, during the years 1945
to 1953. We view the civil-rights movement as one embracing a variety
of minorities, because the problems, battles, successes, and failures
were not confined to one group. They were often shared, sometimes in
concert, by Negroes, Indians, Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ricans, Japanese-Americans, and Chinese-Americans-the major groups usually
called racial minorities. Jews are included because they occasionally
shared grievances with the racial minorities and because they played
a key role in sparking the informal civil-rights coalition of the period.
But this study emphasizes black Americans. They had the overwhelming strength of numbers and purpose among minority peoples and had
generated and led the civil-rights movement since the 1930s. Of necessity, other groups are given less attention because of their smaller numbers and their lesser influence and impact on American life.
The list of people and organizations that we are indebted to is
long. We might begin by mentioning the strong encouragement and
generous financial support given by the Harry S. Truman Library Institute, the University of Kansas, and the National Endowment for the
Humanities. Particularly noteworthy are the wise counsel and invaluable assistance tendered us by Philip C. Brooks, the former director of
the Harry S. Truman Library, and former Vice-Chancellor Francis H.
Heller of the University of Kansas, and the personal interest taken in
this study by James B. Rhoads, the archivist of the United States, and
his predecessor, Robert H. Bahmer.
A study such as this, based upon a wide range and massive amount
of research material, documents in part the diligent and intelligent
viii

help of a large number of civil servants and librarians and especially
archivists and manuscript curators, our brothers-in-arms in Clio's service. Among these we are particularly obligated to Benedict K. Zobrist,
Philip D. Lagerquist, Mary Ann Blaufuss, Harry Clark, Jr., John Curry,
Willie L. Harriford, Jerry Hess, Helen C. Luckey, Erwin Mueller,
Anna Parman, and Cecil Schrepfer of the Harry S. Truman Library;
Lois C. Aldridge, Mark Eckhoff, Thomas E. Hohmann, Joseph Howerton, Maria Joy, Richard L. Lytle, Richard Maxwell, Charles E. Neal,
Harry Schwartz, and John E. Taylor of the National Archives; Reginald
Winter of the Washington National Records Center; John C. Broderick
and Paul T. Heffron of the Manuscript Division of the Library of
Congress; Elizabeth B. Drewry and Jerome V. Deyo of the Franklin
D. Roosevelt Library; Mildred Baruch of the Office of the Secretary of
the Navy; D. C. Allard of the Naval History Division of the Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations; H. Charles Hallam, Jr., librarian of
the Supreme Court; Gerald Chopin of the Justice Department; Dorothy
Sparks of the Treasury Department; Henry Greenberg of the Civil
Service Commission; Idris Rossell and Eddie Williams of the State
Department; Marion Howey and Terrence Williams of the University
of Kansas; Alexander P. Clark of Princeton University; William B.
Liebmann of Columbia University; Archie Motley of the Chicago
Historical Society; Judith A. Schiff of Yale University; James C. Evans
and Rudolph A. Winnacker of the Defense Department. We greatly
appreciated assistance from Lucile Bluford, Oscar Chapman, Campbell
C. Johnson, and Regina McGranery, as well as the insights and suggestions we received from a number of historians, including Joseph
Boskin, David M. Chalmers, Richard M. Dalfiume, Constance M.
Green, Flint Kellogg, Richard S. Kirkendall, Thomas A. Krueger,
Ulysses G. Lee, Jr., Rayford W. Logan, August Meier, Morris MacGregor, Saunders Redding, Arvarh E. Strickland, and Robert L. Zangrando. John Hope Franklin of the University of Chicago and William
Tuttle of the University of Kansas deserve a special vote of thanks for
their patience and kindness in reading and commenting on the manuscript of this study. And, as in all things, we benefited from the forbearance, reactions, and intelligence of our wives, Vivian McCoy and
Margaret Ruetten.
Donald R. McCoy
Richard T. Ruetten
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THE STATE OF MINORITIES
BEFORE THE TRUMAN YEARS

The United States, from its beginnings, has been a land of minorities, and one of its continuing challenges has been the adaptation of
these minorities to the land and to each other. The nation's history is
studded with struggles, by individuals and groups, to achieve civil
rights. Colonists fought against royal and proprietary powers and
against each other to establish fundamental rights to what the Declaration of Independence would call "life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness."• Indians fought against whites, and whites against Indians.
Many Negro slaves sought insurrection and the fugitive life as ways to
attain rights enjoyed by other Americans. One religious group after
another and wave upon wave of immigrants struggled to secure the
rights promised them in charters and constitutions. These battles, as
much as any other American phenomenon, can be considered the
leitmotiv of the nation's development.
After World War I the fight for minority rights was considerably
subdued because of postwar repressive attitudes and the restrictive
immigration legislation of the 1920s. Yet new and great civil-rights
contests were in the offing, if for no other reason than the continuing
presence of minorities that had not achieved anything approaching
equality or even the power to fight for it. These are the minorities to
be dealt with in this study.
Indians, of whom there were 333,969 in 1940, were the nation's
oldest minority and in many ways the most disadvantaged. As wards
of the federal government, they had exchanged much of their freedom
for a thin slice of government assistance. It was not until 1924 that all
• In quoted passages the stylistic conventions of the original have not been retained in minor matters such as capitalization.
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Indians attained citizenship, although as late as 1938 seven states still
forbade them to vote. The Meriam Report of 1928 called attention to
the plight of America's Indians and suggested a program designed to
develop their potentialities. Beginnings were made along that line
during Herbert Hoover's administration with attempts to improve
Indian schools, Indian Bureau personnel, and land policies.
Further change in the status of Indians came during the presidency
of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Congress in 1934 repealed twelve laws that
had virtually made the Indian Affairs commissioner a warden and Indian
reservations prisons. That same year the Indian Reorganization Act
was passed, which offered to reservation Indians some self-government,
federal loans for economic improvement, protection against encroachment on their lands, and increased employment in the Bureau of
Indian Affairs. The act implicitly repudiated the attempt to terminate
reservations and to integrate Indians into white society. Indians also
benefited somewhat from other New Deal programs, especially the
Civilian Conservation Corps and various relief measures. Efforts after
1934 to improve their dire economic situation led to the addition of
some four million acres to Indian lands by summer 1941 and lowinterest loans of over $5.5 million by 1945. Indians were able to gain
an additional four hundred thousand acres of crop lands and seven
million acres of leased grazing land by war's end. Between 1932 and
1944 the number of beef cattle owned by Indians grew from 171,000
head to 361,000 and of dairy cattle, from 11,003 to 50,700 head.
During World War II, 24,521 Indians saw military service, on a
nonsegregated basis, and some 50,000 others gained industrial employment. Also the National Congress of American Indians was organized
to advocate their interests, which reflected their slowly mounting economic strength and political awareness. Yet it was clear in 1945 that
those Indians who had left the reservations suffered from problems of
segregation and "ghettoism," although not to the extent that other
racial minorities did, thanks to the lack of uniformity of prejudice
against them throughout the country. Those who remained on reservations were at an economic disadvantage because of the difficulties of
making reservation resources yield even subsistence livings and because government paternalism was interpreted by most Americans as
a sign of inferiority. Few reservation Indians could compete for jobs in
nearby towns on the same footing as whites, and they did not have
equal protection from the courts and police. There was no denying
that most full-blooded red men suffered severely from discrimination
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and segregation despite the reforms and assistance of the Roosevelt
period. 1
A larger minority group was the Spanish-speaking Americans of
Mexican and Puerto Rican origins. There are no reliable estimates of
the number of Puerto Ricans resident in the continental United States
in 1940, but that year there were 61,463 in New York City, where most
of them had settled. 2 Yet during the Roosevelt years Puerto Ricans
were so few and so quiescent that their problems were rarely discussed.
That situation was to change somewhat after the war.
Mexican-Americans constituted the second-largest so-called racial
minority in the United States well before the 1940s, with estimates of
their numbers running from the 1,422,533 given in the 1930 census to
about 3,000,000 indicated in 1938 by the National Resources Committee. ( The 1940 census counted as Mexican-Americans only those who
had been born in Mexico themselves or had one or both parents born
in Mexico; they were numbered at 1,076,653, which was probably well
below their actual number.) The 1930s were an unhappy time for
Mexicans in the United States. Because of the depression, large numbers of Mexican-born Americans returned to their homeland, often
under pressure in order to remove them from relief rolls and from job
competition. Those who remained, including Mexicans born in the
United States, experienced conditions similar to those of most American Negroes. Carey McWilliams observed: "Large employers of Mexican labor have consistently pursued a policy of isolating Mexicans as
a means of holding them to certain limited categories of work. Systematically discouraging all 'outside contacts,' they have kept Mexicans
segregated by occupation and by residence." Some Mexican-Americans did not submit unresistingly to this condition. From time to time
they banded together in independent farm unions and struck for better
wages and relief from discrimination. Success was rarely theirs,
however, in the face of wholesale :firings, and even violence and
deportations.
World War II brought only small changes. Tens of thousands of
young Mexican-Americans served in the military forces on an unsegregated basis, and some returned with greater skills and expectations.
War-industry jobs, however, only slowly became available to MexicanAmerican civilians. Moreover, there was evidence of discrimination
and segregation, and the Mexican-American leaders were unable to
command respect in either their own or the Anglo communities. There
is also the probability that Mexican-Americans served as substitute
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scapegoats for local problems after the evacuation of the JapaneseAmericans from the West Coast.
Generally the public ignored the problems of Mexican-Americans.
Yet the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, Nelson Rockefeller,
encouraged public and private agencies to relieve tensions between
Spanish-speaking peoples in the United States and the community at
large. Mexican officials worked against exploitation of their brothers in
the United States and were largely responsible for the actions of American officials to lessen the effects of prejudice against Mexican citizens
and, indirectly, Mexican-Americans. Spanish-speaking people in the
United States did benefit economically from wartime prosperity and
Good Neighbor propaganda. Nevertheless, they were by 1945 still a
repressed group, with little influence and few prospects for advancement outside of the few northern communities where they had been
received with a modicum of tolerance.3
There were also the minorities of Asian origins, which in 1940
mainly included 126,947 Japanese-Americans and 77,504 ChineseAmericans. Like other racial minorities, Oriental-Americans could not
move freely in American society. Segregation, discrimination, and
economic disadvantages were common to their lives; although segregation, at least among the Chinese-Americans, stemmed as much from
their cohesiveness as from the pressures of the general community.
Racial tensions, where they surfaced, usually existed on the social
frontiers between Japanese-Americans and whites, because of the
former's high-paced striving for equality and opportunity.
Considerable change came with the war, for the worse for Japanese-Americans and for the better for Chinese-Americans. JapaneseAmericans became America's scapegoat for the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Early in 1942 the government herded 112,000 West-Coast Japanese
and Japanese-Americans into camps located well inland. Their property losses were heavy, and the psychological toll was great in their
shouldering of the burdens of questioned loyalty, ostracism, and confinement. It was tragic that Americans were subjected to life in concentration camps while the nation was mobilizing to combat persecution abroad. The best that was allowed to Japanese-Americans during
the war was to prove their loyalty under ordeal by fire. Early in 1943 a
volunteer combat unit was formed and was so successful that in November selective service was reinstituted for Japanese-Americans.
Some 33,300 served in the army. The record of the two organizations
identified with them-the 442d Infantry Regiment and the 100th
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Infantry Battalion-was among the most distinguished in American
military history.
Wartime civilian manpower needs also slightly softened the harsh
treatment given the Japanese-Americans, and by spring 1943 significant
numbers began leaving the relocation camps for resettlement over the
country. In December 1944 the army even revoked the West Coast
exclusion order. By 1946, when the last relocation camp was closed,
almost 49 percent of the evacuees had returned to the Pacific Coast,
with the remainder settling elsewhere in the country. The relocation
and exclusion orders stemmed in large part from racial prejudice, but
they slowly evoked a counterresponse, which in the long run bolstered
strivings for equal civil rights by Japanese-Americans and even other
racial minorities. 4
The Chinese in America were in a different position. Not as motivated as Japanese-Americans in questing for equal rights, they had
usually avoided those occupations jealously guarded by whites, which
helped to reduce tensions. Thanks to increasing sympathy for China
during the Japanese invasion and the wartime Sino-American alliance,
discrimination lessened to the point where, as Shien-woo Kung wrote,
"the Chinese enjoyed at least a temporary equality in the eyes of the
American public." Chinese-Americans were allowed, sometimes even
encouraged, to compete in small business, civil service, and professional
undertakings. Many of the barriers to housing, union membership, and
social activities were relaxed. Moreover, in 1943 Congress repealed
the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. In 1944 a yearly quota of 105 was
established for Chinese immigrants, and the right to naturalized citizenship, still denied the Japanese, was conferred. All this did not wipe
out discrimination against Chinese-Americans. There were the instances of segregation in the military services and in the schools of
several states as well as the fact that they were still among the first to
be fired when jobs were cut back. The Chinese, however, had achieved
substantial advancement during the war, almost without struggling for
it, and were to keep most of their gains. 5
There were minorities other than racial ones, but neither their
needs nor demands seemed pressing enough to command major attention, at least during the 1930s. America's twenty million Catholics used
the traditional methods of education, economic improvement, legal
action, and especially political influence to progress toward equality.
Although discrimination was occasionally evident, one could agree
with Arnold and Caroline Rose that by 1940 "it was questionable
whether Catholics could any longer be called a minority group."6
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The nation's five million Jews had also found a substantial position
in American life. Drawing on a strong sense of group identity and on
traditions of accomplishment and cooperation, they had been able to
make much of opportunities for advancement. By the 1930s Jews were
found in prominent positions in business, law, medicine, the arts, science, literature, education, and even politics. This advancement continued during the 1940s, and it could be said by the 1950s that there
had been a rapid and generally satisfying rise in the status and income
of Jews. Yet during World War II they suffered to a certain extent
from being "ghettoized" and from being barred from or admitted on a
quota basis to many educational institutions, social groups, and public
accommodations. They also found that anti-Semitism was growing in
America, while the nation was fighting a war against Nazi anti-Semitism. Jews responded to this vigorously. Some of their most important
organizations became defense groups, launching propaganda to counter anti-Semitism and working for laws against discrimination. Particularly noteworthy were the efforts of the American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish Congress, and the Anti-Defamation League
of B'nai B'rith. Jewish organizations also sought allies in their quest
for a tolerant nation, one in which they, and all men, could achieve
advancement through merit. 7 They thereby formed a nucleus for a
civil-rights coalition.
Yet the idea of minority-group cooperation went beyond Jews.
Negroes were similarly reaching out for allies during the war. The
black newspaper the Chicago Defender regularly carried a column by
S. I. Hayakawa, and a number of prominent Negroes denounced the
evacuation of Japanese-Americans from the West Coast in 1942. Congressman Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., sought for other participants in a
minority front, appealing in 1945 for a Negro-Mexican coalition in
California. 8 All this sowed a seed that was to sprout through the topsoil of racial discontent during the postwar period as minorities increasingly came together to work for common goals.
Negroes were, of course, central to the problem of securing civil
rights in America. They constituted the largest racial minority in the
continental United States, with 12,865,518 counted in the 1940 census.
Indeed, at the most generous estimate, all the other racial minorities
together did not amount to as much as one-third their number. Negroes were central for other reasons. One was that no other group was
so restricted: For many minority people there was the possibility of
return to a homeland; for some there were occasional refuges in
America with opportunities for advancement; for all others the patterns
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of discrimination and segregation were less rigid than for black men.
Another reason was that the Negro had been the cause of the nation's
greatest civil-rights skirmish, during the Civil War and Reconstruction,
which had led to the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth amendments to the Constitution and various civil-rights statutes. Enforcement of the bright promises of the 1860s and 1870s had faltered as
time passed, and the statutes had been drained of their vitality by contradictory administrative practices and unfavorable judicial decisions,
which by Woodrow Wilson's presidency had reduced the mass of
blacks to political impotence and social despair. Retrieval of the rights
proclaimed in the 1860s was a goal for Negroes that other minority
groups would share only with less fervor and symbolic significance.
A last important reason was that blacks had not come to America
voluntarily, or to escape anything, or to seek freedom and opportunity.
What they found upon their arrival were slavery and discouragement.
Moreover, even after emancipation, they had been afforded scant
preparation and opportunity to make a decent place for themselves.
Because of their color and their former condition of bondage, they
were more conspicuous than other minorities and usually encountered
the most insulting attitudes about their character and potential. And
for Negroes there were too few tribunes at home and no consuls from
abroad to intervene in their behalf.
Until the 1930s, blacks had not developed sufficient position in
American society to contest discrimination and repression effectively.
The 1930s brought some change. Franklin D. Roosevelt's promises of a
new deal for Americans took on special significance for Negroes. For
the first time, attempts, however often unsuccessful, were made to give
them their share of government assistance. Increased numbers of
blacks entered government service. President Roosevelt and especially
his wife, Eleanor, listened to and talked with Negro leaders. In all, the
tangible results were modest, but the psychological effect was impressive. Hope had dawned in the minds of blacks.
Hope is a fragile tissue, but it was reinforced by other developments. Black leadership and skills were increasing. Literacy among
blacks rose from 83.7 percent to 90 percent between 1930 and 1940, and
the percentage of Negroes in skilled and semiskilled occupations rose
from 23.3 to 28.8. Health improvements were reflected in the extension
of life expectancy at birth from 48 to 53 years of age. The percentage
of young blacks attending school increased from 60.0 to 64.4. Outstanding Negro writers, such as Langston Hughes and Alain Locke,
achieved national prominence. The National Association for the Ad-
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vancement of Colored People reached a membership of some fifty
thousand by 1940. Negroes were given a greater sense of pride and
community, moreover, by such stirring events as the black nation
Ethiopia's strenuous resisting of white Italy in the war of 1935-1936;
Jesse Owens's Olympic victories in Adolf Hitler's Berlin; and Joe
Louis's pugilistic triumphs. The successful use of black boycotts to
increase job opportunities in New York, St. Louis, Washington, and
other cities also contributed to their hope. 9 The importance of the
developments of the 1930s, however, lay not in what they tangibly
accomplished, for that was little, but in their being the overture to
what was to come.
The outbreak of World War II in September 1939 marked the beginning of the end of economic depression for most American workers.
Foreign war orders and American defense requirements swelled the
job rolls throughout most of the country. Negroes found, however, that
the new prosperity was not so all-encompassing as to embrace them.
Some factories would not hire blacks, and most would employ them
only for unskilled positions. Government vocational-training programs
usually discriminated against nonwhites. Moreover, the Army Air
Corps and the Marine Corps were lily-white, the navy used blacks only
as messmen, and the army had few places open within its four small
Negro units.
Blacks were unwilling to accept this situation, unlike their fathers
during World War I, who had closed ranks with whites against foreign
enemies. Negroes in 1940 used with increasing intensity their customary weapons of the 1920s and 1930s. By lobbying in federal agencies, they elicited orders to defense industries to stop discrimination in
hiring, but these directives were rarely taken literally. Blacks pressed
members of Congress for assistance, but they usually found little sympathy. With somewhat greater effectiveness, Negroes exerted pressure
on executive agencies to increase the number of positions open to them
in the civil and armed services.
It was clear that traditional means were not enough. War-borne
prosperity still eluded great numbers of blacks. The next step, taken
in late 1940, was to hold mass protest meetings in various cities, but
these were scantly more successful. Then in January 1941 A. Philip
Randolph, the head of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, unveiled a more potent weapon. Writing in the Negro press, he called for
a march of ten thousand blacks on Washington. Randolph added
muscle to his plea by leading the formation of the March on Washington Movement, the first national, all-black mass organization concerned
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with economic affairs. The response was heartening to Randolph, for
it was apparent that many Negroes were ready for militant action. The
date for the march was set for July 1, and the number of blacks called
for was increased from ten thousand to fifty thousand.
The March on Washington Movement demanded, among other
things, that President Roosevelt issue executive orders abolishing discrimination under defense contracts and in job-training programs, as
well as eliminating segregation in the civil and armed services. The few
concessions that the government made to avert the embarrassment of a
mass Negro demonstration in Washington were to no avail. Finally on
June 25, 1941, Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802, and Randolph
responded by calling off the march.
The order provided less than had been sought, but it was a large
step forward. Defense vocational-training programs were commanded
to halt discrimination, and all new defense contracts were to include
a provision "obligating the contractor not to discriminate against any
worker because of race, creed, color, or national origin." A Committee
on Fair Employment Practices was to be established to deal with the
overall problem of job discrimination by defense contractors and
government agencies. Although tangible results came slowly, Executive Order 8802 represented a great advance, not only because for the
first time the government had used its authority to combat job discrimination, but also because the tactic of mass militancy had been
employed to spur government action. Clearly, precedents had been set.
Regarding civilian employment, the work of the Fair Employment
Practices Committee and other federal agencies was fairly effective.
Not only did the proportion of blacks in the civil service increase, but
the types of positions open to them improved. Between 1938 and 1944
the number of Negro federal civil servants increased from 82,000 to
274,000, and the percentage of those in custodial jobs decreased from
as high as 90 to about 40. Segregation within government service decreased markedly, and almost all government cafeterias operated on a
nonsegregated basis. There were similar trends in many private businesses, most prominently among firms holding government contracts.
From 1940 to 1944 the number of black civilian workers rose from
4,400,000 to 5,300,000. Black membership in labor unions increased
from 600,000 in 1940 to 1,250,000 by the end of the war. Wages
mounted significantly. In 1939 black males as a whole received only
41.4 percent of the average amount paid to white males, while by 1947
they averaged 54.3 percent of the income of white males. 10
Black leaders were also concerned with expanding opportunities
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for Negroes in the armed forces. In 1940 the army responded with a
gesture in the promotion of Benjamin 0. Davis, Sr., to brigadier general-the first Negro on active service to attain that rank More substantial were the appointments of William H. Hastie as civilian aide
to the secretary of war and Campbell Johnson as assistant to the Selective Service director. Thanks to the efforts of these and other Negro
government advisers and to pressure from the Negro press and Negro
organizations, the army by 1943 was taking 10 percent of its selectees
from among black citizens. The Air Corps and the Marine Corps were
opened to Negroes, and the navy increased the number of blacks in
its ranks.
To the dismay of Negro leaders and soldiers, the army remained
almost completely segregated throughout the war and indeed, more
often than not, offered blacks service only in unskilled or semiskilled
noncombatant units. Yet, even with these restrictions, almost eight
thousand Negroes received army commissions, and considerable numbers of others acquired training in various skills. Eighty-six thousand .
black inductees passed successfully through army literacy training
schools. The navy and the marines were far slower in accepting black
officers and in fact commissioned only a handful. The Marine Corps,
however, assigned Negroes to a variety of duties, often on an unsegregated basis. In 1944 the navy began to assign Negroes to general shore
service and even to selected ships, and it began some integration of
blacks and whites. 11 Even so, a great change in the military's racial
policies had to wait for another president and another war.
There was progress in other areas, too. The NAACP made headway in its series of lawsuits for equalization between the salaries of
Negro and white teachers, which had been started in the late 1930s.
In 1941 the Supreme Court held in Mitchell v. U.S. that a black could
not be denied Pullman accommodations when they were available to
whites. In 1944, in Smith v. Allwright, the Court found that the Democratic party of Texas could not, under the Fifteenth Amendment, bar
Negroes from voting, a ruling that helped to expand black suffrage in
the South during the following decade. These and other favorable
court decisions were only chinks in the wall of discrimination, but the
structure began to show signs of stress. 12
The intellectual assault on racist ideas was also important during
the 1930s and especially during the war. Responding to the liberal
atmosphere of the Roosevelt years, the rise in black militancy, and the
ugliness of Nazi racism, intellectuals increasingly focused on the problems posed by intolerance. This was illustrated by the mounting pub-
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lication of scholarly books on race and racism by such authors as
Jacques Barzun, E. Franklin Frazier, Claude McKay, and Gunnar
Myrdal. Related to this concern were the increasing success and impact of black novelists and poets such as Richard Wright and Gwendolyn Brooks. The growing flow of fiction and nonfiction on racial
themes helped to prepare the way for advances in racial understanding,
as did the rise of Negro artists such as Paul Robeson, Canada Lee,
Katherine Dunham, Duke Ellington, and Lena Home on the American
stage, screen, and radio.
The geographical movement of blacks and other minorities during
World War II was heavy-and significant. Some 2,729,000, or about
20 percent, of the nonwhite population migrated. Of these, 964,000
moved within one state, 578,000 between contiguous states, and
1,187,000 between noncontiguous states. Urban nonwhite population
increased by two-and-one-half million. The proportion of the nation's
nonwhites living in the South declined from 75 to 63 percent, while
the nonwhite population of the Northeast, Middle West, and Far West
rose substantially. The significance of these population shifts was to
become increasingly clear after the war, in terms of political strength,
black aspirations, and intergroup alliances. 13
In short, World War II brought dramatic changes in the position
of racial minorities. Almost all benefited from the increased employment necessitated by war production, and service in the armed forces
was a boon to many of the more than one million nonwhite soldiers
and sailors. But these benefits had not occurred automatically. Black
Americans had to launch an intense and continuing crusade to share
in the job boom and, along with Japanese-Americans, had to struggle
for the right to wear the nation's uniform, even on a segregated basis.
And the setbacks during the war were painful. In being packed off to
concentration camps, Japanese-Americans suffered severe losses in
property, income, and social acceptance. Jews felt sorely affiicted by a
wartime rise in anti-Semitism at home, and reservation Indians suffered somewhat because of restrictions in federal aid programs. The
war's overall domestic effect on minorities, however, was beneficial.
By 1945 employment and income for them stood at record levels, more
opportunities for advancement had appeared, and they had acquired
additional skills. Moreover, the membership of the NAACP had increased from 50,556 to 351,131 between 1940 and 1945, giving the
association the base to emerge as a major force in postwar politics. 14
Blacks, overwhelmingly the largest of the nation's minorities,
particularly profited from wartime developments. Large-scale migra-
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tion, military service, and the expansion in jobs, income, skills, political
influence, and organization strengthened their resolve not to return to
their prewar condition of semiservitude. They also believed that for
their participation in the war effort the United States owed them the
right to share equally the rights and opportunities of other Americans.
And many other Americans viewed the situation in the same light.
Educated by the egalitarian generalizations of New Deal spokesmen
during the 1930s and the war, and becoming increasingly aware of
racial tensions, large numbers of white citizens were agreeable to
advancement for minorities; indeed some were willing to help. This
was evident in the hundreds of new interracial and human-relations
groups that had been formed, especially after the widespread race riots
of 1943. Assistance also came from other victims of discrimination.
Jews had mobilized to meet the growth of anti-Semitism, and JapaneseAmericans were battling to throw off the scapegoat role assigned to
them during the war. Some Mexican-Americans and Indians were
striving for improved positions for their peoples, and they would soon
be joined by some Puerto Ricans as that group bulked larger in America as a consequence of heightened migration to the mainland. A civilrights coalition was being formed, composed largely of Negroes and
Jews, but with support from other minorities and sympathetic whites.
The priorities of the various civil-rights groups varied, but the
shape of their overall program was plain. They wanted legislation
fostering fair employment practices, outlawing discrimination in education and in the use of public facilities and accommodations, prohibiting racial and religious restrictions on property sale, increasing
protection against violence, creating equality of treatment in the use of
public funds, and improving educational opportunities. Increasingly,
they were to fight against segregation as the greatest barrier to progress. Above all, they wanted respect for human dignity. Minorities, in
short, sought not only to keep what they had gained during the war
but to obtain what most Americans already enjoyed. And by 1945
minorities were much stronger in resolve, economic status, organization, and skills than ever before, and therefore better prepared than
ever before to quest for equal rights.

2

A NEW MAN IN THE
WHITE HOUSE

Franklin Delano Roosevelt died suddenly, victim of a cerebral
hemorrhage, on the afternoon of April 12, 1945. Almost unanimously
Americans hailed the dead president for his high ideals and his contributions to the cause of racial justice. As the NAACP's Crisis said,
"The struggling masses of common folk over the globe of every race,
color, and religion, have lost a champion and friend." 1
Harry S. Truman was now the president. Minority-group Americans knew little about him, as was clear from the speculations of most
of the black newspapers. The Afro-American (Baltimore) showed its
concern for the southern influences of Truman's Missouri homeland.
The Call-Post (Cleveland) wrote that his record showed nothing "to
indicate that he conceives in any way the crusade of tolerance to be
any part of public leadership." The Chicago Defend,er worried because South Carolina's James Byrnes was a close adviser to the new
president, but it hoped that Truman would "prove himself another
Justice Hugo Black."2
Yet there were exceptions. The Crisis wrote that Truman "has a
good record on matters affecting Negro citizens. He is entitled to a
chance to add to that record as president and in our judgment of him,
pressing as our problems may seem to us, we must remember that we
are but a part of the great problem facing America and the world."
Surprisingly the Amsterdam News (New York), one of his antagonists
during the 1944 election campaign, was optimistic about the new president. It liked his honesty and his record on economic issues, investigation of war expenditures, FEPC, and poll-tax repeal. ''We view," it
said, "with distaste those self-named liberals and experts who see every
issue as a reason to 'abandon hope.' "3
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What was Truman's background on civil rights? He had not been
a crusader for minority-group rights, which was understandable in
view of the southern tint of Missouri politics. There was, however,
another reality in Missouri-the 20,000 Negro voters in Kansas City,
Truman's base of power, and another 110,000 elsewhere in the state.
In running for office, first for Jackson County judge and later for
United States senator, Harry Truman did not overlook that. He may
have flirted with the Klan in the 1920's, but he did not join it. More
important was Truman's identification with Tom Pendergast's Jackson
County machine, which, despite its corruptions, had been the protector
of Negroes in its domain. The organization had looked to Harry
Truman, as one of its liege men, to serve its purposes in relaxing racial
tensions. It also, as Alonzo Hamby pointed out, "brought him into
contact with city minority groups and urban politics, giving him a
breadth of view and necessitating a tolerance which many politicians
with his rural background never achieved."4
Truman reflected the Pendergast policy toward Negroes as presiding county judge, in which position he gained recognition for able
administration of county homes for Negro boys and girls and the Negro
aged. This was apparent from the support he received from black
voters in his first campaign for senator in 1934. Once in the Senate,
Truman continued to enlist the backing of Missouri's Negroes. He had
a hand in removing Lincoln University from politics. He was a supporter, albeit reluctant, of the Costigan-Wagner antilynching bill of
1935 and of similar legislation in 1938. In that latter year and in 1940
he battled successfully to keep intact the functions of the office of
recorder of deeds in the District of Columbia. That office, headed by
Dr. William J. Thompkins, was a leading source of Negro jobs in the
federal government. 5 Truman was to be repaid by Thompkins's active
support in his successful campaign for reelection to the Senate in
1940. And the senator needed that support, for the Pendergasts had
lost power in Kansas City and he was now on his own.
Thompkins, who was president of the National Colored Democratic Association, traveled in Truman's behalf and helped write his
opening campaign speeches. These talks, given at Sedalia, Missouri,
on June 15, contained a strong appeal to Negroes. At ground-breaking
ceremonies for a new Negro hospital, the senator deplored poor housing and job opportunities for blacks and exploitation of them by
emporian pirates. He championed the right of Negroes to be educated
and "to exercise their privileges as free men." Later that day, speaking
at the Pettis County courthouse, he asserted that "the stronger group
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should not impose upon the weaker obnoxious conditions or situations.
In all matters of progress and welfare, of economic opportunity and
equal rights before the law, Negroes deserve our every aid and protection." He was careful to say, however, that "their social life will
naturally remain their own." Truman expressed similar sentiments in a
speech before the National Colored Democratic Association in Chicago
a month later. Then he warned that "a crisis will develop" if the Negro
continued to be ladened with indignities and antagonisms. The solution was clear: 'We should recognize his inalienable rights as specified in our Constitution."6
Mild as these statements would seem a few years later, they were
bold in much of America in 1940. Truman accepted the fact that segregation was still the norm and that progress had to be worked for from
within that framework. That was realistic when given the sentiments
of most Americans, even many Negroes. Yet overlooked in his Chicago
talk had been any awareness on his part that there could be racial
mixing in federal housing when he said, "Whenever it is possible,
Negro managers will be employed in the housing projects tenanted
mainly by colored people."7
Truman was active in other respects. He supported the antidiscrimination amendment to the 1940 Selective Service Act. In 1941
he worked to reduce discriminatory employment practices, and he
introduced legislation to continue General Davis on active duty. Although in 1944 Truman voted in subcommittee for the Russell amendment, which forbade the executive transfer of funds to the FEPC, he
worked to appropriate funds for the committee's continuance. He
usually supported anti-poll-tax legislation and twice voted for cloture
against filibustering on the bill. In short, Truman's record on civilrights matters was good, especially for a border-state senator. It
enabled him to declare when he was under attack during his 1944
vice-presidential election campaign:
I am a liberal, as proved time and again by my record in the
Senate, and I dare anyone to challenge these facts.
I am for a permanent FEPC.
I am for a federal law abolishing the poll tax.
I am for a federal anti-lynching law. 8
His record was strengthened by his longstanding friendship with
Jews and his appointment of a rabbi as lodge chaplain when he was
grand master of the Missouri Masons. Moreover, in Truman's first
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speech after becoming vice-president, he observed that the United
States was extremely vulnerable to intolerance because of the diversity
of its peoples and creeds. Then he proceeded to lambaste "evil doctrines of discrimination" and of "racial and religious intolerance."9
This was Harry S. Truman's record. What it meant for his presidency was difficult to predict, for his was an ambiguous legacy, the
legacy of an astute Missouri politician seeking the confidence of his
constituents. No one can say precisely what had motivated him or
what would. It is too pat to say that he was cadging votes, or that he
was influenced by his rural stars-and-bars background, urban bossism,
or New Deal idealism. Truman was a complex of ideas and impulses,
prejudices and principles. Most important was that he was an honest
man who was proud of his record and intended to do the best he
could constitutionally by all men. He recognized trends and pressures
and adjusted to them, sensing the need to maintain a rough equilibrium
between shifting powers. He also had a keen sense of loyalty and
justice. He was loyal to those who helped him, although he did not
shut out those who criticized him, and he abhorred having anyone get
kicked around. He was no snob: he talked to anyone regardless of
background, unless they were insulting. Truman was the kind of man
who might accommodate the rising tide of black strength and aspirations.
Toward the close of the war, Negroes and most other minorities
were better off than ever before. Greater optimism and leadership
and a much-improved financial and political condition came out of the
war years, thus making it possible for minorities to sustain the drive
for equal rights. Also of great value was their substantial contribution
to America's war effort. Blacks, reds, and yellows believed that the
nation owed them something. It owed them the right to walk freely
into the sunlight of society, to enjoy the rights and opportunities of
other Americans.
That feeling was fortified by logical deductions from America's
rationale for fighting the war. The United States could not crusade
abroad against Nazi racism and brutality and Imperial Japanese oppression and still condone racism, brutality, and oppression at home.
The nation could not offer more to oppressed peoples abroad than it
was willing to grant disadvantaged peoples at home. America was now
the earth's leading military and economic power, and thought of itself
as the greatest moral power. Furthermore, the nation in 1945 had
made formal commitments to human rights by ratifying the Act of
Chapultepec and the United Nations Charter. It could not afford the
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embarrassment of inconsistency, most minority-group leaders thought,
between its preaching and practices in a world that riveted much of its
attention on events in the United States.
Other currents swirled in the mid 1940s. Sociologist Louis Wirth
pointed out that with the "intermingling in the armed forces, in industry, and in day-to-day living, there took place an extensive commingling
of mores and attitudes" that made all Americans more aware of the
facts of prejudice and discrimination. This was augmented by the
growing interest in racial themes in the films and press and on the
radio. Columnist Earl Conrad saw as three great elements of change
the creation of a large Negro voting bloc in the North resulting from
the "Great Migration," labor's increased interest in black workers,
and the glaring contradiction, during the war, between domestic racism and America's avowed democratic goals. Writing later, other
observers also saw the war as a turning point. Charles Silberman asserted that the war destroyed black "fear of white authority." He
added, "What Negroes discovered during the war ... was their power
to intimidate-not by violence, but by their very presence." Wilson
Record associated the rising aspirations of Negroes with their geographical mobility. Thanks to their wartime experiences, many came
quickly to know the advantages of regular cash income, better schooling, indoor plumbing, telephones, radios, supermarkets, and what not.
"In other words, they got a close-up look at some of the more attractive
features of American life, and they wanted 'in'-not merely for their
great-grandchildren but for themselves, too."10
Equally important was the fact that Negroes were organized as
never before. The Urban League and especially the NAACP had
grown markedly during the war. The association had become really
national and was representing the black community to a greater extent
than ever before. It had gained prestige by not having faltered during
wartime in seeking Negro rights, despite the risk of being charged
with jeopardizing national security. The Negro press had also been
unstinting in its quest for black equality and opportunity. Because of
these developments, Walter White, the executive secretary of the
NAACP, could write in 1945 that "Negro militancy and implacable
determination to wipe out segregation grew more proportionately
during the years 1940 to 1945 than during any other period of the
Negro's history in America."11
Also noteworthy was the slowly growing replacement of Snow
White by black beauty in the Negro press. True, advertisements continued to be overwhelmingly of products designed to straighten and
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dye ladies' hair-such as Lady Lennox Hair Dye and Gordon's PositiveAction Straightening Comb-or to achieve lighter skin-such as Nevoline or Dr. Fred Palmer's Skin Whitener. During the war, however,
appeared Jay Jackson's Chicago Defender comic strip "Speed Jaxon,"
which pictured the exploits in the discriminatory army of a brilliant,
courageous, and handsome young Negro. Toward the end of the war
there were advertisements of "Sun Tan Dolls," touted as "The World's
Prettiest Negro Dolls," and of baby food featuring a Negro child. Also
important was the launching in 1945 of Ebony, a picture magazine
that would play up colored beauty. These and other examples of black
self-awareness were, S. I. Hayakawa pointed out in his newspaper
column, "deeply significant, though beginning steps, towards trying
to change the content of our ideals."12
Yet minorities drank at the fountain of fear with the approach of
peace. Resettlement for Japanese-Americans meant facing new as well
as old antagonists and trying to regain what they had achieved before
the war. For all, remained the questions: What would happen to
their jobs as wartime needs evaporated? What would happen to the
gains made in seeking first-class citizenship? Erosion of economic advances was threat enough, but there was also, as the Urban League's
Lester Granger commented, "enough organized anti-Negro and antiJewish sentiment already existing in this country to provide the nucleus
of a formidable Fascist party in the postwar period.''13
Some hope was seen in the development of interest among many
whites. This optimism was based not only on the growth of humanrelations and interracial groups, but also in the rising attention given to
minority-group questions in the white press. This had begun about
1942 with concern about anti-Semitism, which later shifted to encompass bias against Negroes and Japanese-Americans. In 1945, minoritygroup matters ranked among the leading subjects covered on front
pages or in editorials during thirty-three weeks, as contrasted with
twenty weeks during 1944. 14 Apparently large numbers of whites,
intellectually strengthened by the growing egalitarianism of the New
Deal period and encouraged by minority-group spokesmen and concerned writers, were agreeable to minority-group advancement. Indeed some of them were willing to lend a hand.
Another wellspring of aid was found within the religious minorities. Some Catholics, despite their general absorption into traditional
American society, were sensitive to the plight of other minorities.
America, the Jesuit weekly magazine, early in 1945 stood up staunchly
for a permanent FEPC. Students at twenty Catholic institutions in the
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East called for the admission of qualified blacks to Catholic schools.
In 1945 the American Jewish Committee formulated a plan to fight
prejudice in labor, business, and industry, based on the philosophy that
discrimination could not be eliminated against Jews unless it was
eliminated against all minorities in America. 15 This did not mean that
the various minorities lived in harmony. Discord was evident in antiSemitism among blacks, the reluctance of Oriental-Americans to associate with Negroes, and racism among Catholics. But it was plain that
there was a gradual coming together of minorities, or at least of their
leaders, to fight for common goals.
It was at the crest of this high tide of minority-group strength,
apprehension, and aspiration that Harry S. Truman became president.
In his first message to Congress and the people, on April 16, he pledged
to follow in Roosevelt's footsteps in seeking "peace and progress" and
the improvement of "the lot of the common people." Although he
made no reference to racial problems, twice he alluded to race, creed,
and color. Truman held his first press conference the next day, and
Harry McAlpin, the only Negro reporter present, asked him where he
stood on "fair employment practice, the right to vote without being
hampered by poll taxes, and all that?" The president answered, "I will
give you some advice. All you need to do is to read the Senate record
of one Harry S. Truman." As the conference ended, he shook hands
with McAlpin. 16 It was a shrewd performance.
During his first month in the White House, Truman took care to
meet with a couple of Negro leaders. On April 27 he received a visit
from J. E. Mitchell, the managing editor of the St. Louis Argus and a
1944 presidential elector. Truman met on May 5 with the NAACP's
Walter White, who protested that the United States was siding with
Great Britain and France in obstructing the eventual independence of
colonial peoples under the proposed United Nations Charter. White
urged him to tell the UN founding conference at San Francisco that
he would call for an international meeting to deal with the questions of
dependent peoples, territorial trusteeships, and human rights. 17
NAACP and other Negro leaders were aware, more than was the
government, that the issues of human rights and colonialism were
among the factors that would probably shape the world's future.
White, along with W. E. B. DuBois and Mary McLeod Bethune, went
to San Francisco to serve as NAACP observers at the UN conference.
There they worked with other observers to influence the American
delegation to support arrangements for colonial trusteeships and a
human-rights commission. The chairman of the delegation, Edward
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R. Stettinius, Jr., conceded to White that the pressure forced the American delegates to be more flexible on such questions. 18
The United Nations Charter, fashioned during the summer of
1945, provided for trusteeships for many dependent peoples and fostered the founding of some independent nations within a generation.
The Charter also, under Article 55 ( c), obligated the UN and member
states to work for "universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race,
sex, language, or religion." President Truman in his closing message,
June 26, to the San Francisco UN conference did not comment on the
colonial and trusteeship questions as Walter White had asked him to
do, but he did champion an international bill of rights. He asserted
that unless fundamental human freedoms were achieved "for all men
and women everywhere-without regard to race, language, or religion
-we cannot have permanent peace and security." The only disturbing
note was his indication that such a bill of rights had to be "acceptable
to all the nations involved."19 Nonetheless, his statement was a strong
endorsement of the idea of framing an international declaration of
human rights.
All this was well and good, but it did not deal with the problems
nearest to America's minorities. Before long, Negro leaders were pressing Truman to meet with them to consider interests at home as well as
abroad. To allay criticism, David K. Niles, the president's white adviser on minority affairs, recommended that Truman see the executive
committee of the black National Newspaper Publishers Association
during its meeting in Washington the end of May. Truman received
the group cordially and listened to them with interest. The publishers
urged him to make an enforceable fair employment practices bill and
an anti-poll-tax bill administration measures. They also asked that the
attorney general work to give full effect to the Smith v. Allwright
decision on opening primary elections to all voters and that a Negro
be appointed assistant veterans administrator to guarantee all veterans
their benefits under the law. The president made no direct commitments in response to these requests. This and Walter White's complaint, a few days earlier, about discrimination against Negroes who
applied for federal housing insurance constituted the beginning of
black pressures on domestic matters. 20
Truman was ready to support creation of a permanent FEPC.
Minorities had been disappointed by the enactment of the Russell
amendment in 1944, which subjected FEPC appropriations to congressional approval, and by Congress's failure to establish a permanent
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committee. For some time public support had been building for a
statutory committee, starting with the formation of the National Council for a Permanent FEPC, under A. Philip Randolph's leadership, in
1943. The movement had enlisted the backing of a wide range of labor,
racial, religious, civil-liberties, and civic groups. The Socialist and
Communist parties and the 1944 Republican platform also favored
some kind of permanent FEPC. However, bills to make the committee
a statutory agency had perished in the legislative labyrinth from 1942
through 1944. 21
The movement continued its efforts in 1945. Only $500,000 had
been appropriated for the FEPC in 1944, and there was strong congressional opposition to appropriating additional funds to the committee. Moreover, Roosevelt had not supported the movement for a
permanent FEPC, and the Republican bill provided for a toothless
committee. These disadvantages were somewhat offset by the passage
of the New York State Law Against Discrimination in March 1945, the
first such state statute, which the Negro press brandished in the face of
the Democratic administration as an example of what could be done. 22
Thirteen bills to establish a permanent FEPC were introduced in
the House of Representatives and two in the Senate at the beginning
of the Seventy-ninth Congress. A House bill sponsored by Chairman
Mary T. Norton of the House Labor Committee was favorably reported on February 20, 1945. Mrs. Norton asked the Rules Committee
for a special rule scheduling a vote on her bill, but the committee
procrastinated. When a Senate bill was reported on May 24, pressure
for action began to build up. President Truman had indicated to the
Negro publishers and to Walter White that the House was the main
stumbling block. White urged him to seek action from the Rules Committee. Another problem was that proposed funds for the current
FEPC were bottled up in the Appropriations Committee. Roosevelt
had asked that $599,000 be appropriated for the FEPC beginning July
1, but the House committee had failed to report the budgetary item on
the grounds that legislation was pending to make the FEPC a permanent agency. Truman was on the spot, however, caught between the
fire of minorities and their allies and that of southerners and conservatives. 23
Truman decided to work for both a permanent FEPC and funds
for the existing agency. On June 5 he wrote Chairman Adolph J.
Sabath of the House Rules Committee that it was "unthinkable" that
the FEPC should be abandoned while wartime needs demanded "the
participation of all available workers." The president added, "Even if
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the war were over," the fair employment issue "would be of paramount
importance." Employment discrimination would lead to "industrial
strife and unrest. It has a tendency to create substandard conditions
of living for a large part of our population. The principle and policy
of fair employment practice should be established permanently as a
part of our national law." He urged that the members of the House
have the opportunity to vote on both the funding and the statutory
FEPC measures. Truman sent a copy of this letter to Dennis Chavez,
the chief sponsor of Senate FEPC legislation, writing, "As soon as it
becomes appropriate in the Senate, let me know and I shall send a
similar letter." Truman had spoken boldly, thereby giving new life to
the FEPC issue. The contrast with Roosevelt was clear, as Negro
leaders knew. 24
Truman persisted, repeating in a June 13 news conference his
wish that the House be given the opportunity to vote. A "Save the
FEPC" rally was held in New York City on June 19, and the president,
in a telegram to that group, reiterated his support of permanent FEPC
legislation. He again e>,,'})ressed his support of the FEPC in messages
to the Negro Freedom Rally and to black leaders in Kansas City in late
June. As fall approached, he did not abandon the issue, asserting in
his Labor Day statement that "the bigotries of race and class and creed
shall not be permitted to warp the souls of men."2 5
Regardless of presidential messages and mass meetings, the
House and Senate bills for a statutory FEPC were dead. Sabath tried
to get the Norton bill out of the Rules Committee, but all he could
produce was a six-to-six tie vote, which kept the bill off the House
floor. Mrs. Norton's parliamentary maneuvers also failed. In the Senate, Chavez and the other sponsors of the bill for a permanent FEPC
decided that it was inadvisable to bring it up for a vote in 1945.26
Meanwhile action began on appropriations for the existing FEPC.
A subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee had recommended in May an appropriation of $250,000 for the agency, but the
full committee shelved that recommendation. When the pertinent
money measure, the war agencies appropriations bill, came up on
June 7, Vito Marcantonio insisted that the questions of a permanent
FEPC and funds for the existing agency were separate and that the
House should act on the funding question. Marcantonio took the issue
to the Rules Committee and gained the support of Chairman Sabath,
who used Truman's letter and the revelation that President Roosevelt,
on the day of his death, had asked him to work for continuance of the
FEPC. Marcantonio also moved to amend the bill to provide $599,000
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for the FEPC's work. The two congressmen were unsuccessful, as the
House refused to consider the appropriation. 27
In June a similar situation developed in the Senate, as its Appropriations Committee failed to report FEPC funding in the war agencies
bill. The committee did, however, authorize Senator Chavez to ask
the full Senate to add an FEPC appropriation to the bill. When the
bill came up for debate, Senator Theodore Bilbo of Mississippi seized
the floor and for several days conducted a one-man filibuster against
the FEPC. Majority Leader Alben Barkley enlisted both sides in a
compromise that would· provide $250,000 for the agency. It was suggested at the time that the FEPC supporters in the Senate were strong
enough to close debate and adopt Chavez's amendment, but that Barkley acted to forestall the Republicans from claiming credit for such a
result. 28 Be this as it may, the end of the fiscal year was drawing near,
and many senators probably would have shrunk from delaying waragency funds by seeking a cloture petition.
FEPC backers in the House felt no compunction about holding up
the war-agencies bill there. The new fiscal year dawned without Senate and House having reached an agreement. The upper house had a
bill that contained at least a mutilated FEPC appropriation, and the
lower-house bill, thanks to the parliamentary tactics of Representatives
Marcantonio, Norton, and Emanuel Celler, went forward without appropriations for over half of the sixteen agencies involved. The Senate
stood firm, and the House thrashed about in its misery. Finally, on
July 11, the House Appropriations Committee reported out the same
war-agencies bill that had been approved by the upper chamber,
except for a proviso that the FEPC would be considered in the process
of being liquidated. That compromise was agreed to by the full membership of the House and the Senate. The compromise gave no cause
for jubilation among the proponents of the FEPC. 29
The White House played no significant role in the battle aside
from Truman's letter to Sabath and his several public statements.
There is no evidence that Truman cracked the whip over Congress, but
neither is there evidence that he had a whip to crack or that on this
particular issue Roosevelt would have done so. If anything, by putting
himself publicly on record for a permanent FEPC and for funds for the
existing agency, the new president had gone well beyond his predecessor. As would be frequently the case on controversial issues during
Truman's administration, the White House had neither enough public
or congressional support nor other weapons at hand to win. It is
doubtful that Roosevelt, with his charm and cunning, could have ad-
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vanced further against the strong tide of congressional opposition
than did Truman by relying on forthrightness. One has only to recall
President Roosevelt's many failures after 1938 to put Harry Truman's
difficulties with Congress into perspective. All the huffing and puffing
and arm-twisting in the world would probably not have availed on
civil-rights legislation at the end of the war. As Walter White commented in 1945 on Truman and the permanent FEPC bill, "It was not
his fault a tie vote prevented action."30
There were, of course, other Negro pressures and fears that
swirled about Truman. Blacks were much concerned about the new
president's appointments. Many people, leeiy of Truman's Missouri
background, feared that he would appoint southerners to office and
feared what that might mean for Negroes. With the early appointments of Commodore James K. Vardaman as a White House assistant
and Tom Clark as attorney general, alarums were sounded in some
quarters. What really hurt was the nomination in June of James Byrnes
to be secretary of state. Not only was that the most prestigious cabinet
position, but under the law at that time, if Truman had died, Byrnes
would have succeeded him as president. The South Caro,linian, on the
basis of his record, was plainly hostile to black men, and Negro reaction to his appointment was severe. The Pittsburgh Courier labeled
him "a white supremacist of the first rank"; and the Afro-American
charged, "It is plainly the policy of Mr. Truman to make the executive
department as full of southern ideas as is Congress.''31 The appointment of Byrnes, combined with the fact that no Negroes had been
given appointments, was hard to swallow; it offset the favorable impression that Truman had made by his support of the FEPC.
By September the pattern of appointments began to change, with
the nominations of Senator Harold Burton to the Supreme Court and
Robert Patterson as secretary of war. Burton had been active in the
NAACP and supported the FEPC, and Patterson had won a reputation
for not being unfriendly to the Negro in the army. The appointment
of a Chicago attorney, Irvin C. Mollison, to the Customs Court in
October came as a pleasant surprise, not only in itself, but also because
for the first time a black had been appointed to a federal judgeship
higher.than that of the Washington Municipal Court within the continental United States. Some of the edge of the sharp Negro reactions
to many of Truman's appointees was further dulled by the appointment
of Dr. Ralph Bunche to the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission. 32
Negroes had other complaints, including ones about discrimination and segregation in the Veterans Administration and in some gov-

A New Man in the White House

25

ernment cafeterias. Moreover, civil-rights groups had been seeking
legislation to outlaw lynching, poll taxes, segregated travel accommodations, and assaults on soldiers and sailors. Little was done to meet
Negro requests. The only legislative success, apart from the FEPC
appropriation, was the House passage of the anti-poll-tax bill in June.
It was expected, though, that a filibuster would prevent the Senate
from acting on the measure, as had been the case in previous years.
Two presidential actions were encouraging. In November Truman
decided that government cafeteria workers, most of whom were Negroes, should receive the same pay for five days of work as they had for
the wartime six-day work week. On December 22 he vetoed a bill
that would have returned the Employment Service to state operation,
which black leaders thought would heighten employment discrimination in many states.33
Nevertheless, in 1945 all these were secondary issues. The focus
was on the FEPC; and it was to remain there throughout that year and
well into the next, for minorities knew the importance of having an
established agency to help them get and keep jobs. There wei'e some,
however, who saw the economic issue in a broader scope. On August
27 the Urban League sent a long memorandum to Truman, apparently
to assist in the preparation of his September 6 economic message to
Congress. The memorandum not only urged continuance of the
FEPC, but also expressed support for a full-employment act, increased
benefits for social security and unemployment compensation, improvement of the Employment Service's effort on behalf of Negroes, lowand middle-income housing, elimination of restrictive covenants in
realty agreements, better educational and medical opportunities and
facilities, equal and unsegregated administration of veterans' programs,
desegregation of the armed forces, and a general attack on "fear, hate
and conflict within the American population."34
The administration, of course, had its own goals to emphasize:
winning the .war and then the peace, and smoothing the path to economic reconversion. Everything else in 1945 was secondary. The
president was willing to help out on other pressing issues, partly out of
duty and partly out of the hope of keeping the confidence of liberals
and minorities. He could not, however, make racial issues into primary causes without jeopardizing the nation's goals with regard to the
military, foreign affairs, and reconversion. These Truman had to move
rapidly on, for they would admit of no delay. Abroad there were too
many commitments to be kept or reviewed. Literally there was a
world to be won or lost. At home the coming of peace meant the
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unraveling of the wartime economy, with its attendant problems of
shifting from wartime to peacetime production, of inflation, of shifts
in employment, of absorbing veterans into the labor force. Here there .
was a nation to be won or lost in trying to navigate between the Scylla
of inflation and the Charybdis of depression.
Working in minority concerns where it could, the administration's
program paralleled much of that of the Urban League. The president
supported appropriations for the existing FEPC and the establishment
of a permanent committee, and temporary continuance of and increased funds for the federal Employment Service. He requested
additional public housing, more unemployment compensation, and
legislation to allow the government to pursue full employment. He also
asked for a comprehensive program to expand "health security for all,
regardless of residence, station, or race--everywhere in the United
States."35 Nevertheless, glowing words and glittering proposals were
unlikely to dissolve the hostile coalition of Republican and southern
conservatives in Congress. Truman would have his hands full striving
to :{>reserve what existed.
This was nowhere more evident than with the FEPC. The huge
slice in the committee's funds meant that its operations would be cut
sharply. By December its staff had been reduced from 128 to 31, and
it had shut down all but three of its field offices. Even had it continued
at full force, the agency's jurisdiction was rapidly being pared as war
contracts were canceled. Toward the end of summer 1945, the FEPC,
the Urban League, and the National Council for a Permanent FEPC
pressed Truman to help. The FEPC emphasized that up to two million
minority-group workers would be handicapped in getting new jobs
unless discriminatory employment practices were abandoned. The
committee contended that in the probable postwar contests between
labor and management, "elements in both will exploit racial antagonisms for selfish ends." The president's response was to make a permanent FEPC "must" legislation in his economic message of September 6. 86
This demand for a permanent FEPC elicited even less reaction
from Congress than his earlier letter to Sabath. For one thing, whites,
sensitive to the possibility of another depression, felt the job market
tightening. For another, "must" legislation under Truman was clearly
less imperative than under Roosevelt. The Missourian had neither the
strength nor the aura of his predecessor, and conditions were not ripe
for development of them. Yet Truman received credit for trying. The
Crisis gave recognition to the president for his support of FEPC when
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the rest of the government "seems to have turned a cold shoulder to
legislation for a permanent FEPC."37
This did not mean that the pressure was off-far from it. In December the Crisis demanded that "the greatest of pressure" be exerted
on leaders of both parties on the FEPC issue. Indeed, pressure since
summer had been steaming out of the black press. Since August a
group headed by A. Philip Randolph had been seeking "to discuss with
the president the question of his action in behalf of FEPC." Truman
was not eager for advice on the question, and the White House went
to great pains to avoid scheduling a meeting. Of course, there was no
great purpose in such a meeting, but it was impolitic to be evasive
with Randolph's group. It led to a bad reaction among some Negroes,
who wondered how Truman could be too busy to discuss matters so
vitally important to so many Americans. 38
Before 1945 ended, Truman was confronted by a more important
matter in connection with the FEPC. One of his greatest problems had
been work stoppages arising from tension between labor, which was
seeking to keep wartime gains, and management, which was striving
for postwar retrenchment. \Vhen, for the second time within a month,
a wildcat strike shut down the services of Washington's Capital Transit Company, the president, on November 21, directed the Office of
Defense Transportation to seize and operate the company. 39 The
FEPC, which had for years been seeking to have Capital Transit employ Negroes, decided to take advantage of the situation. On November 23 the committee decided to direct the company to desist from
discriminatory employment practices. The next day the White House
ordered that the FEPC directive should not be issued. On November
25 Charles H. Houston wrote Truman on behalf of the committee that
the FEPC had received no direct orders from him. Houston asked for
such orders and for a conference between the president and the committee. Truman inscribed on Houston's letter: "Hold it up!" 40
A week passed without the letter being acknowledged, and in disgust Houston resigned from the FEPC, charging that "the failure of
the government to enforce democratic practices and to protect minorities in its own capital makes its expressed concern for national minorities abroad somewhat specious, and its interference in the domestic
affairs of other countries very premature." Truman replied on December 7, contending that the powers assigned him for seizing property
in a labor dispute required that the facility be operated under the
employment conditions in effect at the time of seizure. He added, "As
anxious as I am for Congress to pass legislation for a permanent FEPC,
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I cannot contravene an act of Congress in order to carry out the present
committee's aims." Administration spokesmen also said that the committee had been derelict in not delivering a directive to Capital Transit after findings of fact the preceding April about the company's discriminatory hiring practices.41
The NAACP snapped up the issue and telegraphed the president on
November 23, urging him to back the FEPC's proposed action. Three
days later David Niles telephoned Walter White to say that Judge
Samuel I. Rosenman had counseled Truman that he could not legally
change the labor policies of a seized corporation. The NAACP pressed
Truman on the matter. Its Board of Directors sent him a resolution
which charged the administration with giving "nothing more than lip
service" to the legislative struggle against discrimination in hiring.
Regarding the Capital Transit case, the directors criticized the president not only for prohibiting the FEPC to issue its directive, but for
giving neither due notice nor "an opportunity for the committee to
present its views." The resolution closed: "We believe it is time for
the administration to demonstrate whether it proposes to take any
effective action toward insuring fair employment practices for all~"42
The FEPC admonished the president that its necessarily limited
activities were no "substitute for effective enforcement of national
policy." It gave notice that because of staff reductions, it would concentrate on dealing with discrimination in civil-service hiring and
studying employment problems of minorities in general. Even on this
basis, its work could go on for only a few more months. 43 In response
to NAACP and FEPC pressure, Truman indicated that he would continue pressing for a permanent FEPC and that he would take action to
support the existing agency during its waning months. Then on December 18 the president wrote to all heads of government agencies,
stressing that refusal to reemploy wartime federal workers from other
offices on the basis of race or creed violated existing law and regulations. He asked the agencies to analyze their personnel policies and
practices in order to facilitate fair consideration of these government
servants for new appointments. He also requested "full cooperation
with FEPC in all matters affecting the employment of minorities in
government." The same day Truman ordered the FEPC to "investigate, make findings and recommendations, and report to the president,
with respect to discrimination in industries engaged in work contributing to the production of military supplies or to the effective
transition to a peacetime economy."44
The FEPC faded away before the end of the fiscal year. Its final
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report to the president indicated that "the wartime gains of Negro,
Mexican-American, and Jewish workers are being dissipated through
an unchecked revival of discriminatory practices." It strongly recommended federal legislation in regard to fair employment practices and
the compilation of complete statistics on employment and unemployment by race and sex. The report added, regarding the government's
policy against discrimination in civil-service and contract work, that
the executive "take steps not only to promulgate its policy more widely,
but to enforce it as well." Truman replied that "the degree of effectiveness which the Fair Employment Practice Committee was able to
attain has shown once and for all that it is possible to equalize job
opportunity by governmental action, and thus eventually to eliminate
the influence of prejudice in the field of employment."45 This was the
FEPC's promise, but it was also its epitaph.
Harry Truman had had a trying year on civil-rights questions
during 1945. He had spoken out for continuing the FEPC, but little
had been accomplished on that or on other issues of interest to minorities. Perhaps the president did no more because he wanted to muster
as much conservative Republican and southern support as possible for
his foreign and domestic programs. The fact was, however, that his
foreign program was not jeopardized by Congress and that he was
getting little cooperation on most of his domestic proposals. The fact
was also that regardless of what he did, the FEPC stood scant chance
of success. Indeed, by his outspoken support he increased the hope of
FEPC advocates, and with its fading, the hope-maker-Trumanbecame the scapegoat.
Another factor was the collapse of the assumption that Truman,
the veteran senator, would have at least as much influence with Congress as Roosevelt had had. He did not, nor had he the skills as president that his predecessor had developed during his long tenure of
office. Truman was further hampered by the lack of public adulation
that Roosevelt commanded and by the fact that seasoned officials were
flocking from their jobs. The former he would never attract; the latter
retarded the organization of a distinctively Trumanesque administration, filled with men upon whom he could rely. Another point cannot
be overlooked. Civil-rights issues, despite the ardor of minority-group
leaders, were not paramount while the nation was involved in ending
the war and in securing peace and reconstruction. Because of that and
the complicated nature of the presidency, Harry Truman could not
have given, unless he had been unusually sensitive, great amounts of
his time and high priority to minority problems. He was no zealot on
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civil rights. It would take a crisis and mounting pressure to raise
minority rights on the scale of priorities.

3

TENSION AND STRIFE

The year 1946 was to be a crucial one for civil-rights advocates.
Minority-group workers not only experienced cutbacks in jobs, but had
to compete in the labor market with millions of demobilized soldiers
and sailors. Returning nonwhite servicemen were to be "put in their
place," as reports of assaults on Negro, Japanese-American, Indian,
and Mexican-American veterans and soldiers indicated. Urban housing,
which was already cramped, worsened as demobilization progressed.
The Truman administration from the beginning viewed the situation as national in scope. In formulating its domestic program, it acted
on the premise that a national solution to economic, veterans', health,
and housing problems would contribute substantially to relieving problems of minorities. The government was also cognizant, at least in its
demands for a continued FEPC, that minorities had special problems.
On January 3, while the second session of the Seventy-ninth Congress
prepared to meet, President Truman took to the radio networks to
reiterate his proposals to meet "the goal of full production and full
employment." He complimented Congress for its cooperation on
foreign affairs, but he criticized it for its failures in providing answers
to domestic questions. He made a special point of denouncing the
"small handful of Congressmen" in the House Rules Committee who
prevented a vote on a permanent FEPC. 1
Truman's radio appeal was greeted by the Negro press with approval, although the question was raised whether his going over the
heads of Congress to the people would lead to success. Truman's personal image was also aided by his appointment, early in January, of
William H. Hastie as governor of the Virgin Islands. As the AfroAmerican pointed out, it was, along with Irvin Mollison's earlier ap31
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pointment to the Customs Court, a "break with precedent." The president was also praised for his veto of legislation to return the Employment Service to the states, where Negroes felt they would receive less
help than was currently the case. 2
The FEPC remained the leading issue among minorities. In 1945
most of the action for a permanent FEPC had taken place in the House
of Representatives, where Mary Norton fought repeatedly, but unsuccessfully, for her bill. In 1946 action was to shift to the Senate. The
Chavez bill for a statutory FEPC had been reported favorably by the
Senate Education and Labor Committee, but had not been brought up
for debate. Chavez, on January 17, took the FEPC opponents by surprise and began debate on his bill. The next day, however, in a
parliamentru:y maneuver, Chavez's foes seized the floor and started a
filibuster. 3
On January 21 Truman again entered the picture, sending up to
Congress his State of the Union message. In it he championed a number of issues that were of interest to minorities. He stressed the need
for passage of legislation regarding full employment, increase in unemployment pay, a higher minimum wage, medical care, continued
federal operation of the Employment Service, increased self-government for citizens of the District of Columbia, and, of course, the FEPC.
He' described the establishment of fair employment practices along
with fair wages as minimum standards for the conduct of the nation's
business affairs. The question was, however, as the Amsterdam News
wrote, "Can President Harry S. Truman deliver?"4
The Senate filibuster continued, despite the efforts of Democratic
and Republican friends of the FEPC to break it up. In his news conference of January 24, Truman said that the filibuster was "a matter
that the Senate itself must settle without outside interference, especially from the president." But he did add that he had "always" been
for cloture to allow a vote. On February 6 he wrote to A. Philip Randolph, "I regard the Fair Employment Practice legislation as an integral part of my reconversion program and shall continue my efforts
to give the Congress a chance to vote on it."5
The fight for the FEPC in the Senate continued. On February 4
Majority Leader Alben Barkley filed a cloture petition signed by half
of the Senate's members. The FEPC opponents deferred a vote on
cloture by debating Barkley's appeal that the Chavez bill was the
unfinished business before the Senate. By February 7 the senators had
tired themselves. The leaders of the opposing groups agreed to put
the cloture petition to a vote two days later, with the understanding
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that if it was not favored by two-thirds of those voting, the fight for the
Chavez bill would be abandoned. When the vote was taken, twentyfive Republicans and one Progressive- joined with twenty-two Democrats to support cloture, while twenty-eight Democrats and eight Republicans voted against. Cloture had failed to receive the necessary
two-thirds support. Accordingly, the Senate voted to consider other
legislation. Thus the upper chamber had at least gone through the
motions of political warfare on the issue.
It had been a relatively friendly war, conducted on the basis of a
five-day week with normal overnight recesses. Good-fellowship was
generally the - rule among the senators, despite hot exchanges in
speeches on the floor. Nevertheless, the Senate's business had been
brought to a standstill, and the nation's attention had been riveted on
the question of a permanent FEPC. Half of the senators and the
president had taken .their stand clearly, if not always vigorously, for
the legislation. If they did not do more, and if other senators did not
join them in the cloture test, it was partly because American public
opinion was flac;cid on the question. It had had three weeks to make
itself felt, and it had come forth like a pussy cat. 6
The chances for federal fair employment legislation were dead for
1946 and, as it turned out, for good. There were still body jerks as
rigor mortis set in. A. Philip Randolph went over the land protesting
the Senate's action. Mass protest meetings were held, including one at
Madison Square Garden which seventeen thousand people attended
and to which Truman sent a message of support. There was even .consideration of a march on Washington, but nothing happened. .It was
suggested that Truman could act by executive order; but that overlooked the Russell Amendment, which stipulated that the FEPC could
be funded only with legislative approval, which had already been
refused. The president did about all he could do in 1946 when he
reaffirmed the policy of nondiscrimination in civil-service and government-contract hiring. In July he directed his civil-rights adviser, David
K. Niles, "to have the appropriate agencies of the government investigate and take the necessary steps where complaints are made .and
discrimination is alleged." 7
There were, however, other issues. In February Congress responded to Truman's request for full-employment legislation. The
Employment Act of 1946 declared that the government would use all
its resources to maximize employment opportunities and authorized
the president to formulate programs to reach this objective. 8 This was
one of Truman's few noteworthy legislative successes in 1946. Con-
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gress, however, returned the Employment Service to the states, where
discriminatory orders for workers could be accepted. Price control
came to a halt; housing programs were slighted; self-government in the
District of Columbia and an increase in the minimum wage were
refused.
As the year progressed, Negroes gave more attention to the renewal of the longstanding battles for anti-poll-tax: and antilynching
legislation. The fight against lynching had been stymied, but a bill
outlawing poll taxes had passed the House in 1945. This was of importance in the development of the political power of minorities, because seven states still required payment of a special tax before citizens
could qualify to vote, an effective barrier to the polls for millions of
poor Negroes, Mexican-Americans, and whites. 9
Truman had not made the anti-poll-tax bill an administration
measure, although he was personally on record as favoring its enactment. By March the National Anti-Poll-Tax Committee, seeking Senate
passage of the bill, felt that David Niles was not handling the matter
satisfactorily. The group's leaders wanted to see Matthew Connelly or
"any other secretary-in fact anyone except Mr. Niles-re this issue."
Connelly's answer was, "Tell them sorry." This reflected the fact that
President Truman, as he wrote to Irving Brant on March 29, was "not
looking for another filibuster. The program has been almost ruined by
one filibuster and I think that is enough for a season." 10
He could not evade the issue, however. While in Chicago, on
April 6, Truman held a news conference with the Keen Teen Club.
During the conference, one shy, nervous girl asked, "Do you see any
immediate solution to the poll tax in the South?" He replied that he
did not. It was a question of education and "a matter that they will
have to work out for themselves, and they are gradually working it
out." The president had blundered. Negroes, seeing no evidence that
the poll tax was being worked out, were incensed. As the AfroAmerican editorialized, "If he's going to welch on the poll tax now,
there is nothing to stop him from welching on the antilynching bill and
on the measure for a permanent FEPC." The newspaper added pointedly, "Maybe Mr. Truman doesn't plan to run again."11
The administration worked feverishly to repair the damage.
Lowell Mellett, a staunch journalistic defender of the administration
and a former White House aide, explained in his column that Truman
"meant only to imply that the United States Senate never would succeed in enacting anti-poll-tax legislation. That he believes in federal
legislation on the subject he demonstrated more than once while a
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member of the Senate." Philleo Nash, David Niles's assistant, compiled
Truman's record on the issue in preparation for a presidential counteroffensive. Niles in tum briefed the chief executive for his regular press
conference, scheduled for April 11. 12
The question was raised at that conference, and Truman read a
statement that Niles had written for him. The president asserted that
he favored both federal and state action, and he suggested that "the
possibility of federal action has stimulated state action." He thought
this may have been the case on fair employment practices, too, where
a number of cities and states had acted. Then he departed from his
text to say, "And you must have the support of the people for any law.
The prohibition law proved that."13
Truman's statement helped, although its value was weakened by
his remark that a law needed popular backing. When Senator John
Bankhead of Alabama wrote to congratulate him for his comment to
the Chicago high-school journalists, the president told him that his
later press conference statement covered the topic "completely and
thoroughly." Whatever Truman personally believed, he remained on
record for anti-poll-tax legislation, although plainly he intended not to
make a major issue of it. Like the FEPC bill, the poll-tax measure
encountered a filibuster. It finally went down to defeat in July. 14
Of course, not all federal civil-rights matters were legislative.
Many concerned executive action. Looming large was the question of
the role that minorities would play in the peacetime armed services:
would the momentum of wartime progress continue, or would it be
braked or even reversed? Lester Granger, the Negro consultant to
Navy Secretary James Forrestal, stressed in his reports that despite
improvement in the service conditions of black sailors and marines,
many commanders tenaciously clung to their prejudices. In following
up Granger's reports, Forrestal in December 1945 disapproved the
Bureau of Naval Personnel's recommendation that "officers can handle
Negro personnel 'without any special indoctrination'." The secretary
directed that "special screening and indoctrination procedures" be established for officers who were to command Negro sailors. He also
asked for progress reports on the use by Negroes of Red Cross facilities
on Guam, Negro shore patrols in the Pacific area, instructional programs for promotions qualifications, and the assignment of ratings to
appropriate billets. Furthermore, the Marine Corps announced in
December that Nisei would-at last-be accepted for enlistment. 15
Forrestal took another action, in December 1945, that bespoke
progress. The aircraft carrier Croatan had refused to take 123 return-
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ing Negro soldiers on board because segregated arrangements could
not be made. That led to a wave of indignation; and Forrestal asserted
that this would not happen again, saying that the navy's nondiscriminatory policy applied to "authorized personnel, of all the armed services of this country aboard Navy ships or at Navy stations and activities." Another sign of progress was the Bureau of Naval Personnel's
statement early in 1946 that Negroes would "be eligible for all types of
assignments in all ratings in all activities and all ships of the naval
service." Moreover, no separate provisions would be made for the use
by Negroes of housing, eating, and other types of facilities; and no
naval unit would have more than 10 percent black personnel by October-with the obvious exception of the Steward's Branch. 16
All this was to the good, but it applied to fewer and fewer Negroes
as postwar demobilization progressed. By 1947 there was only one
black officer left in the navy, and the proportion of Negro sailors
dropped from 5.32 percent in 1945 to 4.82 by 1947 and to 3.7 by early
1950. The rollback was more drastic in the Marine Corps, where a
quota of 2,880 was set, but was never met by 1949. As late as that year
no new Negro recruits were accepted for general service. In 1947
ranking officers of the Coast Guard opposed legislation to end segregation in the armed forces, which indicated that all was not well in that
service. 17
The chief complaint of minorities about the army was that it practiced segregation, a policy upon which the service had basically not
budged. In July 1945 Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson opposed a
bill to desegregate the armed services because it was a matter "not
susceptible to treatment by legislation" and one that would require
radical changes in the army's basic organization. In any event, he
wrote, "Whether such a change would operate in the interest of producing an efficient military establishment is questionable at this time."
Yet the subject of segregation in the army was undergoing study.
Reports from all army forces and commands were being compiled.
Chief of Staff George C. Marshall wrote, apparently as a result of a
survey of special mixed platoons, that he thought "the practicability of
integrating Negro elements into white units should be followed up."
Truman K. Gibson, Jr., before leaving his post as civilian aide early in
the fall, recommended the creation of a board to study and suggest the
changes necessary "to effect the most efficient utilization of Negroes in
the army." Under Secretary Robert Patterson promptly approved of
the recommendation, which led to the establishment, October 4, of the
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Gillem Board, a group of three general officers headed by Lieutenant
General Alvan C. Gillem. 18
The generals worked quickly. By November 17 their preliminary
report was circulating within the War Department for comment and
was somewhat revised as a consequence. Meanwhile Negro opinion
expected the final report to recommend termination of segregation in
the army. The report, however, did not bear out that optimism, for the
Gillem Board strove to meet objections to liberalization. 19
The final report was issued on February 26, 1946. It stated that
the Negro "should be given every opportunity and aid to prepare himself for effective military service in company with every other citizen
who is called." The report also conceded that the army had made insufficient plans for the use of and leadership by Negro soldiers during
the war. To overcome this, it recommended that Negroes be used in
a variety of tasks, with emphasis on the development of leaders and
specialists; that the ratio of blacks to whites in the nation's population
determine the racial composition of the army; that all officers be given
"equal rights and opportunities for advancement and professional improvement"; that "groupings of Negro units with white units" be continued; that "qualified individuals be utilized in appropriate special
and overhead units"; that black units be stationed in areas where local
attitudes are not hostile; that recreational facilities continue to be
segregated; and that no Negro unit be larger than a regiment. 20
Little in the Gillem Report was new. It was more a picture of current army practices than a blueprint for new policies. The board gave
black troops a pat on the back by indicating that their service problems
had been largely environmental, not congenital. It did not consider
segregation to be an ironclad requisite for the use of Negroes in the
army, and indeed it did suggest some blending of blacks and whites in
special and overhead units. Most Negroes, however, did not view the
report as emancipation, gradual or otherwise, from segregation in the
military. As the Amsterdam News wrote, "All it did was to slice jim
crow a little thinner and spread it around more so it wouldn't make
such a stinkin' heap in the middle of the national floor." 21
Despite criticism, the army employed the Gillem Report as the
basis for its official policy for using black soldiers, as embodied in War
Department Circular No. 124 of April 27, 1946. A barely perceptible
oblique face had been taken on the question. It did not satisfy Negro
and white opponents of segregation in the army, who continued to
press for dismantling its paperwork walls.
The chill currents of disappointment with the army's racial poli-
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cies ran swifter with the drastically reduced calls for Negro inductees
in April, the suspension in July of black enlistments except in a few
specialties, and the September decision not to allow volunteer draft
inductions. To the army, the reasons for these actions were justifiable:
it had agreed that only about 10 percent of its strength would be
Negro, but by summer 1946 black troops constituted 16 percent of the
total. To Negroes, it was discriminatory not to take everyone qualified
for service. Although black enlistments were later reopened, another
problem rose in the army's reluctance to assign Negroes to Europe and
the fact that few black men were accepted as regular officers-only 36
in contrast to almost 12,000 whites by early 1947-and few men were
assigned to specialized units. 22
In viewing the army's immediate postwar activities, one can agree
with Marcus H. Ray, the secretary of war's Negro civilian aide, that
the service had "established a very poor public relations." One can
also agree with Colonel Ray that the army was limited by budgetary
restrictions and a paucity of trained personnel in handling Negro
soldiers. 23 Yet these circumstances did not justify trying to enforce an
artificial quota system. A uniform screening procedure and progressive
desegregation would have been more acceptable and fair. But the
army, partly out of unimaginative leadership and partly out of fear of
the consequences of change, clung to the old ways of quota and
segregation. It could not expect, therefore, but to be an inviting target
for civil-rights sharpshooters.
Another target was the administration of veterans' benefits. Veterans were eligible for unemployment benefits of twenty dollars a
week for a year, employment counseling, preference in civil-service
hiring, housing and business loans, educational allowances, and medical care for service-connected disabilities. There were, however, difficulties involved in minority-group veterans taking advantage of these.
A frequently lower level of education, combined with the tendency of
officials to give short shrift to minorities, meant less effective counseling about bene£ts. The unemployment pay proved a boon during the
difficult period of readjustment, but proportionately fewer minority
veterans took advantage of educational provisions. In April 1947 it
was reported that although about 13 percent of all veterans were enrolled in educational programs for veterans, only an estimated 5 percent of Negro veterans were. 24
The NAACP as early as 1944 had pressed for desegregation of veterans' hospitals and full use of qualified black personnel. The association reiterated that position to General Omar Bradley, the new veterans
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administrator, in September 1945. Bradley agreed with the idea of
maximizing use of Negro personnel, but could not see desegregating
facilities in the segregated South. It was reported in December that
seventeen of the ninety-seven veterans' hospitals did not admit black
veterans, and twenty-four others housed them in separate units. The
matter was complicated by the fact that many Negroes favored developing all-Negro hospitals in the South patterned after the one at
Tuskegee. In response to pressure from the NAACP, the National
Newspaper Publishers Association, and the Negro National Medical
Association, the Veterans Administration suspended plans in 1945 to
construct another all-black hospital in the South. Nevertheless, the
policy was, according to General Bradley: "Wherever the local customs are such that integration might easily interfere with the proper
operation of the hospital, we have followed local custom."25
The pressure continued. In a March 1946 meeting with the executive committee of the National Newspaper Publishers Association,
President Truman was urged to abolish segregation in the veterans'
hospitals. His politic reply was, "It fits in with what I have been talking
about for twelve years." Nevertheless, the day before, Bradley had
indicated that the VA would build an all-Negro hospital in Mississippi.
Although Negro organizations and the American Veterans Committee
protested the move, black public opinion was divided. A Negro Digest
poll showed that 34 percent of those asked accepted the idea of allNegro veterans' hospitals and only 28 percent opposed it, with the rest
undecided. Yet the plans were suspended, although White House aide
David Niles wrote Congressman Powell that announcement of a Negro
VA hospital had not been "authorized, made, or contemplated."26
Niles may have believed that, but it was the kind of statement that
earned him the sobriquet of "Devious Dave" in some circles.
Time ran out in March 1947, when Truman approved the building
of a Negro veterans' hospital in Mound Bayou, Mississippi. The action
led to spirited protest, at least from northern Negroes. The AfroAmerican wrote that the approval was "a gratuitous insult, not only to
veterans but to some twenty-odd national groups who have consistently
opposed it since the first hint that it was ·being considered." Whether
because of the force of disapproval or the problems of finding qualified
personnel to staff Negro veterans' hospitals, the one at Mound Bayou
was the last one established. Nonetheless, the Truman administration
made few inroads on existing segregation in veterans' hospitals, although it strove to improve other services to minority-group veterans. 27
The picture was not as unpleasant in 1946 in all areas of federal

Quest and Response

40
action. One demand was met with the appointment of Joseph C.
Albright as special assistant for minority affairs to the veterans administrator. There was William Hastie's appointment as governor of the
Virgin Islands, and that of Morris de Castro as secretary-the first
Virgin Islander to serve in the administration of the area. The nomination in July 1946 of Jesus Pinero to be governor of Puerto Rico marked
the first selection of a native for that position. Other significant minority appointments during Truman's first two years in the White House
included Raphael O'Hara Lanier as minister to Liberia, Truman K.
Gibson to the President's Committee on Universal Training, and advisers and policy makers in the War Department, Housing Administration, Employment Service, Office of Price Administration, Retraining
and Reemployment Administration, Justice Department, and Post
Office Department. There was the renewal of annual Department of
Commerce conferences on the Negro in business in 1946, with Secretary W. Averell Harriman in attendance. Also in 1946 the Federal Reserve System opened its eating and lavatory facilities to all employees. 28
During 1946 housing pressures mounted, largely because living
areas for minorities in cities were becoming increasingly crowded with
continued migration to urban areas and with the return of veterans.
The NAACP had already decided to make a major court issue of restrictive land-purchase covenants. Housing Administrator Wilson
·w yatt and his staff were keenly aware of the need for low-cost housing
for Negroes and worked for passage of the Wagner-Ellender-Taft bill
and emergency veterans' housing as ways to meet the need. This
sensitivity was mirrored in the president's concern with housing in his
messages to Congress during the postwar period. Furthermore, in
August 1946, the Justice Department announced antitrust action against
thirty-eight New York City mortgage firms for manipulation of rents
and financing conditions for Negro and Puerto Rican families. The
case ended in June 1948 when thirty-three of the firms were enjoined
from discriminatory practices in regard to investment in and management of real estate.29
The year 1946 saw an important court decision in Morgan v. Virginia. In 1944 the driver of a Richmond Greyhound Lines bus had
ordered Irene Morgan to move to the rear of the vehicle to make room
for a white passenger. She refused and was arrested and convicted of
violating the Virginia segregation statute. The case was taken to the
United States Supreme Court, which ruled that because state laws
varied so much on transportation segregation, they were a burden to
interstate commerce. Therefore, the Virginia law was declared uncon-
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stitutional in order to promote uniformity and to protect the comfort
of passengers in interstate travel. 30
The government was also active in trying to regularize daims
against it by Japanese-Americans and Indians. The Interior Department sponsored a bill to repay the losses of Japanese and JapaneseAmerican wartime evacuees up to $2,500 per claim. Secretary Julius
A. Krug urged enactment "as a matter of fairness and good conscience,
and because these particular American citizens and law-abiding aliens
have borne with patience and undefeated loyalty the unique burdens
which this government has thrown upon them." Although the bill was
approved in the Senate, it failed to pass the House. 31
The proposal for settlement of Indian claims had a long history.
The Interior Department had sponsored legislation during the 1930s
to establish a commission to settle Indian claims against the government. In 1937 such a bill passed the Senate, but was lost in the House.
In 1939 and 1941 President Roosevelt refused to support similar legislation because of the prospective cost and because it seemed that such
a commission would not dispose of Indian claims, as Roosevelt put it,
"with finality." The question was held in abeyance during World War
II, but was introduced soon afterward. Indian tribes had many claims
against the United States, but the process of settlement was cumbersome, expensive, and by no means just. Before a claim could be adjudicated, Congress had to pass a special act, the provisions of which might
severely limit the scope of the trial. The case could then be taken to
the Court of Claims, which was restricted in the law that it could apply
in hearing such specialized claims. The result was lengthy litigation,
with small chance of success. In fact, of the 118 claims presented to
the court between 1881 and 1950, only 34 were successful. 32
In 1946 the Interior Department again sponsored legislation to
establish an Indian-claims commission. This time the president, Truman, approved it, noting, however, that "we should be exceedingly
careful not to allow claims which are already settled to be opened and
considered again." Truman wanted to "be sure that we are not unloosening a Frankenstein." The bill was enacted by Congress, and the
president signed it in August. The three-man commission was given
broad authority to consider Indian claims once and for all over a tenyear period, subject to review by the Court of Claims. The Interior
Department intended not only that the commission would settle the
claims justly and finally, but that in the long run its work would lead to
reduced expenditures for Indian affairs. Hopefully, the latter would
be accomplished by a lightening of the departmental load in rehashing
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old claims and by the possibility that the funds awarded might put
many tribes on a self-sustaining basis. Secretary Krug also believed
that the law would strengthen the moral authority of the United States
at home and abroad "in the eyes of many other minority peoples."33
The Indian Claims Commission did not live up to expectations. It
was unable to dispose of the claims in ten years, and in 1956 its life was
extended for another six years. Some 852 claims were filed. By 1956,
102 claims had been adjudicated and 21 had been aJlowed recovery to
a total of $13,283,477. Indians were not happy with the small number
of favorable decisions and the paucity of the awards, but the procedure was fairer and less frustrating than what had previously existed
by way of adjudication. 34
If the administration•s accomplishments were less than satisfactory
to minorities, its civil-rights pronouncements were laudable. Its statements were important, for they gave a yardstick against which actions
could be measured, and they served the cause of education by enlightening some whites and by encouraging minority people to seek justice.
Harry Truman was setting new presidential standards in speaking out
for civil rights. He had put in his word for fair employment practices
and even equal voting rights, but there were other presidential statements, growing increasingly tough, in behalf of advancing human
rights.
In talking with the executive committee of the National Newspaper Publishers Association in March, the president mentioned the
need "to give us the Bill of Rights as it was written. . . . We want to
see equal opportunity for everybody, regardless of race, creed or color."
A few days later he vented his frustration with Congress, before a conference of the Federal Council of Churches, when he sought "an Isaiah
or a Saint Paul to reawaken this sick world to its moral responsibilities." He emphasized that "if we really believed in the Brotherhood of
Man, it would not be necessary to pass a Fair Employment Practices
Act."85
He sent a message in June to the annual NAACP convention, demanding jobs for veterans "at fair wages without discrimination by
employers or unions because of race, color, religion, or ancestry." He
also called for protection against terrorism and of the right to vote. A
month later Truman said to the 442d Combat Team, in awarding the
Nisei unit its seventh presidential citation: "You fought not only the
enemy, but you fought prejudice--and you have won. Keep up that
fight, and we will continue to win-to make this great republic stand
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for just what the Constitution says it stands for: the welfare of all the
people all the time."s6
In July the president appointed the National Commission on
Higher Education to inquire into how the functions of American colleges and universities could best be performed. Charles G. Bolte, the
chairman of the American Veterans Committee, wrote to compliment
Truman on establishing the commission and to urge that the group
examine the practice of admitting minority-group students to colleges
on a quota basis. Bolte also urged the president to give his "wise counsel and firm guidance" to the development of equal justice and opportunity for all Americans. Officials in the \Var Mobilization and Reconversion Office recommended that Truman answer Bolte at length in
order to counteract increasing racial tensions and minority-group disappointment. The president accepted the WMRO's suggested reply
almost in toto. 37
On August 28, in a public letter, he wrote Bolte that the commission was concerned with eliminating "barriers of discrimination" in
colleges. Truman took the occasion to assert that despite the war
America had just fought against hatred, "in this country today there
exists disturbing evidence of intolerance and prejudice. . . . Discrimination, like a disease, must be attacked wherever it appears. This
applies to the opportunity to vote, to hold and retain a job, and to
secure adequate shelter and medical care no less than to gain an education compatible with the needs and ability of the individual."38 That
was a strong statement, and the Truman who sent it was different from
the man who in March had wanted to avoid another filibuster and had
commended the fight to another Isaiah, another Paul.
What created this different Truman? It was violence-unwarranted attacks on black Americans-that moved him and his administration. Late in 1945 many Negro leaders had predicted that tension
and violence would rise during the coming year. They did not foresee
that it would be as bad as it was. The activities of the Ku Klux Klan
and similar-minded groups and individuals had intensified. Assaults
on Negroes and Japanese-Americans had been common in 1945, but
the first major outbreak came early in 1946 in Columbia, Tennessee.
There, on February 25, after an altercation between a white radio
repairman and a black customer and her son, the son was arrested. A
white mob soon formed and rushed the county jail, but was warded off
by the sheriff. Meanwhile Negro residents gathered in the black business section and prepared to defend themselves in case a mob struck
out in that direction. At night some city police entered the section to

Quest and Response

44

investigate reports of gunfire. Shooting broke out, and four policemen
were wounded. The Highway Patrol and the State Guard were called
in and arrested some seventy Negroes. Others were later arrested. The
black district was victimized by vandalism and looting during a systematic search for weapons. No action was taken to disarm white
civilians in Columbia, and only four were arrested. While military law
in effect reigned in the small city, two Negro prisoners were killed in
the jail. 39
The Columbia incident touched off widespread protests from
Negroes and liberals, and the federal government quickly responded.
David Niles, for the White House, wrote Attorney General Tom Clark
that satisfaction had to be given "that the federal government is doing
all it can in order to protect civil rights." People and groups seeking
to discuss the matter with the president were referred to the attorney
general and his assistants, who endeavored to talk with all interested
parties. Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation were ordered
to Columbia, and Clark directed United States District Attorney
Horace Frierson to convene a grand jury to investigate whether there
were violations of federal law. The attorney general also promised to
dispatch Justice Department representatives to work with the grand
jury.40
The federal intervention into activities at Columbia had little
effect, though, for the government had no real weapon to wield in the
applicable law, the Enforcement Act of 1870. The grand jury found
that vandalism had been committed while the area was under the control of the Tennessee Highway Patrol and State Guard, but no remedy
was offered. The grand jury found that the arrests, killings, and
searches of homes were justifiable under the circumstances, although
it did issue a strong warning against the "dissemination of half-truths
and falsehoods" that could lead to racial violence. There was one
happy conclusion, thanks probably to federal intervention and the
great publicity given the case. Most of the Negroes arrested were released, and a change of venue in the state courts was granted to the
remaining twenty-five defendants. Of those only two were found
guilty of assault, and even they were subsequently freed by a retrial. 41
The outbreak of other incidents fired civil-rights organizations in
maintaining pressure on the federal government to counteract racial
terrorism. There was heated reaction to Senator Theodore Bilbo's
statements which virtually sanctioned the use of violence to keep
Negroes from voting in Mississippi. A vivid illustration of racial violence came in the report of the punching out of the eyes of Sergeant
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Isaac Woodard by an Aiken, South Carolina, policeman, only three
hours after Woodard was separated from the army. The attack was
forcefully brought to President Truman's attention by R. R. Wright, a
Spanish-American War veteran and probably the nation's most prominent black banker, who wrote: "To 'gouge out the eyesight'. of a man
who had used his eyes to safeguard the freedom of our country is
surely a disgrace unheard of in any other country in the world." Much
of the press joined Major Wright in being appalled at this example of
violence, and the NAACP offered a $1,000 reward for the apprehension
and conviction of the man who blinded Woodard. 42
As summer came there was also news of a lynching in Georgia,
which had just nominated a leading racist, Eugene Talmadge, .for
governor. Macio Snipes, the only Negro to vote in his district, was
killed in his front yard by four white men. More shocking was the
lynching on July 25 outside Monroe, Georgia, of Roger Malcolm, who
had just been released from jail on bond for stabbing his employer.
Two Negro women and another black man, who happened to be with
Malcolm, were also shot and killed. 43 That set off a tidal wave of
protest which was not soon to subside.
The directors of the black National Newspaper Publishers Association met to ask President Truman to demand that Congress enact an
antilynching law. The American Council on Race Relations called
upon mayors' and governors' human-relations groups to do all they
could to end mob violence. The Civil Rights Congress offered a $1,000
reward for the Monroe lynchers. The Amsterdam News wrote that
"the struggle against Talmadge-Bilboism lynch terror calls for an allout effort. All forces that want Americanism must join together to
demand: 'BRING THE GEORGIA LYNCHERS TO JUSTICE!'"
The NAACP and the American Council on Race Relations joined together to "call a conference of groups against mob violence." The
amount of rewards for information leading to the conviction of the
lynchers rose to $30,000, as the NAACP threw in $10,000 and the state
of Georgia, through the efforts of Governor Ellis Arnall, raised almost
an equal amount. Nearly four hundred members of the National Association of Colored Women marched to the White House to demand an
end to lynching, and they set up a picket line that was to continue for
over a week. Dr. Max Yergan, the president of the National Negro
Congress, led a march of more than one thousand persons from Washington Union Terminal to the White House, after which he assailed
Truman for not condemning those involved in racial violence. Other
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mass demonstrations were held, and thousands of letters of protest
were sent to the president and to the attorney general. 44
The government had already begun to act. Attorney General
Clark, on July 26, ordered an investigation of the Monroe lynching and
soon announced that the Justice Department was probing the Ku Klux
Klan in seven states. Four days later Truman released a statement
through Clark expressing his "honor at the crime." He said that he
had directed the attorney general to use all of his department's resources to investigate "this and any other crimes of oppression.''45
The rumble of discontent grew louder as additional reports of
racial violence came. On August 6, in response to the call of the
NAACP and the American Council on Race Relations, black and white
representatives of forty civil-rights, religious, labor, professional, and
veterans organizations met in emergency session as the National Emergency Committee Against Mob Violence. The new committee's goal
was to press the president and the attorney general "to throw the full
force of the federal government behind our actions and sentiments in
bringing before the bar of justice and convicting the lynchers." Even
leading white newspapers were giving considerable attention to racial
violence. In August in New York City fifteen thousand people held a
mass protest meeting, and in Washington another fifteen thousand
paraded to the Lincoln Memorial to demand action against the Monroe "murderers," passage of antilynching legislation, and outlawing by
executive power of the Ku Klux Klan and similar organizations. 46
There was little effective action that Truman and the executive
branch could legally take. They could not outlaw anything by fiat. As
they were doing, they could investigate and could urge citizens and
state and local authorities to act. The margin of federal law upon
which the executive branch could act was narrow and slippery. The
two pertinent provisions, sections 51 and 52 of the 1870 Enforcement
Act, applied only to conspiracies and to willful action by public officials, both crimes being exasperatingly difficult to prove, and the civil
rights involved had been slenderly defined by the courts. Moreover,
the chances for conviction were further narrowed considering that
even if indictments were procured, the trials would be held in communities that were hostile or at best indifferent. 47
Truman could have called Congress into special session to enact
appropriate legislation, as some protestors urged, but he was undoubtedly restrained by the well-founded conviction that the legislators
would not have acted. For the time being, he contented himself by
indicating, on August 1, that he favored an antilynching law. A more
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forceful endorsement came in mid August from Attorney General
Clark, who vowed that he would urge Congress to pass antilynching
legislation. He also called upon all citizens and law-enforcement officials to do all they could to deal with the situation. 48
At the urging of David Niles, Postmaster General Robert E. Hannegan, and Navy Secreta1y James V. Forrestal, Truman in September
sent more than the usual ceremonial greetings to the annual conference
of the Urban League. He declared, "If the civil rights of even one
citizen are abused, government has failed to discharge one of its primary responsibilities. We, as a people, must not, and I say to you we
shall not, remain indifferent in the face of acts of intimidation and
violence in our American communities. We must, however, go beyond
the mere checking of such intimidation and violence, and work actively
for an enduring understanding and cooperation among citizens of all
religious and racial backgrounds." Truman's message was bitingly
clear, but words were not enough. Most Negroes believed with Walter
White that "a dread epidemic is sweeping across our country."49 They
wanted a remedy stronger than presidential prose.
Meanwhile the National Emergency Committee Against Mob
Violence and its affiliated organizations, now grown to forty-seven,
were striving to mobilize public opinion. They enlisted churches, business associations, and unions in a crusade to urge people to combat
hate groups and to press congressmen, state and local officials, lawenforcement officers, editors, and radio and motion-picture executives
to meet the problem of mob violence. The committee also voted to
send a delegation to meet with President Truman, and a meeting was
arranged for September 19. 50
Walter White came to the White House with Channing Tobias,
CIO Secretary James Carey, Boris Shiskin of the AFL, Frederick E.
Reissig of the Federal Council of Churches, and Leslie Perry of the
NAACP's Washington office. Several others, including Eleanor Roosevelt, Bishop Bernard Sheil, and Governor Ellis Arnall of Georgia, could
not come but sent telegrams expressing their grave concern. White
served as the spokesman for the delegation. A statement was presented
to Truman which conveyed the group's dismay with the growth of mob
violence against Negroes and the lack of remedial action. He was
petitioned to step up the work of federal agencies in dealing with
lynchers, to arouse the people "to oppose actively every form of mob
violence," and to reconvene Congress to enact antilynching legislation.
White detailed acts of violence for the president. Truman sat with
clenched hands through the recounting, his face mirroring shock at
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the story of Isaac Woodard's blinding. When White had concluded,
the president got up from his chair and said, "My God! I had no idea
that it was as terrible as that! We've got to do something!"51
Truman knew that there was little he could do under the existing
law, but he promised to confer with Attorney General Clark the next
day. At that point, David Niles, who had been sitting in on the meeting, suggested that Congress be asked to establish an investigatory
commission on mob violence and civil liberties. The president agreed
that that was a good idea. It is possible that White, as he wrote in his
autobiography, then pointed out that such a commission would not be
approved by Congress, and that Truman replied that he would establish it by executive order. More probable is the account in White's
October report to the NAACP Board of Directors. According to the
report, White wrote to Truman the day after the White House meeting,
warning him that Congress would envelop the proposed commission
in the deadly embrace of a filibuster. A few days later the White
House responded, by telephone, saying that the commission would be
established by executive order. 52
Truman was also scheduled to see a delegation from Paul Robeson's American Crusade to End Lynching, including representatives
from Negro publishers, Negro churches, the National Negro Congress,
the Southern Conference for Human Welfare, and the National Council
of Negro Women. The group saw Truman on the morning of September 23; the result was mutual antagonism. When one of the delegates
suggested that there was little difference between lynchings in America
and the Nuremberg war-crimes trials, the president shot back that the
United States could handle its affairs without concern for happenings
abroad. Then Robeson and Truman disagreed sharply on America's
moral position in world affairs, and Robeson asserted that unless mob
violence was soon stopped, foreign intervention would be in order.
Ru:ffied, Truman responded that he would deal with the situation in
the most expeditious fashion. David Niles had thought of using this
meeting to explore further the establishment of a civil-rights study
committee, but as bitterness pervaded the atmosphere, the president's
aide dropped the idea. 53
Black reaction to the American Crusade's meeting with the president was caustic. The Journal and Guide (Norfolk, Virginia) saw
Truman as retreating from his position with Walter ,vhite's group.
The Amsterdam News linked this "boner" with Truman's dismissal of
Henry Wallace from the cabinet. The newspaper added, "We condemn
Truman as a fraud." Yet matters were percolating. Even before the
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meetings with White and Robeson, the president had written and
made public his strong letter against prejudice to Charles Bolte and
had sent vigorous civil-rights messages to the sesquicentennial convention of the African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church and the
Urban League. 54 In effect, Truman had already spoken out against
mob violence, as Robeson's group demanded.
As for another of the Ameiican Crusade's demands, the Justice
Department had done as much as it legally could to deal with mob
action and lynching. Tom Clark had come to the attorney generalship
in 1945 with a good record on civil-rights matters, having ·served energetically as head of the department's Criminal Division. In 1946 he
had been prompt and vigorous in dealing with the Columbia and
Monroe cases. Moreover, when in September Director J. Edgar Hoover
complained that the Federal Bureau of Investigation was spending too
much time probing civil-rights incidents in which the probability of.
federal jurisdiction was small, Clark answered forthrightly, writing:
"In each case the complaint made is indicative of the possibility of a
violation, and if we do not investigate we are placed in the position
... of having failed to satisfy ourselves that it is or is not such a violation." The attorney general agreed with Hoover that frustration would
largely be the fruit of such work, but he said, "As you know it is my
purpose to report these matters to Congress in the hopes of securing a
broader and more substantial basis for federal action.''55
The administration's chief immediate hope, however, in furthering
the protection of human rights lay with a federal civil-rights committee, which had been discussed with Walter White's delegation. The
committee's roots were tangled. The idea had been pondered by a
number of people after a series of race riots in 1943. Saul K. Padover,
who was Interior Secretary Harold L. lckes's adviser on minority problems, had proposed a national committee on race relations. A similar
committee had been discussed by sociologist Howard W. Odum and
Presidential Assistant Jonathan Daniels, but President Roosevelt,
Daniels reported, did "not think well of the idea." Probably the seed of
Truman's civil-rights committee was contained in a 1943 proposal of
David K. Niles, then one of Roosevelt's assistants. Niles suggested the
formation of a national citizens' committee that would develop, in
conjunction with local committees, programs to alleviate racial tensions and, in case of violent outbreaks, to arrange for dealing with
them. 56
Niles was an amiable man. Of Truman's senior assistants, however, he was probably the least involved in White House affairs. As
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Jonathan Daniels said, "He liked to be a man of mystery." And he was
a mystery to many other White House denizens and to a large number
of minority-group leaders. This stemmed largely from the fact that
his interests centered on labor, Jewish, and urban matters, in which he
was highly effective. Other pertinent problems were usually left to
Niles's assistant, Philleo Nash, an able man with a Ph.D. in anthropology, who, however, lacked the rank to have great in:fluence. 57 This
situation helps to explain the disconnected civil-rights approaches of
the early Truman days and, later, the involvement of a number of
White House staff members, including Clark Clifford, Stephen Spingarn, and George Elsey, in human-rights matters. Nevertheless, during
the summer of 1946 Niles could not avoid the menace of mob violence
and the swelling pressure to counteract it. Then, if at no other time,
he played a major role in Negro affairs.
Many other people were credited with the idea of a civil-rights
committee, including President Truman, Walter White, and Tom
Clark. It was Niles, however, who proposed a civil-rights commission
during the White House meeting with the National Emergency Committee group. Columnist Louis Lautier later wrote that he had asked
at the White House whose idea it was and had been informed that it
was Niles's. 58 Taken as a whole, Niles's 1943 proposal, his suggestion
at the meeting between Truman and White's delegation, and Lautier's
report, it would seem that he was most likely the father of the civil-.
rights committee.
The important thing is that the idea of a civil-rights committee was
launched at the September 19 White House meeting and that steps
were soon taken to develop it. As has been indicated, within a few
days it was decided that the president would create the committee,
because it was unlikely that Congress would do so. It was anticipated
that the committee would contain between ten and fifteen members,
and Walter White was asked to suggest names. The NAACP secretary
consulted with several of the association's directors and staff members,
and nominated twenty-three people. It was also promised, according
to White, that the committee would be authorized by October 10.59
News of the proposed civil-rights committee soon leaked out to
the press. Drew Pearson, in his September 26 column, reported that
the White House was considering forming a commission to investigate
lynching, and in early October Negro newspapers carried a similar
story. As to what the committee presaged, speculation was withheld,
with the Chicago Defender writing, "Effectiveness of the agency will
be determined of course by the people who compose it."60
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Pressure on the White House had not ceased as a result of press
rumors. In fact, a black voting backlash was developing against the
Democrats in the forthcoming congressional elections. Negroes had
been disappointed by lack of legislative success in 1946, the apparent
ineptitude of the executive branch, and the rising levels of violence. In
February Charles Houston had written in the press, "The president
may do this and he may do that as leader, but if he cannot produce,
well, there is no such thing as gratitude in politics." One action taken
by Truman during the summer did temporarily strike a favorable note.
That was his public opposition to Kansas City Congressman Roger
Slaughter's renomination. Slaughter had opposed much of Truman's
program, including the FEPC, and the president was not going to
tolerate a foe in his own political backyard. Truman's choice, Enos
Axtell, won over Slaughter by almost three thousand votes, with heavy
support from black Democrats. The victory was greeted joyously by
many Negroes, but it turned to ashes as highly publicized, though
largely unsupported, charges of voting irregularities were used to
smear the president. Axtell's loss to his Republican opponent in
November made the whole undertaking seem quixotic. 61
Election or no election, the administration was not to be rushed in
its preparations for a civil-rights committee. Certainly, the committee
was going to be concerned with more than mob violence. On October
11 Tom Clark submitted to Truman a draft of an executive order to
establish "the President's Committee on Civil Rights" to consider the
broad goal of "preserving and implementing our civil rights." Clark
recommended, more warmly than was usual in such communications,
promulgation of the executive order. The Chicago Defender on October 26 reported that the president was going to announce the "appointment of a 'Federal Commission on Lynching'" the week before election. That, of course, did not happen. Time was needed to smooth out
the order and to line up a group of worthies for service on the committee. 62 It can also be hypothesized that if Truman believed that a
Republican Congress would be elected, he also thought that it would
be politically wiser to save the announcement of the committee until
after the election, because by itself the committee's establishment was
unlikely to change the election results.
A Republican Congress was returned on November 5. The new
Eightieth Congress would have fifty-seven more Republicans than
Democrats in the House and six more in the Senate. Negroes still
largely voted for Democrats, but the Republicans were pressed to
justify whatever inroads they had made, and hoped to make later,
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among black voters. Truman, too, was on the spot. He had sought
action and had, however good the reasons, come up short. But a civilrights committee might remove the pressure from him temporarily and
also be the vehicle to reach his twin goals of solving the nation's civilrights problems and reenlisting minority-group support. Certainly, it
would allow him to salve his own conscience. The violence of 1946
had shaken him. In the future he would often refer to the perturbation that he had felt as the result of assaults on the persons of minority
groups. Standing out in his mind even after leaving office was the case
of Isaac Woodard, "a Negro veteran, still wearing this country's uniform, [who] was arrested and beaten and blinded."63
On December 5, 1946, President Truman issued Executive Order
9808, which established the President's Committee on Civil Rights "to
inquire into and to detern1ine whether and in what respect current
law-enforcement measures and the authority and means possessed by
federal, state, and local governments may be strengthened and improved to safeguard the civil rights of the people." All executive agencies were directed to cooperate fully with the committee, and the
executive order was prefaced with a strong statement condemning "the
action of individuals who take the law into their own hands and inflict
summary punishment and wreak personal vengeance." In the order,
Truman named Charles E. Wilson, the president of General Electric,
as committee chairman. Other members were Mrs. Sadie T. Alexander,
an outstanding Negro lawyer; James B. Carey, secretary-treasurer of
the CIO; John S. Dickey, president of Dartmouth; attorney Morris L.
Ernst; Rabbi Roland B. Gittelsohn; Frank P. Graham, president of the
University of North Carolina; Francis J. Haas, a Catholic bishop;
Charles Luckman, president of Lever Brothers; attorney Francis P.
Matthews; Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr.; Henry Knox Sherrill, the presiding Episcopal bishop; AFL economist Boris Shiskin; Methodist churchwoman Dorothy Tilly; and Dr. Channing Tobias, a director of the
Phelps-Stokes Fund. It was an outstanding group. All of the committee members were prominent either nationally or in their areas of
endeavor. Most of them had been active in civil-rights affairs, and the
others had been experienced in social-welfare work. The committee
was also well balanced, if not geographically, at least in terms of occupations, religion, and, with Mrs. Alexander and Dr. Tobias, race. 64
Equally important was that the committee was charged with
studying the whole spectrum of civil rights, not just mob violence.
Attorney General Clark was at least partly responsible for that, because of his concern with the overall problem of protecting civil rights
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and with the forging of tools to deal with it. The announcement of the
committee was backed up by Clark's "I Am an American Day" address,
in which he asserted that all the law at his disposal now and in the
future would be used to protect civil rights. Credence was given his
statement by the launching of the Justice Department's income-tax
prosecution of the Ku Klux Klan. 65
Black newspaper reaction to appointment of the committee was
somewhat mixed. Most attention was given by the Chicago Defender,
which editorialized, "If the committee is not hampered in its inquiry
and if its recommendations are not circumvented by a welter of administrative procedures, the results should be far more consequential to us
than anything that has happened in the United States since the abolition of slavery." The Afro-American and the Call ( Kansas City) also
played up the story, but the Courier (Pittsburgh) and the Amsterdam
News indicated that they were not impressed, because the problems
were already well known. 66 Generally, however, the Negro press was
mildly pleased with Executive Order 9808, although it was obvious
that it was reserving judgment until the committee actually did something.
The year 1946 was a mixture of horror and promise for minorities.
The victories at the polls of Senator Bilbo and Eugene Talmadge; attempts to curb Negro voting in the South; the blocking of proposed
FEPC, poll-tax, and antilynching legislation; and, most of all, racial
violence were discouraging examples of reaction. Moreover, JapaneseAmericans had received only slight encouragement in their quest for
compensation of wartime losses resulting from evacuation; and American Indians, although heartened by the passage of the Indian Claims
Commission Act, were discouraged because of deteriorating conditions
on some of their reservations. Yet, not all was bleak; for there were,
among other things, Governor Ellis Amall's work to effect understanding between the white and black races, the appointment of the President's Committee on Civil Rights, the Supreme Court's Morgan decision, Hastie's appointment as governor of the Virgin Islands, and the
increased activity of interracial and human-relations groups throughout
the nation.
Probably most encouraging from a long-range standpoint was
Harry Truman's outspoken interest in civil rights. Franklin Roosevelt
had acted to establish the Fair Employment Practices Committee in
1941 only under extreme pressure at a delicate time. Moreover, in the
face of intense, widespread racial violence in 1943, he had said nothing
and done little. Truman, confronted by less intense racial crises and
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subjected to less pressure, often spoke out not only to favor tolerance
and equal rights but also to condemn those who opposed them. As the
Call wrote, "Since the Missourian has been in the White House, there
has been no occasion for Negroes to sigh, 'If only the president would
speak out!' "67

4

WHERE THEY STOOD

By 1947 the racial tensions of the postwar period had been relaxed. Violence, in particular, had declined, partly because federal
investigation and prosecution had harassed the assault forces of racism.
The job situation had stabilized for minority people, who found that
they generally had not reverted to their prewar positions. Many minority-group veterans were enjoying the government benefits to which
they were entitled. Moreover, rapport with the White House and other
federal offices was improving. In short, 1947 was stable enough to allow
time for consolidation of goals and forces, for stocktaking.
The wartime breakup of Little Tokyos scattered Japanese-Americans across the land and gave them a feeling of unsettledness. But
they rose to the challenge by taking maximum advantage of educational and economic opportunities. As William Caudill observed in
his study of the twenty thousand Japanese-American newcomers in
Chicago, by 1947 "white employers and fellow employees accepted the
Nisei and were enthusiastic in their praise of them." Japanese-Americans also won acceptance in white lower-middle-class neighborhoods,
largely because the Chicago middle class had "projected their own
values into the neat, well-dressed, and efficient Nisei in whom they saw
mirrored many of their own ideals." What happened in Chicago occurred to a greater or lesser degree in other communities. Furthermore,
the Japanese-American Citizens League, captained by the indefatigable
Mike Masaoka, forged ahead in relieving the artificial burdens placed
on its people. In 1946 the Senate passed an evacuation claims bill, and
prospects for House and Senate approval in the new Eightieth Congress were good. Also a dent was made on laws restricting land
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ownership by alien Japanese when in 1947 Utah repealed its alienland law.1
Chinese-Americans benefited, too. The favor extended to them
during World War II continued into the postwar period. Job barriers
remained low, and good will was the usual standard in relations between them and white America. In fact, by 1950 their median incomes
were to exceed those of poor whites and all other racial minorities
except Japanese-Americans. A 1946 amendment to the Immigration
Act of 1924 allowed alien wives of citizens to be admitted to the United
States on a nonquota basis and gave preference in the quotas to the
alien wives and children of resident aliens. The War Brides Act of
1947 permitted the entry of Oriental wives of American servicemen, a
victory for both the Chinese- and Japanese-Americans. 2
Indians were preparing to take advantage of the Indian Claims
Act of 1946, and they were pressing for elimination of barriers to voting
and to· allocation of state funds for social-security benefits in Arizona
and New Mexico. Indeed some hope could be gained from the fact
that since 1938 five states had removed restrictions on voting by reservation Indians. Most critical was the situation of the Navajos, who
were threatened with starvation with the onset of the winter of 1947.
In early December President Truman reported that in addition to
regularly appropriated relief funds, the government was making available to the Navajos surplus food, clothing, and equipment. Later that
month Congress appropriated additional relief funds for the Navajos,
and for the Hopis, who lived in their midst. 3
During the 1940s another minority group, the Puerto Ricans,
emerged in force. As American nationals, they had the right of free
entry into the continental United States. Almost 70,000 had settled on
the mainland by 1940. Between 1942 and 1945 there was a net migration of 25,000 more. The exodus, however, occurred thereafter, thanks
to cheap airline passage and high hopes. By the middle 1950s about
490,000 had settled in the continental United States, and approximately
80 percent of them were in New York City. Most of the Puerto Ricans
had few marketable skills and little knowledge of English. They were
ripe for attack by loan sharks and landlords, and usually ran last in the
race for jobs. They had not been on the mainland long enough by the
time of the Truman administration to be well organized. Consequently,
they had few defenders, politically and otherwise. As Earl Brown
wrote in 1947 of the Puerto Ricans coming to New York, their arrival
"is not unlike the migration of southern Negroes to it after World War
I. The only difference is that the Puerto Ricans who come here are

Where They Stood

57
worse off than the Negroes were. And that's hard to believe."4 The
Puerto Ricans not only faced problems traditionally encountered by
newcomers to the United States, but many of them carried the additional cross of color. Little was done to help them. Indeed it was only
in the late 1940s that they slowly came to be recognized as an element
in the nation's spectrum of minority problems.
Some advances had taken place among the more than two million
Mexican-Americans. The broader outlook of the some quarter-of-amillion Mexican-Americans who saw wartime military service contributed somewhat, as did increases in urbanization, unionization, and job
opportunities. Yet these were only beginnings. Most Mexican-Americans were at the bottom of the labor market. Their language and the
pattern of employment in gangs isolated them from contacts with the
general community, and the formation of leadership was a slow process.
Additional handicaps were that many of them had questionable claims
to citizenship and that there was a continual and sizable infusion of
fresh migrants, legal and illegal, from Mexico to meet the calls for farm
labor in the Southwest. In brief, Mexican-Americans generally were
second-class citizens and often in a position in the Southwest below
that of Negroes.5
Religious minodties were in a different situation. Catholics still
smarted from minor discriminations-occasional college admissions
quotas, for example. Moreover, in the postwar period, there were
spectacular attacks against them as agents of the supposedly monolithic structure of the Vatican. Surprisingly, much of this came from
such men as Paul Blanshard and Harold E. Fey, who were veteran
battlers for civil rights. Yet, these attacks were prime examples of the
fact that anti-Catholicism was often the anti-Semitism of the intellectuals. 6 American Catholics did not constitute a monolith, but a large
minority that was itself made up of many smaller minorities, some
better off than others. Only a few, such as Latin-American and Negro
Catholics, were greatly disadvantaged, but most of the subminorities
were no worse off than most Protestant groups in America.
The situation for Jews was somewhat different. Discrimination
was more widely practiced against them in education, employment,
housing, resorts, and clubs. Their problem was not that of getting a
stake in society, but of being as free as the majority of Americans to do
what they wanted to with that stake. Theirs was not a struggle for
basic political, economic, and educational rights, but for good will,
freedom to develop further, and respect for their merits as individuals.
In these respects, 1947 was an encouraging year for Jews. The Anti-
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Defamation League, in its report on anti-Semitism during 1947, acknowledged "the substantial and heartening advances toward good
will, understanding and cooperation among racial and religious groups
in the United States. Important sections of the pulpit, press, radio,
motion pictures and other opinion-molding media gave increased
attention to the problems of prejudice and bigotry and stressed the
ethical and practical need for democratic unity." The League could
also exult about President Truman's Committee on Civil Rights, his
Commission on Higher Education, and the "successful operation" of
fair employment practices commissions in Connecticut, New Jersey,
and New York. 7
American culture was responding somewhat to the cry for justice
for minorities. Gordon Allport noted that universities, schools,
churches, government agencies, and even some industries were giving
attention to cultural conflicts. He wrote that since the 1930s "there has
been more solid and enlightening study in this area than in all the
previous centuries combined." For example, the number of master's
and doctoral theses dealing with the Negro had greatly increased, from
76 in 1932 to 182 in 1939, to 330 in 1947, to 571 by 1950. The pronouncements of Protestant church organizations reached flood stage
between 1945 and 1947, when at least seventy statements against prejudice and discrimination were issued. The landmark was the declaration of the Federal Council of Churches in March 1946, which renounced "the pattern of segregation in race relations as unnecessary
and undesirable and a violation of the Gospel of love and human
brotherhood." Yet, Frank S. Loescher pointed out in 1948, "There is
little evidence yet that the convictions of the rank-and-file membership
of Protestant denominations are greatly influenced by these official
actions."8
The number and variety of books on human rights rolling off the
presses in 1946 were impressive. They included Buell G. Gallagher's
Color and Conscience, which was a plea for Christian deeds to reduce
racial tensions; Margaret Halsey's Color Blind; Fisk University's series
of Social Science Source Documents; the volumes in the Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science entitled Essential
Human Rights and Controlling Group Prejudice; J. Howell Atwood's
The Racial Factor in YMCAs; and the Police Training Bulletin: A
Guide to Race Relations for Police Officers, sponsored by the American
Council on Race Relations and the California Department of Justice.
The years 1947 and 1948 saw more of the same, most notably Charles S.
Johnson's Into the Main Stream; Robin W. Williams, Jr.'s The Reduc-
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tion of Intergroup Tensions; Malcolm Ross's powerful plea to end segregation in All Manner of Men; John Hope Franklin's From Slavery to
Freedom; and Robert C. Weaver's The Negro Ghetto. Also significant
were the inexpensive Freedom Pamphlets published by the AntiDefamation League, including by 1948 Arnold M. Rose's The Negro in
Postwar America, W. Henry Cooke's Peoples of the Southwest, and
Gordon Allport's A B Cs of Scapegoating. The dam had burst. The
trickle of studies, essays, and manuals that had started during the late
1930s was now a steady stream, and it would grow-with the addition
of such classics as Lillian Smith's Killers of the Dream, Morton Grodzins's Americans Betrayed, and Carl Rowan's South of Freedom-into
a river of data, concepts, and protests. This river would not wash away
prejudice and inequality, but it would erode them.
Such writings were supplemented in other cultural areas. Novelists found race relations an increasingly intriguing theme, as testified
to by such best-selling books as Sinclair Lewis's Kingsblood Royal,
William L. White's Lost Boundaries, and Ann Petry's The Street. Appearances by Negroes on the New York stage continued to rise, with
twenty shows employing 219 black actors in 1945 and twenty-eight
using 279 in 1946. The NAACP and Jewish organizations worked to
gain decent portrayals of minorities in motion pictures. Their endeavors were partly responsible for the production of a number of films
during the late 1940s that attacked prejudice and discrimination. The
NAACP also labored to improve the Negro's image in public media
generally, enlisting the help of prominent people in radio, theater,
publishing, and advertising.9
Other advances came. In athletics, Jackie Robinson signed to
play for Montreal, becoming the first Negro to enter modern big-time
baseball. Trackmen Herb McKinley and Buddy Young covered themselves with sports glory at Illinois. Young was also one of college football's first black stars in a generation. In 1946 Negro nurses were admitted to the American Nurses Association in fourteen hold-out states.
By the same year a number of newspapers, including the New York
Times, Detroit News, Dallas Morning Sun, Christian Science Monitor,
Providence Journal, Des Moines Register, and Fresno Bee, had dropped
the practice of identifying people by race unless it was essential to a
story. Negroes broke into the larger press world, so that by 1947
eighteen of them worked as full-time newsmen on newspapers of general circulation. By then, thanks to pressure from the National Newspaper Publishers Association and individual reporters, black newsmen
were accredited to the State Department. Similar developments took
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place in white-collar, scientific, technical, and professional jobs. A
1948 Urban League survey of twenty-five cities found 7,734 Negroes in
such positions, almost all in jobs closed to them but a few years before
and in communities covered by strong fair employment practice laws.
There was a new look to advertisements in black newspapers by 1948.
National business firms not only increased their advertising but adorned
it with pictures of attractive or prominent Negroes. The new code of
the Association of Comic Magazine Publishers stated that "ridicule of
or attack on any religious or racial group is never permissible." Negro
membership in labor unions continued to be high, and, in fact, even
increased from 1,250,000 during the war to 1,500,000 by the 1950s.10
Important gains were made in education. The number of Negroes
enrolled in high schools in seventeen southern and border states and
the District of Columbia rose from 254,580 in 1939-1940 to 338,032 in
1949-1950, while the black population remained relatively stable. The
number graduating from high school increased from 30,009 to 45,291
in the same years, and the elementary- and secondary-school year
lengthened from 156 to 173 days. The amount of funds allocated to
Negro education in ten southern states on a classroom-unit basis between 1939-1940 and 1949-1950 skyrocketed from $441 to $2,197, or
some 400 percent. That rise looks less dramatic, however, when compared to increases in funds for white classroom units over the same
period, which grew from $1,096 to $3,291. That meant a dollar increase of $2,195 per white unit compared to one of only $1,756 per
Negro unit. Black colleges bulged during the postwar era, with 79,391
students enrolled and 8,504 degrees awarded in 1949-1950. The problem was that there was insufficient room for prospective black enrollees
in either Negro or white colleges. Only some twenty thousand of about
one hundred thousand Negro veterans eligible for college under the
GI Bill were able to find an institution that would accept them, and
some 70 percent of those were enrolled in segregated institutions.
Another fifteen thousand applied but were turned away for lack of
space. 11
There were other school developments. In 1947 Archbishop Joseph
Ritter desegregated the Catholic schools of St. Louis, and the following
year Archbishop Patrick O'Boyle began integrating the Washington,
D.C., parochial schools, a process that spread gradually to other dioceses. Illinois passed legislation in 1945 and 1949 to force complete
desegregation of its public schools; and in 1947 New Jersey ratified a
constitutional provision declaring that no person shall "be discriminated against in the exercise of any civil or military right, nor be segre-
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gated in the militia or in the public schools, because of religious principles, race, color, ancestry, or national origin." The New Jersey
constitution was unique in that in effect it equated segregation with
discrimination, thereby denying that separate racial establishments
could be equal. 12 Such legal provisions, however, had little impact on
de facto school segregation, which continued to victimize most racial
minorities.
Clearly, the formal barriers to mixing the races in educational institutions were starting to crumble, as white colleges and schools began
to accept Negro students and to offer courses dealing with race problems. Even a nucleus of black teachers at white colleges had developed. By 1947 some sixty of the three thousand Negro college professors in the United States taught at white institutions. In 1948 Allison
Davis was promoted to professor of education in the University of
Chicago, the first of his race to hold that rank on a permanent basis in
a great American university. 13 It all was a modest beginning, but one
that lent hope for better educational opportunities for minorities.
Moreover, it was part of an overall movement that made the nation's
colleges and universities more cosmopolitan, as sprinklings of Indian,
Oriental, Spanish-speaking, and especially Negro students were found
on campus, along with large numbers of Jews, foreigners, and Catholics. At the same time there was an infusion of Jewish and Catholic
professors at public and nonsectarian private institutions. It must be
said that liberal attitudes had opened the gates, but the GI Bill had
pushed a greater diversity of students and teachers onto campus.
Housing was another area of development. Federal statistics
showed that between 1940 and 1947 overcrowding ( where an average
of more than one-and-a-half persons lived per room) in nonfarm housing decreased from 6 to 4 percent for whites and from 18 to 15 percent
for nonwhites. The percentage of dwellings that required major repairs
or lacked private baths and flush toilets declined from 34 to 22 for
whites and from 75 to 61 for nonwhites. The percentage without electric lighting decreased from 40 to 20 for nonwhites, while for whites it
stood at about 2. The percentage of nonwhites who owned their homes
grew from 23.8 in 1940 to 33.6 in 1947, although white homeowners
rose from 42.7 to 54.5. There were also slight advances in combating
discrimination and segregation in assigning public housing under the
new laws of several states in the period 1945-1947, notably in Illinois,
Indiana, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania. The
federal government, however, took the path of least resistance on
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segregation by following local law and policy in granting aid to
housing projects. 14
Although fair employment practices legislation was stymied in
Congress, there was much activity in the statehouses during the middle
1940s. From 1944 through 1949, fair employment bills were introduced
fifty-nine times in twenty-seven states and enacted in ten. Both Democratic and Republican legislators were responsible for such legislation,
although they were generally spurred by coalitions of Negro, Jewish,
and interracial organizations as well as by some Protestant and Catholic groups. Support from labor, civic, and veterans' organizations came
at best sporadically, which perhaps accounted in part for the fact that
several of the laws had no teeth. 15
Employment patterns and income held up well compared with
those of 1940. The percentage of jobless nonwhites ran 5.4, as compared with 3.3 for whites in 1947. The percentage of employed nonwhite males in various occupations rose between 1940 and 1948: in
government work, from 1.7 to 4.2; professional services, 2.9 to 4.2;
manufacturing, 16.1 to 24; construction, 4.8 to 6.7; mining, 1.8 to 5.1;
trade and finance, 11.7 to 13.6; transportation, communication, and
public utilities, 6.7 to 9.6. The percentages declined from 43.3 to 22.4
in agriculture and from 8.3 to 7.6 in domestic and personal services,
indicating a considerable improvement in the types of work found by
nonwhites. Median wage and salary income of the individual nonwhite grew from $364 in 1939 to $863 in 1947 and to $1,210 in 1948,
and of whites during these same years from $956 to $1,980 to $2,323.
The median nonwhite income increased from 38.1 percent of median
white income in 1939 to 43.6 in 1947 and to 52.1 in 1948, although the
dollar gap widened. Moreover, probably because of higher nonwhite
unemployment, the median nonwhite family income dipped from 56.6
percent of white median family income in 1945 to 51.1 in 1947. 16
Apparently there was a rise in the volume of Negro businesses.
Although the assets of banks owned and operated by blacks only grew
from $28,584,815 in 1945 to $31,307,345 in 1947, assets of Negro insurance companies jumped from $72,787,542 in 191 firms in 1945 to
$118,705,607 in 216 companies in 1948. The number of policies increased from 3,789,989 to 4,944,464. In 1943 Negro savings and loan
institutions reported their worth as $3,131,399, while in 1947 they
counted assets of $8,864,342. 17
During the 1940s, based in part on the rising prosperity of minorities, a civil-rights coalition was formed. The coalition was composed
largely of Negroes and Jews, supported by other minorities and by
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sympathetic whites among Catholics, Protestants, and the unchurched.
The coalition's work was best seen in the struggles in Congress and
state legislatures for fair employment laws, although after 1945 it was
active on other fronts too. It reached its high point about 1949-1950,
after which, distracted by the effects of the Korean War and the country's loyalty-security psychosis, the coalition lost momentum.
During the 1940s the coalition was somewhat sustained by the
nation's slowly changing attitudes. Competing with the belief that
America had a Negro, or Indian, or Mexican-American, or Oriental, or
Jewish, problem was the idea, as Lillian Smith said in 1946, that there
was a "white problem." Even more significant was the developing
concept in many areas that there had to be cooperative approaches to
the problem, whatever it was called. In St. Louis in 1946, for example,
this idea took the practical form of thirty-six community organizations
holding a week-long institute to seek techniques to encourage better
race relations. Over the following three years this seed fruited both in
the desegregation of the governing boards, staffs, memberships, and
clients of numerous organizations and social agencies in the city, and
in a mounting number of interracial and interfaith conferences. 18
This is not to say that understanding was achieved among men of
good will, even among such men in minority groups. There were
antagonisms, for example, between Negroes and Jews because of a
residue of mutually unfavorable views and occasionally unpleasant
contacts. Even when they gathered together to discuss civil-rights
questions, as Kenneth Clark observed, condescension often marked the
attitudes of Jews. Yet earnest efforts were made to overcome these
problems for the common good. The fact that in its first issue Commentary, sponsored by the American Jewish Committee, published
Clark's straightforward article on Negro-Jewish relations was one
example. Black writers and leaders such as Gordon Hancock and A.
Philip Randolph pointed out the sufferings of Jews because of prejudice.19 Most significant was the joining of forces to lash out against
discrimination. Not only were Negro and Jewish groups actively cooperating in seeking fair employment legislation, but the Anti-Defamation League struck out at prejudice wherever it found it. The pattern
of mutual cooperation was set early in the postwar period and would
be repeated in case after case.
Cooperation was not limited to Negroes and Jews, for leaders in
many minorities believed that what affected one group could affect all.
In New York City, as early as 1945, the Japanese-American Citizens
League (JACL) sponsored a rally for a permanent FEPC, which used
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two Negroes and two Japanese-Americans as speakers. A Mexican
American challenge to school segregation in California was supported
by amicus curiae briefs filed by the NAACP, the National Lawyers
Guild, the American Jewish Congress, the American Civil Liberties
Union, and the JACL. At a Memorial Day dinner of Japanese-American veterans in Chicago in 1946, segregation was condemned, in general, and Senator Bilbo and Representative John Rankin, in particular,
as high priests of Jim Ctowism. In Los Angeles and San Francisco,
Negroes during the war had moved into the Little Tokyo sections; and
when the Japanese-Americans returned from detention camps, the two
groups lived together in amity. The American Jewish Congress joined
the JACL and the ACLU in contesting California's alien-land law before the Supreme Court. And Negro newspapers spoke their piece for
Japanese-Americans, with the Afro-American, for example, writing
that "American prejudice and hatred of Japanese-Americans is one of
the blackest pages in our history." 20
Among Negroes, a change of emphasis was developing. The postwar period saw an increasing demand for racial integration as well as
equality. Early in 1946 the Courier, in discussing school segregation,
championed the mixing of races in the schools. NAACP Secretary
Walter White inveighed against de facto segregation of public facilities.
Writing Fiorello H. LaGuardia about a proposed new hospital in a black
area of New York City, White wrote that "segregation can never be the
answer to racial discrimination, whether it be imposed from without
or established from within." Even a southern Negro moderate like
Charles S. Johnson in 1947 wrote, "For the Negro to accept segregation
and all of its implications as an ultimate solution would be to accept
for all time a definition of himself as something less than his fellow
man."21
For years the NAACP had battled for equal educational facilities,
and since the middle 1930s it had worked for admission of black students to public white professional schools when separate-but-equal
facilities were not available. By 1947 the association's lawyers began
an all-out assault on school segregation, "on the ground," as Charles H.
Houston wrote, that "there is no such thing as 'separate but equal,' that
the only reason colored people are segregated is to prevent them from
receiving equality." In taking this line of attack, the NAACP had the
backing of counsel for the American Jewish Congress. Negroes were
further encouraged by a federal court decision against segregating
Mexican-Americans in California's schools. As Lawrence Scott wrote,
the ruling "opens the way to an attack on the whole expensive, segre-
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gated school system of the South and Middle West. It shows the possibility of a favorable ruling by the Supreme Court."22
Other groups sought to break down racial barriers. The Catholic
Interracial Council of Los Angeles challenged a state law prohibiting
interracial marriages. In the test, which involved a Negro and white
Catholic couple, the California Supreme Court in 1948 invalidated the
law. Coalition was also evidenced in politics. Blacks and MexicanAmericans in San Antonio joined together to elect a Negro to the junior
college's board of trustees and a Mexican-American to the school
board.23
In 1947 Walter White, in his role as Pontifex Maximus of interracial forces, complained that there was insufficient coordination in the
holy war against prejudice. He proposed establishment of a Supreme
Headquarters Against All Bigotry. Such a headquarters was never
established, but White, as much as any man, must have been aware of
the increase in cooperative efforts to combat intolerance and discrimination. Not only was there considerable cooperation among Jewish
and Negro groups, but also a certain amount with Japanese, Catholic,
and Mexican-American elements as well as with general organizations
like the Marxist Civil Rights Congress ( formerly the International
Labor Defense), the ACLU, the American Veterans Committee, and
the CIO. Indeed, the high point was reached dwing the late 1940s,
thanks to the economic resources available to the groups involved,
their many common goals, and the increasing receptivity of the nation
and the Truman administration to civil-rights pressures. This intensity
of concern was seen on the local as well as the national level. Carey
McWilliams wrote in 1948 that there were some seven hundred organizations interested in civil rights. In 1949 there were official humanrights agencies in twenty-one states and fifty-one cities. The ,American
Council on Race Relations later conducted a census which revealed
that 1,350 groups around the nation were concerned with improving
intergroup relations. 24
The international situation was another factor that stimulated
action by those who quested for civil rights. The concepts of the interrelatedness of peoples and the need for international cooperation
reached a peak in the 1940s partly because of the wartime alliance
against the Axis powers and partly because of the later search for a
way to avoid another, an atomic, world war. Many people were also
aware that happenings in the United States, the greatest of the superpowers, would be observed with keen interest abroad. St. Clair Drake
and Horace R. Cayton had stated it well when they wrote in 1945,
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"What happens to one affects all. A blow struck for freedom in
Bronzeville finds its echo in Chungking and Moscow, in Paris and
Senegal. A victory for fascism in Midwest Metropolis will sound the
knell of doom for the Common Man everywhere."25
This became all the more important as America cast about for
allies to stave off what it considered to be the postwar threat of international communism. American government pronouncements on behalf
of principles of democracy, freedom, and human rights in the EastW est struggle for the allegiance of men all over the world were somewhat heartening, partly because they paralleled the goals of the nation's
minorities and partly because of growing official awareness that violation of them at home was an embarrassment abroad for the United
States. The work of the United Nations was also encouraging, and the
attempts to establish the UN Commission on Human Rights and an
international bill of rights were of particular interest. As Edward Stettinius, America's representative on the UN Preparatory Commission,
reported, through the efforts of a human-rights commission "the
United Nations will be able to focus world attention continuously
upon the promotion of human rights and freedoms and upon violations
of these rights and freedoms whenever and wherever they occur." To
minorities in America, this promised that their problems would draw
additional interest at home and abroad. Certainly, there was a paradox
involved in America's concern for democracy on the world scene and
its treatment of minorities at home. It was high irony, for example, that
the United States was more concerned with democratic elections in
Poland than in the American South.26
The government was not unaware of the paradox:. In April 1946
Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in response to a request by
FEPC Chairman Malcolm Ross, wrote "The existence of discrimination
against minority groups in this country has an adverse effect on our
relations with other countries. We are reminded over and over by
some foreign newspapers and spokesmen, that our treatment of various minorities leaves much to be desired. . . . Frequently we find it
next to impossible to formulate a satisfactory answer to our critics in
other countries." President Truman stated the problem more succinctly
in February 1948 when he told Congress, "There is a serious gap between our ideals and some of our practices. This gap must be closed."27
The problem was not only one of the distance between principle
and practice for America's minorities. Nonwhite diplomats in Washington often encountered the barriers of the segregated city when they
left their chancelleries, which left them unfavorably impressed with
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America's ideals and manners. At least one case cost the United States
the prestige and economic advantage of securing an arm of the UN.
The University of Maryland offered a site and buildings for the establishment of the headquarters of the Food and Agricultural Organization, but the existence of segregation in the vicinity of the nation's
capital was an important factor in the decision to locate the F AO in
Rome. 28
The UN Human Rights Commission was formed in 1946, and
work was begun on formulating an international declaration of human
rights. The commission itself became a forum for grievances from
minorities in various countries, including India's untouchables, South
Africa's Indians, and the Palestinian Jews. America's National Negro
Congress also approached the UN with complaints from blacks.
W. E. B. DuBois recommended during the summer of 1946 that the
NAACP petition regarding the problems of America's Negroes, a tactic
approved by the association. DuBois was joined by Rayford W. Logan,
Milton R. Konvitz, Earl B. Dickerson, William R. Ming, Jr., and Leslie
S. Perry in preparing the long petition, which documented the injustices and proscriptions suffered by Negroes in the United States. The
document, entitled An Appeal to the World, was filed with the UN's
Human Rights Commission October 23, 1947. It was not formally
acted upon because of official American opposition and the reluctance
of the powers to establish the UN's authority in domestic affairs.
Nevertheless, the petition created an international stir as the foreign
press and foreign governments gave it great attention. 29
The document also had an impact at home. Some people were
angered at the NAACP's boldness, others were encouraged, and still
others surprised. Attorney General Tom Clark told the National Association of Attorneys General, "I was humiliated, as I know you must
have been, to realize that in our America there could be the slightest
foundation for such a petition. And that the association could conclude that amongst all of our honorable institutions there was no
tribunal to which such a petition could be presented with hope of
redress." Clark may have felt some pangs of humiliation, but the
grievances of black men could have come as no surprise to him. Indeed, it is apparent that he was using the petition to support the
federal government's quest for solutions to civil-rights problems, when
he announced that he was going to strive to enlarge and strengthen
the Justice Department's Civil Rights Section. 30
Although the State Department and Eleanor Roosevelt, the American delegate to the Human Rights Commission, had not welcomed the
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NAACP petition, the association was in 1948 invited to designate a
consultant to the United States delegation to the UN General Assembly.
Walter White was designated, and served in that capacity, becoming
the first of many Negroes to serve with the delegation. Meanwhile, the
Human Rights Commission drafted the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, which enumerated rights to such things as life, liberty,
security of person, equal protection under law, equality of rights
within a nation, fair trial, and free choice of employment, among
others. The Declaration was overwhelmingly adopted by the General
Assembly in Paris in 1948. It immediately affected the civil-rights
struggle in America in that it added more international opinion and
legal and moral arguments to the minorities' arsenal of weapons. 31
There can be no doubt that since 1940 the position and importance
of minorities in America, particularly of their upper and middle classes,
had considerably improved. There also can be no doubt that the
change had been fought for every step of the way. True, a small and
increasing number of whites agreed that change should come, and still
others were willing to yield under moderate pressure. The struggle
would continue bitterly, however, because most whites would seldom
grant even minor concessions graciously-and sometimes not at all.

5

A YEAR OF RELAXATION,
OF PREPARATION

During 1947 the Republican-controlled Eightieth Congress took
up its duties. Negroes and other minorities waited to see if the change
in party control would lead to action on civil-rights measures. Few
black leaders expected much, but they did challenge the Republicans
to live up to their past promises. As the Afro-American wrote, "The
Republican party for years has been saying that it would gladly pass a
federal anti-poll-tax bill, FEPC, and antilynching legislation comparable to the federal antikidnapping law but didn't because it didn't
have the votes. Well, it has the votes now.... If the GOP means
business, ... it now has its best opportunity in years to prove it."1
The NAACP and other minority organizations approached the
new Congress with a sizable legislative program, asking for action on
the FEPC, lynchings, poll taxes, filibusters, aid to education, jim-crow
travel, housing, rent control, school lunches, farm aid, various changes
in the District of Columbia, and for the ouster of Theodore Bilbo from
the Senate. Japanese-Americans sought passage of their claims bill
and liberalized citizenship and immigration provisions, and Indians
wanted increased appropriations.
President Truman abetted this drive. In his State of the Union
address of January 6, he pointed out "numerous attacks upon the constitutional rights of individual citizens as a result of racial and religious
bigotry" and said that he was "not convinced that the present legislation reached the limit of federal power to protect the civil rights of its
citizens." Two days later Truman sent his Economic Report up to
Capitol Hill and asked for a number of general measures of interest to
many Americans and particularly to minorities, including rent control,
increasing the minimum wage, extending the Fair Labor Standards
69
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Act to a larger number of workers, and raising and expanding the
coverage of social-security benefits. He added, "We must end discrimination in employment or wages against certain classes of workers.
. . . Discrimination against certain racial and religious groups, against
workers in late middle age, and against women, not only is repugnant
to the principles of our democracy, but often creates artificial 'labor
shortages' in the midst of labor surplus."2
Congress responded but slightly to minority-group demands. Although Bilbo was not drummed out of the Senate, he was not allowed
to take his seat. The question became academic, however, for Bilbo
soon died. In March the Senate Rules Committee ordered the admission of Negro correspondents to the press gallery, and the House of
Representatives soon followed suit. The Senate Rules Committee, also
in March, took action against discrimination in the operation of Capitol
and Senate Office Building restaurants used by Senate employees. 3
Action on legislative proposals moved slowly, however. No hearings were scheduled on the fifteen FEPC bills in the House. Senate
hearings were held on S. 984 in June and July, but the Labor and Welfare Committee failed to report this FEPC bill until the folJowing year.
Little prodding came from the executive branch, and Truman only
alluded again to fair employment practices in a June speech. Moreover,
the White House decided to dispose of A. Philip Randolph's pleas for
presidential support by not answering them. Labor Secretary Lewis B.
Schwellenbach did not testify before the Senate Labor Committee,
although in August, after the first session of Congress adjourned, he
did send a long and strong endorsement of S. 984 for inclusion in the
record. 4
No action was taken on antilynching proposals or on Adam Clayton Powell's bill to forbid segregaton in interstate transportation. Only
a minor victory was achieved in the effort to limit :filibusters, and that
was to extend the cloture rule to Senate motions not considered to be
pending business. Only three measures in which civil-rights advocates
were interested met with some success: the House passed the antipoll-tax and Japanese-American-claims bills, and the Senate and the
House enacted legislation providing for the people of Puerto Rico to
elect their own governor. Some pleasure was taken in Truman's vetoes
of the restrictive Taft-Hartley labor bill and the measure excluding
newspaper and magazine vendors, a group which included many
Negroes, from social-security coverage. 5
Nevertheless, these actions gave scant cause for joy. Negroes
knew that the poll-tax bill would be filibustered to death in the Senate.
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Moreover, regarding the FEPC, who could forget House Speaker
Joseph Martin's blunt statement in January that "we are not going to
pass the FEPC bill" because of opposition from industrialists who were
the Republican party's chief financial supporters. The general reaction
of the Negro press and Negro leaders was that the first session of the
Eightieth Congress was a failure. The Defender, using a phrase that
Harry Truman would make famous a year later, called the Republican
Congress a "do-nothing Congress."6 There was plenty of evidence,
certainly, that it would be "business as usual" throughout the Eightieth
Congress unless something remarkable happened.
Harry S. Truman had his ups and downs with minorities in 1947,
and deseivedly so. Although his January State of the Union message
and Economic Report dealt favorably with many issues of concern to
minority groups, he did little to press specific civil-rights questions.
Furthermore, on January 23, he crossed a CORE picket line that was
protesting the refusal of Washington's National Theater to admit black
people to performances. His blunder was widely taken as an insult to
Negroes. 7 Several interpretations of the president's apparently relaxed
position early in 1947 can be suggested. One is that he was hoping
to ride out civil-rights problems without doing much of anything.
Another is that he was not yet fully aware of the situation and therefore drifted, now that the pressures of 1946 had lessened. Still another
is that Truman and his government were in the process of transition,
of adjusting to the new powers in Congress and a new set of emerging
postwar problems. The fourth is that he knew what was happening
and was biding his time for the right moment to strike. Cases can be
made for all four of these views, but the evidence favors the third one,
that Truman was caught up in a transitional tide.
A considerable number of weighty problems had roosted on the
president's shoulders. Among them were the attenuation of relations
with the Soviet Union and its satellites, recruitment of allies, development of the United Nations, reconstruction of war-torn Europe, and,
at home, treatment of the problems of civil rights, inflation, labormanagement relations, and welfare services. These had to be dealt
with in the face of Republican control of Congress, opposition from
the Left and the Right within the Democratic party, and shifts of
power within executive circles; and they had to be done by an overworked chief executive who was far from popular within his nation.
In view of all this, it can be conjectured that Harry Truman, before
taking action on civil rights, decided to wait upon the report of his
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civil-rights committee, which was longer in coming than expected, and
to see what the Republicans did.
Some Democratic strategists, however, were busy. Liberals were
forming in ranks that would support and push the president toward a
more advanced civil-rights policy. After the Democratic defeat in the
congressional elections of 1946, a group of these liberals, led by Federal
Security Administrator Oscar R. Ewing, came together to discuss how
Truman was to recoup the party's losses. Liberalism had to be the
road, and the president, according to Ewing, would have to emerge as
"the champion of various groups." A band of administration liberals,
beginning late in 1946, met at Ewing's apartment every Monday evening to talk about how to influence Truman on policy. In on these
discussions and in developing influence on presidential policy were,
among others, Ewing, White House Special Counsel Clark Clifford,
Leon Keyserling of the Council of Economic Advisers, Assistant Interior Secretary C. Girard Davidson, Assistant Labor Secretary David
A. Morse, and Presidential Administrative Assistant Charles S. Murphy.
Interior Under Secretary Oscar Chapman was an important ally, for
he, more than anyone else who held Truman's confidence, had wide
connections with minority groups, including Negroes, Indians, Japanese-Americans, and territorial peoples. 8
These men were concerned with many things, and in general, as
Cabell Phillips has written, with "a liberalism focused on the creation
and equitable distribution of abundance." 9 Minority problems were
subsumed under this approach. The administration liberals, however,
were just forming in 1947. Their effect was to be gradual, for they
represented a transition from earlier, less coordinated influences on
Truman. They also represented the elements that would help the
president structure his Fair Deal program. This development was not
just one of stimulus and response. Truman's decision to listen increasingly to the administration liberals made it clear that he welcomed
their advice.
At least an equally important development was the formation of
the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) and the Progressive
Citizens of America ( PCA). The ADA, headed by Leon Henderson,
Chester Bowles, Wilson Wyatt, and other militant New Dealers, was
pitted against the PCA, which rallied around Henry Wallace. Both
groups appealed to liberals in the Democratic party and sought to pick
up what they thought was the shattered leadership of the party. 10 Both
placed pressure on Truman from the Left. He responded, with the
assistance of the Ewing group, by joining in the fight for liberal and
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minority-group support, finally gaining the reluctant backing of the
ADA, while the PCA dissipated its strength in Wallace's quixotic
candidacy for the presidency in 1948.
These struggles and influences left their mark on Truman's statements and actions in 1947. His State of the Union message and his
Economic Report showed this, as did his decision to present the annual
Wendell Willkie awards to Negro journalists in February, wheri he
lauded the black press for its "courageous and constructive manner" in
dealing with race relations. He also carried the message of human
rights abroad. In addressing the Inter-American Conference in Rio
de Janeiro in September, the president referred to "the belief of our
people in the principle that there are basic human rights which all
men everywhere should enjoy." A president as forthright as Truman
would have been prepared to make such a statement only i£ he was also
prepared to seek those rights for his own people. Moreover, although
he did not make an issue out of civil-rights legislation in 1947, he did
fight for other legislation of interest to minorities-for the adjustment
of income to prices, extension of wages-and-hours and social-security
laws, public housing, rent control, and price ceilings. 11
The most publicized of Truman's civil-rights statements was his
June 29 address to the annual meeting of the NAACP. Walter White
invited him to speak to the association's closing session at the Lincoln
Memorial. The president accepted and told White to send "a memorandum of the points you think I ought to emphasize in my speech."12
Plainly, Truman wanted to demonstrate his earnestness on civil rights.
Furthermore, his speech could serve as a holding action until the
civil-rights committee made its report.
This was to be no quiet statement to Negroes, but a major address.
In preparing the message, Truman rejected David Niles's suggestion to
devote only the last paragraph to civil rights. Instead, the speech was
devoted solely to that subject. Not only was Truman's appearance to be
staged at the Lincoln Memorial, with the probability of a large audience, but he was to share the speaking with Eleanor Roosevelt and
Republican Senator Wayne Morse, no small crowd drawers themselves.
Truman's talk was to be precedent-breaking in that no president had
previously addressed the NAACP. The four major radio networks
broadcast his speech, as did most independent radio stations; and the
State Department arranged to transmit the message by shortwave all
over the world. 18
In the address, Truman solemnly declared, "We must make the
federal government a friendly, vigilant defender of the rights and
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equalities of all Americans. And ... I mean all Americans." After he
said, "There is no justifiable reason for discrimination because of ancestry, or religion, or race, or color," Truman enumerated the fundamental rights that each citizen should have. These were "the right to
a decent home, the right to an education, the right to adequate medical
care, the right to a worthwhile job, the right to an equal share in
malting public decisions through the ballot, and the right to a fair trial
in a fair court." He added that the evils of insult, intimidation, physical injury, and mob violence had to be dealt with. "We cannot wait
another decade or another generation to remedy these evils . . . we
can no longer afford the luxury of a leisurely attack upon prejudice
and discrimination . . . we cannot, any longer, await the growth of a
will to action in the slowest state or the most backward community.
Our national government must show the way." After Truman sat down,
he said to Walter White, '1 said what I did because I mean every word
of it-and I am going to prove that I do mean it."14
Truman's address left him open to criticism from some whites, and
indeed to the charge that any sign of friendship for Negroes was a
form of being a Communist fellow traveler. Yet a great deal of attention was given the speech abroad, and there were reports that many
whites took it well at home. Black response was enthusiastic. Walter
White summed it up when he told Truman that the speech "was the
most forthright pronouncement any American president has yet made
on this issue." Of course, understandably, there were those, such as
the Chicago Defender and the Amsterdam News, that pointed out that
although the words were great, there was no substitute for deeds. 15
And this was not to take anything away from the president. His words
had been electrifying. But the question was sincerely meant, what
was the government going to do?
The answer, until the President's Committee on Civil Rights reported, was, not much. One thing in the works was the Freedom
Train. Sponsored by the American Heritage Foundation, with the cooperation of the White House and the attorney general, its goal was to
exhibit across the nation such documents of American freedom as the
Bill of Rights and the Emancipation Proclamation. Thanks to a resolution by Charles E. Wilson, the foundation's board of directors voted to
withdraw the train from cities that tried to segregate visitors to the
exhibit. Not only was the Freedom Train a public-relations effort in
behalf of basic concepts of freedom, but it was an object lesson in
civil rights, however small, in that the train's stops were canceled in
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Memphis and Birmingham, which had insisted upon segregation of
those who wanted to see the documents. 16
More significant were governmental action and inaction on matters of concern to minorities. Federal employment constituted one
area of interest. That fair practices in government employment had
not been achieved was strongly suggested by data gathered from various federal agencies on the employment of blacks in their Washington
offices as of August 1947. The figures showed that employment patterns varied greatly among the agencies that supplied useful information. The National Labor Relations Board employed 69 Negroes and
280 whites in the capital, and the Civil Service Commission, 422 and
1479; while the Bureau of the Budget had 25 Negroes to 545 whites,
and the Tariff Commission, 10 to 219. More than 10 percent of the
employees were black in the Federal Security Agency, the Public
Housing Authority, the Federal Housing Administration, the Housing
and Home Finance Agency, and in the Commerce, Navy, and State
departments. The Interior and Agriculture departments and the Interstate Commerce Commission had less than 10 percent. Although the
employment percentages varied considerably among these fourteen
agencies, the types of positions given to Negroes were almost unvarying. Only in two agencies-Federal Security, and Housing and Home
Finance-was the proportion of Negroes to whites in professional positions more than one in ten. The black-to-white ratio in professional
jobs averaged under one in a hundred in the other twelve agencies,
with indeed none reaching as much as three in one hundred. In all
agencies except the Commerce Department, Negroes outnumbered
whites in the lowest category, the CPC ( Custodial, Protective, and
Crafts) level. 17 Blacks were plainly the victims of the low level of education afforded them and of discriminatory patterns of employment in
the civil service.
Another area of concern was the appointment of Negroes to executive positions. The black press contended that the number of Negroes
in high-level government jobs had declined markedly, and it was said
that the caliber of some of those who remained was lower. The usual
example of this was Marcus H. Ray, the civilian aide to the secretary
of war, who was considered weaker than his two predecessors, William
H. Hastie and Truman K. Gibson. A few battles were won, for example
in the Department of Labor, which appointed a black to the Women's
Bureau and another one to increase integration of black youths in the
apprenticeship training program. One prestige appointment was that
of President Charles S. Johnson of Fisk University to be an American
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delegate to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization. 18
Negroes were also keenly interested in the whites who occupied
the highest government positions. The appointment of General Omar
Bradley as army chief of staff was widely approved. Commenting on
his work as veterans administrator, the Afro-American said that he had
"under the most trying conditions demonstrated his ability and courage
to do a job." More predictable were the compliments given to Tom
Clark. The Chicago Defender, for example, named the attorney general to its Honor Roll of Democracy for 1947, citing him for conceiving
the Freedom Train idea, pressing to upgrade the Justice Department'.s
civil-rights unit, and interceding in litigation involving racially restrictive covenants and the union rights of black railway firemen. 19
The NAACP was disturbed about appointments to several agencies. The association's labor secretary, Clarence Mitchell, appeared
before the Senate Civil Service Committee to challenge confirmation
of Jesse M. Donaldson as postmaster general because of evidences of
racial discrimination while he had been first assistant postmaster general. Although Donaldson was confirmed, a subcommittee was appointed to investigate Mitchell's charges. Walter White took this
matter up with the president, along with that of Carl Gray, who had
been named to head the Veterans Administration. White contended
that Donaldson and Gray possessed undesirable racial attitudes, and he
urged Truman "that particular attention be devoted to examination in
the future of the racial and religious attitudes of all others who may be
considered for federal government posts." Truman responded cordially,
but in effect indicated that he did not need White's advice. "When I
make administrative appointments, I try to make them on the basis of
the ability of the man to do the job, and I think that has been followed
in almost every instance."20
Negroes were also concerned with developments in the defense
establishment. The appointment of Kenneth C. Royall as secretary of
war met with opposition. Columnist Louis Lautier said that Royall
was less liberal on race relations than his predecessor, Robert Patterson, and was thought to be "responsible for reactionary moves of the
department." Black leaders were pleased with the appointment of
James V. Forrestal as the first secretary of defense. Some were, however, unhappy that in the new, unified defense establishment, only the
army had a Negro adviser. 21
Negroes were interested in more than appointments in the reconstruction of the military services. The Supreme Court's decision in the
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Morgan case against segregation of passengers on interstate busses led
the army to rule: "It is not the function of military police to compel
military personnel to obey state laws." Military police could intervene
only to protect soldiers involved in a dispute or when the soldiers conducted themselves in a discreditable manner. The army custom of
burying soldiers and veterans in national cemeteries on a racially segregated basis yielded in 1947 to the pressure of black protest.22
The segregation of national guardsmen was another and more important pressure point. Citizens' committees had been formed in six
states to urge racial integration of their Guard and Reserve components. In response to NAACP pressure on the army, Civilian Aide
Marcus Ray recommended in April that each locality be permitted to
decide whether to integrate its Guard and Reserve units; but the recommendation was "nonconcurred in" by Lieutenant General C. P. Hall,
the director of organization and training, and Major General W. S.
Paul, the director of personnel and administration. They suggested
instead that the Reserve be governed by Circular No. 124, and that
integration of the National Guard be left up to the states, with the
proviso that troops would in no case be mixed racially within companies. Hall's reasoning was that "individual integration will not be
accepted on a nation-wide basis in time of emergency" because it
would lead to discontent. This statement was accepted by Chief of
Staff Dwight D. Eisenhower and Assistant Secretary of War Howard
C. Peterson. Ray swallowed the policy recommendation, but he cautioned that it might lead to well-founded court cases which "would
endanger the orderly and progressive movement toward a full utilization of our manpower as outlined and envisioned by Circular 124."
He also indicated that black and liberal-white elements would '1ine up
against the army and this may well be felt in Universal Military
Training."23
Adoption of the Hall-Paul recommendation would have been a
step forward, although a short one. It might even have averted the
crisis in the army in 1948 over official state pressures to desegregate the
Guard. Secretary of War Patterson, however, decided to make no
change in policy. The letter that went out in response to the NAACP's
communication, after being mulled over for two-and-a-half months,
was a model of evasion. Colonel Edward J. Geesen, the acting chief
of the National Guard Bureau, conceded the importance of questions
relating to racial integration of guardsmen and said that the War Department had "studied them earnestly and in detail." The crux of his
answer was, "You, of course, will realize the impossibility of making a
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decision of such consequence based on an abstract or hypothetical
presentation. A question of this kind will be determined, if presented
in regular course, on inquiry from official sources."24 In other words,
there would be no change. Patterson had evidently decided that the
army had more to lose from southern reaction to change than from the
antagonism of Negroes and white liberals. The test of his wisdom
would come in 1948, forcefully, "on inquiry from official sources" in
northern states.
As indicated by these National Guard, burial, and military-police
matters, the army brass, although slow, was not unmovable. Intransigence in 1947 was provided mainly by the secretary of war. More
evidence that some top uniformed leaders of the army were willing to
consider change was supplied by an experiment in Europe. Lieutenant
General Clarence R. Huebner, chief of staff for the European command, believed that black soldiers could benefit greatly from improved
training and indoctrination. This he personally sponsored in Europe
from 1947 on, with General Paul's encouragement. His program also
included greater use of Negro officers with black units and a genuine
effort to qualify more Negroes for use in specialties. Huebner's program was to lead to considerable advancement of black troops in terms
of pride and skills.25
Conscription had lapsed early in 1947. With the emergence, however, of the cold war between Russia and the United States, debate
began about the need for a peacetime draft, either along wartime lines
or in the form of universal military training for all qualified young
men. Negroes decided to exert pressure for nondiscriminatory and
unsegregated conscription procedures. Therefore, during the fall of
1947, A. Philip Randolph and Grant Reynolds organized the Committee
against Jim Crow in Military Service and Training, which was widely
supported by Negro newspapers and leaders. 26 Thus the stage was set
for a battle royal in 1948 on several fronts concerning blacks and the
armed services. Negroes wanted to be consulted; they wanted an end
to discrimination and segregation in the services; they wanted fair
treatment and equal opportunities in an area of life that affected so
many of them so much; and they were willing to make a major political
fight for achievement of these goals.
President Truman had chosen to meet America's future manpower
needs through a program of universal military training. Under this
plan, all young Americans would spend a period of their lives in military training, so that there would always be a considerable number of
men in service and, after a while, a large body of trained men that
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could be drawn upon in case of emergency. Late in 1946 the president
appointed a commission of prominent citizens to study the question of
universal training and how best to achieve it. Truman K. Gibson, Jr.,
was named to it, as was Charles E. Wilson, the chairman of the President's Committee on Civil Rights, which militated against the commission taking a segregationist line.
In May 1947 the President's Advisory Commission on Universal
Training made its report, strongly opposing segregation in a citizen's
army. That did not settle the question, however, for Truman did no
more than to present the report to Congress with his endorsement.
Additionally, an experimental unit established at Fort Knox, to show
how universal training would work, contained no Negroes, in order to
avoid raising the question of race in the eyes of southemers. 27 What
it did, of course, was to raise the issue of military segregation all the
more forcefully in the minds of blacks and liberals.
Another group that added to the official pressures for civil rights
was the President's Commission on Higher Education, which had been
appointed during the summer of 1946. Its report, made public beginning in December 1947, urged, "The time has come to make public
education at all levels equally accessible to all, without regard to race,
creed, sex or national origin." The commission's report confirmed, as
the Chicago Defender wrote, that Jim Crowism was "officially under
fire." The reaction among Negroes was a happy one, perhaps all the
more because of the consternation and bitterness created in the South
by the commission's recommendations. 28 The report reinforced sentiment among minorities to challenge discrimination in education, but
it also stiffened the determination of southern whites to meet the challenge either by outright resistance or by trying to improve educational opportunities for minorities within the framework of separatebut-equal schools.
The most eagerly awaited official civil-rights activity of 1947 was,
of course, the work of the President's Committee on Civil Rights. The
committee met for the first time on January 15 at the White House,
where President Truman gave it a big send-off. He told the committee
that he wanted to stop a recurrence of the Ku Klux Klan terrorism of
the 1920s. "I don't want to see any race discrimination. I don't want
to see any religious bigotry break out in this country as it did then."
Yet he charged the committee with more than meeting current problems. As he said, "I want our Bill of Rights implemented in fact. We
have been trying to do this for 150 years. We are making progress, but
we are not making progress fast enough." The president found it diffi-
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cult to state in detail what he wanted, but it was something that would
work a change in people's hearts, "accomplish the purposes which we
have been trying to accomplish for 150 years," and clarify the powers
of the federal government in protecting citizens' rights. "It's [a] big
job," he told the committee. "Go to itl" 29
The committee got down to work that same day. It established
three subcommittees which were to investigate existing federal laws
and to suggest new legislation to remedy inadequacies; to consider the
social, economic, and public relations aspects of civil rights; and to
study elements that contributed to the derogation of minority rights.
The question of securing an executive secretary for the committee was
discussed, and it was decided that "it would be better to get a younger
person who would put in a lot of time" and "who in no way was connected with any group or organization." Chairman Charles E. Wilson
told his colleagues that no fiscal ceiling had been placed on the committee in doing its work. As to how much time the committee had for
its work and to whom it should report, he said that the president
would receive the report and that recommendations along legislative
lines were expected within sixty days, so that they could be acted upon
by Congress during the cu1Tent session. As to how Congress should be
approached, the committee concluded that its report "ought to go as a
'massive approach.' "3 0
The President's Committee on Civil Rights (PCCR) met again on
Febrnary 5 and 6. Wilson announced that President John S. Dickey
of Dartmouth College and Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., would be vicechairmen and would serve with him as the members of the executive
committee. Assignments were made to the three subcommittees, which
were expected to become active immediately. In addition, the committee met with representatives of the Justice Department to discuss
its civil-rights activities. The appointment of Robert K. Carr as executive secretary was announced. 31 Carr's appointment was fortunate.
He was a professor of government and chairman of the department at
Dartmouth. For the preceding two years he had . been part of the
Cornell University research project on civil liberties, with particular
concern for the operations of the Civil Rights Section of the Department of Justice. Carr was to prove an able, energetic, and wellinformed executive secretary.
The members of the PCCR varied in their backgrounds and interests, so that keeping track of such a large group, fifteen, was no
small problem for Wilson and Carr. Absenteeism occasionally became
a problem because of illness and conflicting engagements; and at least
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once-on April 17-not enough members turned up to constitute a
quorum at a meeting. Yet, most committee members showed zest for
their work and indeed a keen sense of mission. That sense was best
shown in their singular action in taking a special oath of office: "I do
solemnly swear that I will well and faithfully discharge my duties as a
member of the President's Committee on Civil Rights and that I will
bear true faith and allegiance to the ideals to which this committee is
dedicated. So help me God."32
President Truman, in his January 15 talk, had said that his office
and the attorney general would aid the committee. The White House
did assist considerably in making administrative and fiscal arrangements for the PCCR and its staff. Philleo Nash and David K. Niles kept
in close touch with the committee and its work. The White House was
well aware of the group's potential value. Of course, the committee
was meant to draw up a blueprint for dealing with the overall problem
of civil rights. It was further hoped that the PCCR would serve the
purpose of educating the people to the need for action. But the committee also had the function of removing Truman from immediate
civil-rights pressures until a program could be formulated. This was
seen in the fact that the PCCR, during its existence, became the chief
vessel to contain pressure, protests, and ideas. The best illustration of
this was in the case of Willie Earle's lynching on February 17. Walter
White urged the committee to investigate the lynching. Charles
Wilson replied immediately, "Appreciate your wire. Federal investigations under way. This crime will command our closest attention. Urge
that you forward President's Committee additional information and
advice. Deeply concerned." Niles exulted in a memorandum of February 19 to Matthew Connelly: "The president may be interested to
see how his Civil Rights Committee is taking him off the hot seat. Day
before yesterday there was this brutal lynching in South Carolina.
They immediately moved in on it." 33
The Justice Department also helped the PCCR, probably viewing
it as a public-relations and pressure-group adjunct to its own operations. The department prepared drafts of possible civil-rights legislation for the committee's inspection. Although the department was not
pressing specific bills onto the committee, it did make plain its concern
for adequate legislative sanctions against violations of civil rights. As
Turner Smith, chief of the Civil Rights Section, told the committee on
February 6, "My trouble is not personnel. Our real difficulty is legal
trouble." At the committee's suggestion, Smith promptly submitted a
paper outlining the problems that appeared "to be of principal public
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concern." These included lynchings; the Ku Klux Klan; discrimination
in primary elections; discrimination in transportation and public accommodations; police brutality; and issues peculiar to Japanese-Americans, Mexicans and Mexican-Americans, and Jehovah's Witnesses.
Progress had been made in dealing with some of these problems, but
Smith made it clear that the legal bases for action left much to be
desired. 34
Attorney General Tom Clark appeared before the committee on
April 3. He stressed that prosecutions in civil-rights cases had steadily
increased over the past five years, indeed that more than half of all
such prosecutions in the nation's history had taken place during that
period. Clark urged the PCCR to take seriously its educative potential
in preventing lynchings and mob violence. "Law enforcement," he
said, '1argely depends upon the communities. You can't legislate
morals in the people; you have to educate morals into people. We have
to cause communities to become more interested and more publicspirited in this regard." Yet legislation had its place. What he recommended was enlargement of "the present Sections 51 and 52 of the
Civil Rights Statutes so that those who engage in mob activity or lynching activity, as it is commonly known, might be found guilty of a
federal offense."35
While materials from the Justice Department were piling up, the
committee elicited recommendations from other parties. Late in February Executive Secretary Carr sent letters to 194 groups and 112 individuals asking for recommendations and information. Responses
came from 82 people and 141 organizations, including those as diverse
in interest as the American Bar Association, the Red Cross, the National Education Association, Time magazine, and the United Automobile Workers, as well as such obvious respondents as the NAACP,
the American Jewish Committee, and the American Civil Liberties
Union. The PCCR corresponded with many other groups and individuals, and had extended exchanges with some of the original correspondents, on civil-rights questions. Some twenty-five federal agencies and
many state and local units of government also assisted the committee. 36
The members met in full committee ten times and even more often
in their subcommittees. Additionally, they exchanged with Carr and
each other a considerable volume of letters, recommendations, memoranda, and reports. At their meetings they sometimes heard witnesses
-about forty-in open or closed sessions. The PCCR's staff churned
up a large number of studies that shed light on a broad range of
minority-group problems. This activity showed how true was Presi-
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dent Truman's comment that "it's a big job." By February it was clear
that the committee could not study the problem thoroughly enough to
make well-supported legislative recommendations by the middle of
March. The target date for the final report was moved to June 30.
That soon proved unrealistic too, so on March 19 the committee voted
to set October 1 as the date for its report. 37
By late April the PCCR had made substantial progress. It was
hoped that the committee and its subcommittees could complete their
remaining investigations by late May or June, so that the committee
could determine its final recommendations and the writing of the report
could begin. This was, however, a case of too much optimism. It had
taken much time to develop the positions of the various committee
members and of the subcommittees; these positions had yet to be reconciled. Moreover, since the members were busy people, the problem of
scheduling committee meetings intruded on the progress of the PCCR
and its staff. And then there was the necessity of moving the staff
offices into a different building in May. Other delays hampered progress. For example, on May 23 Carr wrote the attorney general asking
for the Justice Department's advice on four points; but Tom Clark did
not send a reply for almost two months. 38 In any event, not enough
members of the committee could find time to come together in late
May or early June to make the decisions on what should be included
in the report. Carr was able to schedule a session for June 30 and July
1 in Hanover, New Hampshire, and it was there that the PCCR made
most of its decisions.
There were, of course, disagreements among the committee members at Hanover, as there had been at most of their meetings. But, as
Channing Tobias later related, little struggle was involved in bringing
the committee to essential agreement. The PCCR invested much time
in deciding what not to recommend. They discarded suggestions for
antilynching legislation directed against whole communities; invoking
of the congressional-representation penalty clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment against states where minorities were denied voting rights;
self-government for dependent areas; joining of a permanent Civil
Rights Commission with the Justice Department's civil-rights program;
grants-in-aid for health, education, and housing; criticizing the Housing Authority on restrictive covenants; abolishing the Un-American
Activities Committee; and repeal of sedition laws. These were dropped
for a variety of reasons, probably because they were out of the committee's purview or were impolitic, or because other approaches to the
problems were thought to be more satisfactory. Disagreement, when it
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cropped up, was confined mainly to discrimination in schools, proposed
nonsegregation stipulations on federal grants-in-aid, the role of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation in civil-rights cases, and the administration of federal loyalty programs. 39 Lest it appear that the committee
was drastically shaving its responsibilities, it must be said that it
decided to be bold in the many areas that it decided to tackle. It would
make recommendations for state and local as well as federal action. It
would attack segregation as well as discrimination in American life.
This is plainly seen in the PCCR's final report.
The committee's recommendations were largely settled at the
Hanover meeting, and it was left up to the staff to tie up loose ends in
consultation with committee members and to translate the recommendations into acceptable language. The PCCR agreed to keep the final
report within 100 to 250 pages in length. 40
Now came the task of writing. Robert Carr believed that the
Hanover session had gone well, although he wrote to Morris Ernst,
"We are not entirely out of the woods yet, and I suppose we won't be
until the finished report is finally submitted to the president." Carr
wanted to spend the first two weeks of July reviewing what had happened at Hanover and then to enter a "period of intensive activity" of
composing the draft report. He believed that the report could be
drafted and circulated among the committee members by September
1, when he wanted the committee to meet again in final session.
Charles Wilson thought that date too optimistic and suggested postponing the meeting until September 12-13.41
There were other affairs to attend to. The PCCR had pressed for
government action on civil-rights violations on several occasions. One
had been the Willie Earle lynching. Another came up in July, when
one committee member, Mrs. Tilly, wrote with alarm about a series of
violent incidents in Georgia and urged the attorney general to intervene. Carr indicated that he was in touch with the Justice Department
on the "veritable reign of terror" in Georgia. In fact, he added that
the committee staff "has brought pressure on the department with respect to a variety of matters and I think our influence is being felt." 42
The draft report was circulated early in September, and responses
came from committee members within the week. Mrs. Alexander made
twenty-five comments, especially in the areas of violations of rights and
strengthening of laws, and she did it in a forceful and convincing manner. Bishop Sherrill's comments were minor and aimed chiefly at pointing up that the problem of civil rights was not just a southern one.
Mrs. Tilly believed that the draft put "too much hope on legislation as
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a cure all." All would not be well even if legislation were procured.
She also felt that the report was too belligerent toward the South, not
because the accusations were unjust but because they might "undo the
social progress the South has made in the last twenty-five years." Particularly she opposed an attack on segregation, because she doubted
that Truman would accept the report, because of its political implications among southerners, and because "the South will stay ignorant
before it will be forced to having non-segregated schools."43
Apparently the Justice Department was the only government
agency given the opportunity of commenting on the draft report. Reaction came in the form of a pained letter of protest from J. Edgar
Hoover to Chairman Wilson. The Federal Bureau of Investigation had
been criticized in the draft for the laxity of its standards in a couple of
cases, and Hoover complained that the PCCR had not inquired of him
so that he could make available all the facts in those cases. The committee allowed the bureau to submit data that led to a change in the
report. Specifically, allegations that the FBI was reluctant to handle
civil-rights investigations and that it disagreed with the Civil Rights
Section over investigatory standards were toned down, although not
eliminated. 44 Hoover had not swept the rug clean; he did not, and
would not in the future, convince anyone that he was dedicated to the
cause of civil rights.
The committee met as scheduled September 12-13 and disposed of
all but two of its remaining disagreements-nonsegregation stipulations
on federal grants-in-aid and school discrimination. Under Wilson's
and Carr's smooth direction and with White House assistance, the
report was quickly guided through the final editorial and printing
stages, and a date for presentation of the document to the president
was set for October 29, almost a month later than scheduled.
While the PCCR was doing its work, there had been much speculation among Negroes as to the results. At the end of May, James E.
Boyack, writing in the Courier, indicated that "sweeping changes in the
nation's civil rights law will be recommended by the President's Committee." Charles H. Houston was pessimistic that the committee would
be tough enough to try to "challenge the conscience of this country to
the stark necessity of establishing true democracy at home." Louis
Lautier wrote that the committee had 'been laboring ever since it was
appointed last December and is about to bring forth a mouse." The
Chicago Defender believed, however, that the committee's report
would meet "squarely the issues which disturb us," but asserted that its
work, in order to mean anything, had to be followed up by President
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Truman and Congress. The conflicting speculation resulted from the
fact that the PCCR had kept its work confidential. Perhaps secrecy
was advisable, as Negro columnist Lem Graves, Jr., suggested, so that
the committee could work outside "the glare of the public spotlight,"
even though this had led to mediocre press relations. 45 Certainly the
fact that the committee kept out of the limelight enabled its report to
receive considerable publicity when it was released, because it was
not stale news.
The PCCR gathered at the White House on the morning of October 29 and submitted its report to the president. When Truman received the document, he told the committee: '1 have stolen a march
on you. I have already read the report and I want you to know that
not only have you done a good job but you have done what I wanted
you to." Truman made the report public the same day. He urged all
Americans to read it and suggested that it might be "an American
charter of human freedom in our time," one that would be at home "a
guide for action" and abroad "a declaration of our renewed faith in ...
the integrity of the individual human being ... protected by a government based on equal freedom under just laws." 46
The PCCR's report, which was called To Secure These Rights, was
divided into four main parts. The first part reviewed the American
heritage, asserting that it was based on the premise that "all men are
created equal as well as free." This was a postulate that the committee
believed had been recognized by the people in making their state and
national constitutions. The committee further contended that there
were four basic rights for Americans-those of "safety and security of
the person," "citizenship and its privileges," "freedom of conscience
and expression," and "equality of opportunity." These were the rights
that the nation had to labor to perfect. The second section of To Secure
These Rights was the largest and dealt with the state of basic rights in
America. It summarized the disparities between the promises of freedom and equality and their achievement-a roll call of the grievances
of American minorities, particularly those of the Negro. The third part
concerned the federal government's responsibilities in securing people's
rights. As the PCCR saw it, the need for federal action stemmed from
the inability of states to eliminate outrages, the prestige of the national
government in showing the way for local communities, the necessity to
offset the unpleasant international implications of America's failure to
achieve equal human rights at home, the tendency of people to look to
Washington for protection of their rights, and the federal government's
direct responsibility for the rights of its employees, clients, and the
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people in its territories. The constitutional powers of the national government to act were extensive, the committee emphasized; but to be
effective they required specific legislative and executive action.
The committee's recommendations, which made up the fourth and
last part of the report, constituted the most eagerly awaited section.
The reasons given for the recommendations were moral, economic, and
international. The gap between America's civil-rights aims and accomplishments, the PCCR said, created "a kind of moral dry rot which eats
away at the emotional and rational bases of democratic beliefs." It was
also costly, for it drained off much of the nation's "human wealth, its
national competence." Moreover, the country "is not so strong, the
final triumph of the democratic ideal is not so inevitable, that we can
ignore what the world thinks of us or our record." The committee
made thirty-five recommendations. In short, federal, state, and local
governments, as well as private citizens, were called upon to enlist in
a crusade for the elimination in America of discrimination and segregation, of intimidation and mob violence, and of violations of rights.
The PCCR's specific recommendations were so significant that they
will be reproduced here, although without their lengthy explanations.

I. To strengthen the machinery for the protection of civil
rights, the President's Committee recommends:
1. The reorganization of the Civil Rights Section of the
Department of Justice to provide for: The establishment of
regional offices; a substantial increase in its appropriation and
staff to enable it to engage in more extensive research and to
act more effectively to prevent civil rights violations; an increase in investigative action in the absence of complaints;
the greater use of civil sanctions; its elevation to the status of
a full division in the Department of Justice.
2. The establishment within the FBI of a special unit of
investigators trained in civil rights work.
3. The establishment by the state governments of law
enforcement agencies comparable to the federal Civil Rights
Section.
4. The establishment of a permanent Commission on Civil
Rights in the Executive Office of the President, preferably by
Act of Congress; and the simultaneous creation of a Joint
Standing Committee on Civil Rights in Congress.
5. The establishment by the states of permanent commis-
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sions on civil rights to parallel the work of the federal Commission at the state level.
6. The increased professionalization of state and local
police forces.

II. To strengthen the right to safety and security of the
person, the President's Committee recommends:
1. The enactment by Congress of new legislation to supplement Section 51 of Title 18 of the United States Code
which would impose the same liability on one person as is
now imposed by that statute on two or more conspirators.
2. The amendment of Section 51 to remove the penalty
provision which disqualifies persons convicted under the Act
from holding public office.
3. The amendment of Section 52 to increase the maximum penalties that may be imposed under it from a $1,000 fine
and a one-year prison term to a $5,000 fine and a ten-year
prison term, thus bringing its penalty provisions into line with
those in Section 51.
4. The enactment by Congress of a new statute, to supplement Section 52, specifically directed against police brutality and related crimes.
5. The enactment by Congress of an antilynching act.
6. The enactment by Congress of a new criminal statute
on involuntary servitude, supplementing Sections 443 and 444
of Title 18 of the United States Code.
7. A review of our wartime evacuation and detention
experience looking toward the development of a policy which
will prevent the abridgment of civil rights of any person or
groups because of race or ancestry.
8. Enactment by Congress of legislation establishing a
procedure by which claims of evacuees for specific property
and business losses resulting from the wartime evacuation can
be promptly considered and settled.

III. To strengthen the right to citizenship and its privileges, the President's Committee recommends:
1. Action by the states or Congress to end poll taxes as a
voting prerequisite.
2. The enactment by Congress of a statute protecting the
right of qualified persons to participate in federal primaries
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and elections against interference by public officers and private persons.
3. The enactment by Congress of a statute protecting the
right to qualify for, or participate in, federal or state primaries
or elections against discriminatory action by state officers
based on race or color, or depending on any other unreasonable classification of persons for voting purposes.
4. The enactment by Congress of legislation establishing
local self-government for the District of Columbia; and the
amendment of the Constitution to extend suffrage in presidential elections, and representation in Congress to District
residents.
5. The granting of suffrage by the States of New Mexico
and Arizona to their Indian citizens.
6. The modification of the federal naturalization laws to
permit the granting of citizenship without regard to the race,
color, or national origin of applicants.
7. The repeal by the states of laws discriminating against
aliens who are ineligible for citizenship because of race, color,
or national origin.
8. The enactment by Congress of legislation granting
citizenship to the people of Guam and American Samoa.
9. The enactment by Congress of legislation, followed by
appropriate administrative action, to end immediately all discrimination and segregation based on race, color, creed, or
national origin, in the organization and activities of all
branches of the Armed Services.
10. The enactment by Congress of legislation providing
that no member of the armed forces shall be subject to discrimination of any kind by any public authority or place of
public accommodation, recreation, transportation, or other
service or business.

IV. To strengthen the right to freedom of conscience and
expression, the Presidents Committee recommends:
1. The enactment by Congress and the state legislatures
of legislation requiring all groups, which attempt to influence
public opinion, to disclose the pertinent facts about themselves through systematic registration procedures.
2. Action by Congress and the executive branch clarifying the loyalty obligations of federal employees, and estab-
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lishing standards and procedures by which the civil rights of
public workers may be scrupulously maintained.

V. To strengthen the right to equality of opportunity, the
President's Committee recommends:
1. In general: The elimination of segregation, based on
race, color, creed, or national origin, from American life. The
conditioning by Congress of all federal grants-in-aid and other
forms of federal assistance to public or private agencies for
any purpose on the absence of discrimination and segregation
based on race, color, creed, or national origin.
2. For employment: The enactment of a federal Fair Employment Practice Act prohibiting all forms of discrimination
in private employment, based on race, color, creed, or national
origin. The enactment by the states of similar laws; the issuance by the President of a mandate against discrimination in
government employment and the creation of adequate machinery to enforce this mandate.
3. For education: Enactment by the state legislatures of
fair educational practice laws for public and private educational institutions, prohibiting discrimination in the admission
and treatment of students based on race, color, creed, or national origin.
4. For housing: The enactment by the states of laws outlawing restrictive covenants; renewed court attack, with intervention by the Department of Justice, upon restrictive covenants.
5. For health services: The enactment by the states of
fair health practice statutes forbidding discrimination and
segregation based on race, creed, color, or national origin, in
the operation of public or private health facilities.
6. For public services: The enactment by Congress of a
law stating that discrimination and segregation, based on race,
color, creed, or national origin, in the rendering of all public
services by the national government is contrary to public policy; the enactment by the states of similar laws; the establishment by act of Congress or executive order of a unit in the
federal Bureau of the Budget to review the execution of all
government programs, and the expenditures of all government
funds, for compliance with the policy of nondiscrimination;
the enactment by Congress of a law prohibiting discrimina-
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tion or segregation, based on race, color, creed, or national
origin, in interstate transportation and all the facilities thereof,
to apply against both public officers and the employees of
private transportation companies; the enactment by the states
of laws guaranteeing equal access to places of public accommodation, broadly defined, for persons of all races, colors,
creeds, and national origins.
7. For the District of Columbia: The enactment by Congress of legislation to accomplish the following purposes in the
District; prohibition of discrimination and segregation, based
on race, color, creed, or national origin, in all public or publicly-supported hospitals, parks, recreational facilities, housing
projects, welfare agencies, penal institutions, and concessions
on public property; the prohibition of segregation in the public school system of the District of Columbia; the establishment of a fair educational practice program directed against
discrimination, based on race, color, creed, or national origin,
in the admission of students to private educational institutions; the establishment of a fair health practice program forbidding discrimination and segregation by public or private
agencies, based on race, color, creed, or national origin, with
respect to the training of doctors and nurses, the admission of
patients to hospitals, clinics, and similar institutions, and the
right of doctors and nurses to practice in hospitals; the outlawing of restrictive covenants; guaranteeing equal access to
places of public accommodation, broadly defined, to persons
of all races, colors, creeds, and national origins.
8. The enactment by Congress of legislation ending the
system of segregation in the Panama Canal Zone.

VI. To rally the American people to the support of a continuing program to strengthen civil rights, the President's
Committee recommends:
A long term campaign of public education to inform the
people of the civil rights to which they are entitled and which
they owe to one another. 47
These were the PCCR's recommendations. They were unanimously agreed upon by the committee except that a minority, at least
Mrs. Tilly and Dr. Graham, believed that abolition of segregation
should not be required to establish eligibility for federal grants-in-aid.
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Another minority disagreed on the idea that states should pass laws to
prohibit discrimination in the admission and treatment of students in
public and private nondenominational educational institutions. 48
The report was news-big news-and press commentary was
widespread. Although many white southern newspapers condemned
the report, others felt that there was much in it that was worth considering. Elsewhere, the Chicago Sun Times thought that To Secure
These Rights would "be the book of the year." The Washington Post
called the report "monumental," and the liberal New York newspaper
PM hailed it as "unprecedented in the nation's history." The Washington Star believed that it was a "fine statement," but grumbled because
the PCCR placed too much "dependence on compulsion under law."49
Negro commentaries usually recognized that the report would not
satisfy all civil-rights advocates and that its words had yet to be implemented, but they hailed it generally and generously. Walter White,
writing in the New York Herald Tribune, said the report was "the
most uncompromising and specific pronouncement by a governmental
agency on the explosive issue of racial and religious bigotry which has
ever been issued." He was pleased that Wilson and Luckman were
among the authors of the report, because it meant that "for the first
time, distinguished representatives of industry have spoken out on the
subject." The Afro-American called To Secure These Rights "one of
the most significant documents of all time." The Journal and Guide
complimented the committee for a fine report and President Truman
for his "moral courage." The People's Voice (New York) considered
the report "of extreme historical importance," because finally the government had admitted that "segregation and discrimination were cancerous sores sapping the strength of democracy and making it a mockery before the world." 50
The PCCR did not rely just on the press to give publicity to its
report. With White House support, it kicked off its own campaign to
educate the public. The committee ordered 25,000 copies of To Secure
These Rights for distribution to the press; various federal and state
officials; public libraries; diplomats; and farm, business, professional,
civic, fraternal, labor, consumer, Negro, religious, international-relations, social-welfare, veterans, and women's organizations. Other elements took up the educational task, too. The Courier and the AfroAmerican ran the report in serial form, with a maximum circulation of
500,000. By the middle of February 1948, 37,700 copies of the government edition of To Secure These Rights and 36,000 copies of Simon
and Schuster's one-dollar edition had been distributed. PM had circu-

A Year of Re"laxation, of Preparation

93
lated 160,000 copies with its Sunday magazine and had sold another
230,000 reprints at ten cents apiece. The American Jewish Congress
prepared and distributed 200,000 copies of a summary of To Secure
These Rights. This group also assisted in the writing of the Public
Affairs Committee pamphlet on the report, and went to great lengths
to publicize the document through newspapers, publicists, the radio,
and various organizations. The American Council on Race Relations
published a fifty-nine-page pamphlet on how to achieve the rights referred to in the report. The Pacific Citizen, the organ of the JapaneseAmerican Citizens League, gave much of its space to the report. On
radio, CBS's Peoples Platform, ABC's Town Meeting of the Air, and
Mutual's American Forum of the Air devoted sessions to discussion of
To Secure These Rights, as did the intellectual's radio paradise, the
University of Chicago Round Table. The Methodist Woman's Society
of Christian Service made the document part of its 1948 study program. Other organizations that helped publicize the report included
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the
American Civil Liberties Union, the Illinois Inter-Racial Commission,
the CIO Committee to Abolish Discrimination, the Columbus (Ohio)
Council for Democracy, the American Friends Service Committee, the
Anti-Defamation League, the National Conference of Christians and
Jews, and the Council Against Intolerance in America. The Advertising Council issued one-minute spots on radio emphasizing racial and
religious tolerance and understanding. 51 In short, a great educational
campaign had been set in motion by the PCCR's report.
But there were other results. State civil-rights committees were
established in Massachusetts and Michigan, chaired respectively by
Charles Luckman and Bishop Haas. Civil-rights audits were begun in
Montclair and Plainfield, New Jersey, and Minneapolis, Minnesota;
and the American Association of University Women encouraged its
local units to develop such projects for the measurement of the state of
civil rights in their own communities. Collier's published Charles
Luckman's article "Civil Rights Means Good Business" in its January
17, 1948, issue. Articles on civil rights appeared in other leading magazines. In December 1948 the Federal Council of Churches in America
called racial segregation "unnecessary and undesirable" and declared
that "as proof of their sincerity, the churches must work for a nonsegregated church and nonsegregated society." These were only some
examples of the positive reaction that the President's Committee on
Civil Rights could claim to have set off or encouraged. 52
There can be no doubt that To Secure These Rights, as William L.
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White wrote, "stirred America's conscience." It was widely distributed
and publicized, discussed and debated. In that regard, it secured
expanded recognition both of the dimensions of the problem of securing human rights and also of the potential solutions to that problem. As President Truman wrote, in 1949, it became "a charter of
human rights for our time."53 As such, it has been drawn upon directly
and indirectly for manifesto after manifesto over the years. Indeed,
To Secure These Rights served for a generation as the basic statement
of most of the goals of civil-rights advocates.
But the PCCR's report had more immediate effects. It galvanized
civil-rights movements into greater activity in efforts to implement its
recommendations. Not only did the report consolidate goals for these
movements, but it gave them a yardstick by which to measure their
success. 54 The document also gave President Truman and other members of his administration a blueprint to work with. Truman, in his
press conference of November 6, equivocated on the report, indicating
that he had not yet read it carefully. When asked if the report would
be used as part of his 1948 State of the Union message, he replied,
"It could be used as a foundation for part of the message-some of it,
maybe." As far as public appearances were concerned, the president
was wise in going slowly. He would have an abundance of public
reaction to bear once his intentions were fully revealed. He certainly
knew, as Mrs. Tilly had written earlier, that "the political implications of
the report could be terrific," that "the South knows how to REBEL."55
For the time being, he was not above muddying Suwannee's waters.
Yet Truman was about to launch an unprecedented civil-rights
venture. Not only was the need to act strong, but the pressure was
intense. Within a matter of days in the fall of 1947 had come the
NAACP petition to the United Nations, the report of the PCCR, Henry
Wallace's opening appeal for Negro votes, and Attorney General Tom
Clark's warning in dedicating the Freedom Train that "all over the
world, now, people are watching us Americans .... They want to know
whether we practice what we preach."56 Soon, too, would come the
antisegregation recommendations of the President's Commission on
Higher Education.
Truman and the White House staff were making plans. Clark Clifford has said that as soon as the president received the PCCR's report,
he had wanted to send a message to Congress, which was shortly to
meet in special session. Truman was counseled against haste, so it was
planned to bring up civil-rights questions early in the next regular session of Congress. During November and early December, Truman
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discussed with various administration officials what he should do, and,
of course, he received a variety of advice. The die was cast when, on
December 9, he asked Special Counsel Clifford to consult with Attorney General Clark in drawing up a recommendation. The president's
spokesman on civil rights in the Senate, J. Howard McGrath, even
earlier had begun to be briefed by Assistant Interior Secretary C. Girard
Davidson on civil-rights matters. 57 Truman, by putting himself in the
hands of three civil-rights liberals-Clark, Davidson, and Cliffordmade it plain that he did not intend to be stopped by threats of
southern white opposition. He would risk their alienation in order to
seek the national interest and the political support of civil-rights elements. A civil-rights program for action in both the legislative and
executive branches was in the offing. The year 1947 had been one of
relative relaxation, of preparation; 1948 would unleash a new offensive,
the president's civil-rights program.

6

OF PROMISES MADE
AND DELAYED

On January 7, 1948, speaking to Congress in person and to the
nation by radio, President Truman delivered his State of the Union
address. His message was a request for vital legislation as well as a
reaffirmation of the progressive tradition in America. But it was more.
"Our first goal," the president noted slowly and deliberately, "is to
secure fully the essential human rights of our citizens," for "any denial
of human rights is a denial of the basic beliefs of democracy and of our
regard for the worth of each individual." After briefly indicting the
various forms of discrimination in America, Truman referred to the
report of his Committee on Civil Rights, which "points the way to corrective action by the federal government and by state and local governments." He would take the lead, he promised, and soon send a
special message to Congress dealing with the problem of civil rights in
America. In the following days and weeks, the president virtually
deluged Congress with special messages, including his budget message
of January 12, in which he requested a one-million-dollar appropriation for a National Commission Against Discrimination in Employment.1
Civil-rights leaders and the Negro press were pleased. Referring
to the president's request for a permanent FEPC, Elmer Henderson
noted that "the president has pointed the way" and that Congress must
"follow his lead." There were, of course, denunciations from those who
viewed the State of the Union message as a plea for votes in November,
which prompted the Chicago Defender to regret only "that more of
the other aspirants to the presidency do not follow his example."2
Actually, only the politically innocent could suppose that politics was
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not involved, for in fact Truman's annual message of January 7 was the
opening gun of his campaign for nomination and election in 1948.
There was nothing precipitant about the decision to launch the
campaign with the State of the Union address. In September 1947, for
example, a White House assistant spelled out the importance of the
message in the campaign politics of 1948. The memorandum noted
that its principles would "inevitably become the basis for the Democratic party platform in June 1948" and should set the party's campaign
course. 3 Nor was there anything precipitant about other campaign
strategy. Although Truman's stock had risen considerably by the summer of 1947, according to public-opinion polls, Democratic campaign
strategists were keeping their optimism subdued. As early as the
summer of 1947, various members of the administration, the Democratic National Committee, and the White House staff had begun sifting and exchanging ideas for the politics of 1948. One memorandum,
unsigned and undated but apparently written in August 1947, dealt
with the problem of the president's image, suggesting in particular
that until the Democratic convention, the president speak "not as a
candidate for election, but as the representative of the whole people."4
These materials apparently provided some of the background and
ideas for a forty-three-page confidential memorandum of November
19, 1947, over Clark Clifford's name, which outlined the campaign
strategy for 1948. Predicting that the Republicans would nominate
Thomas E. Dewey and that Henry A. Wallace would be the Progressive
candidate, the memo pointed to six "major points of conflict" in 1948,
including civil rights. It assured the president, however, that the South
was safely Democratic and that civil rights could be pursued without
fear of a Dixie rebellion. The political dividend was that Negro and
Jewish voters in heavily populated northern states might provide the
margin of victory in the fall of 1948.5
How much influence the Clifford memorandum exercised on Truman and subsequent campaign strategy remains undocumentable at
this point. What seems clear, however-given the rhetoric of the cold
war, the president's own personal commitment, the continuing militancy of black leaders, and the political circumstances of a campaign
year-was that civil rights would be an important issue in 1948, with
or without the Clifford memorandum. For years, Negro politicians and
leaders had argued that the black vote provided the balance of power
in heavily populated states of the North, particularly in close presidential elections; it was a fulcrum that could be used to pry pedormance as well as promises from the two major parties. Walter White
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was to remind the president of this power in May 1948, when he sent
him a copy of Henry Lee Moon's recently published Balance of Power:
The Negro Vote, accompanied with the unsubtle hint: "You will enjoy
and profit from reading it."6 And there could be no assurance that the
Negro vote would go Democratic in 1948 as it had in every presidential
election since 1936. It was never clear how much of the Negro vote
was for FDR personally instead of the Democratic party generally,
and southern domination of the congressional wing of the party for the
previous ten years had been both irritating and embarrassing to civilrights advocates within the party.
Moreover, the defection of some Negroes from Democratic candidates in the elections of 1946 was cause for alarm, particularly in New
York, the home state of the leading contender for the Republican
nomination, Governor Dewey. His appointments of Negroes to important state positions, his endorsement of New York's FEPC legislation of 1945, and his statements in favor of justice for American minorities made him a force to fear. Indeed, to many black Republicans, he
seemed the logical successor to Wendell Willkie. To a considerable
extent, however, Truman had offset Dewey's appeal as a result of his
speech to the NAACP in June 1947, his requests for civil-rights legislation, and his vocal endorsement of the report of his Committee on
Civil Rights. And the reluctance of many congressional Republicans
to vote for civil-rights legislation was not lost upon Negro leaders. In
January 1948 the Call saw the Negro vote as "fluid" and observed that
Truman had halted the trend toward the Republican party, in part
because of the report of his civil-rights committee, which prompted
Negro voters to "Stop, Look and Listen!"7
The Democrats, however, had other fears. On December 29, 1947,
Henry A. Wallace announced for the presidency as a third-party candidate sponsored by the Progressive Citizens of America, an announcement that carried with it a sense of political urgency. Since late November, Wallace's aides had sought to persuade him to announce his
candidacy, so that he would "get the credit for forcing any progressive
gestures which Mr. Truman makes." 8 The former vice-president had
appeal for a broad range of liberals who wanted more democracy at
home and less belligerency abroad. Since his abrupt departure from
the administration in 1946, he had been a consistent critic of Truman's
foreign policy, arguing that the policy of containment was plunging
the nation down the road to a third world war. Wallace's domestic
program likewise had its attractions. In addition to his espousal of
advanced social-welfare legislation, he had repeatedly condemned
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prejudice in all of its forms. In May 1946, according to a poll of the
Negro Digest, 91 percent of the black voters favored Wallace for the
Democratic presidential nomination in 1948. Thus, it came as a great
shock to many civil-rights leaders when he resigned under £re as commerce secretary in September 1946. Many Negroes expressed dismay,
including Walter White, Henry Lee Moon, and Bishop W. J. Walls;
and one columnist noted that, except for Tom Clark and Julius Krug,
the administration was "bereft of heads of departments who have a
fair and impartial attitude toward colored people."9
In November 1947 Wallace toured the South under the sponsorship of the Southern Conference for Human Welfare, defying southern
tradition by speaking to integrated audiences and advocating equal
justice. His appeal to many Negroes was obvious, and the presence of
Paul Robeson and Canada Lee on some of his speaking tours added
credibility to his rhetoric. To those Negroes who had come to believe
that neither major party would do anything to bring about justice in
American life, Wallace was especially appealing. "Voting for a Democrat or Republican is like voting for different ends of the same egg,"
Charles H. Houston asserted in February 1948. "Wallace offers the
American people something different.''10
At the beginning of 1948, then, the Wallace threat seemed real;
for he might drain away enough Democratic votes, including those of
the Negro, to deny Truman his bid for election in his own right. The
administration responded accordingly. The report of the President's
Committee on Civil Rights offered a foundation for action, and his
special message of February 2, 1948, would build on it. To the administration, the report and the message were part of the same package,
and the one called for the other. 11 But Wallace's third-party candidacy
strengthened the sense of urgency within the White House and probably contributed to the timing as well as the substance of Truman's
message on civil rights. The vagaries of politics thus meshed with the
president's personal commitment to justice and fair play; and in his
message he sought to appropriate the civil-rights issue as his personal
property in the campaign of 1948, much as Henry Wallace was attempting to do.
The February 2 message was historic, if only because it represented the first occasion upon which an American president had dispatched a civil-rights message to Congress. It was also eloquent and
forceful. Pointing out that the founding fathers had contended that
all men were created equal, the president indicted the "flagrant examples" of discrimination spelled out in the report of his civil-rights com-

Quest and Response

100
mittee. Although there had been racial progress, To Secure These
Rights also illuminated "a serious gap between our ideals and some of
our practices," which, he said, "must be closed." The president then
developed the particulars of his program, including ten recommendations for congressional action. Specifically, he requested abolition of
the poll tax; establishment of a fair employment practices committee as
well as a permanent commission on civil rights; federal protection
against lynching; creation of a civil-rights division in the Department
of Justice; home rule for the District of Columbia and suffrage for its
residents in presidential elections; strengthening of existing civil-rights
statutes; statehood for Hawaii and Alaska and a greater measure of
self-government for the territories; prohibition of segregated facilities
in interstate transportation; removal of the inequities in naturalization
laws; and settlement of the evacuation claims of Japanese-Americans.
All this, the president concluded, represented a "minimum program"
for Congress.
Truman also promised executive action, particularly an executive
order to prevent discrimination in federal employment, one with the
necessary authority to ensure compliance. Moreover, he had already
directed the secretary of defense to eliminate, as quickly as possible,
"the remaining instances of discrimination in the armed services." He
carefully avoided the word "segregation"; that would come later. In
conclusion, he placed his campaign for civil rights in the context of the
cold war, contending that "the peoples of the world are faced with
the choice of freedom or enslavement." To set the proper example,
"we must correct the remaining imperfections in our practice of democracy."12
The message was not a carbon copy of To Secure These Rights,
primarily because of certain omissions. The president, for example,
carefully refrained from attacking segregation directly, except in interstate transportation, where the Supreme Court had already pointed
the way. Moreover, the executive branch itself was not doing its utmost to eliminate discrimination in civil-service employment, in the
armed forces, or in the rendering of public services. On the other hand,
the message clearly outlined and anticipated the course of the struggle
for equal rights over the next two decades. Given the racist circumstances of 1948 and the muted but sometimes resentful disagreement
within the administration over civil rights, the message represented a
clear-cut victory for advocates of racial justice in America. 13
And with few exceptions, the northern press and civil-rights organizations accepted it as such. Some wondered, however, if Truman
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had not requested too much. The New York Herald Tribune, for one,
accused the president of throwing the book at Congress and suggested
that he set aside "the more bitterly controverted items." Others indicated that he was simply playing politics, particularly to offset Wallace.
Negroes, however, were on the whole delighted. The Journal and
Guide compared Truman with Roosevelt at the latter's expense, though
it did comment on the absence of any generous proposal in the presidential message to aid American Indians, "who are perhaps more oppressed, cheated, disfranchised, and sinned against than even the
Negro, if that is possible." The Negro weekly also observed that the
president would not profit politically, if only because he had "alienated
the vast majority of the white South" in doing "a great and selHess
thing." The Call, with considerable prescience, argued that the message had made the Negro a permanent political issue until justice was
a reality. Even the Amsterdam News, already committed irrevocably
to Governor Dewey for the presidency, found praise possible. 14
It was the white South that found the message unpalatable. Having studiously ignored the State of the Union address, southerners now
released their pent-up anger and frustration. Letters poured into the
White House; southern politicians · denounced the program on the
floor of Congress; and southern governors threatened secession from
the party. In a classic understatement, Senator Tom Connally of Texas
informed a constituent: "We are deeply distressed in the utterances of
the president and the position in which he has placed our party."15
These opinions were neither isolated nor scattered. It was clear
that significant numbers of southern leaders were mobilizing against
Truman, as indicated by the attempt of a committee of the Conference
of Southern Governors to force the administration to capitulate. On
February 23, 1948, five southern governors, led by J. Strom Thurmond
of South Carolina, conferred at some length with J. Howard McGrath,
chairman of the Democratic National Committee. Actually, it was
more of a grilling. Tight-lipped and with the pose of a prosecutor,
Governor Thurmond fired question after question at Senator McGrath,
who, though sorely tested, not only maintained his composure but
staunchly resisted any compromise that would be meaningful to the
South. Responding to Thurmond, McGrath indicated his support of
Truman's civil-rights message of February 2, opposed restoration of
the two-thirds rule in the nomination of presidential candidates ( by
which the South could have denied Truman the nomination), agreed
with the presidential request for the abolition of segregation in interstate transportation facilities, refused to exercise any influence to with-
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draw civil-rights bills then under consideration in Congress, and endorsed the move to establish a civil-rights division in the Department
of Justice. McGrath offered to compromise only when he suggested
that the party's plank on civil rights in 1944 might be adequate for
1948, but at this point the governors were clearly more interested in
the president and his program than in the Democratic platform. The
governors departed with the warning shot that "the South was no
longer in the bag."16
In mid March the Southern Governors Conference received the
report of its committee that had met with McGrath. With all but four
southern states represented, the Conference recommended that delegates to the Democratic National Convention oppose Truman's nomination and that presidential electors refuse to vote for any candidate in
the general election who favored civil rights. At a news conference
early in April, Governor Fielding Wright of Mississippi declared that
the people of his state meant business and that the South would hold
its own convention should Truman win the Democratic nomination.
A meeting in May of "volunteer citizens" in Jackson, Mississippi, summarized the thinking of militant southern segregationists: they would
oppose Truman's nomination and the adoption of a plank on civil
rights at the Democratic convention in July; if unsuccessful, they
promised to meet in Birmingham, Alabama, on July 17 to take action
appropriate under the circumstances. 17
Yet it was plain from the outset that the South was not solid in its
hostility to Truman or in the strategy that it should follow. Politicians,
for instance, feared the effect that secession from the party might inflict on their careers. Moreover, there were voices of moderation and
instances of courage, even in the deep South, where secession from
the party seemed most likely to occur. One such example took place in
Atlanta, where white and black advocates of civil rights, representing
eleven southern states, gathered to draft resolutions in favor of equal
justice and federal civil-rights legislation. Others were also taking a
strong and positive stand. Monsignor T. James McNamara, pastor of a
Catholic church in Savannah, speaking to a local business organization,
defended the president's civil-rights program and labeled the South's
reaction an "ostrich-like attitude." The clamor of white supremacists,
unfortunately, not only mufHed these voices of reason but also intimidated others into remaining silent. 18
The militancy of the white South surprised the administration.
Truman had anticipated a cold congressional reception, similar to that
given to his State of the Union message, not a fiery southern response.
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In retrospect, it is difficult to understand the administration's miscalculation. It is true that southerners had repeatedly threatened secession
from the party of Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt, but it is equally
clear that Roosevelt had taken some of this talk seriously, studiously
skirting those racial issues that might offend the South and sometimes
regretting his wife's civil-rights activities. It is also true that white
racists, perhaps for political purposes, deliberately misrepresented the
president's position and the contents of his special message, particularly when they contended that he favored "mongrelization" of the
white race. Yet Congressman Oren Harris of Arkansas spoke for many
white southerners when he informed the president in a letter of February 9 that compromise was impossible. "We cannot agree to relinquish our violent opposition to proposals for Anti-lynch, Anti-poll tax
laws and the establishment of FEPC," he wrote, and any "concession"
from the administration would only be considered as adding "insult to
injury."19 One cannot avoid the conclusion that many white southerners clearly understood the long-range implications of the president's
civil-rights programs. Although the message did not directly attack
the citadel of segregation, its rhetoric and its opposition to segregation
in interstate transportation facilities and in the nation's capital clearly
foreshadowed an assault on segregation everywhere in America. Moreover, Truman had implied that discrimination and segregation were
one and the same thing-as Negroes had argued for years and as the
administration would soon contend vigorously in various amicus curiae
briefs before the Supreme Court.
The extent and volume of the southern reaction persuaded the
administration to shift to low gear in its drive for civil rights, particularly in matters that would command public scrutiny. Truman had
yet to win the nomination of his own party, hopefully with some
southern support and without making his position on the issues untenable in the fall campaign against Wallace and the Republican presidential nominee. It was a delicate political situation, and the administration consequently held certain matters in abeyance until after the
Democratic convention. This included the ·white House staffs omnibus civil-rights bills, which had been drafted concurrently with the
president's special message and which incorporated several of its legislative suggestions. 20
Shortly after the president's message of February 2, the White
House had sent the bill to Senate Minority Leader Alben Barkley, with
the request that he submit it to Congress. The vehemence of the
southern protest, however, coupled with the fear that a southern £iii-
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buster on the bill might jeopardize the passage of other vital legislation, apparently prompted the administration and Barkley to put the
bill under wraps. The president's comment during his news conference
on March 11 made it abundantly clear that a civil-rights bill would
not be forthcoming from the administration during the current congressional session.21
The administration also stalled on the presidential promise to
issue an executive order to ensure equal employment opportunities in
federal civil service. In his news conference of May 13, when pointedly
asked about it, Truman stated that the administration was not preparing the order "at the present time." In rebuttal, the Afro-American
contended that drafts of such an order already existed but that administrative disagreement over its political effects had delayed issuance.
Actually the Civil Service Commission had submitted a draft, but
members of the White House staff found it too weak, one that "would
incur as much wrath as a stronger order and yet would not gain any
favor." In a letter in April to the president, Walter White sought to
minimize the importance of the southern rebellion, while "eagerly
awaiting the issuance of your promised executive order." The president, however, decided that the order could wait until after the Democratic convention. 22
If the administration procrastinated on some of its promises, it
had also made it clear to the white South that the civil-rights message
itself was not negotiable. And if the president had initially misjudged
the reaction of many southerners to the message, they too had misjudged the president. It was out of character for Truman to cave in to
pressure of any kind. He might temporize, but capitulation was out
of the question; and the suggestion of Congressman Frank W. Boykin
of Alabama, shortly after the special message, that the president reassure the South by announcing his firm belief in states' rights and his
opposition to federal civil-rights legislation could stem only from a
gross misreading of Truman's nature as well as of the political climate
of 1948.23
Nonetheless, throughout the winter and spring of 1948, rumors
circulated that Truman would modify his civil-rights requests of Congress, rumors that the White House repeatedly denied. Within days of
the special message, a "highly placed Senate source" suggested Truman's willingness to accommodate the South, which Press Secretary
Charles G. Ross quickly scotched during one of his regular morning
press conferences. "There will be absolutely no retreat on any point,"
said Ross, raising the matter himself; "the whole story is without foun-
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dation and fact." On March 8, when Senator McGrath announced to
the press that Truman would accept the presidential nomination, he
brought up the issue of civil rights, asserting, "The president's position
remains unchanged since he delivered that message." On March 12
Truman attended a luncheon with members of the cabinet and the
Democratic National Committee at which he informed everyone, including southern committee members, that he retracted nothing: "I
stand on what I said; I have no changes to make."24
It was the same in April and May. Although some civil-rights advocates grumbled when Truman delivered an address in May at Philadelphia's Girard College, which denied admission to Negroes, the
president could point to his speech in April at the College of William
and Mary, where he referred twice to civil liberties and the Bill of
Rights in the presence of Virginia's segregationist governor, William
Tuck. A few days after this speech, Senator Allen J. Ellender of
Louisiana conferred amicably with the president on various matters,
including civil rights. "The president said he considers it a good program," Ellender announced afterwards, "and that he wouldn't change
it." Through it all, Truman refused to comment on reported southern
defections, except to jest during a news conference in April, when
asked if he had heard anything about a back-to-Truman movement on
the part of southern Democrats, that "there were a great many who
never left Truman."25
Even if Truman had been personally disposed to grant various
concessions to the white South, the militancy of the black North would
have made it politically difficult, if not impossible, particularly in view
of the Wallace candidacy. The president was walking a tightrope.
Negroes, of course, had applauded his special message of February 2
and had taken special delight in the consternation of the white South.
Actually, the South's reaction paid an extra dividend with northern
black leaders. One Negro columnist noted that although Truman was
"a better New Dealer to Negroes" than Roosevelt, "he so far has not
been able to convince Negroes that he is not a backwoods Missourian
at heart. But the present abuse of Mr. Truman by certain southern
gentlemen is lifting the president to a new level in the estimation of
Negroes and other liberals."26
The administration sought to perpetuate this advantage even in
Httle things, such as inviting Mrs. Thomasina W. Johnson, the Labor
Department's adviser on minorities, to the White House for tea. There
were also more substantial activities. When the president toured the
Caribbean late in February, he invited three representatives of the
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black press, the first time that Negroes had received press accreditation
on a presidential tour. In the Virgin Islands, he publicly paid tribute
to the abilities of his "friend" Governor William H. Hastie. His short
address, studded with references to freedom, celebrated the centennial
of the emancipation of slaves in the Virgin Islands. Numerous pictures
showed the president in the receiving line with the black governor and
his wife, which of course did nothing to soothe southern anxieties.
When critics dismissed it all as politics, the Afro-American countered
with praise for Truman's ability to win the hearts of oppressed peoples
and expressed its appreciation for politicians who "in paying attention
to the farm vote, the labor vote and the big business vote also pay
attention to our vote."27
But this activity was not enough to assuage the feelings of some
Negro leaders who wanted tangible accomplishments. Black militancy
was on the rise in 1948, not only because it was an election year, but
also because of the international situation. The cold war had begun
in earnest in 1947, and the Communists throughout the world delighted
in exposing the hypocrisies of an America that preached democracy
and practiced discrimination. Negroes at home became increasingly
determined to use the rhetoric of the cold war to their advantage; and
that rhetoric became even more pronounced in 1948, particularly
when President Truman addressed a joint session of Congress on
March 17. In a speech replete with references to freedom, democracy,
and justice, the president indicted the "ruthless" policies of the Soviet
Union. To combat them, he pleaded for speedy congressional approval
of the Marshall Plan for western Europe, universal military training,
and temporary enactment of selective service. 28 The Berlin blockade
beginning in June 1948, and the American airlift response, added yet
another dimension to the cold war and another problem for the Truman administration.
The situation late in 1947 and early in 1948 seemed ready-made
for A. Philip Randolph, who was shrewdly attempting to exploit a
deteriorating international condition as he had in the spring of 1941
when Roosevelt finally succumbed and created a fair employment practices committee. In the fall of 1947 Randolph and Grant Reynolds
organized the Committee against Jim Crow in Military Service and
Training and quickly launched a campaign of propaganda and pressure. The time seemed propitious, and not only because of the cold
war. After all, there had been the report of the President's Committee
on Civil Rights, which condemned "the injustice of calling men to
fight for freedom while subjecting them to humiliating discrimina-
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tion,"29 and Truman's announcement in his message of February 2 that
he had directed the secretary of defense to eliminate discrimination in
the military. Both indicated a commitment on the part of the president
to democratize the military.
On February 5, 1948, Randolph met with officials of the Democratic party in order to ask National Chairman McGrath, who was
absent, to issue a strong statement denouncing segregation in the military and to attempt to influence Congress in its action on the bill for
universal military training. Upon advice from Wi1liam Dawson, Chicago's black congressman, the party spokesman responded with caution and without promises, while quoting portions of Truman's message on civil rights. Then on March 22, five days after Truman's
address to the joint session of Congress, Randolph and Reynolds conferred with the president. Once again they pleaded their case, requesting in particular that the president issue an executive order to
abolish segregation in the military and to inform state governors that
the federal government would no longer dictate racial policy in the
National Guard. Moreover, Negroes were of the "mind and temper,"
Randolph warned, "of not wanting to shoulder a gun to fight for the
protection of democracy abroad until they have democracy at home."
Visibly disturbed, Truman replied that he was doing his best under
difficult circumstances; he also apparently considered the statement a
threat, although Randolph insisted that he was simply reporting a
"deep emotional feeling" throughout black America. 30
At the end of March, Randolph came up with his most dramatic
ploy. Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, then
holding hearings on universal military training, he stated flatly that he
would counsel American youth, black and white alike, to boycott the
military, to refuse to register and to serve unless segregation was abolished. When Randolph argued that he would urge civil disobedience
even in time of war, Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon cautioned him
about the possibility of treason; but Randolph reminded the senator of
the existence of a higher law. Truman K. Gibson, black member of the
President's Advisory Commission on Universal Training, sought to offset Randolph in his testimony, labeling the threat "shocking"; and
White House aides believed that he had succeeded to some extent. 31
The reactions of the Negro community to Randolph's threat represented a fairly accurate barometer of black opinion in 1948. No one
disputed his goals, but some questioned the method of civil disobedience. The Journal and Guide more or less summed up press reaction
in its editorial caption: "Protest, Yes; Treason, No!" Few, however,
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were disposed to accuse Randolph of treason; and one, the Afro-American, annointed him "the John the Baptist of a new emancipation."32
On the other hand, an NAACP poll of Negroes eligible for the
draft reported that 71 percent were sympathetic with the position of
civil disobedience. Congressman Adam Clayton Powell endorsed civil
disobedience and excoriated Truman Gibson as "the rubber stamp
Uncle Tom who was used during the war by the War Department to
cast aspersions on Negro troops in Italy, while these same Negroes
were shedding their blood and dying." George S. Schuyler, the acidulous columnist of the Courier, gloated about the administration's embarrassment over the threat of civil disobedience "at a time when our
government is beaming to all countries, especially Russia, loud selfserving praise of the freedom and justice enjoyed under the Stars and
Stripes." Although Schuyler seemed to endorse Randolph's position, he
later became less enamored of the idea, perhaps because he was then
traveling the road to reaction. 33
A similar ambivalence prevailed throughout civil-rights organizations. The reaction of the NAACP was typical, as well as revealing of
the political questions involved. Shortly after Randolph had testified,
Walter White wired Senator Morse of the Armed Services Committee
that "our association is not advising Negroes to refuse to defend their
country if it is in danger"; but he pointedly did not repudiate the tactic.
Morse, however, was unhappy with the association's equivocation.
Faced with the prospect of incurring the wrath of a strong civil-rights
advocate in the Senate, White wrote a conciliatory letter to Morse in
which he clearly disavowed civil disobedience. Randolph himself was
not as easily dissuaded and continued his protest, which included
picketing the White House in May against the "Jim Crow Army."34
In the meantime, other Negro leaders were applying pressure elsewhere, particularly on Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, in an
attempt to persuade him to implement the president's instruction to
eliminate discrimination in the military. Forrestal's position in the
winter and spring of 1948 was not enviable. He was then attempting
to win congressional approval of military appropriations and of selective service, while struggling to establish his primacy over the secretaries of the army, the navy, and the air force; at the same time, he
sought to follow the president by liberalizing the racial policies of the
three services, particularly those of the army. In short, Forrestal was
caught in a squeeze between the White House, Congress, the service
secretaries, and professional military men. Although sympathetic with
the goal of racial integration, Forrestal preferred a gradual approach
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to the problem, much like the one that the navy had pursued during and
after the Second World War. On March 18, 1948, he met with eleven
Negro editors and publishers, seven of whom were scheduled to begin
a two-week inspection of army installations in Europe. Their report
upon their return surprised no one, including Forrestal, and consisted
largely of a ringing indictment of the debilitating and costly effects
of segregation.35
The meeting of March 18 was but a prelude to a much larger and
more significant gathering on April 26, a "National Defense Conference
on Negro Affairs" sponsored by Forrestal and Lester Granger, who
served as chairman. Fifteen of America's most prominent Negroes,
representing a virtual who's who of black America, were in attendance;
but Randolph was pointedly not invited. Representing the military
were Forrestal, the service secretaries or their representatives, and
military and civilian aides. The meeting was not a happy one. Although encouraged with the progress of the navy, the black conferees
found much room for improvement-. They were less sanguine about
the air force, which admittedly still followed the general guidelines of
the Gillem report even though it was now a separate service. And they
were altogether unhappy about the army, particularly the attitude,
both personal and official, of Secretary Kenneth Royall, who contended
vigorously that segregation could exist without discrimination. As a
result, the Negro conferees pledged not to serve in any advisory capacity to the Department of Defense as long as such attitudes were
tolerated, which indicated a significant turning point in the tactics of
"moderate" blacks. 36
Another result was that Royall and the army were severely criticized in the Negro press. The Crisis, the official organ of the NAACP,
summed up its attitude in the editorial title "Stonewall against America." The Chicago Defender declared that it was time "to build an
American Army and not a Confederate Army." Royall, for his part, was
also displeased. On April 30, in a memorandum to Forrestal, he contended that neither the air force nor the navy had been completely
candid during the conference and that the absence of the other two
secretaries had resulted in his being placed in the spotlight. 37
Actually, the limelight was on the White House, and its occupants
were beginning to feel the heat. On May 12 Clark Clifford and other
staff members met with Forrestal to devise what could be done immediately without incurring the wrath of everyone concerned. At that
point, the White House was considering the appointment of a committee within the Department of Defense to deal with the accusations
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of discrimination. The situation was extremely sensitive, for it was
feared that any action concerning segregation in the military beyond
the president's directive of February 2 would endanger passage of the
selective-service bill. The proposed committee was thus held in abeyance, although by late June the White House had apparently decided
to issue an executive order to establish a presidential committee on
July 26-after the Democratic convention and after Congress had
adjourned. 38
Amidst the furor of the winter and spring of 1948, there was some
progress in one area of military segregation-that involving the National Guard units of various northern states. The struggle epitomized
in microcosm the complex problems facing the administration-including pressure from northern governors and Negro leaders, opposition from southerners, and the recalcitrance of the army-all in the
context of campaign-year politics, growing apprehension over Communist successes abroad, and frustration with Congress's painfully
slow deliberations. The concern in 1947 with democratization of
northern National Guard units developed into a squabble early in
1948 as a result of the request of Governor Alfred E. Driscoll of New
Jersey to permit integration of the state's National Guard in conformance with a provision in the new state constitution. Other governors,
with the vocal support of civil-rights advocates but without Driscoll's
constitutional mandate, made similar requests. Army Secretary Royall
was not disposed to grant concessions. Prodding from Forrestal, however, persuaded him to inform Driscoll on February 7 that, "for the
present, Army militia units of New Jersey, if othenvise qualified, will
not be denied Federal recognition on the ground of nonsegregation.'·
Royall indicated, however, that he acceded to the request only because
the people of New Jersey, "by direct majority vote," had lodged desegregation in the state constitution. He would recognize nothing other
than a constitutional proviso. 39
•
Presidential Assistant Philleo Nash, however, had other ideas. Responding to pleas that Royall's position contradicted both the report of
the president's civil-rights committee and the president's special message of February 2, Nash suggested in April that the president press
the army to permit the individual states to determine the racial policies
of National Guard units not on active federal duty. The army should
recognize any state action in this regard, be it a constitutional provision, legislative enactment, or gubernatorial order. In endorsing
Marcus Ray's position of 1947, Nash considered a states' rights approach as the most progressive and only immediate, although partial,
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solution. But for the moment, David Niles had the upper hand and
persuaded the White House staff to do nothing and let Forrestal worry
about it. 40
Clark Clifford, however, was becoming increasingly sensitive to
the political consequences of inaction. Working closely with Forrestal
and his special assistant, Marx Leva, Clifford forced a concession from
Secretary Royall. Although Royall still refused to recognize a gubernatorial order, at least until he received a report from the army's Committee on National Guard and Reserve Policy, which was then considering the problem, he indicated in May that he "would be inclined" to
accept state legislative action as well as a constitutional provision. This
represented a partial victory for the White House over Royall. Clifford
reluctantly and temporarily approved Royall's position, perhaps in deference to the political and international situation of the moment. Moreover, it was also clear that Royall's position was more progressive than
that of parts of the professional military. The Committee on National
Guard and Reserve Policy, for example, subsequently reported against
integration of any Guard unit by any means. 41
Royall probably conceived of his policy as a compromise between
the White House and the National Guard committee. His timing in
implementing it, however, was politically inexpedient to say the least.
On July 8, only hours before the Democratic convention opened, he
drafted letters to Governors James C. Shannon of Connecticut and
Luther W. Youngdahl of Minnesota, denying requests for integration
of Guard units by gubernatorial order. The White House, understandably enough, held up the letters and delayed any decision until after
the convention and after the creation of the President's Committee on
Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services on
July 26. Royall was then informed that the new committee would consider the problem, and the secretary dutifully informed the governors
to that effect. 42
The concessions of 1948 permitted progress. In 1949 several states
abolished segregation in Guard units by legislative action. And after
the Minnesota legislature memorialized Congress to abolish segregation in the Guard, the army accepted Governor Youngdahl's executive
order as a legitimate expression of the will of the state's people. From
there, it was but a short step to acceptance of a gubernatorial order
without any legislative mandate whatever. In 1950 the General Staff
made the recommendation that the army recognize the authority of
the governors, which the army eventually accepted. There the matter
stood, to continue as standard policy through the Eisenhower and
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Kennedy administrations, with several states, not all of them southern,
still clinging to segregation in the National Guard. 43
Despite the militancy of black leaders in the early months of 1948
and despite the administration's limited response to their demands,
Henry Wallace had difficulty in attracting black leaders to the Progressive standard. After barnstorming across the country for several
months, he could count only a handful of prominent Negroes behind
his candidacy, although the backing of such people as Paul Robeson,
Canada Lee, William E. B. DuBois, Benjamin J. Davis, and Bishop
Walls gave the illusion of considerable support, perhaps in part because of the vigor with which they denounced the major parties. Davis,
for example, contended in the pages of the Daily Worker that Truman
"speaks Negro rights, but he acl:s white supremacy.''44
It was soon apparent, however, that the black press, most leaders
of civil-rights organizations, and Negro politicians and labor leaders
would not support Wallace. For this there were many reasons, both
ideological and practical. Even before Wallace announced his candidacy, Lester Granger of the Urban League attacked his record of accomplishment as a member of the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. Wallace's glittering promises in 1947 and 1948 far exceeded his
plodding performances on racial matters as secretary of agriculture
and as secretary of commerce. As early as 1940, when he ran as the
Democratic vice-presidential nominee, a Negro columnist had pointed
to the "prejudice-ridden branches" in the Agriculture Department, with
"the worst record" in the federal government. When Will Alexander
left the Department of Agriculture in 1940, the last thing that Wallace
allegedly said to him was: "Will, don't you think the New Deal is
undertaking to do too much for Negroes?" Wallace himself almost
admitted as much in 1948, when he conceded in an interview that he
had not become concerned about segregation until 1944. 45 Wallace's
past record, however, probably had little effect in determining the attitudes of 1948. Negro leaders were hard-boiled traders, willing to overlook the indiscretions of the past in favor of the promise of the present;
and the politics of the present worked to Wallace's disadvantage.
To a considerable extent, Truman's strong position on civil rights,
coupled with the prospect of Governor Dewey as the Republican
nominee, neutralized Wallace's appeal. 46 But a major handicap facing
Wallace in 1948 was the persuasive charge that he could not win, a fear
echoed repeatedly in the Negro press and in the speeches of various
black leaders. Though conceding the need for a new party, "because
both of the major parties are affiicted with dry rot," Walter White
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nonetheless contended that a third party in 1948 was "dangerously
perhaps even tragically ill-advised." His reasoning was not difficult to
comprehend. "If the Negro vote swings in a bloc of decisive proportions to Wallace," argued the Journal and Guide, "neither of the major
parties will have any sense of obligation to fight for a better deal for
us." Congressman Adam Clayton Powell saw Wallace's candidacy as
"extremely unwise at this time," for it might persuade Republicans to
nominate a more conservative candidate rather than "a great American
like Eisenhower whom I am ready to support 100 percent." Other
black leaders, including A. Philip Randolph, disavowed "the extreme
Left" in order not to jeopardize civil-rights legislation in Congress.
Long accustomed to the nuances of politics, Negro leaders were not
about to jettison their greatest opportunity in an election year for a
ride with rhetoric, which was all Wallace could produce. 47
There were also ideological considerations. By 1948 few black
leaders viewed the Soviet Union as a haven for oppressed minorities,
and few shared Wallace's views about the cold war. Indeed, although
some still hesitated, most Negro leaders were then shifting from a nonCommunist to an anti-Soviet position, a process accelerated by Truman's message to Congress on March 17, 1948, outlining the international situation. Although more excited than most, the Afro-American struck a responsive chord when it editorialized, "If Russia really
believed it could whip the U.S. today, it would declare war before
sunset."48
Although black leaders did not give Wallace the endorsements he
sought from them, the administration did not assume that the Negro
voter was reacting similarly, for it was not clear that the voter would
play follow-the-leader in 1948. It was disturbing, for example, when
Leo Isacson, a congressional candidate of the pro-Wallace American
Labor party, trounced all other candidates in a by-election in a New
York district composed mainly of Jews and Negroes on February 17.
Some polls reported that Wallace would receive from 20 to 30 percent
of the black vote. William L. Batt, Jr., head of the Research Division
of the Democratic National Committee, was shocked when political
leaders in Harlem and Brooklyn predicted that Wallace would receive
75 percent of the black vote in their wards. Having already established
a "very informal advisory group ... on the Negro situation," the committee now made plans to organize a formal, functioning operation. It
would also help, Batt noted in April, if the administration would issue
its executive orders on fair employment in civil service and discrimination in the military; and he wondered if the administration had accu-
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rately gauged southern sentiment. Unlike the White House, Batt apparently had yet to realize the full import of the southern rebellion,
particularly its possible effect on the president's nomination in July. 49
Unfortunately for Democratic strategists, Wallace was not the
only candidate suffering from the "no-win" syndrome. The president
was also affiicted. As his popularity plummeted early in 1948, various
elements of the Democratic party sought nervously, then frantically, to
dump Truman in favor of General Eisenhower, whose only apparent
qualification for the presidency was his unrivaled popularity. No one
knew either his party preference or his political position on the divisive issues of the day, although he had made one thing clear when he
had repeatedly disavowed any political ambitions. Nonetheless, in the
most unusual development of a bizarre campaign year, an unabashed
alliance of big city bosses, labor leaders, New Deal ideologues, liberals
of the Americans for Democratic Action, and southern white supremacists strove to impose the ultimate indignity on the man in the White
House. The absurdity of the campaign was nowhere better exemplified
than in the joining together of Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota and
J. Strom Thurmond of South Carolina to make common cause against
Truman and for Eisenhower. 50
What made the alliance of opposition Democrats particularly unholy was the issue of civil rights, which the ADA had consistently
championed and which the South had steadfastly resisted. Eisenhower
may have been a political enigma, which permitted diverse groups to
coalesce around his candidacy, but there was at least one crack in the
facade as a result of his appearance early in April before the Senate
Armed Services Committee. At that time he had testified generally in
favor of the policies of the Gillem report, advocating the continuation
of segregation in the military, at least for the present. To northern
liberals, however, election victory was apparently more important
than principle; so they continued to champion his candidacy, while
preparing simultaneously, and incongruently, for a civil-rights confrontation at the Democratic convention. Negro leaders, however,
would have none of it. After Eisenhower had testified, Walter White
apologized to readers of his weekly column for his previous praise of
the general. Though some Negro papers withheld comment, there was
considerable disenchantment; the Chicago Defender, for example, saw
the general as "just another brass hat with a glib tongue and a ready
smile.''51
Through it all, the president preserved a stony silence; he really
had little choice. Moreover, he could take only cold comfort from the
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fact that no convention in the twentieth century-Democratic or Republican-had denied the nomination to its incumbent president, for
his predicament was without parallel. Yet if Truman was ever threatened by the draft-Eisenhower movement, the general came to his
rescue, only days prior to the convention, when he emphatically disavowed any interest in the presidency. It was then too late for the
opposition to close ranks behind any other possibly successful candidate. 52
The final challenge to the president came from the Republicancontrolled Eightieth Congress. From January to July 1948, Truman
was confronted not only with the politician's task of winning his party's
nomination but also with the presidential duty of persuading a reluctant Congress to pass legislation in the national interest. Shortly after
his address on March 17, Congress responded to his request for approval of the Marshall Plan, but his bid for selective-service legislation
ran into several snags. Randolph was not the only one playing politics
with the issue. Southern Democrats threatened its passage when they
backed an amendment, introduced by Senator Richard Russell of
Georgia, to permit a draftee the choice of serving in a unit of his race,
a thinly disguised attempt to offset the president's directive to end
discrimination in the armed services. Both Forrestal and Royall paraded to the Hill to testify against the amendment. The Senate Armed
Services Committee subsequently rejected it, and the Senate later concurred by voice vote. The other threat came from Senator William L.
Langer of North Dakota, who, opposed to the draft altogether, sought
to defeat it by proposing several civil-rights amendments, including an
outright ban on segregation in the military.53
The Senate, however, overwhelmingly defeated all of the Langer
amendments, except one exempting soldiers from payment of a poll ta.x
in federal elections. The final bill also incorporated an innocuous provision prohibiting discrimination "in the selection of persons for training and service." But at least the administration had its bill. Although
Senate Democrats had united with Republicans to defeat the Langer
proposals, Republicans received much of the criticism in the Negro
press. Columnist Louis Lautier, although distressed with Senate Democrats, was furious with Republicans; while the Afro-American saw
Langer's "greatest service" in '1aying bare, for all to see, the hypocrisy
of the Republican party's 1944 platform which called for specific civil
rights legislation."54
Negroes were also angry over the fate of other civil-rights legislation. It was bad enough when Republicans refused to bring anti-
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lynching, anti-poll-tax, and FEPC legislation to a vote; but the party's
determination of priorities made matters even worse. Since the war,
FEPC had replaced antilynching legislation as the foremost demand of
black Americans; and A. Philip Randolph, also serving as cochairman
of the National Council for a Permanent FEPC, reminded Republicans of this fact in a speech early in 1948. He suspected that the Republican leadership would push an antilynching bill instead of legislation for an FEPC, "which is opposed by the N .A.M., the Chamber of
Commerce, and other forces." The black leader had exposed a raw
nerve, for many businessmen with influence within the Republican
party viewed an FEPC as an infringement on their rights, both personal and property. Some also considered it Communist-inspired, and
Randolph was quite conscious of the need to deal with the "red
bogey."55
Randolph's suspicions were confirmed in April when Senate Republicans voted top priority to antilynching legislation, with the explanation from Senator Taft that "it's the easiest to get through." Randolph, however, considered it "shocking" for the Republican majority
to give preference "to the least needed of the three major civil-rights
bills." But that was only part of the priority. According to a report in
May, the Republican Policy Committee had devised two priority lists,
with antilynching legislation at the bottom of the second list and with
no other civil-rights measures scheduled for consideration. Roy Wilkins wondered about the party "of bad faith and broken promises."56
Both parties in Congress, however, were guilty of ignoring many
of the requests made by the President in his civil-rights message of
February 2. A bill providing home rule for the District of Columbia
reached the floor of the House, but the rush for adjournment allegedly
prevented a vote on it. Statehood for Alaska was never considered;
and the Senate refused to approve a House bill, passed during the first
session, providing statehood for Hawaii. Moreover, at least two measures not included in the president's message came up for consideration.
One was an attempt to incorporate antisegregation and antidiscrimination amendments into the Taft-Ellender-Wagner housing bill; it was
beaten down. When the housing bill finally passed during the special
session, Negroes were displeased not only because it lacked any antidiscrimination provisions but also because of the limited nature of the
bill itself.57
The other measure involved an attempt by a House subcommittee
to deny federal grants-in-aid to states practicing school discrimination,
which had been recommended by the Committee on Civil Rights but
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not by the president. The provision, of course, had no chance of passage, which the NAACP recognized when it endorsed the education
b111 without the denial clause. Black leaders were aware that if
Congress denied federal funds to southern states on the grounds of
discrimination, Negro school children would suffer even more. But
even without the restriction, the bill failed. The defeat of another bill
concerned with segregation in southern schools, however, represented
a victory of sorts for the foes of discrimination. In February 1948 the
Conference of Southern Governors had proposed that fourteen states
form a regional educational compact to pool resources and, ostensibly,
to provide better facilities in higher education. Though race was not
mentioned, the compact was actually a device to circumvent the
Supreme Court's ruling for equal educational opportunities. Formulated in a bill, the proposal passed the House, but by a close vote the
Senate sent it back to committee, where the bill died. 58
Negroes were understandably unhappy with the Eightieth Congress, but they were not the only minority group with a grievance.
Jews were furious over the final provisions of the displaced persons
bill, which, although providing for the admission of over two hundred
thousand displaced persons in Europe for the next two years, discriminated against Jews. Leaders of various Jewish organizations inundated
the president with appeals for a veto. American Catholics, on the other
hand, were generally pleased with the provisions affecting members of
their faith. "Since I cannot discern or admit alleged anti-Catholic
aspects of displaced persons bill passed by Congress," Francis Cardinal
Spellman wired the president, "I respectfully urge you in the name of
charity and national honor to sign it." Caught between religious
minorities but convinced that something had to be done, the president
"with very great reluctance" signed the bill on June 25. He denounced
it, however, as a bill that mocked the "American tradition of fair play"
in its "callous" discrimination against Jews and "many displaced persons of the Catholic faith who deserve admission." The issue had ominous political overtones; for the Jewish vote, like that of Negroes,
could well be a decisive factor in determining the electoral votes of
large states in November. Yet Truman's recognition of Israel on May
14, after weeks of vacillation and contradiction, considerably offset any
lingering anger over his acceptance, however reluctant, of the displaced persons bill. 59
There was yet another bill that might have precipitated a clash
between American minorities. Early in the year Congressman Walter
H. Judd of Minnesota introduced a bill, drafted by the State Depart-
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ment and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, which provided
for a token increase in Oriental immigration. Of more importance, it
repealed the prohibition against naturalization of Orientals-one of
the president's recommendations in his civil-rights message. The bill,
however, was not only discriminatory because of the token number of
immigrants that it would have admitted but also because it favored
Japanese over Chinese immigrants. 60 But the bill had no chance of
passage, and a possible confrontation between Chinese- and JapaneseAmericans was thus avoided. Japanese-Americans, however, were mollified with the passage of the Japanese Evacuations Claims Act, which
the president had also recommended and which constituted a belated
but only partial apology for the property losses they had suffered
during the Second World War.
The Japanese Evacuation Claims Act was the only civil-rights
recommendation of the president to survive the Congress; and as adjournment neared late in June, the impatience and irritation of black
leaders mounted. The party of Lincoln had not produced; the Crisis
summed it up in the editorial title "From tb,e GOP Congress: Nothing."61 It was that record of "nothing" that Truman chose to exploit,
beginning with his "nonpolitical" tour of the West in June 1948. Yet,
up to this point in the year, Truman and the Democrats generally had
also produced little in the way of concrete results; for the early months
of 1948 had been primarily a record of promises made and delayed as
the parties prepared for the fall campaign and as the presidential candidates jockeyed for position in the conventions and on the issues.

7

VINDICATION
OF A COMMITMENT

During the winter and spring of 1948 Truman followed the high
road of presidential politics and spoke as the representative of all the
people rather than as a candidate for election. If he was tempted to
descend into the political arena then, the rumbles of southern white
revolt, the militancy of northern black leaders, the ponderous deliberations of Congress, the Democratic draft-Eisenhower movement, Wallace's third-party candidacy, and the deterioration of the international
situation persuaded him to remain above the clamor as much as possible. It was good politics to appear calm in the face of tribulations at
home and provocation abroad. But the time arrived when Truman
had to take the offensive in order to ensure his nomination at the Democratic convention and to bolster his sagging popularity. The vehicle
for his first attack was a "nonpolitical" tour of the West from June 4 to
June 18, 1948. The ostensible purpose of his transcontinental journey
was to accept an honorary degree and to deliver the commencement
address at the University of California at Berkeley.
There was nothing new, of course, about a presidential "nonpolitical" tour; but it did offer a convenient, if transparent, excuse to leave
Washington be.fore the adjournment of Congress and to sound out the
sentiment of the country. Various people, including Truman himself,
have taken credit for the idea. One of the first suggestions appeared in
a memorandum from Gael Sullivan of the Democratic National Committee in August 1947. The memo urged the president, prior to the
Democratic convention, to "show himself to the nation via the back
platform of a cross-country train." It also advocated a change in presidential style. Noting that the president's "easy manner of speaking
... informally" was often '1ost in translation to the people via radio and
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speaking tours," it suggested that "the entire approach to the president's speeches be changed. It would be well to gain more natural
delivery, even if some rhetorical effects are lost."1 Whether by accident or design, Sullivan's recommendations became part of the campaign strategy of 1948. Indeed, although Truman had spoken informally with notes on various occasions in the spring of 1948, the "Give
'em hell, Harry" approach was born during the "nonpolitical" tour of
June.
Whistle-stopping across the country, the president repeatedly
labeled the Republican-controlled Congress as one of "special interests" designed to frustrate the needs of the people. His was a wellbalanced attack. In large cities, he indicted Congress for its inadequate record of legislation on labor, social security, housing, and price
control. In agricultural areas, he pleaded for stronger legislation to
guarantee farm profit. And in various small towns, he emphasized
issues peculiar to them. His autumn appeal to workers, farmers, and
consumers was already taking shape. He was careful, however, to
restrict his indictment of Congress to domestic matters, for he desperately needed its cooperation in foreign and military affairs. 2
Nor did Truman completely neglect the issue of civil rights. In
his first major speech, in Chicago, the president stood firm on his commitment. There, in addressing the Swedish Pioneer Centennial Association on June 4, he emphasized the courage of American pioneers,
the injustice of the displaced persons bill pending in Congress, and
the need to provide democracy at home in order to offset the appeal
of American Communists. In particular, he promised that the federal
government would be "a friendly, vigilant protector" of the ideals of
freedom and equality and contended that the "menace" of communism
within the United States "lies primarily in those areas of American life
where the promise of democracy remains unfulfilled." When people
"are arbitrarily denied the right to vote or deprived of other basic
rights, and nothing is done about it," he continued, "that is an invitation to communism."3
The speech was not lost upon American minorities. Negroes were
especially appreciative. Traveling with the presidential special, Stanley Roberts, a columnist for the Courier, was elated. "If apprehensive
Negroes feared, or southern revolt Democrats hoped, that the man
would backtrack from civil rights advocacy as an integral part of the
program," he wrote, "the fears of the former were needless, and the
hopes of the latter have gone with the wind." Republicans, however,
were outraged with the "nonpolitical" tour: it was as "nonpolitical as
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the Pendergast machine," said Carroll Reece, chairman of the Republican National Committee. And Senator Robert A. Taft was incensed
with Truman's "blackguarding Congress at every whistle station in the
W est." 4 It was in that mood and with the expectation of nominating
the next president that the Republicans opened their national convention in Philadelphia on June 21.
Black leaders, too, had high expectations concerning both the Republican platform and the candidate. Before the convention opened,
various Negroes, including Walter White and Channing Tobias, testified in favor of a strong civil-rights plank before the resolutions committee. White frankly expressed his disappointment over the failure of
the Eightieth Congress to enact legislation on the civil-rights provisions
of the 1944 Republican platform. Tobias warned that both parties
"face a long, strong line of Negro voters never before seen in the history of this country," which prompted a southern member of the committee to inquire if that was "a considered statement or a threat."
Tobias straddled nicely, ·placing it in the category of a "considered
statement," though "it may be interpreted as a threat." 5
As the platform emerged from committee, however, it was more
liberal than the Eightieth Congress was on civil rights, although it
represented no improvement over the 1944 version. The plank hedged
in calling for the abolition of the poll tax without specifically endorsing federal legislation. More important to black leaders, the plank
failed to mention the FEPC by name and was content to "favor the
enactment and just enforcement of such federal legislation as may be
necessary" to ensure the "right of equal opportunity to work and to
advance in life."6
In view of the fact that fair employment practices had become the
foremost legislative demand of black Americans, this fuzzy endorsement was unacceptable to many. Louis Lantier pronounced it a "platitude" and viewed the civil-rights plank as "weak, to say the least. It is
vague and indefinite and promises little." A. Philip Randolph's comments were predictably more colorful. "This is lousy," he concluded,
contending that the Republican party had descended "to its lowest
depths of opportunism and has become more 'Dixiecrat' than Mississippi and South Carolina." But the plank's equivocation on the FEPC
was probably not designed to appeal primarily to the South. The initials had become inexorably associated with Franklin D. Roosevelt,
whom Republicans longed to forget, and, more recently, with the
charge that it was not only an infringement on the rights of employers
but was also Communist-inspired. In view of the plank's statement of

Quest and Response

122
opposition "to the idea of racial segregation in the Armed Services of
the United States"-a position repugnant to the white South-it is
probable that the absence of the famous initials stemmed from a desire
to appeal to businessmen and to Democratic as well as Republican
patriots rather than to southern whites in particular. 7
Although disappointed with the plank, some Negro leaders were
able to console themselves with the expectation that Thomas E. Dewey
would be nominated. There was great concern, however, that Senator
Taft might win. Although Taft had the support of old-guard Negro
Republicans, the more militant blacks within the party were lining up
with Governor Dewey. They feared Taft's conservatism on socialwelfare legislation at a time when it appeared that the Republican
nominee would also be the next president. 8
Not all Negro leaders, however, were enamored with the New
York governor. Some supported his nomination only because of the
mediocrity of his competitors alJ).ong Republicans. Others, like Walter
White and the Chicago Defender, believed that the Democratic party
was the most promising vehicle for civil-rights progress, if only because the party's presidential wing seemed more receptive to the pleas
of black Americans. As early as July 1947, the Defender had launched
a campaign against Dewey and his position on states' rights. In March
1948 Walter White devoted one of his newspaper columns to Dewey,
"whose record is best described as spotty" and whose ambivalence
justified the widespread wisecrack that he "would rather be president
than right." In June, White argued in particular that the New York
governor had refused to support fair employment legislation in his
state in 1944 until after he had secured the presidential nominatiJm.
But others were edging toward an endorsement of D ewey for president in November even before his nomination in June. In May, for
example, the Amsterdam News declared outright for Dewey. '1n the
White House," the editor wrote, "this great American and friend of
the Negro and human decency would have greater influence to advance the cause of democracy throughout the nation.''9
Certainly the Republican party came up with an attractive ticket
when it nominated Governor Dewey on the third ballot and chose
Governor Earl Warren of California as his running mate, even though
earlier in the year the latter's record on civil rights had been a matter
of some dispute. In April, in a biting editorial entitled 'Warren? Are
You Kidding?", the Afro-American had listed many grievances against
the California governor. "Mention the name of . . . Warren as a
potential compromise candidate for the Republican presidential nomi-

Vindication of a Commitment

123
nation," contended the editor, "and colored voters in Los Angeles will
laugh in your face." Three weeks later, the paper abruptly reversed
itself, suggesting that there was nothing wrong with Warren's heart,
only with his tactics in failing to win civil-rights measures from the
state legislature. 10
Actually, as far as black Americans were concerned, the ticket of
Dewey and Warren was the best they could expect from the Republicans. In fact, there was considerable jubilation, although Ralph
Matthews, columnist for the Afro-American, reminded his readers that
they were "still only the front men for a motley collection of mediocre
pedormers whose actions in Congress have been something less than
lousy," which was an inelegant way of saying that Dewey had to run
on Taft's record. Even the Chicago Defender, which would endorse
Truman in the general election, applauded this "notable victory" of
the liberal wing of the Republican party. It also issued a warning:
"Those Democrats who are determined to repudiate President Truman
and his civil rights program are courting disaster for the Democratic
party. Should they win control in Philadelphia, they will drive Negroes ... into the Republican camp."11
Black leaders were understandably nervous about the Democratic
convention, set to open on July 12, and their concern embr~ced both
the platform and the prospective candidates. The collapse of the
Eisenhower boom shortly before the convention, however, ensured
Truman's nomination and permitted Negroes and northern liberals, led
by members of the ADA, to concentrate attention on the party's platform. Rumors about the civil-rights plank were disquieting. On June
22, 1948, Congressman John Rankin of Mississippi emerged from the
White House to deliver a prepared statement in which he implied that
the South would adhere to a plank along the lines of the generalized
version in the 1944 platform, a plank unacceptable, as it turned out, in
the heated politics of 1948.12
As usual, Walter White appeared before the platform committee
to deliver an impassioned plea for a strong plank. "The day of reckoning has come," the NAACP leader warned, "when the Democratic
party must decide whether it is going to permit bigots to dictate its
philosophy and policy or whether the party can rise to the heights of
Americanism which alone can justify its continued existence." During
his testimony, as well as that of Channing Tobias, according to a report
in the Afro-American, "a strange silence" greeted their sharply worded
demands, and southern members of the committee "merely sat back
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and smiled." This prompted the paper to conclude that "it looks like a
deal has already been made."13
The Afro-American's suspicions were partially correct, although
the situation was a good deal more complicated than the newspaper's
commentary implied. Having virtually bagged the nomination, Truman sought to prevent a massive southern walkout over the civil-rights
plank by seeking the middle ground between the demands of white
southerners and those of northern liberals, although, apparently, there
was disagreement within the Truman ranks over what the · middle
ground should be. The evidence suggests that administration stalwarts
in Congress, particularly Senators Francis J. Myers, Scott Lucas, and
Howard McGrath, were willing to settle for a paraphrase of the 1944
plank, as McGrath had suggested in his meeting with southern governors in Febmary and to reporters during a news conference on
July 10. 14 The White House staff, led by Clark Clifford, apparently
wanted something stronger and more specific, while stopping short of
a plank that would provoke widespread southern rebellion during
and after the convention.
In the days prior to the convention the White House staff was in
constant communication with William Batt, director of the Research
Division of the Democratic National Committee, exchanging ideas as
well as specific drafts of the platform. On July 9 Batt congratulated
Clifford on the "superb stuff" in the fourth draft of the platform, particularly the "powerful Civil Rights plank." The statement on civil
rights, though written mostly in general terms, specifically endorsed
legislation "recommended by President Truman," which obviously
would offend southern sensibilities. On July 11 Clifford discussed
the administration's platform proposals in Philadelphia with Senator
Myers, chairman of the platform committee, devoting considerable
time to civil rights. Clifford also indicated to Myers that the president
"was convinced that he could not run on a weak civil-rights plank."15
Nonetheless, what emerged from a platform subcommittee over
the weekend was only a thinly disguised rewrite of the weak 1944
statement, one that was unacceptable to the militants of the Americans
for Democratic Action as well as to southern conservatives, who had
found a similar plank distasteful but not unpalatable in 1944. Caught
in the middle, the Truman forces united and eventually agreed upon
a plank more specific than the subcommittee's version and stronger
than southerners wanted, although weaker than the White House draft.
ADA leaders, led by Andrew Biemiller and Hubert Humphrey, were
still dissatisfied; and in a final committee session marked by dis-
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courtesy and rage on both sides, the northern rebels lost their fight to
commit the party to the specific civil-rights proposals outlined by the
president in his message of February 2. Senator Lucas epitomized the
temper of the session when he asked about Humphrey, then mayor of
Minneapolis and a candidate for the Senate: "Who is this pipsqueak
who wants to redo Franklin D. Roosevelt's work and deny the wishes
of the present president of the United States?"16 Although the ADA
forces were soundly defeated in the committee, Biemiller promised to
carry the fight to the convention floor.
The administration's forces could not take Biemiller's threat
lightly, not only because of the damage that a floor fight might inflict
on the public image of a party already rent with dissension but also
because the ADA's strength was greater than the number of its delegates-120-might indicate. This pregnant fact emerged in a floor
fight on July 13, when a Negro delegate challenged the credentials of
the Mississippi delegation because of its pledge not to support the
party if the convention nominated Truman and adopted a civil-rights
program. Pandemonium broke loose; and when order was finally
restored, the motion was defeated. It was clear, however, that many
northern delegates were in an angry mood; and this encouraged the
Biemiller forces to strive to amend the civil-rights plank on the floor of
the convention. They were also encouraged when some of the northern
big-city bosses, desperately hoping to win on the local level even if
Truman went down nationally, promised support for the minority
plank. One of them concluded, ''This is the only way we can win the
election, by stirring up the minorities and capturing the cities," adding,
"and besides, I'd also like to kick those southern bastards in the teeth
for what they did to Al Smith in 1928." And the ADA delegates were
elated when Hubert Humphrey agreed to present the minority plank
to the convention, although only after the addition of a statement
commending the president for "his courageous stand on the issue of
civil rights," which permitted the young politician to maintain a bridge
with the administration. 1 7
The floor fight erupted on July 14, when four amendments to the
civil rights plank were introduced before the convention. Three were
southern proposals with a states' rights flavor and the fourth was the
ADA plank, which differed mainly from the majority version in its demand for congressional action on fair employment practices, mob violence, and equality in political participation and military service. In
presenting their amendments, southern spokesmen were modest and
restrained; and it was Humphrey, speaking last for the liberal plank,
0
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who infused the lackluster session with enthusiasm. "There are those
who say to you-we are rushing this issue of civil rights. I say we are
a hundred and seventy-two years late," the young mayor exclaimed.
Then he said, "There are those who say-this issue of civil rights is an
infringement on states' rights. The time has arrived for the Democratic party to get out of the shadow of states' rights and walk forthrightly into the bright sunshine of human rights." With that, northern
delegates erupted into a ten-minute demonstration. The convention
then moved to a vote, and the three southern amendments went down
quickly at the hands of a coalition of northern liberals and administration forces . The alliance then split. Although most of the administration's congressional leaders, in collaboration with the South, voted
against the Humphrey-Biemiller amendment, the northern liberals
carried the day by a close vote. Incredibly enough in the face of the
South's obstinance and the administration's reluctance, a strong civilrights plank had become part of the platform. 18
Through it all, the president preserved a discreet silence. The
fin.al plank was probably stronger than he would have liked as a presidential candidate confronted with the possibility of losing most of the
South in November, despite his later statement that the plank was his
own. 19 But all he had to do was accept it. After all, the final civilrights plank still fell short of some of the recommendations in his message of February 2. It did not include, for example, any mention of
home rule for the District of Columbia, though it did endorse suffrage
for its residents. Nor did it identify the FEPC by name; instead, much
like the Republican platform, it called for "the right to equal opportunity of employment." Moreover, although generally stronger than
its Republican counterpart, the plank promised only "the right of equal
treatment in the service and defense of our nation," while the Republicans had specifically declared their opposition to segregation itself.
The platform also embraced other civil-rights recommendations of the
president, thus appealing to minorities other than black Americans. It
urged immediate statehood for Hawaii and Alaska and increased selfgovernment for the Virgin Islands, Guam, Samoa, and Puerto Rico,
and condemned the "inadequate and bigoted" displaced persons bill
passed by the Eightieth Congress.20
Southern reaction to the platform and to Truman's nomination
was predictable. Some delegates walked out shortly after the adoption
of the minority civil-rights plank, while others remained to cast their
presidential ballots for Senator Richard Russell. Truman, however,
won on the first ballot, though he was denied the traditional unanimity;
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and Senator Barkley, a soufhern moderate on the race issue, was selected as his running mate. The president's acceptance address delighted the delegates. Reflecting his new oratorical approach, Truman
spoke from an outline in terse, biting phrases. He promised victory in
November-which his audience found difficult to believe in, despite
the euphoria of the moment-boasted of the many Democratic achievements, and displayed contempt for the Eightieth Congress of "special
privilege." He also dealt skillfully with the civil-rights issue. Referring
to his recommendations to Congress on civil rights, he noted that "some
of the members of my own party disagree with me violently on this
matter. But they stand up and do it openly! People can tell where they
stand." He continued by saying that the Republicans "all professed to
be fo_r these measures. But Congress failed to act." In concluding, he
surprised the delegates and angered Republicans when he revealed his
intention of calling Congress into special session, on July 26, so that
the conservative Republican Congress would have the opportunity to
translate their party's liberal platform into law. 21
Never before had black Americans been so jubilant, and their enthusiasm often embraced the candidates and platforms of both parties.
Columnist Louis Lautier spoke for many when he noted: "Colored
voters find themselves fortunately situated. Both President Truman
and Governor Dewey are excellent candidates . . . both parties are
committed to a civil-rights program." Walter White declared that the
strong civil-rights plank in the Democratic platform marked "the
greatest turning point for the South and for America since the Civil
War"; and he argued that both parties were now committed to the
recommendations of the President's Committee on Civil Rights. 22
Meanwhile southern dissidents were busy transforming talk into
action. Faithful to their pledge of May 10 at Jackson, Mississippi, to
hold a rump convention if the Democrats nominated Truman and
adopted a civil-rights plank, various southern Democrats assembled in
Birmingham, Alabama, on July 17 to launch the States' Rights party.
It was clear from the beginning that only a part of the South would
secede from the party of Harry S. Truman. But what the convention
lacked in wide southern support, it more than made up for in enthusiasm. Waving Confederate flags, while rebel yells pierced the convention hall, the delegates unanimously nominated South Carolina's Governor J. Strom Thurmond for president and Mississippi's Governor
Fielding Wright for vice-president on a platform denouncing "totalitarian government" and advocating "segregation of the races." Al-
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though the so-called Dixiecrats could not realistically expect victory in
November, they could vengefully hope to deprive Truman of victory. 23
Those backing Henry Wallace's third-party candidacy were equally displeased with the results of the Democratic convention, particularly the adoption of the strong civil-rights statement. They feared,
with good reason, that Truman and the platform would limit their
inroads into the minority vote. Indeed, shortly after the Democratic
convention, some Negro commentators called for Wallace to withdraw
as a candidate. C. B. Baldwin, Wallace's campaign manager, tried to
head off such suggestions when he noted sarcastically that the Democrats had nominated "the man nobody wanted and adopted a program
nobody meant." There was further cause for alarm in the fact that
Wallace's popularity had not increased. From January to July 1948
Wallace had been running downhill, as both foreign and domestic
events seemed to conspire against him. He had also compounded his
problems with a number of political blunders, the most monumental of
which was his refusal to disavow Communist support at a time when
genuine fear of the Soviet Union was on the rise. 24
None of this seemed to faze the delegates of the "new party" as
they trooped enthusiastically into Philadelphia for the opening of their
convention on July 23. Consistent with the party's bid for minority
votes, blacks played conspicuous roles throughout the convention.
Charles P. Howard, a black lawyer and a former Republican, delivered
the keynote address after W. E. B. DuBois, although he was in attendance, had declined; Shirley Graham, the biographer of Frederick
Douglass, spoke about the tyranny of America; Larkin Marshall, the
first black senatorial candidate from Georgia since Reconstmction,
nominated Senator Glen Taylor of Idaho for the vice-presidency; Paul
Robeson spoke and sang; and Dean Joseph Johnson of Howard University's medical school occasionally presided over the platform committee and served on the drafting committee with Mrs. Paul Robeson. 25
The delegates of the "new party" opted for the name Progressive
party and nominated Wallace and Taylor on a platform that condemned Truman's foreign and domestic policies. The civil-rights plank,
as might be expected, not only indicted the record of the old parties
but specifically condemned "segregation and discrimination in all of
its forms and in all places."26 The whole was an attractive package to
minorities; but Communist influence on the deliberations of the convention, although it has been exaggerated, largely offset the platform's
appeal at this stage of the campaign.
The actions of the Truman administration in the weeks following
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the Democratic convention also contributed to the increasing isolation
of the Progressive party. After his nomination had been secured and
Congress had approved the Marshall Plan, selective service, and military appropriations, Truman could respond to his own promises and
to the increasing pressures of the civil-rights movement. He also had
the advantage that an incumbent president has of being able to campaign while appearing to be engaged in his official duties. On July 20,
for example, he paid public tribute in a special White House ceremony
to Brigadier General B. 0. Davis, Sr., upon the Negro soldier's retirement from the army after a half-century of service. 27
On July 26 Truman delivered his surprise packages, Executive
Orders 9980 and 9981. Fulfilling a long-delayed promise made in his
special message of February 2, Executive Order 9980 proclaimed the
policy of "fair employment throughout the federal establishment, without discrimination because of race, color, religion, or national origin,"
and directed each department of the executive branch to appoint a fair
employment officer to supervise operating procedures, to receive complaints, and to take "necessary corrective or disciplinary action" in consultation with his department head. The order also established a Fair
Employment Board in the Civil Service Commission to review cases
and to report to the president when necessary to maintain the fair
employment program. Obviously, the program would take time to implement; and there would be variances in departmental operating
procedures, although at least eighteen agencies had established such
procedures by the end of the year. There were also outright refusals
to obey the presidential order. On September 17, for example, Mortimer Jordan, Collector of Internal Revenue in Alabama, informed
Secretary of the Treasury John Snyder that he had no intention of following the directive. Jordan was subsequently removed. 28
The other order, 9981, was more significant, not only for its political import at the moment but also in terms of its impact. The order
paraphrased the Democratic platform in calling for "equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without
regard to race, color, religion, or national origin," and it promised implementation "as rapidly as possible." To assist or prod the military
toward achieving this goal, the president created the Committee on
Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services. 29
Although the administration had apparently decided late in June
to issue such an executive order, the statements of both major party
platforms concerning discrimination in the military and the pressure of
civil-rights advocates made it imperative to release the order directly
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after the conventions. A. Philip Randolph, for example, had repeatedly
threatened that Negro youths would fail to register for the new draft,
scheduled to begin on August 16, unless the president issued an executive order abolishing segregation. Behind this threat he had a new
organization entitled the League for Non-Violent Civil Disobedience
Against Military Segregation. On July 15 he and Grant Reynolds had
written to the president, contending that the statements of both platforms had presented him with a "bipartisan mandate to end military
segregation forthwith by the issuance of an executive order." They also
pointed out that "the date for registration under the draft is only a
month away and it is the hope of all Negro youth that there will be an
alternative beyond submission to a discriminatory law and imprisonment for following the dictates of self-respect." The ADA's Leon Henderson had also reminded Truman of the platform promises of both
parties and had urged an executive order abolishing segregation "so
that the armed forces of the world's greatest democracy may become in
truth the world's most democratic armed forces." 80
Public reaction to the president's order on military discrimination
was divided. Henry Wallace denounced it as an "empty gesture," and
southerners came up with the usual strictures. Surprisingly, Negroes
were far from unanimous. The Chicago Defender, already committed
to Truman, contended that the executive orders were "unprecedented
since the time of Lincoln" and argued that American citizens would
not "permit Mr. Truman to be crucified on a cross of racial bigotry."
Others, however, observed that the word "segregation" did not appear
in the presidential order and wondered if black Americans were about
to be given another example of white obfuscation. 31 The situation was
complicated further when the press picked up Chief of Staff Omar
Bradley's statement that the army was not a social laboratory and
would change its racial policies when the nation as a whole had
changed. Although General Bradley's statement carried the connotation of insubordination, he had not read the president's order, was
unaware that reporters were in the audience, and had inadvertently
mixed up his words. 32
As it turned out, Bradley's bobble worked to the advantage of
black Americans and, ultimately, to the administration itself. The
matter inevitably came up in the president's news conference of July
29. Truman denied that Bradley had favored "segregation in the lower
echelons of the army," but more important was his response to a reporter who wondered if his order envisioned "eventually the end of
segregation." ''Yes," replied the president flatly; and that was that. 83
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For the first time, Harry Truman had publicly committed himself to
the end of segregation in the armed forces, although he had implied
earlier that segregation was discriminatory, particularly in his special
message of February 2.
The rest was anticlimactic. When A. Philip Randolph wondered
if Truman would fulfill his public commitment, Senator McGrath met
with his group on August 2 and assured them that the president's committee would follow the directives of the president. On August 18
Randolph announced the end of his civil-disobedience campaign on
the basis of "assurance that segregation in the armed services is unequivocally banned under the executive order of July 26," an expression more of hope than of fact. But the executive orders deflated the
pressure from black leaders for the remainder of the election campaign. Although the NAACP did not endorse a presidential candidate,
because of its nonpartisan status, most of its members were happy with
Truman. "His new orders," editorialized the Crisis, "represent a spirit
and a courage on these issues as refreshing as they are rare. A standard
has been set for government administrators of the present and the
future." 34
Truman had been making political capital elsewhere. His announcement of a special session had allowed him a momentary political
advantage, of which the opposition was clearly aware. The New York
Times observed that the president's purpose was to "attempt to put the
Republicans on the spot for their failure to enact legislation-principally in the matter of low-cost housing and price-control." Truman
admitted this later in his Memoirs. "Of course," he recalled, "I knew
that the special session would produce no results in the way of legislation. But I felt justified in calling the Congress back to Washington
to prove to the people whether the Republican platform really meant
anything or not."36
To dramatize the special session, Truman appeared in person before a joint session of Congress on July 27, where he presented his
legislative requests. Speaking in careful, restrained language, in striking contrast with the strident tone of his acceptance address, the president identified two critical areas-housing and inflation-for congressional action. He also hoped for "other important legislative measures
on which delay would injure us at home and impair our world relations." Among other things, he urged the enactment of those measures
that he had "recommended last February to protect and extend basic
civil rights of citizenship and human liberty." Noting that Congress
had enacted legislation only with respect to Japanese-Americans, he
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pleaded for those other measures "necessary to carry out our American
ideals of liberty and justice for all.''36
Truman apparently hoped for congressional action on housing and
inflation, despite the confession in his Memoirs that he was playing
politics. No one seriously expected Congress to pass a civil-rights bill,
least of all the president, and he carefully played down the issue. But
it was hoped that some action would be taken on other matters, and
careful planning on the part of the administration preceded delivery
of the message to Congress. In particular, the White House consulted
with members of the cabinet and with Democratic leaders in Congress.
Democratic strategists also sought to mobilize outside forces in support
of the president's requests and at least to create the illusion of administrative efforts for civil rights. Consulting with representatives of the
NAACP, the ACLU, and other civil-rights organizations, members of
the Democratic National Committee's Research Division urged them
to press for continuation of the session until the president's civil-rights
program had been enacted, but warned, "Under no circumstances must
it be a political football and used to becloud the pressing problems of
inflation, housing, education.''37 This is to a large extent what happened. Few liberal Democrats, in the White House or in Congress,
were willing to put civil rights first, which lessened their credibility
among racial minorities and weakened the civil-rights movement of
the time.
Faced with the prospect of easy victory in November and having
a presidential candidate who was reluctant to become entangled in the
politics of the special session, Republicans planned less carefully.
Herbert Brownell, Dewey's campaign manager, sought to offset any
criticism of congressional inaction by arguing that before the Republicans could enact their platform, it was first necessary to elect a Republican president to lead a Republican Congress. The Afro-American,
however, rejected this logic, contending that "the opportunity is certainly theirs. What they do with it will be a fair test of the party's
leadership."38
But Republicans were not bereft of inspiration. If the president
could play politics, so could they, and Senate Republicans came up
with the tactic of placing an anti-poll-tax bill first on the agenda. Such
a bill had passed the House in 1947 and now awaited consideration in
the Senate. To prevent a vote on it, Republicans reasoned, southern
Democrats would launch a filibuster, thereby embarrassing the president. Thus, on July 29, Senator Kenneth S. Wherry moved to consider
the anti-poll-tax bill, and the inevitable occurred when southern Demo-
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crats objected strenuously on the grounds of unconstitutionality. On
August 2 Wherry sought to invoke cloture on the measure, but the
chair ruled that under existing rules cloture could not be applied, and
the debate continued. Seeking to offset southern arguments concerning constitutionality, Senator Morse reminded his colleagues that
Congress had legislated specifically against the poll tax in the soldier
vote bill of 1942. He also recalled that Truman and Barkley had voted
then against the anti-poll-tax amendment to that bill, though both had
supported the final soldier vote bill which included this provision. 89
The subsequent debate and maneuvers on the 1948 anti-poll-tax bill
consumed half of the two-week special session. Finally, on August 4,
the Senate voted sixty-nine to sixteen in favor of a motion by Wherry
that automatically removed the anti-poll-tax bill from the agenda.
That action effectively terminated consideration of civil-rights legislation in the special session.
Civil-rights organizations had been painfully reminded of the
power of southern Democrats to prevent action on civil-rights measures. But they were also keenly aware of the fact that Senate Republicans .had voted unanimously for Wherry's motion, while liberal Democrats and the Democratic leadership had supplied all sixteen votes in
opposition. Even before the end of the session, Walter White unleashed a torrent of invective at the Republican leadership and
southern Democrats, identifying the latter as those "morons of the
Senate who fear with a mortal terror that any interference with the
Dixie sport of lynching, disfranchisement or second class citizenship
for Negroes would instantaneously mean that their wives and daughters would flee in ecstasy to the Harlems of the South." Republicans
were delighted with the Dixiecrat filibuster, he maintained, and "sat
back and chortled, believing that the voters are so dumb that they
could not see through the transparent dishonesty of the opera bouffe
which was being staged."40
Republicans were scarcely more responsive to other presidential
requests. Although Congress did provide for bank and consumer credit
controls as well as for additional public housing, these provisions fell
short of Truman's recommendations. The administration's political
ploy therefore had been a success. On August 12, shortly after the
adjournment of the special session, the White House released a scorecard contrasting the president's requests with Congress's inadequate
action. This also prompted comparisons between the performance of
the Republican Congress with the promises of the Republican platform. Moreover, during his news conference on the same day, Truman
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was asked i£ he would label it a "do-nothing" session. Quickly exploiting the situation, he replied that indeed the term "do-nothing" applied
to the deliberations of the entire Eightieth Congress. 41
The administration had taken the offensive, and the customary
August lull during a campaign year was not allowed to destroy the
advantage. Throughout the month, while other candidates prepared
for the fall campaign, the president skillfully exploited the advantages
of his office, issuing various statements denouncing the "feeble" efforts
of the Eightieth Congress. At the urging of David Niles, he also met
with Negro leaders of Harlem, including the "unofficial" mayor, who
pledged their support. 42 And behind the scenes, Democratic strategists
prepared for the greatest effort in the history of the party to attract the
black vote.
Organized Negro pressure on the administration had evaporated,
but no one assumed that the black voter was a captive of the Democratic party, particularly because of the threat of Wallace's candidacy.
The Research Division of the Democratic National Committee, created
earlier in the year, contributed many tactical suggestions as well as
detailed data, including a twenty-three-page "fact sheet" outlining the
administration's accomplishments in the area of civil rights. It was a
comprehensive brief, which, aside from the obvious, included such
things as the Justice Department's amicus curiae briefs in the restrictive
covenant cases of Shelley v. Kraemer and Hurd v. Hodge, a report of
the administration's intervention in court cases in New Mexico and
Arizona to permit Indians in those states to vote, and the Justice Department's argument in the Supreme Court case of Takahashi v. Fish
and Game Commission of California, which contended successfully
that the state law prohibiting Japanese-Americans from commercial
fishing violated the Constitution. 43
In August, William Batt of the Research Division also forwarded
to Clark Clifford a six-page memorandum outling strategy for the president's campaign, which Clifford in turn, after slight revision, sent to the
president. The document stressed three main objectives-to win the
majority of political independents by identifying Dewey with the
"failures" of the Eightieth Congress; to solidify the Democratic appeal
to workers, veterans, and Negroes without overlooking farmers and
small businessmen; and to cut into normal Republican areas by highlighting the president's program for "peace." The president should
"speak out fully" on his civil-rights contributions. "His record proves
that he acts as well as talks Civil Rights," the memo argued; "the Negro
votes in the crucial states will more than cancel out any votes the presi-
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dent may lose in the South." Geographically, the president should tour
the Midwest and Far West and then finish in the East, where he should
emphasize the housing shortage, inflation, labor, and civil rights. And
in New York he "should appear for a major speech at a mass meeting in
Harlem, a center of Negro population. His appearance there would
have a powerful effect on Negro voters throughout the United States."
Finally, the memorandum implied that the South should be ignored,
except for a brief trip where the president could remind southerners
of the economic benefits of the New Deal. 44
It was a well-reasoned document and, with some variations, accurately described the campaign that Truman would wage. On his transcontinental tour, beginning on September 17, he launched a wellbalanced attack, indicting the "do-nothing" Congress everywhere,
while exploiting issues of local concern. As he swept across the country, he ignored civil rights, an issue that had never electrified the
farmers and small-town people of the vVest. California, where Wallace
was considered strong and where Warren had much home-state appeal,
was another matter. In a major address in Los Angeles, Truman opened
fire on Wallace, contending that Communists controlled his party, that
a vote for him was wasted, and that the Democratic party was truly
liberal in seeking, among other things, to "extend civil rights."45
On his return journey through Texas and Oklahoma, he studiously
avoided any mention of civil rights, or of Strom Thurmond, for that
matter, which prompted some newspaper comment. In Dallas, Truman reportedly spoke to a desegregated audience in Rebel Stadium;
and it did him no harm, with black or white voters, when he said in
response to Tom Clark's introduction of him as the man who stopped
Joe Louis: "It wasn't Joe Louis I stopped-it was John. I haven't
quite that much muscle." Moving north into Oklahoma and then to
southern Illinois, the "Little Egypt" area of agriculture and coal mining, Truman evoked the memory of William Jennings Bryan, as he
warned his audiences that "big-business Republicans have begun to
nail the American consumer to the wall with spikes of greed." In
southern Illinois he also informed his audiences that his administration
had "continued the fight to expand our civil liberties by new measures
against discrimination." He did not go beyond that for the time being.
On October 2 the president was back in Washington, satisfied with his
performance and with his reception. 46
The administration's strategy was clear. By avoiding a confrontation over civil rights and by refusing to admit Thurmond's existence,
Truman hoped to restrict Dixiecrat strength to the deep South. In-
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deed, for the remainder of the campaign, he ignored the South, except
for speaking in Miami to the American Legion Convention, where he
stressed the issues of peace and war, and in Raleigh, North Carolina,
where he spoke at the dedication of a monument to Presidents Jackson,
Polk, and Johnson. Truman's Raleigh speech was a thoughtful and
skillful performance, designed to appeal to southern moderate opinion
and yet to reaffirm his commitment to fulfill his constitutional duty.
Identifying himself with the three presidents, each of whom had fought
"the forces of pressure and persuasion which sought to make him act as
a representative of a part of the nation only," Truman formulated a
single message from this lesson of the past: "Do your duty, and history
will do you justice."47
From the moment that Thurmond had opened his campaign at a
watermelon festival in Cherryville, North Carolina, he had tried desperately to provoke Truman into a debate, or at least to force him to
respond to his accusations. And Thurmond was a clever performer.
He concentrated on equating the civil-rights program with communism,
an association that was becoming increasingly popular in right-wing
circles. On August 21, for example, he alleged that the administration
was "honeycombed" with Communists who were dictating policy, particularly on civil rights. His running mate, Governor Wright, declared
that the FEPC was "hatched in the brains of Communists.''48
On September 25 Thurmond wired Truman in El Paso, noting
"the amazing parallel between the ideology and administrative provisions of the proposed FEPC bill, which you support, and Communistic
Russian all races law promulgated by Stalin.'' He hoped that Tmman
would "not duck any of these issues while in the South." There were
also naked appeals to the racist vote. A form postcard sent to southern
workingmen urged labor unions to fight Truman, the man seeking to
"force you to work with Negroes and other undesirables." Through it
all, Truman remained imperturbable, and the strategy paid political
dividends. By mid October, it was clear that the States' Rights party
was becoming increasingly isolated. Prestigious southern newspapers
shunned the party; politicians feared the loss of patronage or remembered past favors; and nearly everyone realized the hopelessness of
the cause. 49
Although a few black critics carped at the president for his reluctance to speak out boldly on civil rights during the first part of his
campaign, 50 most of the major Negro newspapers maintained a discreet
silence-and for a somewhat embarrassing reason. Many were now in
the process of endorsing Governor Dewey, 51 who was actually saying
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no more about civil rights than the president and a good deal less about
social-welfare legislation. Indeed, both Dewey and Warren, who had
initially won political reputations as relentless prosecutors, were resting their case on a mountain of platitudes, content with the expectation
of a landslide victory in November. Such an approach was a serious
miscalculation as far as the Negro vote was concerned. Although
Dewey's record on race relations was impressive, it was also unknown
to the average black voter outside the state of New York. Truman,
however, had reaped the benefits of vast publicity since the report of
his Committee on Civil Rights. The Republican National Committee
did seek to publicize Dewey's record through the activities of its Negro
Division and lavish advertisements in the Negro press. 52
The New York governor, however, made no serious effort to entice
black voters; and Negroes in his audiences responded accordingly.
Negro columnists traveling with the "Dewey Victory Special" as it
clicked across the country commented on the lack of enthusiasm for the
governor and on the small number of Negroes in his average-sized
crowds. And in Oakland, California, where one-third of the audience
was black, he said nothing about civil rights, although in Santa Fe he
did refer to the existence of an FEPC in New York state. Black citizens
were also distressed when Dewey advocated that the African colonies
be returned to Italy; this prompted the National Council of Negr:o
Women, meeting in its thirteenth annual convention, to criticize the
governor. 53
Although Dewey took a firm stand on civil rights in New Castle,
Pennsylvania, his speech in New York City on October 21 best illustrated his low-keyed campaign approach to the issue of equal justice.
Then Dewey declared:
Government ... must guide its way by one single standard of
equal justice and equal treatment for all.
By a faithful adherence to this standard we can meet
even our most difficult problems of discrimination against minority groups, of prejudice, of bigotry, of denial of certain
human rights.
From my own experience in this state with the largest
minority groups in the nation, I have found it possible to find
peaceful, honest solutions to problems which fester when they
are ignored or explode if they are mishandled.
By a simple re-discovery of our devotion to human rights
and the protection of others from the abuse of those rights, we
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can draw a line through every conflict and draw it straight and
true. It can be drawn so that both civil liberty and social responsibility complement and fortify each other.
We should deal with the problem of social injustice wherever it is to be found in America and solve that problem in
American terms. 54
Nor were the Republican leaders that were speaking for Dewey
going overboard in their enthusiasm for civil rights. In Charlotte,
North Carolina, Harold Stassen promised southern voters that Dewey,
if elected, would find "an intelligent compromise between states' rights
and human rights which would satisfy Dixie." Although Senator Taft
contended to a northern audience that a Republican Congress would
enact something in the way of civil-rights legislation, he dropped the
subject in the South, where he took a states' rights approach and indicted the "planned economy and totalitarian regulation of the Truman
New Deal." Plainly, neither major party was inclined to discuss the
issue in the South, although both were interested in the region's votes. 55
Henry Wallace was not as reluctant, and during the fall he invaded the South, where several untoward incidents occurred. His
campaign again took him to all parts of the country, but the enthusiasm
shown earlier in the year was no longer apparent, except in New York
City. The Progressive convention may have inspired some of the
faithful, but the allegations of Communist influence on its proceedings
and within the party increasingly isolated Wallace from the mainstream of America, particularly as the cold war promised to warm up.
And the leadership of the Americans for Democratic Action, now in
the Truman camp, was not about to allow anyone to forget the charges.
In October the ADA released a forty-two-page indictment of Wallace,
the burden of which was to pin the Communist tag on the Progressive
party.56
Although Negroes generally had been reluctant to indulge in such
accusations, perhaps because they, too, had been the object of suspicion,
an increasing number of blacks began to perceive a reddish hue to the
party. Columnist Earl Brown, who had attended the Progressive convention, reported that he "saw Communists and their allies and stooges
running the Third Party convention as ruthlessly as any dictator ever
ran a political show." Although appreciative of Wallace's courage, the
Chicago Defender noted that "in order to love him, you must also love
his motley crew of Communist stooges, for he has refused to repudiate
the Commies." A. Philip Randolph, too, joined the chorus of condem-
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nation, although he restricted his praise to Norman Thomas, then campaigning for the sixth and last time as the Socialist party's presidential
nominee. 57
The Wallace candidacy also ignited long-smoldering differences
within the NAACP, particularly between Walter White and W. E. B.
DuBois, its research director. An avid supporter of Henry Wallace,
DuBois found White's thinly disguised admiration for Truman unbearable, particularly when White excoriated Wallace in his syndicated
column for his notoriously "bad" performance on racial matters while
secretary of agriculture and of commerce. In subsequent columns,
White evaluated Dewey's record on human and civil rights as "that of
a man who coolly appraises political advantage and acts accordingly,"
while "it must be recognized that no president in American history has
made as frontal an attack on racial and religious discrimination as
Truman." The bitter disagreement between the two NAACP executives led to DuBois's ouster as research director. 58
The affair had portentous consequences for the NAACP. White's
public expressions in favor of Truman challenged the credibility of the
organization's claim to nonpartisanship, and White found himself the
subject of increasing criticism in the Negro press, particularly from
those newspapers championing Dewey. In his own inimitable way,
George Schuyler undoubtedly spoke for many when he concluded:
"While I do not usually agree with Darkwater (W. E. B. DuBois), the
Leftwing octogenarian who has long and futilely aspired to the leadership of U.S. Senegambians for the benefit of Stalin, I must admit that
he 'has something' when he charges that Blondie (Walter White) is
riding the Truman New (?) Deal bandwagon. Of course, Walter replies that the NAACP is non-partisan, but the people who believe that
should have their heads examined."59
Democratic strategists did not permit White's virtual endorsement
of Truman to delude them into assuming that he, or any Negro for that
matter, could deliver the black vote in November. 60 Although Wallace's overall appeal had fallen from its crest, it appeared that he still
retained impressive support from black citizens, at least judging by
the crowds of them in his audiences and by the number of Negroes
running on the Progressive ticket for local offices. As a consequence,
the Democratic National Committee was engaged in its greatest effort
to woo black Americans. The 1948 Democratic campaign was far more
than a one-man affair. Early in August, National Chairman McGrath
publicly announced that the committee's Negro Division had been disbanded and its black members distributed throughout the staff; segre-
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gation and discrimination, he announced, were inconsistent with the
president's policy with regard to federal employment and the armed
forces. 61
Under the supervision of John P. Davis, a Negro who was Assistant
Director of Publicity, the committee also published a four-page newspaper entitled the Truman Record, which contained articles by William L. Dawson, Channing Tobias, and others, emphasizing Truman's
contributions to civil rights. A million copies were distributed, with
special concentration on the key states of New York, Pennsylvania, and
Illinois. In addition to other pamphlets and brochures, the committee
published three million copies of a pictorial history of The Story of
Harry S. Truman, which the opposition labeled a comic book. The
booklet pictured the president repeating phrases from his State of the
Union address of January 7, 1948, including his statement that "our
first goal is to secure fully the essential human rights of our citizens,"
while someone in the background observed that "the right to vote must
be shared by all!" The Political Action Committee of the CIO also
issued a leaflet entitled "A Look at Truman's Record on Civil. Rights." 62
But the most significant tactic was the summoning of Governor
William Hastie of the Virgin Islands, whose activities were designed
almost entirely to undermine Wallace. On October 13, speaking at the
headquarters of the Democratic National Committee, Hastie promised
to visit nineteen cities on behalf of the president. He focused his criticisms on the Progressive party, "a political puppet securely tied to the
Communist party line." A memorandum of White House Assistant
Stephen Spingam summarized Hastie's approach and contribution:
"Throughout the campaign Hastie was the Democratic party's primary
weapon against the Wallace move to suck in the uninformed Negro
vote." 63
Moreover, the Truman forces had the untiring efforts of Congressman William L. Dawson, who headed the all-black National Citizens
Committee for the Reelection of President Truman. The committee
pledged itself to raise $500,000; and it issued various pieces of propaganda, including a four-page statement on the "Truman Policy on
Negro Health." The occasion for the statement was the publication of
Federal Security Administrator Oscar R. Ewing's The Nation's Health:
A Report to the President, a 186-page report in support of the president's national health-insurance program. Among other things, the
document promised medical services to everyone "without regard to
his race or religion, the color of his skin, his place of national origin or
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the place he lives in our land," and urged the abolition of discrimination in the training and employment of medical personnel. 64
The Ewing report received considerable coverage. Dawson
stressed its significance in his article in the Truman Record, and Walter
White gave it a paragraph in his statement praising the president.
Although the timing of the book coincided nicely with the needs of the
campaign, it was not primarily a tract for the moment, for it would
become the basis for the administration's proposed health program.
Moreover, Ewing took his work seriously and was primarily responsible for the agreement earlier in the year to permit Negro medical
personnel to practice in Gallinger Hospital in Washington, D.C. Ewing
was also an active campaigner for the president. Speaking in Richmond, Virginia, to three hundred delegates of the National Urban
League on September 9, he lauded Truman for his controversial and
courageous stand on civil rights, insisting that every Negro who "loves
his race" should support him. 6 5
Finally, there remained the president, who had played down civil
rights for over a month, apparently ignoring the advice of Clifford and
Batt in August to speak out boldly on the subject. True, early in October he had toured Philadelphia's South Street-a black ghetto-and
the Defender happily highlighted the fact that he was the first president to do so. But in speeches elsewhere throughout most of the
month, he had avoided the issue of civil rights, except where it might
be raised obliquely in connection with displaced persons legislation.
Although there were indications that he already had impressive support from the black rank and file, he decided to take no chances. In
the last week of the campaign, he launched an overt, almost blatant,
appeal for the votes of American minorities, particularly those of
Negroes, Catholics, and Jews. In arriving at the decision to do this,
Truman was taking a calculated risk. Although he apparently considered most of the South safely Democratic, he also had to take into
account the existence of antiminority prejudice elsewhere, for a Roper
poll in September indicated the possibility of a white Protestant backlash. 66
The new offensive was quite apparent in his speech in Chicago on
October 25, where his campaign invective degenerated into demagoguery. Speaking from a prepared text, Truman ignored the "contemptible Communist minority" in order to concentrate on the "crackpot
forces of the extreme right wing"-all located in the Republican party.
Indeed, he more than implied that the forces behind Hitler, Mussolini,
and Tojo paralleled those in influential positions in the Republican
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party-those who were "stirring up racial and religious prejudice
against some of our fellow Americans." Nor was it simply a solitary
reference. He returned to the subject, asserting that "dangerous men,
who are trying to win followers for their war on democracy, are attacking Catholics, and Jews, and Negroes, and other minority races and
religions"; and he particularly indicted the voices of religious prejudice
for passage of the displaced persons bill. Although more subdued in
Cleveland the following evening, he pointed out that the special session had not responded to his plea to enact legislation "to protect the
basic rights of citizenship and human liberty."67
In the remaining days of the campaign, he devoted speeches to
each of America's three most prominent minorities. Speaking in Boston
on October 27, he concentrated on the Catholic vote, though he did
note almost parenthetically that Massachusetts had abolished slavery
during the Revolutionary War because "the people held that liberty
was not for any one race or creed." In the course of his address, he
denounced religious bigotry, particularly in the "shameful" campaign
of 1928 in which "the Republican appeal was based on religious prejudice because of Al Smith's Catholic faith." 68
Truman then moved on to New York, where he delivered a major
address in Madison Square Garden. There, he appealed to Jewish
members of the audience by discussing the administration's policy
toward Israel, which at that moment was involved in fighting with
Arab nations. The president warned his audience that he would not
allow domestic politics to influence that policy, which must have provoked little applause. He then declared, however, "I have never
changed my position on Palestine or Israel," which would have been
news to the Zionists in the crowd, because of his earlier equivocation
on the recognition of Israel. 69
Despite the importance of the Jewish vote, particularly in New
York, it should be emphasized that Truman had sought religiously to
keep the Palestine issue out of the campaign. Until late October he
had restricted his appeal for Jewish votes to an indictment of the Displaced Persons Act. On October 22, however, Dewey released a statement reaffirming his support of a Jewish homeland. Only then did
Truman mention his own attitudes and actions in this regard, first in a
public statement on October 24, then in his speech on October 28 in
Madison Square Garden. 70
His speech in Harlem the next day, however, was the highlight of
the New York tour. It was a significant occasion, not only because he
was the first president to speak in Harlem but also because he was to
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receive the Franklin D. Roosevelt Memorial Brotherhood Medal. It
was, moreover, the first anniversary of the report of his Committee on
Civil Rights. Consequently, Philleo Nash of the White House staff prepared carefully, and it required at least six drafts to get a message that
would strike the proper tone, one without invective and virtually
devoid of partisanship. 71 Speaking thoughtfully and carefully from his
prepared text before an audience estimated at sixty-five thousand, the
president emphasized the contribution of his Committee on Civil
Rights in preparing the way for the achievement of equality and justice
in America. He pointed out that over one million copies of the committee's report had been printed, and he stressed its educational value
to all Americans. Governmental agencies, both state and federal, could
and would act, he reminded his audience, but private action was also
necessary, "for in the last analysis, freedom resides in the actions of
each individual." After briefly mentioning his executive orders of July
and the Department of Justice's contributions before the Supreme
Court, he closed with the promise to work for the attainment of equal
rights "with every ounce of strength and determination that I have."
The speech was an impressive performance, but at that late date in the
campaign it probably influenced few votes. In fact, some Negro papers
that had endorsed Dewey failed to report it. Some southerners were
aware of it, however, and at least one white editor accused the president of having advocated the abolition of southern segregation in his
address. 72
A few speeches remained, then Truman returned to Independence
to vote and to a.wait the election results. The polls showed Dewey in
front, though Truman had narrowed the gap in the final weeks of the
campaign. Still no one, except Truman apparently, really expected his
stunning upset victory. In popular votes, Truman received 24,179,345
to Dewey's 21,991,291, Thurmond's 1,176,125, and Wallace's 1,157,326.
In electoral votes, Truman won 303, with Dewey and Thurmond receiving 189 and 39, respectively. Careful strategy had paid off. Thurmond's electoral votes were confined to Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina, except for one from a Tennessee elector.
The administration had been able to isolate the States' Rights party
and to cut into the Wallace vote in the North at the same time. Truman also received approximately 69 percent of the black vote, and in
many areas-Harlem, for example-he ran well ahead of Roosevelt's
margin in 1944. 73
Although Truman had a sizable plurality, the electoral count of
303 to 189 was misleading, for he had carried California, Illinois, and
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Ohio by a total of only 58,584 votes. Had the voters shifted slightly in
all three states, Dewey would have won the electoral vote and the
White House. Here, the black vote played its role, for the concentration of that vote in the cities of heavily populated states contributed
mightily to Truman's margin of victory in the electoral college. For
example, Truman won California by 17,865, yet Negro voters in Los
Angeles gave him a 25,028 margin over Dewey. Truman carried Illinois by 33,612, while Chicago's Negroes alone gave him a 128,541
plurality. In Ohio, Truman squeezed through by a mere 7,107 votes,
but Negroes in Cleveland provided him with a margin of 14,713. And
so it went. 74
The substantial black vote for Truman was no mystery. Aside
from the obvious propaganda value of his Committee on Civil Rights,
his special message of February 2, the civil-rights plank in the Democratic platform, and the issuance of executive orders 9980 and 9981,
Truman had other things working for him, including the memory of
Franklin D. Roos~velt Wallace was fatally handicapped. The increasing tension of the cold war and the accusations concerning Communist
influence within his party, which Hastie effectively exploited, alienated Wallace from a growing number of black Americans. And over it
all hung the indisputable fact that Wallace simply could not win.
Although Dewey had a respectable record on civil rights as governor
of New York, that record was largely unknown to many black voters,
and Dewey chose not to enlighten them in his campaign speeches in
1948. Moreover, when white southerners rebelled out of fear that the
president really "meant it," some Negroes were finally persuaded to
take the Missourian at his word.
There were other reasons, economic as well as racial. The depression of the 1930s was still a vivid and painful memory to those black
Americans who had lived through it. The widespread fear of a postwar depression had not materialized, and Truman reaped the benefit.
Moreover, black Americans, like other low-income groups, favored
social-welfare legislation, and Truman's espousal of such measures and
his hard-hitting indictment of the "do-nothing" Eightieth Congress was
effective in convincing many Negro workers that he was a fitting representative of the New Deal tradition. In voting for Truman, these
people were motivated as much by class as by race.
Nor did Truman's veto of the Taft-Hartley Act and his exploitation of the fact during the campaign do him any harm with most black
voters. Indeed, the act had been a divisive, though minor, issue within
the black community since its passage in 1947. Although blacks were
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still blocked from entering into many unions, particularly the skilled
crafts unions of the AFL, many now belonged to the CIO as a result of
recruiting drives during the 1930s and of the labor shortage and the
actions of Roosevelt's FEPC during the Second World War. Furthermore, leaders of the CIO, black and white alike, did their homework
in educating workers to the political realities of the time. 75
Negro workers were thus part of the CIO's bitter campaign
against revision of the Wagner Act. When the Republican Congress
passed the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, prominent black leaders chose
sides. Those who opposed substantial revision of the Wagner Act and
supported Truman's veto included Walter White and the NAACP,
A. Philip Randolph and other labor leaders, several columnists, and the
Chicago Defender and several minor Negro newspapers.76 Most of the
major Negro papers, however, lined up in favor of Taft-Hartley, in part
because of its abolition of the closed shop ( which appealed to them as
employers) and because it contained a clause aimed at discrimination
in labor unions. 77 Thus, when the Taft-Hartley Act became a significant issue in the campaign of 1948, blacks were involved. While several Negro newspapers urged the election of Dewey in part because of
the Republican-enacted Taft-Hartley Act, black as well as white CIO
workers prepared to troop to the polls to vote for Truman, which in the
last analysis probably hurt Wallace more than Dewey. 78
If black workers could vote along class as well as racial lines, so,
too, could black employers-which offers some explanation for the fact
that all of the major Negro papers, except the Chicago Defender, endorsed Dewey for the presidency. Historically Republican until the
New Deal, some Negro publishers were eager to return to the Republican fold; and the nominations of Willkie in 1940 and Dewey in 1944,
rather than someone like Robert Taft, persuaded them to drop Roosevelt after 1936. The Call, in fact, had never endorsed Roosevelt, so that
· its support of Dewey in 1948 was completely consistent with its past
editorial policy. In 1948 Dewey's strong record on civil rights persuaded some black publishers to see a standoff on that issue, and this
permitted them to endorse the governor for economic reasons. Thus
some favored .Taft-Hartley; others wanted lower taxes; one endorsed
"free enterprise"; still others were not convinced of the sincerity of the
man from Missouri. The Dixiecrat rebellion persuaded some that the
Democratic party was a hopeless vehicle for progress on civil rights if
the rebels should return. And several reasoned that at that moment in
history civil-rights legislation stood a better chance of enactment with
a Republican president and a Republican Congress. With a Republi-
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can in the White House, Republicans in Congress would be under
pressure to support his program, while most northern Democrats
would go along because of their personal commitment and their black
constituents. 79
Truman, of course, was not without support from the black press.
In addition to the Chicago Defender, several smaller papers across the
country, including some in the South, endorsed his candidacy. Moreover, he had the support of many black columnists, who endorsed him
at the same time that their editors were eulogizing Dewey. Finally, the
majority of black political reporters supported the president. On the
eve of the election, they polled themselves: there were fourteen in
favor of Truman, three for Dewey, two for Wallace, and, unbelievably
enough, one for Thurmond. 80 Thus, in some ways, black journalism in
1948 paralleled its white counterpart.
Truman's upset victo1y of 1948 has become part of American folklore, but the entire campaign was much more than that. For years,
black Americans had anticipated the day when their votes would become numerous enough to affect presidential elections. As early as
1924 Professor Kelly Miller of Howard University had argued that as a
result of the migration of southern Negroes to northern cities during
the First World War, "the solid Negro vote constitutes the balance of
power in the closely contested states of the North and West which
usually determine the issue between the two parties.''81 The announcement was premature, but the election of 1948 made the wish a reality.
It demonstrated that in a close contest the weight of America's most
numerous racial minority could determine the electoral votes of large
states and hence the election, assuming, of course, that the black vote
was fluid enough to shift according to the interests of the moment
rather than to the dictates of memory.
Moreover, throughout the year, civil rights had occupied a position of importance, evidenced by the strong statements in both party
platforms and the unprecedented activities of both national committees; the president's message of February and his executive orders of
July 26; the Dixiecrat defection and Wallace's courageous campaigning. This position represented the fruition of a movement that had
begun at least ten years before to increase public awareness of civilrights problems. No longer could the issue of civil rights be ignored,
and in the future both parties would vie for the black vote. "From that
time on," Roy Wilkins has written, "the civil-rights issue has been
squarely in the national political picture of both major parties ( not
around the fringes as in the old days), and the non-southern Negro
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voting power is now balanced ( in the Democratic party) against the
Deep South white vote." 82
There were other significant results. In voting for Truman in
1948, Negroes demonstrated a loyalty to the party as well as to the
president. During the 1930s black Americans had abandoned their
historic allegiance to the Republican party, and from 1936 on, they had
voted for Roosevelt, primarily for economic and emotional reasons.
The New Deal convinced most blacks that the Democratic party was
preferable on "bread and butter" issues, although many still looked to
the party of Lincoln for progress on civil rights. Truman's contribution
was not only to confirm the Democratic party's commitment to socialwelfare legislation and to invoke the memory of the economic appeal
of the New Deal but, of -equal importance, to champion civil rights as
no Democratic president had ever done, thus neutralizing the traditional appeal of Republicans on this issue. This was quite an achievement, particularly in view of the presence and power of southern
Democrats in the party, and it made it increasingly difficult for Republicans to cut into the black vote.
The election of 1948 contained other hints of the future, particularly with regard to alterations in customary voting habits and the
increasing complexity of campaign strategy. In 1948, while Truman
was solidifying the allegiance of Negroes to the Democratic party, he
was also persuading some racist white voters to look elsewhere: the
States' Rights party was the first significant manifestation of white
backlash in the twentieth century-a fact that both major parties had
to keep in mind when bidding for black votes in subsequent elections.
In 1948 the issue of civil rights provoked conflicts only between the
North and the South and within the Democratic party, although beneath the surface in northern ghettos of various white ethnic minorities
lay unasked questions and unresolved answers concerning Truman's
egalitarian policies. In the future, the white backlash would emerge
and be present, in varying degrees, in every part of the country. Moreover, the revolt of the white South also encouraged the party of Lincoln to look South for votes in the future. But for the moment, the
events of 1948 brought hope to minorities that progress would continue.

8

A NEW DAY DAWNS?

Truman's victory in November stirred hope throughout black
America, for civil-rights advocates chose to interpret his election as an
endorsement of his stand for equal rights. Walter White lost no time in
cabling the president. "Your triumph, achieved over both the extreme
Right and extreme Left," he maintained, "is a mandate under which
you and the new Congress can proceed to carry out the program you
outlined so clearly and courageously to the people." "The people have
spoken!" exclaimed Mrs. Sadie Alexander to Francis Matthews, a fellow member of the president's civil-rights committee. "They have
approved President Truman's appointment of a Committee on Civil
Rights, the report of that committee and the president's determination
to make the recommendations of that report a reality." Matthews
agreed. Writing to the president on November 12, he rejoiced "in the
vindication of your championship of our committee's report and recommendations." Truman's response was more than pro forma; after the
customary pleasantries of thanking Matthews for his "generous words
of congratulations and commendation," he penned at tl1e bottom: "We
shall win that civil rights battle just as we won the election, I am sure."1
Although some did not share Truman's certainty about victory on
the field of civil rights, few doubted his personal commitment, and the
pages of the black press were replete with glowing tributes to the president. "The future for civil rights looks brighter than it has in the history of this country," concluded a reporter for the Courier. "Democracy Reborn with Truman Victory," went the headline of a front-page
article in the Call, erstwhile supporter of Governor Dewey. "No candidate for the presidency ever faced a greater combination of hostile
power," editorialized the Chicago Defender. "In the face of such oppo-
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sition Harry Truman never wavered once. He discussed every issue
from civil rights to foreign policy and he took his stand without qualification or compromise."2
But if there was little doubt in the black press about the president,
there was considerable apprehension about the new Congress, for the
election had also resulted in Democratic majorities in both houses.
Here, black opinion was divided. The Chicago Defender was convinced that Democratic control of Congress would ensure enactment
of the president's program and that Truman possessed enough patronage power to keep southern politicians in line. At the very least, several
newspapers expected the new Congress to legislate against lynching
and the poll tax. But the Journal and Guide was deeply distressed.
Pointing out that Sam Rayburn of Texas would serve as speaker of the
House, that Vice-President Barkley of Kentucky would preside over
the Senate, and that southerners would chair important committees,
the paper concluded on the wry note that these facts "should give
Negro leaders who had advocated Mr. Truman's election very little
to be happy about."8
Nevertheless, for the moment Truman had the advantage, which
he was determined not to lose, either with black America or with the
new Congress. On November 16, in his first news conference after the
election, he promised a civil-rights statement in his State of the Union
message. This prompted Jonathan Daniels to write in the Raleigh
News and Observer: "There is nothing strange about that. Indeed, one
certain thing is that Harry Truman means what he says." In another
news conference on December 2, Truman delighted black America
with his response to a question concerning how Dixiecrat electors
ought to cast their votes. "I don't want the Dixiecrat vote," the president retorted. "We won without New York and without the solid
South, and I am proud of-that."4
All this helped, of course, when Congressman Frank W. Boykin of
Alabama declared in a postelection speech in Mobile that Truman,
prior to the election, had confided: "Frank, I don't believe in this civilrights program any more than you do, but we've got to have it to win."
The Associated Negro Press picked up the story and also reported that
Truman had "no comment" on the matter. The ANP predicted, "The
statement will continue to plague and haunt him until he makes some
definite statement on the congressman's speech." The alleged statement actually haunted no one. The White House subsequently denied
it in private correspondence, and most Negro papers did not even
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bother to report it. The Call refused to accept it at the outset, denouncing Boykin as a southern politician habituated to "skullduggery."5
In his resolution not to waver on civil rights, Truman had solid
support from several Democratic spokesmen and senators. When
Senator Sparkman of Alabama sought to prevent a showdown in Congress by proposing the appointment of a congressional committee to
investigate the problems of minorities in America, Senator Pepper of
Florida rejected the idea, stating that the administration was determined to move quickly on civil rights. Vice-President-elect Barkley
also chose to let people know where he stood. In a speech in New York
in mid December, he made an exceptionally strong and vigorous statement in favor of civil-rights legislation, noting that "the controversial
aspects of it cannot minimize our obligation to deal with it." And
when Senator Sparkman promised a fight if the president refused to
compromise, Senator McGrath reported that he saw "no change in the
president's attitude. He is still determined to press for his program as
he outlined it before the 80th Congress and during the campaign."6
Truman also had the same message for Walter White when he
called at the White House on November 29 to present the statistics of
the black vote. White later emerged to announce the president's determination to pursue his civil-rights program. "I saw no sign of any
compromise," he reported. The NAACP leader was unusually optimistic. Speaking to the tenth constitutional convention of the CIO, he
proclaimed that "the outlook is infinitely brighter for the stopping of
reaction, for the repeal of anti-labor legislation and the enactment into
law of civil-rights and social welfare legislation than any time in recent
history." Yet his critical faculties had not escaped him. In his column
in the Chicago Defender, he noted that the old guard might die but
would never surrender, which "makes it imperative that liberals, and
especially Negroes, waste no time jubilating over the election of a
somewhat more enlightened Congress . . . or the defeat of those who
attempted to lynch Harry Truman because of his civil rights program."7
Truman also conferred with other civil-rights advocates. On December 10 he met with four members of the National Committee on
Segregation in the Nation's Capital, who presented him with the published, and abbreviated, version of the committee's comprehensive
investigation of discrimination in the District of Columbia. With financial support from the Julius Rosenwald Fund, the committee had been
privately organized in the fall of 1946, at the same time that Truman
had created his own Committee on Civil Rights. In fact, the two committees had worked closely together. Four members of the president's
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committee-Sadie Alexander, James Carey, Dorothy Tilly, and Channing Tobias-had also served on the National Committee on Segregation in the Nation's Capital, and the latter committee had supplied
the president's committee with the source material for its brief indictment of discrimination in the District. 8 Truman thus had good reason
to accept the report in an "extremely warm and cordial" manner, as
George N. Shuster, chairman of the committee on segregation in
Washington, later revealed to the press.9
The committee's published report, entitled Segregation in Washington, had been prepared by Kenesaw M. Landis, who had ruthlessly
cut the original manuscript to a brief, hard-hitting, and well-illustrated
ninety-one pages, hoping thus to achieve the maximum impact. He
succeeded. In casting a bright light on the dark side of racism, Segregation in Washington did for the District what To Secure These Rights
had done for the nation.10 By word and picture, Segregation in Washington illustrated the plight of blacks living in the shadow of the
Capitol, who were suffering the degrading effects of discrimination in
employment, recreational facilities, education, restaurants, theaters,
and housing. By inference, it revealed that on racial matters the nation's capital combined the worst features of discrimination, northern
as well as southern. As a showplace of American democracy, the capital was a disgrace.
The discrimination in the District was apparent the moment a
visitor deplaned at Washington's National Airport, located on the Virginia side of the Potomac, because of its rigidly segregated restaurant
facilities. Discrimination at the airport had a long and complicated
history. Almost from the moment it opened in June 1941, Negroes had
lodged complaints. When Edgar G. Brown, then president of the
United Government Employees, was denied service and referred to
the basement to dine with the help, he staged a one-man sit-down
strike; the Southernaires, a prominent black radio group, also protested. And everyone was confused by premature reports that discrimination would not be tolerated because the airport was supervised
directly by the Civil Aeronautics Administration, which was located
within the Department of Commerce. 11
In 1945 the situation was clarified, or so it seemed, with the settlement of a longstanding boundary dispute between the state of Virginia
and the District of Columbia. The federal government was given
exclusive jurisdiction over the National Airport, constructed on reclaimed land on the Virginia side of the Potomac; but the law contained a joker. It stipulated that certain sections of the federal criminal
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code applied to the airport, including Section 289, which provided that
when the federal government assumed control of state land, the criminal laws of the state would nonetheless remain in effect; and Virginia
law required segregation in "public halls." To complicate matters
further, a private corporation, Air Services Terminal, Inc., was the concessionaire; and it opposed integration of its restaurant facilities. 12
On the surface, it seemed a hopeless situation for advocates of
desegregation, although some obviously were unaware of the finer
points of the law. In 1945 and 1946 criticism of the Civil Aeronautics
Administration mounted, and Henry Wallace, then secretary of commerce, came in for much abuse. Apparently Wallace's solicitor had
informed him that he lacked authority to integrate the airport in view
of the Virginia law, although a White House assistant later recalled
that Wallace had never responded to White House referrals on the
subject. 13 The NAACP then protested to his successor, W. Averell
Harriman, who received similar advice from departmental lawyers.
But unlike Wallace, Harriman pursued the matter and personally
urged Congress to adopt legislation requiring integration of facilities
at the National Airport. As a result, the Chicago Defender placed
Harriman on its honor roll in 1947 "for his role in ending discrimination
in the Washington airport restaurant." The announcement was premature. Congress failed to respond to Harriman's request and rejected
Congressman Everett Dirksen's bill to eliminate segregation at the
airport. 14
There the matter stood while politics were being played, although
the airport situation threatened to become an issue. It cropped up
occasionally in criticisms of Henry Wallace, and a court case instigated
by the NAACP posed a special problem for the administration. After
several postponements, the case was scheduled to be heard by Judge
Albert Bryan in federal district court on October 28, 1948; and the
administration was thus faced with the possibility of embarrassment in
the closing days of the campaign. The matter was referred to John R.
Steelman, assistant to the president, who consulted with the Department. of Commerce as well as with the president. Apparently, the
solictor for the Commerce Department concluded that the department
lacked authority to issue a desegregation order. 15
The Department of Justice, however, had already decided otherwise. In an unsolicited opinion, Acting Attorney General Philip B.
Perlman informed Commerce Secretary Charles Sawyer on October 27
that he had the necessary authority. Pointing out that the Justice Department had been in contact with Judge Bryan, which evidently led
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to a further postponement of the case, Perlman requested action by
the Commerce Department "at an early date." The Justice Department
had thoroughly studied the problem, Perlman contended, and believed
that the Civil Aeronautics Administrator could issue regulations for
the airport. Presumably, the Department of Justice was insisting that
a restaurant was not a "public hall," as stipulated in the Virginia segregation statute. Secretary Sawyer, however, chose not to issue an order
at that time. 16
With the matter apparently at a standstill, Truman decided to
intervene. The immediate occasion for his action stemmed from a
letter of November 10, written by Sadie Alexander. Upon deplaning at
Washington National Airport on August 9, she informed the president,
the soda fountain offered to serve her a glass of milk only if she would
carry it "to the ladies room or drink it in the lobby." She refused to
suffer the indignity and promised to take the case to court, which she
did in October. Mrs. Alexander, however, preferred executive action.
Therefore, she asked the president to request an opinion from the
attorney general, who, she was convinced, must "advise you that the
defendant cannot deny the same service . . . solely because of color."
Francis P. Matthews also promised Mrs. Alexander that he, too, would
urge presidential action. The White House responded. David Niles
requested an opinion from the Department of Justice, which of course
was favorable to executive action, and Clark Clifford participated in
writing the order. 17
On December 27, 1948, after seven years of agitation, black
Americans had a small amount of satisfaction when D. W. Rentzel,
CAA administrator, announced that the government, on the advice of
the Justice Department, had ordered the end of racial segregation at
Washington National Airport. Mrs. Alexander, writing to the president, saw the action as "further evidence of your conviction that
democracy can and must be made a living force in America." She also
dropped her court case immediately. 18
The problem of segregation at Washington National Airport revealed in microcosm all of the difficulties involved in razing the wall
of segregation in America. In removing only a stone, the cause of justice had to combat legal technicalities, ignorance, bureaucratic inertia,
departmental opposition, political calculations, and general indifference, both within the government and without. Nor was the case
closed. Air Terminal Services, Inc., the concessionaire, refused to serve
six Negroes within twenty-four hours after the CAA order, and it
appealed to the federal district' court for an injunction. On January 3,
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1949, Judge Albert Bryan denied the injunction, holding that the Civil
Aeronautics Administration had ample authority to erase the color line
at the airport; and Virginia authorities indicated that they would not
contest the order. It was only fitting that Edgar G. Brown, who had
launched the first sit-in protest in 1941, was the first to be offered service
on January 4, although during the three-hour wait while the waitress
ignored him, he lost his appetite and "couldn't even drink their water."
His black companions, however, dutifully consumed ham and eggs. 19
There were to be other gratifying moments for black America. On
January 3, the House of Representatives stripped the Rules Committee,
which had a strong Dixiecrat-Republican flavor, of its almost absolute
power to bottle up bills. Previously, it had required a petition signed
by 218 members of the House to force a bill out of the Rules Committee; now, any committee chairman could request a vote of the House
to place any bill on the calendar that had been in the committee over
twenty-four days. It was a decisive victory for the administration and
promised to facilitate consideration of various progressive measures,
including civil-rights bills.20 Indeed, some members of the White
House staff later saw the move as one of great significance, for in 1949
the threat of action by committee chairmen persuaded the Rules Committee to report bills dealing with housing and social security, which
Congress subsequently passed. In addition to this reform, black Americans also took pride in the appointment of Congressman William
Dawson as chairman of the Committee on Expenditures in Executive
Departments-the first Negro "to head a major congressional committee in modern times."21
Then there was Truman's State of the Union address on January 5.
In his news conference the week before, he had indicated that the message would "cover the waterfront." It did. Speaking to a joint session
of Congress, the president offered a bold program to provide every
American with the opportunity "to obtain his fair share of our increasing abundance." In requesting low-cost housing, an increase in the
minimum wage, repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act, extension of Social
Security, federal aid to education, and various controls over the economy, Truman revealed clearly the contribution of the New Deal to his
own Fair Deal. The address included more, however, for he also
called for national medical insurance and enactment of civil-rights
legislation. Speaking with deliberation, he referred to the requests in
his special message of the previous February 2. "The civil rights proposals I made to the 80th Congress, I now repeat to the 81st Congress.
They should be enacted in order that the federal government may
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assume the leadership and discharge the obligations clearly placed
upon it by the Constitution." To dispel any doubt about his commitment, he closed with the statement, "I stand squarely behind those
proposals," which he emphasized with voice inflection and hand gesture. And in news conferences after the address, he reaffirmed the
commitment.22
Yet, in requesting civil-rights legislation from Congress, Truman
was determined not to go beyond his message of February 2, 1948,
which had aroused so much controversy. At that time, for example, he
had requested home rule for the District of Columbia and nothing
more, unless '1ocal corrective action" failed in the "near future," in
which case he said that he would ask for a "model civil rights law for
the Nation's Capital." Thus, despite the recommendations of To Secure
These Rights and the stinging indictment of racism in Segregation in
Washington, the president, for reasons known only to himself and his
advisers, chose not to fight for such legislation in 1949. Perhaps he
feared that a congressional battle over liberalization of racial policies
in the District might jeopardize the passage of legislation, civil rights
and otherwise, that would benefit Negroes everywhere in the country,
although one correspondent pointed out that southerners could not
employ the argument of states' rights in debates over civil-rights legislation for the District.23 Perhaps, too, the administration feared vigorous opposition from white residents of the District. An editorial in
the Washington Post in December 1948, for example, had conspicuously omitted any mention of corrective legislation for the District,
while calling for a cautious approach on civil-rights legislation generally.24 Whatever the reason, from 1949 on, the administration would
attack discrimination in the District obliquely and piecemeal through
the actions of various executive agencies, particularly the Interior and
Justice departments. The president would also make a telling point
about segregation in Washington during inaugural week.
The State of the Union message was anything but bland, and it set
off a discordant chorus. While liberal Democrats sang hosannahs,
many Republicans decried his proposals for "state socialism" in concert
with the wails of southern politicians. Congressman E. E. Cox of
Georgia, for example, gloomily predicted that approval of the civilrights program would create "the greatest social disturbance the country has ever known," although Hugh Scott, chairman of the Republican
National Committee, maintained that Truman was "as bold in urging
socialized medicine as he is now timid in hastily skimming over the
explosive civil rights issue."25

Quest and Response

156
Few black leaders agreed with Scott. Walter White, as usual, immediately wired the president, praising him for the "unequivocal reaffirmation" of his stand on civil rights as well as for his espousal of
various social-welfare measures. "We are more hopeful today than at
any time in recent history," editorialized the Chicago Defend,er. "The
president has strengthened the faith of all of us and struck another
blow for freedom." Black Americans were also pleased with the request in his budget message of January 10, 1949, for a hefty increase in
the appropriation for Howard University. Moreover, two days later
Truman met with a delegation representing the National Citizens
Council on Civil Rights, whose spokesman declared afterwards that the
president had promised action "right away" and that his staff was
already in the process of drafting various civil-rights bills.26
The highlight of the new year, however, was yet to come, for
Harry S. Truman's inauguration was destined to be an historic occasion
for black America. Negroes had eagerly anticipated the ceremonies
since December 25, when the Afro-American had headlined a secondpage story: "TRUMAN'S TO BE FIRST INAUGURATION WITHOUT COLOR LINE." The story noted that "for the first time since the
administration of William Howard Taft . . . the foes of segregation
have gained a foothold, and plan a completely integrated program on
a city-wide basis." To facilitate integration of the festivities, the
inaugural committee named William L. Houston, a Negro lawyer, to
serve as a committee chairman. One of the first public indications of
this change in policy occurred at the Truman-Barkley Club Dinner on
January 18, where the president made his first speech of inaugural
week. In the audience were four blacks, guests of Welborn Mayock,
general counsel of the Democratic National Committee and treasurer
of the Truman-Barkley Clubs.27
The parade, too, was a revelation, although the army predictably
stymied complete integration by separating the races by platoons. The
crews of light tanks, however, were integrated, while the men of the
Coast Guard were completely scrambled. Moreover, the Women's
Army Corps "showed a dark face in a sea of white ones." Blacks also
sat in the president's reviewing stand and were delighted with the
president's apparent snub of Governor Thurmond as he passed before
the president. Negroes attended the President's Reception and danced
at the President's Ball. There were, of course, some incidents in the
privately owned hotels and restaurants which maintained a fairly rigid
color line; but the threats of several delegations to cancel reservations
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unless Negro guests were accepted sometimes resulted in their admission.28
In describing inaugural week, the highly partisan Chicago Defender; for once, reflected the feelings of most Negro newspapers when
it concluded: "For the first time in history Negro citizens were fully
integrated in the inaugural celebration and it was obvious to everyone
that the lily-white era of Washington's official social life had come to
an abrupt end. It was made clear ·that when President Truman talks
about the American people, he is talking about all the people."29 The
reports of the inauguration in the Negro press also revealed a subtle,
though significant, change in the vocabulary of black America. For
years, Negroes, like whites, had generally used the words "desegregation" or "unsegregated" to describe the erasure or the absence of the
color line; but the reports in the press of January 1949 indicated that
black America, or at least part of its leadership, was well on the way to
general usage of the word "integration," which was not only a stronger
and more positive expression of their desires but was also inflammatory
to some whites who interpreted it to · mean "social equality" and the
"mixing" of the races. It was also an indication of greater determination and hope on the part of black America and a hint of the progress
then taking place under the Truman administration.
There were, in addition, many tangible accomplishments in race
relations across the country, in state and local governments as well as
in the private sector. In many instances the exhortations and actions of
the Truman administration, coupled with the pressure applied by various civil-rights organizations, resulted in dramatic breakthroughs on
the color front. Some of these gains resulted from court decisions, both
state and federal, and affected minorities other than black Ameticans.
For example, To Secure These Rights had indicted the states of Arizona
and New Mexico for their disenfranchisement of reservation Indians.
In July 1948, encouraged by an amicus curiae brief filed by the Departments of Justice and Interior, the Arizona Supreme Court ruled
that those Indians who met the state's educational requirements must
be permitted the right to vote. The following month, a special federal
court, after listening to another brief from the two departments, ruled
similarly for New Mexico. Both cases were historic, if only because
they "removed, once and for all," wrote the Afro-American, "the remaining abridgements of suffrage which have plagued the nation's
Indians." The federal court decision did not sit well with the New
Mexico legislature, however, and in 1949 only the governor's pocket
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veto prevented enactment of a bill designed to contravene the court
and to disenfranchise the Indians again. 30
The courts were also upholding the right of Negroes to vote in the
South. Since 1944, when the Supreme Court case of Smith v. Allwright
had outlawed the white primary, various southern states had adopted
ingenious devices to keep Negroes from the polls; but federal judges,
particularly South Carolina's courageous J. Waties Waring (who was
eventually hounded out of the South), repeatedly ruled them unconstitutional. 31
Mexican-Americans, too, were profiting from the postwar awareness of minority grievances. For years, their children had been segregated in various schools in the Southwest, often without legislative
sanction. In California, for example, the state law called for segregation only with respect to Indians and certain Orientals; but MexicanAmericans were in fact also segregated, ostensibly because of a language problem. As a result, a few parents joined with LULAC-the
League of United Latin American Citizens-to bring a successful court
case against the segregation policies of four school districts in Orange
County, California. A federal circuit court upheld the decision. In the
so-called Delgado case in Texas in 1948, a similar ruling was reached,
except that separation might be permitted in the first grade if language
problems existed. 32
Although there were few serious attempts, at least immediately, to
implement the court decisions, the California case apparently had
some connection with the legislature's decision to drop all mention of
segregation from the educational code. Moreover, because of the organized activities of LULAC and the increased voting power of Mexican-Americans, some politicians were becoming sensitive to their grievances. In 1949, for example, when small-town authorities in Texas
denied the right of chapel services and interment for the body of Felix
Longoria, a Mexican-American killed in combat during the Second
World War, Senator Lyndon B. Johnson intervened and arranged for
burial in Arlington National Cemetery. 33
While Congress continued to frustrate creation of a federal FEPC
in the postwar years, by 1949 nine states had followed the pioneering
efforts of New York and established their own commissions; and in
Kansas and Nebraska, state commissions were investigating employment discrimination. Although their laws varied widely in scope and
in effectiveness, eighteen of the more populous states had enacted laws
banning discrimination in amusement facilities and places of public
accommodations, such as hotels, restaurants, libraries, parks, public
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conveyances, and educational institutions. Seven states had expressly
abolished segregation in their National Guard units, while two others
-New York and Pennsylvania-had paraphrased the Democratic platform in calling for equality of treatment. Only a few states, however,
had taken steps to outlaw discrimination in public or semipublic housing. Oregon and Utah had both repealed their alien-land laws, by
which they had traditionally prevented certain Oriental groups from
owning real property. 34 By the standards of the late 1940s, a time
when the old verities and prejudices still imprisoned the minds of most
whites, such state action represented advances in the attempt to establish equality in America, particularly because the most populous states
were generally those involved in attempting to implement a new
order.
That progress resulted not only from the Truman administration's
leadership by word and deed but also from the irrepressible activities
of civil-rights organizations and from the ever-increasing number of
Negroes elected to state legislatures and city administrations-people
who could speak with some authority concerning the needs of the
black community. It would be misleading, however, to suggest that
Negroes, or any underprivileged minority, for that matter, held the
semblance of a balance of power in any state or local government unit,
for the rate of progress was agonizingly slow. 35 The fact that most
state legislatures were gerrymandered in favor of rural America while
most American minority groups were concentrated in large cities only
indicated that proportionate representation was far in the future, even
on the city level, where similar gerrymandering was a frequent practice. It was indeed a sad commentary on American democracy when
Mexican-Americans in Los Angeles, the city's largest minority, went
without representation on the city council from 1881 to 1949. Even
New York, with its large Jewish population, did not send a Jew to the
United States Senate until 1949, when former Governor Herbert H.
Lehman replaced the ailing Robert F. Wagner; in fact, Lehman was
the first Jew to be popularly elected to the Senate from any state. 36
Although American minorities generally lacked the muscle at the
polls to elect their own people, they could and did unite with concerned white American Christians to elect sympathetic whites to various local offices. Furthermore, some major cities did respond with their
own fair employment practices ordinances, notably Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, and Philadelphia. Attempts
to enact local housing ordinances, however, almost invariably failed,
despite the combined efforts of various Jewish, Negro, and church
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organizations. Yet, thirty-three cities had established commissions on
human relations since 1943-when the first was created-to investigate, to give advice on, and to seek solutions to the problems of racial
tension and discrimination. 37
If only because there was so much room for improvement there,
some of the most dramatic progress occurred in the South. And there
were good reasons for the improvement. Concerned southern whites
hoped that correction of the most blatant examples of racism might
forestall action on the part of the federal government and the federal
courts; sympathetic whites were encouraged and emboldened by the
commitment of the Truman administration and by the report of the
Committee on Civil Rights; and black Americans were registering to
vote in record numbers. In 1948 alone-the year of the Dixiecratsforty-seven meetings were held throughout the South to discuss civil
rights, according to reports of the Southern Regional Council. 38
Moreover, as a result of the abolition of the white primary in 1944
and the increasing determination of the federal courts to strike down
the newly created barriers to Negro participation in the southern electoral process, the number of Negroes qualified to vote jumped in the
postwar period. From an estimated 250,000 black voters in 1940, the
number increased to 750,000 in 1948 and 1,008,614 in 1952. Although
the 1952 figure represented only 20 percent of the potential black vote
in the South, it was an impressive increase over the 5 percent of 1940
and compared well with the 28 percent of 1960. Further, by the end
of the 1940s, only five southern states-Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi,
Texas, and Virginia-retained the poll tax as a prerequisite for voting;
and at this point its existence was as much an irritating symbol of
discrimination as an effective deterrent to registration. 39
This liberalization, coupled with the continuing migration of
blacks from the country to urban areas, increased somewhat their
political awareness and effectiveness in contests for local offices in the
South. On the statewide level, however, rural control of the legislature completely negated their growing influence within southern cities.
Nonetheless, there were encouraging signs on the local level. Negroes
were elected to city councils in Richmond, Virginia, and in WinstonSalem, Fayetteville, and Greensboro, North Carolina. Others were
appointed to positions as precinct officials. In 1949 Governor Kerr
Scott of North Carolina named a black educator to serve on the state
board of education; this represented progress, if only because such
tokenism had been politically unnecessary a decade earlier. 40
Moreover, as a result of the Supreme Court's insistence, Negroes
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began serving on southern juries with increasing frequency, even in
areas where a black juror had not been visible since the turn of the
century. Black policemen, too, were becoming more common, if not
commonplace; and the annual report of the Southern Regional Council
in 1948 revealed that only Mississippi and Louisiana contained allwhite police departments. Between 1947 and 1952, the number of
Negro police tripled, while the number of southern cities with such
personnel doubled. In 1951, 443 black officers were on duty in eightytwo cities of thirteen southern states, although, predictably, their
authority almost invariably extended only to black people in all-black
areas and was usually enforced without benefit of sidearms. 41
Although none of these advances immediately threatened the
white southern way of life-in fact, some were designed to perpetuate
that way of life-there had to be a beginning somewhere at some point;
and the faint signs of increasing tolerance gave hope where none had
existed before. The wall of segregation, however, remained virtually
impassable for Negroes, except when traveling on interstate transportation facilities or when entering the hallowed halls of a few professional and graduate schools in the upper South. To be sure, there
were sometimes diligent efforts to equalize health, educational, and
recreational facilities, but only within a segregated pattern and usually
for the purpose of undermining the rationale for federal action. The
Supreme Court, in particular, was becoming a frightful specter to
many white southerners in the late 1940s.
In some other parts of the country, however, there were concerted
efforts to remove the barriers of segregation, particularly on the part
of private and professional organizations and in the entertainment
world. "Americans of every faith, race and ancestry," noted the National Council of Civil Rights in its report near the end of the decade,
"are proving their convictions that freedom is indivisible-and that the
surest way to safeguard their own precious liberties is to protect the
rights of their neighbors." Although the statement was as much an
expression of hope as of fact, it did focus attention on those activities
that promised to reshape the nation's racial practices. Moreover, in
publicizing racial progress, civil-rights organizations had the everincreasing support of numerous popular magazines-Collier's, Woman's
Home Companion, Parent's Magazine, Seventeen, Ladies' Home Journal, Reader's Digest, Newsweek, and Time-which published occasional pieces on the plight of America's minorities. 42
Religious periodicals, too, were involved in propagating the new
faith. And although eleven o•clock Sunday morning continued to be
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the most rigidly segregated hour of the week, various churches were at
least making verbal commitments to equal rights and to an integrated
society. Although individual churches had generally ignored the 1946
plea of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America to
renounce "segregation in race relations," the council reaffirmed its
position in even stronger language in subsequent years and pledged a
specific course of action. In 1949, for example, it promised full support
to the equal-education cases in Texas and Oklahoma when they appeared before the Supreme Court. 43
The United Council of Church Women, representing ten million
members of eighty-four Protestant denominations, also adopted a series
of resolutions in 1948 calling for a program of persuasion to accompany
a package of legislation. That same year Archbishop Robert Cushing
publicly pointed to the actions ·of a "staggering" number of religious
and racial bigots, contending that "no true Christian could support or
participate in any such activity."44 The growing realization of many
Catholic and Protestant leaders of an apparent contradiction between
scriptural injunction and church practice, and the increasing cooperation between them and various Jewish organizations that had long
been committed to the fight against intolerance, provided further evidence of a new and viable civil-rights coalition in the country.
Many professional organizations, too, decided to pay at least lip
service to democracy and to the cause of equal rights. In 1949, for the
first time in its history, the American Medical Association accepted a
Negro physician into its House of Delegates; and there were even more
impressive signs of change in the actions of its constituent societies.
For example, in 1948 the Baltimore County Medical Society unanimously approved admission of Negro physicians; in 1949 the Missouri
State Medical Association dropped the word "white" from its constitution, and, later in the year, the St. Louis chapter began accepting black
membership applications; and in 1950 the Florida State Medical Association altered its bylaws to remove the white label. Moreover, in
June 1950, during its annual convention, the AMA passed a resolution
that urged local societies with racial restrictions to review them in light
of present developments. Apparently, those developments included
not only a growing conviction in favor of integration in American society but also increasing public support for Truman's national healthinsurance program, which the AMA vigorously denounced as "socialized" medicine. Many Negro physicians suspected that the recent, and
belated, "democracy" of the AMA was a crude overture for the support
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of the black National Medical Association, which had endorsed such
legislation as early as 1946.46
The American Nurses Association, with no ideological or selfinterest issue to champion, proved more progressive than the AMA. In
1948 the association not only provided for direct memberships in the
national organization to nullify the racial restrictions of district chapters, but also elected a Negro to its board of directors. By the end of
1949, only chapters in Georgia, Louisiana, Texas, Virginia, South Carolina, and Washington, D.C., continued to refuse the applications of
black nurses. 46
The American Bar Association lagged behind both the AMA and
the ANA. Although its constitution nowhere mentioned race as a
qualification for membership, the association had long practiced a lilywhite policy. The National Lawyers Guild, however, had accepted
both blacks and whites since its organization in 1936; but its effectiveness was limited because of its small membership and the growing
number of accusations by superpatriots of its alleged subversiveness.
By the late 1940s, the Federal Bar Association, which was composed
primarily of the federal bench and bar, contained at least four black
members, while the ABA had relented enough to extend membership
to some half-dozen Negro lawyers, perhaps because it was under considerable pressure from various state associations. In 1949, for example,
the New Jersey State Bar Association recommended that application
blanks eliminate references to race, creed, and color. 47
Other organizations were more in tune with the times. In 1949 the
American Association of University Women amended its bylaws so that
local chapters could not discriminate against otherwise qualified applicants. The Red Cross finally began distributing blood without indicating the race of the donor. Records were kept, however, should a
physician request such information. And the National lnterfraternity
Conference recommended that college and university fraternities drop
their restrictive membership provisions, although the real battle on the
campuses was more than a decade away. The Congress of Racial
Equality also reported some progress in integrating public accommodations across the country. 48
The most dramatic and visible penetrations of the color barrier
came in the entertainment world, particularly in athletics and motion
pictures. Until 1947 major-league baseball was a white man's sport,
although usually with a speckled audience. But the rhetoric of the
times and the appeal of the box office combined to produce the first
modem major-league contract for a black player, Jackie Robinson, who
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became the storybook hero of the decade. His phenomenal success
with the Brooklyn Dodgers in 1947 persuaded other teams to follow
suit. By 1951 eighteen Negroes were playing on six teams, .and the
number would accelerate rapidly in the 1950s. 49 Integration quickly
became a fact, and complete acceptance was not far behind.
In football, the story was much the same. Although it was national news when the Yale University team selected Levi Jackson as its
captain for the 1949 football season, professional football-particularly
the maverick and short-lived American Conference-was already exploiting the talents of black players. The National Football League
had originally excluded Negroes, but in the late 1940s, it, too, met the
spirit of the times. By 1951 eighteen Negroes were playing on six of
the league's twelve teams, and each year thereafter saw a substantial
increase. On both the college and professional levels, however, integrated basketball lagged behind. Occasionally various college teams
paraded a Negro or two, but the solid evidence of black talent emerged
most clearly in the colorful and skillful performances of the Harlem
Globetrotters, who delighted audiences and intrigued coaches across
the country. In 1950 the New York Knickerbockers of the National
Basketball Association had seen enough and signed Nathaniel "Sweetwater" Clifton of the Globetrotters. The precedent was set, and within
two decades black players would dominate the sport at the professional level. 50
The story was different, however, in those sports that had limited
box-office appeal and those that required leisure time and a degree of
affiuence. In tennis, some of the private courts maintained a color line,
though the United States Lawn Tennis Association did not. The first
Negro to play at Forest Hills, for example, was Althea Gibson, in 1950,
who went on to become one of the greatest women players in the history of the game. But black men were conspicuously absent from most
courts until the 1960s. Golf was even more difficult for blacks to penetrate, largely because it required financial resources beyond the means
of most of them. Nearly all private clubs, and some public courses as
well, drew a color line when it came to playing the game. Moreover,
only Joe Louis's threat of a law suit persuaded the Professional Golfers
Association to drop its ban on "non-whites." The story was similar in
professional bowling and wrestling. By the end of the decade, however, black and white alike-outside of the South-were beginning to
accept integration as the new way of life in the nation's athletics. 5 1
Equally significant for the present and the future was Hollywood's
changing of the images of American minorities, a process that began
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during the Second World War and accelerated in the postwar period.
In 1945, however, it was not at all clear that Hollywood would continue the trend, and there were repeated criticisms of the industry for
its perpetuation of stereotyped casting and token representation.
There were also fears that the new psychic mysteries would include
the eye-rolling, knee-quaking, "skaird-of-haints" Negro in the tradition
of Stepin Fetchit. Decades of futile protest had prepared blacks to
expect the worst and to recognize that progress was neither linear nor
permanent. 52
The fear was genuine but misplaced, for a number of postwar
factors and events persuaded Hollywood to make the greatest effort in
the industry's history to remove stereotypes, to expand opportunities
for black performers, and to propagate better understanding of all
minority groups. The grotesque revelations of the Nazi concentration
camps, the increasingly shrill rhetoric of the cold war, the preachments
of the Truman administration, the pressures from various civil-rights
organizations, the threats of blacks to boycott the box office, the competition of television, and the occasional compassion of white actors,
directors, and producers combined to produce a new epoch in the
history of Hollywood and to persuade the industry to exchange some
of its white southern audience for an equally large northern audience.
Hollywood's commitment, of course, was neither unanimous nor complete; and movies sometimes worked at cross-purposes, while they
almost always stopped short of advocating equality between black
and white.
Perhaps predictably, Hollywood launched its first postwar attack
against religious bigotry, thus continuing a trend developed during the
war and at the same time attacking a subject that was less inflammatory than white mistreatment of blacks. Indeed, as a result of Going
My Way (1944) and The Betts of St. Mary's (1945), Bing Crosby,
Barry Fitzgerald, and Ingrid Bergman made Catholicism a respectable
and entertaining theme, while simultaneously humanizing the clergy.
Treatment of anti-Semitism, however, was a more delicate matter.
During the war, a number of pictures had excoriated Nazism for its
anti-Semitism; but its existence at home was ignored, except in Pride
of the Marines and in several other movies that made oblique references to it. But the appearance of Edward Dmytryk's Till the End of
Time in 1946 signaled the beginning of a direct assault on American
anti-Semitism, although Walt Disney's Abie's Irish Rose, denounced by
the Negro press and the National Conference of Christians and Jews,
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provoked momentary bewilderment concerning the direction in which
Hollywood was heading. 53
Two pictures in 1947, however, dissipated nearly all doubt. Dmytryk's Crossfire centered directly on anti-Semitism in America, and the
picture's financial success sparked hope in the black community. "If
the producers continue to make intelligent films and make money on
these films," Walter White noted, in praising Crossfire, "perhaps in
time Hollywood will have the courage to attack anti-Negroism." And
when Gentleman's Agreement appeared later in the year, Ebony-the
black counterpart of Life magazine-labeled it "undoubtedly the most
daring picture ever made in Hollywood."54 The trend was evident,
and Negroes hoped to profit from it.
But .the impact of such films was less evident than the purpose,
and some commentators feared that audiences might react adversely to
the message. In particular, some contended that these movies worked
at cross-purposes, that their visual messages differed from their verbal
ones. One critic, for example, observed that the persecuted Jew in
Crossfire had all the characteristics of the stereotype-"soft-handed,
flashily dressed, suave, artistic"-which might "reinforce rather than
abate" the emotions that feed anti-Semitism. Although studies were
taken of audience reaction to Crossfire, which indicated a decrease of
racial prejudice among those who saw it, others were quick to note
that Hollywood generally produced pictures with only a vague idea of
audience reception and without any systematic research into their effects. Throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s, experts continued to
plead for such studies, including an examination of the unconscious
impact versus the "message" in the antibias film. 55
The box-office appeal of the pictures of 1946 and 1947 exploring
anti-Semitism did not persuade directors and producers to plunge immediately into a similar examination of racial prejudice. In fact, Walt
Disney's Song of the South in 1946 set off a chorus of criticism. Although recognizing the film's artistic merit, the NAACP regretted its
glorification of slavery. Ebony could find no merit anywhere. Denouncing James Baskett, who played Uncle Remus, as an "Uncle TomAunt Jemima caricature complete with all the fawning standard equipment thereof-the toothy smile, battered hat, grey beard, and a profusion of 'dis' and 'dat' talk," the critic lamented the appearance of
another one "of those Mammy-minded, plantation-prejudiced movies
that ... has done more to ... set back Negro progress than a fistful of
Bilbo speeches in Congress."56
The years 1947 and 1948 were more promising. Body and Soul
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co-starred Canada Lee as a black boxer on a first-name basis with his
white friend, John Garfield; and The Burning Cross cast a bright light
on the white-sheeted bigots of the Ku Klux Klan. There were also
little things, such as the absence of the "yas, sah, boss" convention in
The Long Night, the unobtrusive presence of black people in crowd
sequences of The Best Years of Our Lives, and the use of the title
"Mrs." to address a black maid in Cass Timberlane. In 1948 The Boy
with Green Hair circuitously attacked color prejudice; pro-football-star
Kenny Washington lobbed hand grenades at the Vietnamese as a member of the French Foreign Legion in Rouges' Regiment ( a touching
irony which escaped the critics); and Jackie Robinson played himself
in The Jackie Robinson Story. Many of the stereotypes continued, of
course, and Ebony magazine complained about "perennial Hattie
McDaniel donning an apron for the 83rd time since she first went before the cameras in 1931."57
The big breakthrough came in 1949, when a few directors decided
to deal with themes that were traditionally verboten. Lost Boundaries,
for example, dealt with the subject of "passing." So did Pinky, which
also raised the explosive issue of intermarriage but, predictably, without its consummation and with Jeanne Crain posing as a Negro in order
to "pass" as white. ( The candid, though strained and somewhat unimaginative, approach of Guess Who's Coming to Dinner was still far in
the future.) Intruder in the Dust starred Juana Hernandez in a powerful indictment of lynching, and Home of the Brave and Battleground,
recaptured some of the courage and bigotry of the Second World
War. 58
For the first time in its history, Hollywood was systematically exploring the roots of racism in America, although the message almost
invariably fell short of black expectations. Critics, for example, denounced the selection of Jeanne Crain for the lead role in Pinky. Nonetheless, there was rejoicing throughout the black community. "Hollywood Comes of Age," editorialized the Courier; "The handkerchief was
snatched off," concluded a film critic; "Hollywood can never go back
to its old portrayal of colored people as witless menials or idiotic buffoons," exulted Walter White. 69
Nor was the trend only momentary. As a result of box-office success, between 1950 and 1953 several films continued to exploit blackwhite relationships. In 1950 No Way Out featured Sidney Poitier in a
sensitive role as a black intern in a white hospital, which Ebony,
usually hard to please, saw as "the most outspoken, hardest-hitting
picture ever filmed on racial hatred." In 1951 other themes were de-
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veloped in Bright Victory, The Breaking Point, The Well, and Steel
Helmet (which reflected the recent integration of troops in Korea). 60
The Red Ball Express, starring Jeff Chandler, Alex Nicol, and
Sidney Poitier, was the big story in 1952. The picture dramatized the
actions of truck drivers, black and white alike, in a completely integrated unit, who rushed supplies to the rapidly advancing forces of
General George Patton during the Second World War. A black private
performed the most heroic act when he voluntarily drove his truck
through a minefield ( and was killed in the process), and the film presented a "first" when Poitier slugged a white soldier. But if the film
was good propaganda, it was poor history, for the real Red Ball Express
was a segregated outfit. In fact, the ironies of the film were intriguing.
While the picture was being produced, black actors and actual black
soldiers lived under semisegregated conditions at Fort Eustus while
filming the story of an integrated company that was actually segregated. 61
By 1953 the Negro trend was subsiding. Some themes were exhausted at the box office; others were considered too explosive for
white sensibilities; blacks who customarily performed stereotyped roles
were at loggerheads with the NAACP; and the pall of McCarthyism
hung over every production. But there was no turning back Although
stereotypes continued, such as those in Uncle Tom's Cabana, the degrading Stepin Fetchit role was a thing of the past, which the actor
himself discovered when he came out of retirement in 1951. The revolution in the industry between 1943 and 1953 had also broadened the
traditional roles for black actors and paved the way for the candid
productions of the 1960s, particularly after 1953, when Hollywood
revised its production code and struck miscegenation from the list of
forbidden topics. 62
Nor were Catholics, Negroes, and Jews the only minorities to
profit from Hollywood's concern. The American Indian, too, was
stereotyped but in a manner quite different from the Negro. Although
he generally lost the war, the Indian often won a battle or two in
which he displayed savage ferocity. His bravery, his essential manhood, was seldom questioned, while the Negro generally appeared as a
docile, dumb, sometimes demented creature, who evoked laughter,
derision, and occasional pity. In the postwar period the Indian demanded justice, not manhood, from the hands of Hollywood. As three
Oklahoma Indians, all members of the state legislature, noted in a
resolution: "It's a battle if the white man wins, a massacre if the Indian
is victorious." In 1950 Broken Arrow sought to correct matters. James
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Stewart married the leading Indian lady; and Jeff Chandler played a
creditable Chief Cochise, although the substitution of a sun-tanned
white for a natural red was somewhat irritating to the few Indian
actors in Hollywood. In congratulating Twentieth Century-Fox,
Walter White praised the studio for "smashing all of the old cliches
about Indian treachery and barbarity." In 1951 Burt Lancaster starred
in Jim Thorpe-All American, and in 1953 an Indian played a visible,
though minor, part in Take the High Ground. 63
In shattering a stereotype, there was always the danger of creating
or perpetuating another. In The Oxbow Incident, for instance, Leigh
Whipper's sympathetic role as a black preacher was offset by the portrayal of a greasy villain with a Mexican accent, a continuation of a
usually unfavorable Mexican-American stereotype. Yet during the
postwar period the portrayal of the Mexican was ambivalent, as in
The Treasure of the Sierra Madre. In 1950, however, Paramount decided to depart momentarily from the Bing Crosby-Bob Hope tradition
and produced The Lawless, a gripping drama about discrimination
against, and hatred of, Mexicans in the American Southwest. In the
same year, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer released Right Cross, featuring
Ricardo Montalban as Johnny Monterez, a Mexican-American boxing
champion who feared that Anglos would treat him as a social leper
once he lost the crown. The plot was strained, but Right Cross did
give off "sparks of social conscience."64
There was also concern for Orientals. Though Chinese-Americans
were often portrayed as grinning, menial laborers, they could take
some consolation in the exploits of Charlie Chan, who invariably solved
crimes after white detectives had failed. And Japanese-Americans won
belated recognition in 1951 in Go for Broke, which not only exposed
the bigotry of white officers but also extolled the courage of the Nisei
442d Regimental Combat team during the Second World War. The
film, however, was small compensation for the bucktoothed, inhuman
villains of Hollywood's wartime productions. 65
Although the competition of television spurred Hollywood to new
heights of tolerance, television itself threatened to compromise this
progress. For years, the radio show of "Amos and Andy" had burlesqued and stereotyped black America, perhaps unintentionally, and
repeated protests about it had no effect. Television premiered the program in 1951, despite vigorous objections. The "Beulah" show-"the
ridiculous and nauseating Beulah"-was also offensive. Moreover, the
industry generally continued to boycott black performers on other
programs.66 Nor was that all. In 1952 the Japanese-American Citizens
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League lodged a protest against the old Hollywood productions then
appearing on television, some of which depicted Japan as monstrous
and Japanese-Americans as spies and saboteurs. Negroes, too, remonstrated against the release of pictures with prejudiced themes, those
that portrayed blacks "as goofs, simpletons, dumbbells and half-savage
buffoons"; but television would remain generally unresponsive until
the 1960s.67
The gains nearly everywhere, however, were appreciable. Some
of the progress smacked of condescension, of tokenism, of lip service.
Occasionally, one form of discrimination replaced another. Yet progress was unmistakable at all levels of government and within the
private sector of the nation. America was still a long way from President Truman's hope to fulfill the promises of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States. As he expressed
it in his special message on civil rights in February 1948, "We know the
way. We need only the will." 68 At the end of the decade, the will was
present as never before, and the question was not simply if the country
would continue to move ahead on racial matters but more if it would
be able to maintain the same rate of progress.

9

DEADLOCK IN CONGRESS

The country's change in mood regarding racial and religious tolerance encouraged civil-rights advocates to hope for a similar alteration
in the attitude of Congress, which had been consistently unresponsive
to pleas for equal-justice legislation, at least for black Americans. The
facility with which the House of Representatives restricted the arbitrary power of the Rules Committee on January 4, 1949, was a comfort, although everyone recognized that the Senate, in which southerners held grimly to the power of the filibuster, was the key to legislative progress. Everyone was also aware that the Senate would have
to tighten the cloture rule before civil-rights measures could be
brought to a vote.
Traditionally reluctant to limit debate, the Senate had adopted
Rule XXII in 1917, which provided that debate on a "pending measure" could be terminated by a two-thirds vote. While presiding one
day during the special session of 1948, Senator Vandenberg chose to
interpret the rule in a narrow, legalistic fashion and sustained Senator
Russell's point of order that cloture could not be applied to debate on
a "motion," only on the measure itself. In view of the obvious fact
that a motion to consider a bill had to precede a vote on the measure,
the effect of Vanderberg's ruling was to nullify Rule XXII and to grant
southerners the opportunity to debate endlessly on motions to consider
civil-rights bills. 1
Two courses of action were available. The Senate could amend
Rule XXII to apply to a motion as well as to the measure itself, or it
could seek another ruling from the new presiding officer, Vice-President Barkley. The Republican leadership chose the former method
and backed the Hayden-Wherry Resolution, reported from committee

171

Quest and Response

172

on February 17, 1949, which provided for the application of cloture at
any point by a two-thirds vote of those present. Senate Democrats, led
by Majority Leader Scott Lucas, held back, seeking to determine the
best course of action, although Lucas himself personally favored a
stronger "gag" rule, one that would terminate debate by a majority of
the entire membership.2
The paucity of Democratic support for the Hayden-Wherry Resolution-indeed, the absence of any concerted Democratic effort to
amend the rules-worried and irritated civil-rights advocates. Seeking
to apply pressure, Walter White denounced the "pattern of evasion" of
certain members of the Senate; and the NAACP sent telegrams to its
sixteen hundred branches, urging a grass-roots movement to press senators to vote in favor of a rule that would allow cloture by majority
vote. White also wired the president, complaining, "Not one Democrat has as yet fought for or even spoken out to end filibusters. We are
perturbed. We trust our perturbation is premature, despite evidence
to the contrary."3
Despite this protest and a similar one from A. Philip Randolph,
the White House did not respond. As Philleo Nash noted in an interoffice memorandum: '1 know of nothing we could say at this point, except that the matter is entirely congressional. This would be so unsatisfactory that I am sure it is better to say nothing."4 Since the election,
the president had carefully stressed congressional prerogatives in several news conferences, while expressing hope for enactment of his
proposed legislation. At the opening of the new Congress, the administration obviously did not want to jeopardize its relationship, and
thereby its program, by publicly interfering with the determination of
Senate rules.
Moreover, Senate Democratic leaders were faced with a delicate
situation. In the process of organizing the Senate and in determining
legislative priorities, they had to consider the possibility that a protracted debate over civil-rights legislation might imperil the president's
entire Fair Deal program. They were also caught in a triangular
squeeze between the Republican attempt to seize, or at least to share,
credit for facilitating passage of civil-rights legislation, the refusal of
southerners to consider any genuine compromise of the cloture rule,
and the demands of many civil-rights organizations to change Rule
XXII so that a simple majority could invoke cloture.
Indeed, on February 5, representatives of twenty-one organizations met in New York, where they adopted a resolution calling for
bipartisan support of an amendment to Rule XXII to permit cloture by
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a majority of senators present. And the demand could not be dismissed
as the ravings of a few impotents, for the participants included representatives from the CIO, the AFL, the NAACP, the ACLU, ADA, the
National Catholic Welfare Conference, the American Jewish Congress,
the American Council on Human Rights, the American Jewish Committee, the National Newspaper Publishers Association, the National
Council for a Permanent FEPC, the National Baptist Convention, and
the AME Church and the AME Zion Church. 5 It was an impressive
demonstration of interracial and interreligious solidarity and a pregnant reminder of the political potential of such a coalition. In short,
the Democratic leadership in the Senate was on the spot.
While Lucas equivocated and while the Hayden-Wherry Resolution languished in committee, Senator William F. Knowland of California sought to perpetuate the initial Republican advantage by moving to bring to a vote his own bill to limit cloture. In a rare display of
unanimity, every Democratic senator voted against the motion, which
was defeated by a vote of fifty-six to thirty-one. Senator Lucas was
furious and accused Republicans of attempting to determine the calendar of a Democratic-organized Senate. Although Lucas promised to
take up the issue of cloture in "due time," Senator Wayne Morse caustically retorted that the Democrats were seeking "to keep civil rights
in the background, because they know it will split their party wide
open."6
Whatever was passing through the mind of the new majority
leader, he was obviously off to a poor start. Finally, on February 16,
with the Hayden-Wherry Resolution about to emerge from committee,
the report went out that Democrats and Republicans would unite to
support the amendment but that it would not be brought to the floor
until February 28. Lucas indicated, however, that he would set aside
the resolution whenever priority legislation was ready for action. He
had botched it again. To civil-rights advocates, nothing was more important than equal-justice legislation. 7
At this point, the president intervened. Meeting with Lucas and
other Democratic leaders on February 28, Truman directed his congressional lieutenants to meet the issue "head-on," even if it meant
delaying consideration of other legislation. That afternoon, Lucas
moved to consider the Hayden-Wherry Resolution, and the anticipated
southern filibuster began. For nearly two weeks, southern wails echoed
throughout the Senate chamber. Senator John L. McClellan raised the
Red bogey in labeling cloture a compromise with communism, and J.
William Fulbright somehow found passages from the encyclopedia
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pertinent to the issue at hand. 8 In his maiden effort in the Senate,
Lyndon Johnson rose to denounce cloture as "the deadliest weapon in
the arsenal of parliamentary procedures," against which "a minority
has no defense." When the NAACP urged Senator Lucas to hold
round-the-clock sessions in an effort to break the filibuster, the majority
leader demurred on the grounds that the tactic might kill older
members. 9
While the filibuster was in progress, Truman ventured his own
views on cloture in a news conference on March 3. In response to questions, the president stated flatly that he would reduce the requirement
for cloture to a majority of those present, if he "had anything to do
with it." Of course, he had nothing to do with it at this point, but his
endorsement of the position taken by the twenty-one civil-rights organizations a month earlier set off a cacophony in the Senate. Senator
Wherry charged that Truman had "tossed a monkey wrench" into
efforts for a workable cloture rule, while Russell of Georgia now
claimed proof for his accusations of a conspiracy on the part of the
administration. Even Senator Lucas felt. compelled to disagree with .
the president and reaffirmed his position in favor of requiring only a
majority of the membership for cloture. At the same time, to soothe
southern sensibilities, if only because important legislation other than
civil rights was at stake, he offered the guarantee that a majority of the
Senate's Democrats would support cloture by a two-thirds majority if
southerners would permit a vote on the issue. Predictably, the southern
senators rejected the overture. 10
But northern Democrats still held a trump, or so they thought. As
early as March I, Lucas had indicated that he would circulate a petition proposing another ruling on cloture by the new presiding officer,
Vice-President Barkley. But the petition was momentarily delayed
when several senators argued that southerners had not been "sufficiently provocative," although Senators Knowland and Lucas subsequently collected the signatures of seventeen Democrats and sixteen
Republicans, which they presented to Barkley on March 10. 11
Although Truman was taking the sun in Key West, Florida, he followed events closely through contact with White House assistants. On
March 8, for example, Charles Murphy dispatched a long message to
the president in which he pointed out the necessity for senatorial action
on cloture in the near future. Important legislation was piling up,
Murphy noted, such as bills on housing, repeal of Taft-Hartley, extension of rent controls, deficiency appropriations, and extension of the
European Recovery Program; and the only hope appeared to be a
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favorable ruling by the vice-president. This was the key vote, he
reasoned, and the president agreed. Responding to Murphy, Truman
urged the Democratic leadership to "carry our fight to a successful
conclusion. We shouldn't show any weakness and if Barkley's ruling
can be sustained we will be in pretty fair shape." Senator Lucas, however, was less optimistic and informed the White House on March 8
that he did not have the votes to uphold a favorable ruling. 12
· Lucas was correct. On March 10 Vice-President Barkley ruled
favorably on the petition, which permitted the application of cloture
to a motion as well as to the measure itself and in effect reversed Vandenberg's decision in 1948. But Senator Russell quickly appealed the
ruling of the chair, and on the following day, by a vote of forty-six to
forty-one, the Senate overruled Barkley's decision. It was a crushing
blow for the administration and for civil-rights advocates everywhere.
Twenty-three Republicans had united with twenty southern and three
western Democrats to keep the South in the saddle. 13
In the numerous post-mortem analyses, there were spastic criticisms of nearly everyone. In a refrain that would become increasingly
familiar, some critics rebuked Lucas for his "timid strategy and
fumbling leadership." One member of the NAACP board of directors
singled out Walter White for special criticism: his "inept leadership"
in not mobilizing the support of other organizations, said Alfred Baker
Lewis, led directly to the defeat of Barkley's ruling. In his column in
the Chicago Defender, White admitted that organized pressure on individual senators was lacking, so much so that "senator after senator
told me that he had seen no great interest in the civil rights program";
but White was not about to criticize himself. 14
Nor was President Truman immune. The Afro-American contended that a "smarter" president would have made civil rights a bipartisan matter, and there were grumblings about his absence from
Washington. The most outspoken criticism came from the New York
Times, which declared it "scarcely disputable" that the president's
"impromptu" endorsement of cloture by a mere majority "came at the
least fortunate moment in the whole discussion, alarmed the moderates, stiffened the die-hards." Perhaps, but civil-rights advocates did
not think so. Except for the Courier, nearly all Negro newspapers,
black columnists, and civil-rights organizations had praised Truman
for his position on cloture. Moreover, despite the certainty of the New
York Times, what impact Truman's statement had was disputable, for
no hard evidence indicates that it changed a single senatorial mind or
lost a vote. 15
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Despite such scattershot criticism, there was virtual unanimity
concerning the responsibility of Senate Republicans. In a careful analysis of the vote, Robert K. Carr demonstrated that a coalition of midwestern Republicans and southern Democrats was largely to blame.
Of the eighteen Republicans from the Midwest, fourteen voted to overrule Barkley, whereas eight of the nine New England Republicans
voted to sustain the ruling. Condemnation was bitter and generally
unrestrained. Walter White denounced the "GOP reactionaries" and
wondered if "the famous initials of Abe Lincoln's party should henceforth read 'Gone Old Party?'" The Afro-American confessed its error
in supporting Republicans during the campaign of 1948, and a columnist for the Chicago Defender tersely concluded that "the Elephant
has embraced the Skunk."16 The memory of the vote of March 11
would linger long in the minds of black Americans.
Nor were the roles of individual Republicans ignored in the criticism. Although Knowland and Taft voted to sustain Barkley's ruling,
Wherry and Vandenberg did not, and Vandenberg may have been the
. key figure in the entire affair. On March 2 he had released his fellow
Republicans from any obligations of personal or party loyalty to his
ruling of August 1948. However, in an impassioned address on March
11, only hours prior to the final vote, Vandenberg struck hard at
Barkley's "ingenious thesis," which he considered an affront to legislative due process. It was also a personal affront, and Vandenberg's
pride was obviously involved. His speech may not have changed a
single vote, but it was impressive. "We are lost," groaned several
Democrats following his address, while Walter White contended that
Vandenberg "cost us from five to seven votes. He has given an aura of
respectability to those who wanted an excuse to vote to upset Mr.
Barkley."17
The vote on the Barkley ruling was fraught with meaning. The
debacle highlighted the reluctance of most Republicans to support
civil-rights legislation because of the party's more conservative position
on social and economic matters and illustrated the power of a Republican-southern-Democratic coalition. The geographical distribution of
the vote was also a painful reminder to Negro leaders of the limitations
of black power at the polls. Although the Negro vote might constitute
the balance of power in a close presidential contest, it did not exercise
the same political muscle with respect to the Senate, where only a
handful of senators had to fret about a large black constituency. Thus,
western Democratic senators, such as McCarran of Nevada and McFarland and Hayden of Arizona, could vote against the Barkley ruling
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with the assurance of impunity, and there was nothing that civil-rights
advocates could do about it. Finally, the ruling itself was vital for the
future of civil-rights legislation. From the vantage point of 1952, Roy
Wilkins considered it the most "crucial vote on civil rights in the past
ten years," not only because it "would have paved the way for shutting
off the filibuster on the motion to take up FEPC" but, more important, because it would "have forestalled the adoption of the infamous
Wherry-Hayden Rule 22 on filibusters which stands as a permanent
roadblock to civil-rights legislation."18
Wilkins was referring to the so-called compromise that followed
in the wake of the defeat of the Barkley ruling, when Senators Wherry
and Hayden sponsored a substitute amendment for their original
cloture resolution. Although the substitute sanctioned the application
of cloture to a motion, it was obviously designed to appeal to the South,
for it required a "constitutional" two-thirds majority-that is, twothirds of the entire membership rather than the current requirement of
two-thirds of those present-to invoke cloture. Moreover, the amendment prohibited the application of cloture to a motion to amend Rule
XXII in the future. 19
In short, Vandenberg's ruling in 1948 and the Senate's defeat of
Barkley's ruling in 1949 led to the adoption of a new rule that increased
the power of the South to frustrate enactment of civil-rights legislation.
Although thirty Democrats and twenty-two Republicans had signed
the petition endorsing the Wherry-Hayden amendment, which all but
guaranteed its passage, administration Democrats led by Senator Lucas
sought to delay the inevitable. But Lucas had lost control of the
Senate. Tempers flared, even among friends of civil rights. Walter
White frantically wired senators that "a vote for the Wherry substitute
resolution means that the Senate will never pass any civil-rights legislation or ever amend Rule 22 again." It was of no use. On March 17,
1949, the Senate voted sixty-three to twenty-three to approve the substitute resolution, and the fight was over. Only fifteen Democrats, led
by the hapless Lucas, and eight Republicans had held out to the bitter
end. 20
It was a subdued Harry Truman who greeted reporters at his news
conference on March 18 in Key West. Asked if he still hoped to win
senatorial approval of civil-rights legislation, he refused to comment
"because the matter hasn't reached the conclusion." Asked about the
rumor that the Senate had agreed to pass only a poll-tax bill, he offered
no comment, except to point out that he only advised the Congress and
that the United States had three "independent prongs" of government.
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Faced with the expiration of rent control on March 31 and with a
growing backlog of bills, particularly appropriations for the Marshall
Plan, Truman was obviously shoring up his political fences. Yet the
following week, during a news conference in the White House, he
expressed hope that "we will get that program through."21
But the NAACP was no longer thinking in terms of winning the
total program. At its April meeting, following the cloture debacle, the
Board of Directors departed from precedent and voted to "establish
priority of FEPC over all other legislation on civil rights." Previously,
the organization had insisted that all parts of the civil-rights package
were of equal importance, although ever since the war it had been
clear that civil-rights supporters considered the FEPC first among
equals.22
Regardless of the adoption and the feared effects of the new cloture rule, the Truman administration proceeded with its plans to push
civil rights. Even while the filibuster was in progress, members of the
White House staH were drafting legislative proposals, which they
circulated to various executive agencies for recommendations and ap~
proval. In the meantime, Representative Mary Norton introduced the
administration's anti-poll-tax bill in the House on March 3, and by the
end of the month the administration's complete program was ready
for introduction.23
For the moment, however, the White House stalled. In response
to an inquiry from Mrs. Norton, the president advised her on April 5
that he would "rather not discuss it publicly until we are sure exactly
where we stand."24 The statement was deliberately nebulous, perhaps
because the 1948 appropriations for the European Recovery Program
had expired on April 3 and authorization for new funds would not
clear both houses until April 13. Whatever the case, on April 28, Senator McGrath introduced the administration's civil-rights program in
the Senate, an ambitious package obviously meant to encompass most
of the president's recommendations in his special message of February
2, 1948.
Aside from the bills concerning lynching, the poll tax, and a com-:
pulsory FEPC, the program included a surprise omnibus bill, which
proposed some legislative novelties. The bill called for the establishment of an executive commission on civil rights, creation of a joint
congressional committee on civil rights, elevation of the Civil Rights
Section of the Department of Justice to a full division headed by an
assistant attorney general, amendment of existing civil-rights statutes
to close loopholes, additional guarantees to protect the right to vote,
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and prohibition of discrimination and segregation in interstate commerce. In the House, Emanuel Geller sponsored the omnibus and antilynching bills, and Adam Clayton Powell, erstwhile Truman critic,
introduced the administration's FEPC proposal.25
For ten days in May, a parade of witnesses, mostly favorable to the
bill, passed before Powell's subcommittee. The white South, of course,
had its day; and Congressman Laurie C. Battle of Alabama appeared
to denounce the FEPC as "unconstitutional, unenforceable, and unwise." Congressman Charles E. Bennett of Florida suggested that
Communists and "a lot of pretty wild people, with pretty long hair" in
the North were behind the scheme to destroy the South's "traditional
democracy," which prompted Chairman Powell to retort that it was the
president's bill, not the Communist party's. Clare E. Hoffman, a
Republican congressman from Michigan, saw it as "another step toward dictatorship." He was also certain that one objective of the
FEPC was to encourage "social intermingling" and intermarriage
among the races. Nor was he alone in having this obsession. The candid and offhand testimony of one southern congressman clearly exposed a man hung up on the fear of interracial sex. 26
The testimony in favor of the bill was more impressive and more
to the point. Secretary of Labor Maurice Tobin vigorously supported
the administration's bill, particularly because of its strong enforcement
provisions, but assured his audience that its authority would not be
invoked precipitantly or arbitrarily. Felix S. Cohen, representing the
Association on American Indian Affairs, eloquently argued that the
Indian's problem was more economic than social, for "Indians are the
last to be hired and the first to be fired." Herman Edelsberg of the
Anti-Defamation League, in reply to the argument that Congress could
not legislate love or legislate prejudice out of existence, pointed out,
"The bill is not aimed at prejudice, the bill is aimed at discrimination,
at overt acts which you might call the bitter fruits of prejudice."27
In further testimony, Mike Masaoka of the Japanese-American
Citizens League, though conceding "tremendous improvement" in
employment practices since prewar days, presented an impressive
array of statistics documenting the degrees of employment discrimination against Japanese-Americans as one moved from the West Coast,
where prejudice was still rampant, to New York, where the situation
was "heartwarming." Masaoka attributed the bright prospects in New
York to the state's fair employment practices law. He also made it
clear that his plea for a federal FEPC embraced the cause of all
minorities in America. Clarence Mitchell of the NAACP argued that
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the bill would strike at discrimination in employment in both North
and South; and he reported on an investigation of fifty-one firms in
eighteen states, which revealed that only eleven employed blacks in
skilled positions and that only five of twenty-nine with apprenticetraining programs would admit Negroes. 28
Finally, the Department of State reintroduced Dean Acheson's
statement of 1946 concerning the adverse effects of discrimination on
America's international relations. Indeed, on May 20, Congressman
Powell observed that all witnesses favorable to the bill had stressed the
international implications of white America's prejudice against darker
minorities. This contrasted with the absence of such testimony and
such observations during hearings in 1945 and 1946. 29 The cold war
was obviously exercising an impact on domestic affairs in more ways
than one. Opponents of fair employment practices legislation alleged
that the proposal was a Communist conspiracy from within; proponents argued more plausibly that the cold war from without demanded that America put its house in order.
One-of those who appeared before Powell's subcommittee to speak
against a compulsory FEPC was Congressman Brooks Hays of Arkansas, who had been designated as the spokesman for several moderate
southerners. By this time, Hays was widely known for his so-called
Arkansas plan for compromise on civil rights, which he had presented
in a speech to the House in February 1949. His program called for a
constitutional amendment to outlaw the poll tax, a modified antilynching law that would permit federal intervention only when local authorities failed to act, abandonment of attempts to deal legislatively with
segregation in interstate transportation, and establishment of a counseling service in the Labor Department in lieu of a compulsory FEPC. 30
On February 5, when a member of the White House staff apprised
Truman of Hays's interest in seeking compromise, the president ignored the overture; and in July he personally informed Senator Russell
that the Arkansas plan was unacceptable. Aside from his own personal
feelings, Truman had to consider the political implications of any
move on his part to dilute his program, which he had already described
as the minimum in order to achieve equal justice in America. Most
civil-rights advocates considered Hays's program a surrender to the
South rather than a step in the right direction. As Thomas L. Stokes
put it in commending Hays for his courage, the so-called compromise
begged "the essential issue involved. This is that there are basic rights
guaranteed in the Constitution which hardly can be compromised in
justice. They have been compromised since the Civil War, which
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seems too long. The weakness of the southern position is the assumption that there is anything to compromise in the first instance."31
Obviously, Truman already had enough troubles with Congress
without inviting the bitter opposition of the civil-rights coalition, tenuous and temporary as that coalition might be. The entire Fair Deal
program, however, was in jeopardy, along with other priority items of
the administration. Thus, on May 24, following a meeting with the
president, congressional leaders announced their hope to adjourn by
July 31, unless Congress failed to act on the three "top must" measures
-consent to the North Atlantic Pact, extension of the Reciprocal Trade
Agreement program, and repeal of Taft-Hartley.32
The determination of priorities distressed the critics. The ADA,
noting the absence of civil-rights and social-welfare measures, accused
Democrats of hoisting the "flag of surrender." Despite the president's
attempt to temper the announcement of his congressional leaders, and
despite his comment on May 25 that he would continue to press for
enactment of his program, the criticism came thick and fast. The
NAACP released a statement that spared the president but lashed at
the leadership of both parties and the "faint-heartedness" of some liberal Democrats. The June issue of the Crisis was even less generous.
Expressing its shock at the "runout" on the party's pledges, the NAACP
organ warned that if "Mr. Truman and his congressional leaders fail
at this point to apprehend the extent of the growing doubts and disillusionment they may understand them more clearly after the 1950
election."33
The administration moved quickly to heal the breach. After meeting with the president and with the members of the Senate Democratic
Policy Committee on May 31, Senator Lucas distributed a prepared
statement that promised to extend the congressional session beyond
July 31 to enact "the most urgent proposals" of the president. Although
he did not specifically identify the "urgent proposals," Lucas pledged
"every effort'' to enact civil-rights legislation in spite of the WherryHayden rule on cloture.34
The statement only partially accomplished its intent to mitigate
black criticism. On June 20 Roy Wilkins reminded White House Assistant David Niles that Negro hopes for "a stout effort" to change the
Senate rules had been "dashed" since January 1. Now Congress was
"fiddling around" with a weak antilynching bill and with the "wholly
unsatisfactory attack on the poll tax through constitutional amendment." Wilkins's distress with administration leaders in Congress was
clear, and his letter was apparently an appeal for Truman to intervene
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more directly in the question of congressional priorities; Others were
equally critical of the leadership of both parties in Congress. Robert
R. Church, perennial Republican and chairman of the black Republican
American Committee, fumed that the "illegitimate intimacy between
a majority of Republican senators with southern poll tax Dixiecrats is
a national scandal and a disgrace to the party of Abraham Lincoln."35
Faced with the penchant of some Republican congressmen to
look south for political comfort and with the tendency of some northern
and western Democrats to wander far from the party's program, the
president was confronted with the necessity of an urgent search for
votes. There were, of course, many gratuitous suggestions from wellintentioned sources, such as that a bipartisan approach to civil rights
was needed or that additional pressure should be applied on recalcitrant senators. But no one could present a precise formula, except to
emphasize the president's power of patronage. And that, as Truman
well knew from his own senatorial experience, was a slender reed.
Some also suggested that he punish Dixiecrat congressmen following
his victory in 1948 by denying them key chairmanships and by wit_hdrawing patronage. Truman, however, quickly and wisely dissociated
himself from this route. In his news conference of December 2, 1948,
he pointed out that the designations of committee assignments was a
matter for Congress; and it was soon apparent that he would not distribute patronage on the basis of party loyalty during the 1948 campaign.36 In submitting an ambitious program to a new Congress, Truman needed all the good will and support that he could muster from
members of his own party; and to urge reprisals in congressional assignments might cost him the allegiance of several Democrats who otherwise had little sympathy, either personally or ideologically, with their
southern colleagues. Having served in the Senate himself, Truman
was intimately familiar with Congress's jealousy of its prerogatives.
Of course, there were some actions that could not be tolerated,
particularly the defection of southern members of the Democratic
National Committee during the 1948 campaign. With the president's
blessing, the new chairman of the committee, William M. Boyle, Jr.,
announced in August 1949 the expulsion of six southern members representing the states of South Carolina, Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia. J. Strom Thurmond was one of the casualties. 37
Moreover, although the president would not seek revenge for past
congressional defections, he made it clear in his news conference of
April 28, 1949, that he expected support of his present program. Appropriately enough, Truman's statement coincided with Senator McGrath's
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presentation of the administration's civil-rights program to Congress.
To reporters, Truman stated flatly that the voting records of Democrats in Congress on the Fair Deal would determine the allocation of
patronage, which might or might not affect Dixiecrats, depending on
their future votes. Senator McGrath preferred to apply it to past recOFds as well, though he accepted the presidential statement with the
acknowledgement that "he makes the appointments." 38
Truman's announcement immediately set off a flurry of speculation and heated rhetoric. The Chicago Defender reported that Congressman John H. Rankin of Mississippi had already "felt the lash of
the president's patronage whip in the appointment of two Mississippi
postmasters on whom he was not consulted by the White House."
When a Mississippi physician accused the president of denying patronage to the entire delegation of his state, Truman replied that he "hadn't
heard about it." Yet there was some substance to the charge, for it was
repeated by Congressman John Bell Williams of Mississippi, who complained that the White House had yet to approve any postmaster
appointments for his state. Moreover, the office of L. Mendel Rivers,
congressman from South Carolina, reported that the Census Bureau
director had advised Rivers that his name did not appear on a White
House list for recommendations for appointments to that agency. 39
Actually, the White House staff had been keeping close tabs on
congressional voting for some time and had devised a scorecard of
"Hold" and "Clear" lists concerning appointments. The strategy was
simple. Some appointments were held up indefinitely, so much so that
after the congressional elections of 1950 narrowed the Democratic
majorities in both houses, thereby increasing southern power within
the party, Congressman E. C. Gathings of Arkansas expressed the hope
that "maybe some southern postmasters will finally be appointed."40
Important vacancies had to be filled as soon as possible, but the
president simply ignored the recommendations of some who fought his
program. And here he ran into trouble. In the fall of 1949, for example, Truman appointed Neil Andrews as an interim federal judge in
the northern district of Georgia without consulting Senators Russell
and George. In August of 1950 the senators had their revenge when
the Senate refused to confirm Andrews in a voice vote. No one questioned the judge's qualifications, but the president had violated the
hoary tradition of "senatorial courtesy." At the same time the Senate
rejected his appointment of Carroll 0. Switzer as judge for the southern
district of Iowa, after Democratic Senator Guy M. Gillette termed the
nomination a "direct affront."41 The Senate also rejected the nomina-
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tion of Martin A. Hutchinson to the Federal Trade Commission, after
Senators Harry F. Byrd and A. Willis Robertson of Virginia had declared Hutchinson unfit for the position.
Truman could not win. While the Senate rejected some of his
nominations on the grounds of "senatorial courtesy," others criticized
him for allowing some southerners to retain their customary patronage.
Moreover, it was always clear that some southern congressmen preferred the loss of patronage to the accusation that they supported parts
of the president's program, which could be more damaging when
election time rolled around. 42
Another problem that plagued the president during the Eightyfirst Congress was the inclination of certain senators to use civil rights
as a political football. The game began in the first session over the
administration's housing bill, when Republican Senators John Bricker
of Ohio and Harry Cain of Washington, who led the opposition to
public housing, proposed an amendment prohibiting discrimination in
all units authorized by the bill. It was a shrewd maneuver. Aware that
support for public housing came mainly from northern liberal and
southern senators, Bricker and Cain sought to drive a wedge between
the two traditionally inharmonious groups, thus destroying any chance
for passage of the bill. 43
It was a nasty situation and led to a split in the civil-rights coalition, both within and without the Senate. The NAACP, the American
Council on Human Relations, and the National Negro Congress were
willing to take a chance that the bill with the amendment would not be
defeated, while the National Council of Negro Women and other
organizations were not. In the House, the two black congressmen went
opposite ways, with Adam Clayton Powell favoring such an amendment, while William Dawson, reflecting the strategy of the administration, concluded that addition of antidiscriminatory provisions would
insure the defeat of the housing bill. A similar breach occurred in the
Senate when Wayne Morse and Paul Douglas, although civil-rights
champions, vigorously spoke against adoption of the Bricker-Cain
amendment, which they considered tantamount to a vote against public
housing itself. It was again the old question of priorities. 44
On April 21 the Senate rejected the Bricker-Cain proposal, 49 to
31, and the House buried a similar amendment on June 29 by a vote of
168 to 130. This led to passage of the housing bill shortly thereafter.
The Housing Act of 1949, which called for the construction of 810,000
public housing units over the next six years, was the greatest domestic
triumph of the Eighty-first Congress. Neither Congress nor subsequent
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administrations fulfilled the commitment, however, so that by 1964
only 356,203 units had been constructed. 45
A similar donnybrook developed with respect to federal aid for
education, although injection of the issue of separation of church and
state meant that a religious complication was added to that of a confilct over race. The Senate bill, which the president privately preferred, 46 would have allowed the states, if they so chose, to allocate
federal funds to parochial schools for textbooks and for school bus
service; it would also have required states with segregated schools to
provide "just and equitable apportionment'' of federal funds between
white and black systems. The NAACP drafted an amendment to the
bill that would have denied federal aid to those states with segregated
schools, and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge was persuaded to sponsor it
in the Senate. In contrast to Bricker, Lodge was sincere, though he was
also naive if he entertained any hope of its adoption. The opposition
was strong and included Hubert Humphrey, who contended that the
issue of civil rights should be fought on civil-rights bills alone. "As
much as I detest segregation," he noted, "I love education more." On
May 3 the Senate overwhelmingly rejected the amendment by a vote
of sixty-five to sixteen, and on May 5 a bipartisan coalition voted fiftyeight to fifteen to pass the bill itself. 47
The NAACP, however, refused to concede defeat, and on May 9
its board of directors passed a resolution to continue the fight. In a
letter to the branches, Acting Secretary Roy Wilkins outlined the new
strategy of seeking to amend the House bill on federal aid to education.
In view of the developments in the House, that hope was tragically
misplaced. Graham A. Barden of North Carolina chaired the hearings
and reported a bill to the full Committee on Education and Labor that
differed markedly from the Senate bill in at least two respects. It
eliminated completely the guarantee for equal allotment of funds to
black and to white school systems and prohibited the use of any federal
money for parochial schools on the grounds that such procedure violated the constitutional guarantee of separation of church and state. 48
The situation quickly became hopeless. John Lesinski, chairman
of the full committee, accused Barden of drafting an anti-Negro, antiCatholic bill that dripped "with bigotry and racial prejudice" and
promised that the bill would never emerge from his committee. House
Majority Leader John McCormack, also a Catholic, chimed in with
similar accusations. Francis Cardinal Spellman also found the issue
irresistible and attacked Barden as a "new apostle of bigotry." This
led to Cardinal Spellman's celebrated dispute with Eleanor Roosevelt,
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who defended Barden because of the religious issue involved. As
Lesinski had promised, the bill never emerged from committee. 49
Straight civil-rights bills fared little better, although the House
did pass Mary Norton's anti-poll-tax bill on July 26 by a strong bipartisan vote of 273 to 116, the fifth time in seven years that the lower
house had approved such a bill. But no one was excited about its
prospects in the Senate, and the bill died in the Senate Rules and Administration Subcommittee, chaired by John Stennis of Mississippi.
The House Judiciary Committee failed to report an antilynching bill,
while the Senate Judiciary Committee approved Republican Homer
Ferguson's bill on June 6 rather than those offered by Humphrey and
McGrath, which provided for much stiffer penalties. But the Senate
bill went nowhere, despite the propaganda and agitation that accompanied the lynching of a young black in Georgia. The NAACP opposed the Ferguson bill anyway-as ineffective and much too weak.
There was even less action on the administration's omnibus bills,
which failed to reach the full committee of either house. 50
Truman's elevation of Senator McGrath to attorney general also
added a serious complication, for Senator Pat McCarran, head of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, appointed James Eastland of Mississippi
to succeed McGrath as chairman of the subcommittee responsible for
all civil-rights bills in the Senate, except for those involving the FEPC
and the poll tax. 'We are mighty sorry about this," editorialized the
Call. "President Truman has made a gallant fight for civil rights,"
although he could not dictate to the Senate. "But what else can we do
but hold the Democrats responsible?" Nor was Truman happy about
it. In his news conference of September 15, when asked for his reaction to the appointment of Eastland, he snapped a "No Comment,"
with exclamation point. 51
Finally, as expected, Congress failed to pass an FEPC bill, although civil-rights pressure here was intense. On June 2, 1949, spokesmen for the NAACP, the AFL, the CIO, ADA, and various Jewish
organizations met with a White House adviser to urge first priority for
FEPC legislation; and on July 7 they delivered the same opinfon to
Senator Lucas. In a conference on September 9, Democratic leaders
in the Senate agreed to place the FEPC first on the civil-rights agenda.
The president was already committed. In a meeting on August 30
with Adolph Sabath, chairman of the House Rules Committee, Truman requested that the FEPC be considered as "must" legislation when
the House resumed full sessions on September 21. Although the Committee on Education and Labor had reported the bill in August, Sabath
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promised nothing except to see "what can be done." The corresponding committee in the Senate, however, did not report the bill until
October, and then without any recommendation. 52
Nonetheless, something had been accomplished, if only that the
path had been cleared for prompt consideration of the FEPC in the
second session. Official confirmation of postponement came on October 3, following the president's regular conference with legislative
leaders, when Senator Lucas promised early action on the FEPC in the
second session. He also noted that the decision to postpone civil-rights
legislation until 1950 was made after consultation with the "principal
minority groups of the country," although there had been some
grumbling from the ADA, the American Council on Human Rights,
and the Courier. 53
It had not been a satisfying legislative year for black Americans.
There were a few benefits, though one had to strain to find them. For
one thing, the appropriations for Howard University were the largest
in the history of that institution. A black columnist was pleased that
Congress had refused appropriations to the District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency for the purchase or condemnation of homes
in the Marshall Heights area, for the result would have been the displacement of blacks by whites. The Afro-American was happy about
the passage of the Housing Act and the increase in the minimum wage
from forty to seventy-five cents an hour but complained that civil-rights
bills, "those hardy perennials," again had "withered on the vine." 54
The refusal of Congress to enact the administration's national
health-insurance program was also a matter of concern. The Chicago
Defender viewed the program as one of the largest potential benefits
"for Negroes and low income groups . . . since the passage of social.
security and minimum wage legislation under the Roosevelt New Deal,"
and most black leaders agreed. Yet the National Medical Association
(NMA), reflecting some of the conservatism of the American Medical
Association and perhaps influenced by its intense campaign of opposition, adjourned its annual meeting without taking a position on the
plan. This prompted the NMA's new president to declare that "if
you support the stand against Truman, you will receive a pat on the
back from the AMA, but condemnation from ten million Negroes and
the NAACP." 55
The legislative successes of 1949 were all too few, and civil-rights
supporters were largely impartial in criticizing both parties in Congress while remaining generally favorable to the president. The Amsterdam News described the situation and the dilemma. The Republi-
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can party, declared the editor, "is pictured as-and frequently is-the
party of archconservatism, opposed to social changes that are needed
by underpaid and handicapped groups such as Negroes. The Democratic party claims to be-and sometimes is-the party of liberal reform. But the Democratic party is also the party of the reactionary
South." The editor concluded that President Truman, although wellmeaning and sincere, "knows perfectly well that he is a prisoner of
his party."56
Perhaps-but Truman did not think so, and in the fall of 1949 he
:6red a concentrated barrage of statements in favor of human rights
that had not been equaled by any earlier president. Some of the
rhetoric, of course, had an obvious connection with the cold war. In
accepting the honorary chairmanship of National Brotherhood Week,
he contended that "America is dedicated to the conviction that all
people are entitled by the gift of God to equal rights and freedoms
even though they may differ in religious persuasion, in social and
political views or in racial origin." The following day, October 6, he
reaffirmed his commitment to eventual integration of the armed forces.
On October 24, when laying the cornerstone for the United Nations
building in New York City, he paid tribute to the UN for its devotion
to "fostering respect for human rights." In taking part in a program on
"Religion in American Life" on October 30, he asserted that America's
strength was its spiritual faith, a faith that "makes us determined that
every citizen in our own land shall have an equal right and an equal
opportunity to grow in wisdom and in stature, and to play his part in
the affairs of our nation." Speaking in St. Paul on November 3, as part
of Minnesota's Truman Day celebration, he minced no words in holding that "all Americans are entitled to equal rights and equal opportunities under the law, and to equal participation in our national life,
free from fear and discrimination." The pronouncements were coming
in such rapid :6re that the Call predicted that when the record of the
Truman era was fully written, "among the surprising things about it
will be the way in which the Democratic president . . . stood :6rm in
the pledge to make Negroes equal before the law."57
The high points of November, however, were speeches before two
prominent human-rights organizations. Speaking at a luncheon of the
National Conference of Christians and Jews, Truman eulogized the
members of his audience for their ":6ght against the forces of intolerance, to bring light to the dark by-ways of prejudice, and to spread the
spirit of tolerance and brotherhood which unites our country." He also
referred to his recommendations for legislation, contending that "in
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view of the fundamental faith of this country and the clear language
of our Constitution, I do not see how we can do otherwise than adopt
such legislation."58
In his address to the annual meeting of the National Council of
Negro Women, he devoted most of his remarks to the United Nations,
which the NCNW was honoring as part of its convention. But he did
not overlook the opportunity to discuss "the extension of freedom and
opportunity to all our citizens without racial or religious discrimination," noting that "we are awakened as never before to the true meaning
of equality-equality in the economic world. We are going to continue
to advance in our program of bringing equal rights and equal opportunities to all citizens. In that great cause," he concluded, "there is no
retreat and no retirement."59
The statement was pure Truman in content if not in form, and for
more reasons than one. In particular, his plea for economic equality
was neither a verbal slip nor a speechwriter's inspiration of the moment. Truman had never accepted the idea of intermarriage or of
intense socialization, which he called "social equality" and which he
would continue to oppose long after leaving the presidency. But economic equality was another matter; and if segregation interfered with
that right, then it had to go. On December 6, 1949, the first anniversary of the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights, he climaxed
his appeal for justice and tolerance with a proclamation declaring
December 10, 1949-and that day in each succeeding year-as United
Nations Human Rights Day. 60
Meanwhile the White House staff was quietly working in other
directions. In November, Elmer Staats of the Budget Bureau informed
Stephen J. Spingam, a White House assistant, of the inadequate budget
request of the Justice Department for its Civil Rights Section. In
particular, the section had only seven lawyers in contrast with eight
in 1948, and of the thousands of complaints received annually, only a
few were investigated and even fewer prosecuted. In view of congressional inaction on the presidential request to elevate the section
to a division, Spingam suggested to Clark Clifford that the administration ought to increase the present size of the section to fifteen. Moreover, Spingam asserted that such action "would be further assurance
that the administration meant business in the civil rights field and
would offset the legislative defeats in this field which we are likely to
receive in 1950." When Clifford postponed decision, then left with the
president for Key West, Spingam approached Charles Murphy, Clifford's assistant, who in tu.m talked with Attorney General McGrath.
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The new attorney general was more than agreeable and responded
with a request for fifteen additional lawyers in the Civil Rights Section,
which both Staats and Spingarn considered excessive and cut to a
total of fifteen. 61
The upshot of the matter was that Truman's budget message for
fiscal year 1951, delivered to Congress on January 9, 1950, included a
request for an additional $110,000 for the Justice Department's Criminal Division, primarily for "a substantial expansion" in the civil-rights
program. The president's budget message also contained the usual
pleas for appropriations to finance the proposed creation of a Fair
Employment Practices Commission, a permanent Commission on Civil
Rights, and the appointment of an assistant attorney general to super~
vise a civil-rights division in the Department of Justice. 62
Civil-rights champions were pleased not only with the budget
statement but also with the president's State of the Union message of
January 4, 1950, in which he gave no hint of retreat or compromise on
civil rights. In some ways, the statement of 1950 was stronger than
that of 1949, or at least it was more specific. In addition to his request
for enactment of legislation to guarantee "democratic rights" and "economic opportunity," he specifically urged statehood for Hawaii and
Alaska, home rule for the District of Columbia, and more self-government for the island possessions. He also expressed his disenchantment
with some of the actions of Congress. "Some of those proposals have
been before the Congress for a long time," he concluded. "Those who
oppose them, as well as those who favor them, should recognize that it
is the duty of the elected representatives of the people to let these
proposals come to a vote.'' 63
Cloture was the problem, as both the president and civil-rights
advocates realized. Although the NAACP had been caught napping
during the fight over the Barkley ruling in March 1949, it had no intention of nodding again. In mid October 1949, representatives of various
NAACP branches met in New York to map strategy for pressure activities in the second session and to call an organizational meeting on
November 10 to establish the National Emergency Civil Rights Mobilization. At that meeting, various church, labor, civic, and trade associations began formulating detailed plans for a meeting of delegates from
sixty organizations in Washington on January 15-17, 1950, for the purpose of lobbying for civil-rights legislation. The group, however, was
cautious about its invitations and fended off attempts of the Civil
Rights Congress to infiltrate the movement. 64 Given the growing hysteria concerning communism, it was difficult enough to preserve the
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legitimacy of civil rights without the additional burden of a suspect
organization.
With Walter White on leave, secretly honeymooning on a world
tour as a member of the "Round the World Town Meeting," Roy Wilkins had become the acting secretary of the NAACP, which led to his
appointment as chairman of the mobilization. Although Wilkins lacked
White's contacts at the White House, he quickly sought to persuade
the president to address the mobilization's convention. David Niles
vetoed the idea, but did agree with Spingam's suggestion that Truman
receive a delegation from the conference. Spingam was particularly
concerned that Truman "set at rest the rumors inspired by Negro
Wallaceites and Republican sources that the president gives lip service
only to the civil-rights program. Since the likelihood of enactment of
any consequential civil-rights legislation in 1950 seems remote, it would
appear to be particularly desirable that the president ... demonstrate
( as we know to be the case) that he means what he has said about
civil-rights legislation."65
The mobilization was more successful than anticipated, at least in
its propaganda value and in demonstrating interorganizational, interracial, and interreligious unity. Although representatives of the
NAACP constituted a majority of the more than 4,000 delegates, the
attendance figures of other organizations were impressive, with 383
from the CIO, 350 from the Anti-Defamation League, 185 from the
American Jewish Congress, and 119 from the AFL, as well as many
delegates from other concerned organizations. Of equal importance,
the delegates came from thirty-three states, "a spread," according to
Roy Wilkins, "never before achieved by any other delegation to Washington."66
The most significant result of the conference was the agreement
on legislative priorities. Organized labor subordinated its opposition
to Taft-Hartley, as did the various Jewish organizations to the Displaced Persons Act, to vote top priority to the enactment of FEPC
legislation in the second session of the Eighty-first Congress. It was a
long way from the bleak, lonely days of 1939 and 1940, and the NAACP
was ecstatic with the ·"ever-expanding support for legislation to extend
equal economic, social and political rights to all American citizens.''67
Armed with the unanimity of the conferees, Roy Wilkins led a
delegation to the White House for an audience with the president. As
Wilkins began reading a prepared statement that appealed for support
in pushing FEPC legislation through Congress, Truman interrupted to
point out, "You don't need to make that speech to me, it needs to be
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made to senators and congressmen." He informed the delegates that
congressional leaders had assured him that they would bring civil
rights to a vote, even "if it takes all summer," and noted also that his
program was necessary "if we are going to maintain our leadership in
the world." In the course of his remarks, Truman pointed to the recent
passage of a resolution in the Rules Committee, which he termed "a
blow that is serious and backward-looking. I am doing everything possible to have that motion beaten when it comes up for consideration
on the floor of the House."68
The president was referring to the action of the Rules Committee
on January 13, 1950, when members voted nine to two to repeal the
"twenty-one day rule" adopted the year before. The administration
was alarmed, for the rule had permitted chairmen of standing committees to by-pass the Rules Committee during the first session. Moreover, of immediate concern was the fate of the House FEPC bill, which
the Rules Committee had refused to report-an action that prompted
John Lesinski of the House Education and Labor Committee to announce his intention of bringing up the bill under the twenty-one-day
rule on January 23. Should the House sustain the resolution of the
Rules Committee, that opportunity would be lost. 69
The administration quickly mobilized its forces, suggesting to
minority groups that a vote for the resolution was a vote against civil
rights; and the president himself enlisted the aid of Speaker Rayburn
and House Majority Leader McCormack. At the same time, members
of the National Emergency Civil Rights Mobilization buttonholed and
pressured congressmen to defeat what they termed "the Dixiecrat effort to restore the old power of the Rules Committee to bottle up civil
rights and social welfare legislation." On January 20, after Speaker
Rayburn insisted that the entire Fair Deal program was at stake, the
House rejected the resolution of the Rules Committee by a healthy
margin of 236 to 183. Upholding the administration were 171 Democrats, 64 Republicans, and Marcantonio of the American Labor party.
Those opposed included 98 Republicans and 85 Democrats, with nearly
all of the latter from below the Mason-Dixon line, which clearly revealed the central position of civil rights in the effort to restore the
power of the Rules Committee. 70
The way now seemed clear for Lesinski to move for House consideration of FEPC under the twenty-one-day rule. Yet there might be
trouble, for Speaker Rayburn, who did not enjoy a reputation as a
civil-rights enthusiast, had consistently refused to indicate if he would
recognize Lesinski for that purpose. Adam Clayton Powell, for one,
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suspected the worst and wired the president, demanding that he instruct Rayburn to recognize Lesinski or all was lost. He also reminded
Truman that he had personally instructed congressional leaders in the
past concerning such bills as those on social security and the minimum
wage. In view of past differences between the congressman and the
president, the tone of the telegram was impolitic, and it failed to have
its intended effect. On January 22 Rayburn announced his intention
to ignore Lesinski on the grounds that the "atmosphere" of the House
was not "right" for consideration of the FEPC. 71
Obviously, there was something wrong with the atmosphere somewhere, and Congressman Marcantonio of the American Labor party
quickly located it within both parties as well as in the White House.
The question arose early in the president's news conference of February 2, and Truman was forced to admit that he had not requested
Rayburn to recognize Lesinski. "I didn't ask him to recognize anybody," he stated. "That's the business of the speaker. He has been in
charge of that, and nobody can tell him whom to recognize." 72 Perhaps-although in this instance Truman seemed to be genuflecting too
much in the direction of the Hill. As Powell had pointed out in his
telegram, the president did not always refrain from urging the "Big
Four"-the Democratic leaders in Congress-to move on other priority
items of the administration.
Actually, Truman was probably influenced by a combination of
the old question of priorities and a sense of futility over Rayburn's
attitude, for there was no good reason to question Truman's sincerity
concerning the enactment of effective civil-rights legislation. On January 12, 1950, for example, he had agreed with an assistant's suggestion
that Charles Murphy approach Attorney General McGrath to persuade
him to use whatever influence he possessed with his former colleagues
on the Senate Judiciary Committee to bring the omnibus bill to the
Senate floor. Despite rumors of a harmony meeting between northern
and southern Democrats, Truman made it abundantly clear that he
would not accede to Dixie overtures. In a meeting with Congressman
Brooks Hays, he listened courteously but indicated that his own FEPC
proposal was not negotiable. Given the unwillingness of civil-rights
organizations to accept diluted proposals, he probably had no choice
anyway. In his news conference of January 27 Truman indicated his
refusal to accept a voluntary FEPC, and when queried about an organized southern attempt to present a negotiable civil-rights package,
he responded tersely: "My compromise is in my civil-rights message." 73
Clearly, the president had made up his mind. On February 9,
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when a reporter asked if he cared to comment on the bill recently introduced in the Virginia House of Delegates to abolish segregation in the
state, he said, "No. That is Virginia's business," but then volunteered
that he was "glad to hear it, however." Obviously, the pressure of
civil-rights stalwarts did not require this type of comment. Nor was it
necessary, for political reasons, for him to extemporize on civil rights
on February 15 to the Attorney Generals Conference on Law Enforcement Problems, meeting in the capital, where he expressed his desire
"to emphasize particularly equality of opportunity. I think every child
in the nation, regardless of his race, creed or color, should have the
right to a proper education," he contended. "And when he has finished
that education, he ought to have the right in industry to fair treatment
in employment."74
In the meantime, Congress again became embroiled in civil-rights
matters. There was great alarm over the new statement of policy
adopted by House and Senate Republicans and released to the press
on February 7, 1950. It was sad enough when the statement declared
that "the major domestic issue today is liberty against socialism," which
was precisely the argument of many who opposed enactment of FEPC
legislation. But it was altogether tragic that it made only a passing,
general reference to civil rights. The statement read: "The right of
equal opportunity to work, to vote, to advance in life and to be protected under the law should never be limited in any individual because
of race, religion, color, or country of origin. Therefore, we shall continue to sponsor legislation to protect the rights of minorities." 75
Such a position was virtually meaningless, and some of the strongest criticism came from Republicans. In view of the fact that the party
had selected a Lincoln Day rally as the occasion for issuing the manifesto, Congressman Jacob Javits regretted that it "did not declare unequivocally for FEPC, antilynching and anti-poll-tax legislation in the
best Lincoln tradition," while Senator Lodge deplored the absence of
any commitment to break the southern filibuster. Unable to suppress
his disappointment, Senator Irving Ives argued that the statement fell
far short of the Republican platform of 1948, "particularly on civil
rights, labor-management relations and social responsibility." The
Afro-American was bitter. "Instead of a strong, aggressive document,"
wrote the editor, "the 2,000-word GOP statement turns out to be
another anti-Democratic pronouncement with a measly 49 words
addressed to civil rights." 76
The policy announcement had immediate relevance, for northern
House Democrats were searching desperately for ways to bring the
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FEPC bill to the floor. Confronted with Rayburn's opposition and with
the apparent lack of any real commitment on the part of most House
Republicans, they wondered if it was worth the effort. Nonetheless,
the House had to act if an FEPC bill were ever to reach the statute
books, for Senate Democrats had decided to await the action of the
lower chamber, where admittedly the chances of passage w~re much
greater because of the absence of the filibuster. 77
The "House-first" strategy on FEPC legislation was a new wrinkle
and put administration Democrats to the test. After repeated failures
to force it out of the Rules Committee, and after both Powell and
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., were unable to obtain the required 218
signatures on a discharge petition, which most House Republicans
boycotted, civil-rights Democrats seized upon the device known as
"Calendar Wednesday." Under this procedure, Speaker Rayburn was
required to recognize chairmen of standing committees on successive
Wednesdays, at which time they could introduce legislation. Chairman Lesinski's turn came on February 22, 1950, and FEPC was finally
on the floor. But the customary bickering and parliamentary maneuvering permitted Republican Samuel K. McConnell of Pennsylvania to
introduce a substitute FEPC bill, which expressed opposition to discrimination and proposed a commission to investigate and to recommend, but which did not provide for effective powers of enforcement. 78
On February 23 a coalition of southern Democrats and conservative Republicans carried the day and adopted the McConnell amendment by a vote of 222 to 178. As the NAACP put it, "The friends of
FEPC are the 178 Congressmen who voted against the McConnell
amendment," which included 128 Democrats, 49 Republicans, and
Marcantonio; the "enemies" were the 104 Republicans and 118 Democrats who supported it. On a motion to recommit the bill to committee
for further study, the "friends" of FEPC shifted tactics and voted
against the bill on the grounds that referral to committee would kill
FEPC in the House for the remainder of the session and that the
presence of even a weak bill would force the Senate to act. 79
The decision to oppose recommittal belonged to Roy Wilkins and
Congressman Dawson, which prompted a few criticisms in the Negro
press. One columnist contended that "Roy used poor judgment" and
suggested the recall of Walter White to "active duty." But if there was
disagreement over a tactical situation, there was unanimity concerning
the McConnell bill's lack of merit. Although Truman ducked a question during his news conference of February 23, his answer was clear
enough to indicate his opposition. Faced with a southern filibuster in
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the Senate no matter what type of FEPC was under consideration,
Senator Lucas promised to take up the Senate's much stronger bill and
to ignore McConnell's proposal. 80
It was now up to the Senate, and no one was particularly sanguine, for coupled with the southern resort to the filibuster was Senator Lucas's tendency to procrastinate. Indeed, much of the growing
disenchantment with the administration stemmed from the majority
leader's refusal to abide by his promise in October 1949 to place FEPC
first on the agenda in the second session. In this, Lucas was not alone,
for the White House was generally a willing ally as well as an occasional promoter of decisions to postpone a showdown on FEPC. Thus,
when Truman departed for Key West in March 1950, a White House
assistant, remembering the criticism showered on the president because of his absence during the Barkley ruling in March 1949, wondered if it would not be advisable to avoid Senate action on FEPC
until his return around April 10. More to the point, on April 11 Truman urged Senator Lucas to give priority to foreign-aid measures,
particularly appropriations for the third year of the Marshall Plan,
which he considered "more important at this time" than controversial
domestic items; and the Senate Democratic Policy Committee quickly
agreed. 81
The decision sparked the usual complaints. Roy Wilkins, for one,
wired the White House, expressing his shock and dismay for the "continued delay and evasion on the part of the Democratic leadership in
the Senate." White House Assistant David Niles responded, explaining
the president's position and assuring the NAACP leader of his determination to bring FEPC legislation to a vote. Truman himself sought
to soften the criticism during his news conference of April 13, when
he explained the necessity for immediate action on Marshall Plan appropriations. He also promised that "FEPC will be carried to the logical conclusion, and every effort will be made to pass FEPC promptly
without starting a filibuster against an international matter that is of
vital importance to the whole world." In response to another question,
the president implied that he regarded all forms of segregation as
discriminatory. 82
It was not enough for some of the critics. In an editorial entitled
"The Sad and Gloomy Truth," the Courier accused Truman of continuing "to kid Negroes," for everyone knew that civil-rights legislation
was "completely dead." And as the president prepared to depart on a
short speaking tour, ministers of the African Methodist Episcopal
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Church requested members of their congregations to stand quietly
during his addresses and refuse to applaud. 83
The Senate showdown took place on May 19, although not before
Lucas had permitted southerners to filibuster the FEPC bill in an easy,
lackadaisical manner, with plenty of time for everyone to prepare for
dinner. On that day, a motion for cloture on the bill, which now required two-thirds of the entire Senate, went down by a vote of thirtytwo_to fifty-two, twelve short of the required number. As usual, the
NAACP subjected the vote to intense scrutiny. Of the fifty-two votes
in favor of cloture, the Democrats produced only nineteen as against
thirty-three Republicans, while twenty-six Democrats ( five from outside the South) and six Republicans were opposed. Moreover, there
were twelve absentees, ten of whom were not southerners. On the
basis of these figures, the Crisis concluded: "So neither the Republicans nor the northern Democrats can blame the Dixiecrats. Cloture on
FEPC was blocked by northern and western senators of both parties,
nine Republicans and twelve Democrats." Actually, the magazine was
a bit too impartial, although others were also disposed to equalize the
responsibility. Given the fact that it was an administration-backed bill,
the Democrats gave a sorry performance, which Walter White subsequently admitted in pointing to the "very bad" record of Senate
Democrats. 84
Although Truman himself escaped most of the criticism, the administration moved quickly to repair the political damage. When the
Fahy Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the
Armed Services, which had been created by executive order in 1948,
prepared to submit its report to the president on May 22, 1950, the
White House staff drafted a statement relating the report to the Senate's actions on FEPC. On May 22 the president released the statement, in which he praised the Fahy Committee for its diligence in
preparing the way, "within the reasonably near future," for equality
within the military. In concluding, he referred to the commotion in
the Senate over the fair employment practices bill, contending that the
accomplishments of the Fahy Committee illustrated the value of a
commission in the "admittedly difficult field" of civil rights. "I hope
the Senate will take this report into consideration as it debates the
merits of FEPC," he continued, "and that, as I urged in my State of the
Union Message in January, it will permit this important measure to
come to a vote." He was referring, of course, to a vote on FEPC itself
rather than on a motion to consider the bill, which was what the vote
of May 19 was about. Nor did he have a watered-down compromise in
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mind. During his news conference of May 25, he stated flatly that he
would not accept the McConnell version of FEPC. 85
White southerners were naturally unhappy with the accomplishments of the Fahy Committee in moving toward integration of the
armed forces and attempted to destroy legislatively what the president
was accomplishing administratively. In deference to the wishes of
Senator Russell, the Senate Armed Services Committee amended the
administration's selective-service bill to permit draftees and volunteers
the option of selecting a segregated unit, which, according to Russell,
both white and black southerners preferred. When the bill appeared
on the floor, Senator Lucas and Senator Leverett Saltonstall, Republican of Massachusetts, introduced identical amendments to eliminate
the provision; and the Senate adopted the Lucas version on June 21,
1950, by a bipartisan vote of forty-two to twenty-nine. But Russell
refused to surrender and sponsored another amendment that called for
a poll of the entire military, stipulating that if a majority of men from
thirty-six states preferred segregation, they would be assigned to segregated units; if they favored integration instead, the amendment would
be voided. But the same coalition beat it down by a vote of forty-five
to twenty-seven. 86
In the meantime, Senate Democrats and the White House were
girding for a final battle over FEPC, with another vote on the motion
to consider the bill scheduled for July 12. The White House staff prepared carefully, and divided senators into four categories according to
their past votes on FEPC. It was plain that pressure had to be applied.
"We should not go to the polls in November with only the poor showing
we made on May 19," one assistant warned; and he called for "every·
possible effort ... to have the 30 potential civil rights Democrats present and voting on July 12." To achieve this purpose, Murphy and
Spingarn urged the president to wage "an all-out campaign," although
realistically they noted: "It looks as though cloture will be unsuccessful in any case, but it seems desirable to get as high a Democratic
vote as possible."87 Truman gave them the green light, and the staff
quickly contacted Senator Lucas and William Boyle, chairman of the
Democratic National Committee. Lucas was already buttonholing
senators and sending out telegrams, and Boyle quickly telegraphed
Democratic party officials throughout the country, requesting their assistance in securing full attendance in the Senate in support of the
president and the party platform. 88
The vote on July 12, however, confirmed the suspicions of everyone, when the Senate failed to invoke cloture on the motion to con-
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sider FEPC by a vote of thirty-three to fifty-five, nine short of a twothirds majority. Although the Democratic vote for cloture was an
improvement over that of May 19, it was not enough to offset six Republican votes against cloture. If the administration hoped that the
second effort would neutralize some of the criticism, it was disappointed, for the Negro press was replete with commentary on the
divided nature of the Democratic party. Nor were Republicans spared.
The Afro-American, for one, maintained that Taft's leadership "prevented the Senate from passing even a watered-down FEPC bill."
Some also blamed the Wherry-Hayden resolution, under which cloture
required a two-thirds vote of the entire membership; although the
fifty-five of eighty-eight votes of July 12 would still have fallen short of
cloture under the old rule.89
The failure to achieve cloture on July 12, 1950, spelled the end of
efforts to pass an FEPC bill in the Eighty-first Congress. Indeed, events
seemed to work against its enactment. The bill had long been suspect,
and southerners were not alone in accusing it of being Communistinspired, particularly after Senator Joseph R. McCarthy began his fear
campaign in February 1950. Moreover, the outbreak of the Korean
War in June necessitated a drastic reshifting of administrative priorities, both at the moment and in the future, although one NAACP
leader argued that the war made it imperative to enact FEPC legislation, "not only because our country can no longer enjoy the luxury of
wasted industrial manpower but also because our men in Korea need
to know in their hearts and minds that they are not fighting in vain."
The war did seem to offer a lever, which A. Philip Randolph was quick
to grasp. Taking a page from his own past-in particular, the pressure
that the March on Washington Movement had exerted on President
Roosevelt to create an executive FEPC-the black labor leader urged
another executive order to cope with the problems of another war. As
the months passed, others took up the cry. 90
It was a sad year legislatively for civil rights. Although the president appealed twice in 1950 for home rule for the District of Columbia, the House District Committee refused to act on a Senate bill,
passed during the first session, which provided for a modicum of selfgovernment. Congress also ignored the president's request for appropriations to expand the Civil Rights Section of the Department of
Justice. In fact, the hearings on the matter were a farce. Six of the
eight Democratic members of the Senate subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations were from the South, and Chairman Pat
McCarran was no civil-rights advocate. In the course of the testimony,
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some even questioned the legitimacy of the Civil Rights Section itself,
which had functioned since 1939. Federal aid to education went nowhere, for it was still hung up on the knotty religious question of public
assistance to parochial schools.91
Yet three of the president's recommendations in his special message of February 1948 were able to survive the congressional obstacle
course. In July, Congress authorized Puerto Ricans to vote on reorganizing their government as a commonwealth in association with the
United States. Under this plan, which was implemented in 1952, Puerto Rico became free, as long as it was consonant with the federal constitution, to decide its internal affairs, including taxes. Also in July
1950, Congress granted to the people of Guam citizenship, a bill
of rights, local self-government, and an independent court system.
Another of Truman's 1948 recommendations cleared Congress, on August 28, but not without grievous injury to its purpose. This was an
amendment to the Nationality Act of 1940. The White House was of two
minds about the bill, and its staff prepared both acceptance and veto
messages, with the Justice Department and Budget Bureau in favor of
the veto. The first section of the amendment contained what the president wanted, granting the right of naturalization to those Asians, mostly
Japanese, who still lacked that privilege. Section two was something
else. It denied naturalization to those who had belonged to a totalitarian party within ten years prior to the initiation of proceedings and
provided for cancellation of citizenship for membership in such an
organization within five years after naturalization.92
Truman chose to checkmate the spread of what would soon be
called McCarthyism. In his veto message of September 9, 1950, he
praised section one, but said that section two was "so vague and illdefined that no one can tell what it may mean or how it may be
applied." Moreover, he maintained that the act· would create ''a
twilight species of second-class citizens, persons who could be deppved
of citizenship on technical grounds, through their ignorance or lack of
judgment." He then urged Congress to reconsider the amendment,
preserving section one and removing "those ill-advised provisions" in
section two. "At a time when the United Nations' Forces are fighting
gallantly to uphold the principles of freedom and democracy in Korea,"
he concluded, "it would be unworthy of our tradition if we continue
now to deny the right of citizenship to American residents of Asiatic
origin."93 Had Truman known then what he learned later, that on
September 23 Congress would vote to override his veto of the Internal
Security Act, which contained some of the same provisions as section
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two, he might have signed the amendment to the Nationality Act. As
it turned out, he lost on both counts. Having urged and received congressional cooperation in legislating against communism abroad, the
president was finding it difficult to cool congressional fever over communism at home.
The Truman administration's concern for the American Indian
was also apparent during the Eighty-first Congress. Part of the government's awareness stemmed from the increasing activities of Indians
themselves, who were demonstrating a disposition to organize and to
propagandize in the postwar period. Prior to the war, most of the
organizations devoted to the welfare of Indians were composed of and
led by concerned whites. In 1944, however, Indians from all over the
country met to establish the National Congress of Americans Indians,
which strove to become the red man's counterpart to the NAACP. By
1950 the organization claimed a membership of one hundred thousand
and operated from an office in Washington, D.C. 94
Nonetheless, red men had little political strength. Although the
Indian population was rapidly approaching the half-million mark by
1950, Indian leaders and white compatriots were acutely aware of the
limitations of red power on election day. In a speech to a black audience in 1949, Charles Eagle Plume of the Montana Blackfeet placed
part of the responsibility for their tragic economic situation-"The
Georgia Negro eats better than the American Indian"-on the political
fact that Indians could not "carry a single county in the nation" on
election day. And it was the Indian's economic plight, not his power
at the polls, that prompted the Truman administration to propose a
program of relief and rehabilitation, particularly for the long-suffering
Navajos and Hopis of the American Southwest.95
On December 2, 1947, the president reported publicly on the dismal situation facing the tribes of New Mexico and Arizona, outlining
executive action to alleviate hunger and requesting stopgap appropriations for the winter, which Congress quickly approved. He also promised to submit to Congress a long-range program to help solve Indian
problems. Privately, he directed Secretary of the Interior Julius L.
Krug to draft the proposed legislation, which Krug submitted to the
White House in February 1948 and, with presidential approval, to
Congress shortly thereafter. 96
The bill, dubbed the Navajo-Hopi rehabilitation bill, proposed a
ten-year program, with an initial appropriation of nearly ninety million
dollars for agricultural, commercial, and industrial development and
for improved health, educational, and housing facilities. Although the
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proposal failed to · pass the Eightieth Congress, it got an unexpected
boost when opponents of the Marshall Plan decided that something
should be done first to relieve economic distress at home; thus the
Navajo soon became part of the crusade against communism. Not to be
outstripped, opponents of the administration's Navajo program also
invoked the specter of communism in labeling the bill an attempt to
"sovietize" the American Indian.97
During the legislative deliberations of 1949, passage of the bill
seemed certain until it became ensnarled in the problem of discrimination by the states of Ne,w Mexico and Arizona in distributing benefits
to the Indians. In this particula.r case, Arizona and New Mexico denied
all social-security benefits to the Indians, pleading an inability to
match federal payments because of their large Indian population.
Critics pointed out that the remaining forty-six states somehow found
the financial means to carry their end of the program, though in all
fairness it should be noted that the other states did not have as many
large reservations exempt from state taxation. 98
In Jl,lly 1948, Oscar Chapman, Under Secretary.of Interior, urged
the president to press the Social Security Board to enforce the law and
to withhold all social-security funds from the two states until they
abandoned their discriminatory policy. "The spectacle of Indian dependent children and old people starving in Arizona and New Mexico
because they are excluded from Social Security benefits," Chapman
warned, "would besmirch the record of this administration for faithfully executing the humane requirements of the Social Security Law."
The administration was in a quandary, for it was not that simple. If
the states of New Mexico and Arizona continued to deny payments to
their Indians, starvation and disease would result; if the Social Security
Board withheld all federal funds, white and red alike would suffer.
Under pressure from the Social Security Administration, New Mexico
and Arizona agreed to permit Indians to apply for social security,
which had the effect of buying time but only until it became painfully
apparent that no applications would be approved. 99
In 1949 senators from the two states introduced a bill that w<;>uld
have required the federal government to pay up to 80 or 90 percent of
the social-security benefits to reservation Indians of New Mexico and
Arizona. As one critic put it, "They now ask Congress to discriminate
in favor of Indians to overcome the effect of their own discrimination
against members of that race." Although Congress did not approve
this particular proposal, it did incorporate its provisions into section
nine of the administration's Navajo-Hopi rehabilitation bill, increasing
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the federal share of social-security payments from 60 to 92 percent.
Section nine also proposed to transfer jurisdiction over inheritance and
water rights from tribal authority and federal courts to the state courts
of New Mexico and Arizona, which was enough to make any Indian
advocate shudder. 100
Despite the bill's overall merit, protests poured into the White
House, including one from the Navajo Tribal Council, urging a presidential veto. In nearly every case, the protests embraced both parts of
section nine, although the Navajo Tribal Council, for obvious reasons,
did not object to the social-security provision. Others did. For example, Oliver La Farge contended that federal assumption of 90 percent of social-security payments was "a vital breach in the non-discrimination provisions of .the Social Security Law. It segregates the Navajo
and Hopi peoples ... .for special treatment under that law. By so
doing it establishes a dangerous precedent, and jeopardizes the rights
under the Social Security Law of all other Indian groups and of other
minorities."101
Although members of the White House staff and cabinet officials
were less than enthusiastic about the social-security provision in the
bill, they realized that it was one solution to the government's dilemma.
Oscar Chapman was reconciled to its inclusion, recognizing that it
permitted a better solution in the future and also constituted "the sugar
which spurred this bill along." The proposal to transfer authority to
the state courts, however, was another matter, and on October 17,
1949, the president vetoed the bill on these grounds. He deliberately
said nothing about the social-security proposal and promised to approve the bill if Congress deleted the "objectionable provisions" of section nine. Congress quickly responded, and on April 19, 1950, Truman
signed the bill. 102 A solution, however temporary and unsatisfactory,
had been found to the problem of social-security benefits for the Indians of New Mexico and Arizona.
The Indians of New Mexico, and opponents of segregation everywhere, received another boost when the president signed a bill in
October 1949 appropriating matching federal funds for the construction and continued support of a nonprofit general hospital in Albuquerque. According to Truman, the bill would "encomage the integration
of hospital facilities for the care of Indians and non-Indians in the same
community." Although he regretted that Congress had deleted "the
meritorious provisions which would have guaranteed complete protection for Indian patients against possible future discriminatory practices," he was satisfied with the assurance of the Interior Department
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that it could insure nondiscriminatory practices through a judicious
administration of future funds. Moreover, county officials had promised "that no forms of discrimination or segregated services were ever
intended, nor will they be permitted, in the operation or maintenance
of the hospital." Accordingly, Truman approved the bill, confident that
"fair and equal treatment will be accorded all patients of the hospital."
The future sustained the president's faith, for the hospital in Albuquerque, financed jointly by federal and state appropriations, subsequently became the model for construction of hospital facilities elsewhere in Indian country. 103
Indians and their allies had good reason for optimism in 1950. By
his actions in 1949 and 1950, Truman had indicated his continuing desire to include the "forgotten American" in his civil-rights program, a
commitment that began with the Indian Claims Act of 1946. The government's amicus curiae briefs in the Indian voting cases in Arizona
and New Mexico in 1948, the economic-rehabilitation program for the
Navajo and Hopi tribes in 1950, and the president's public opposition
to the traditionally segregated facilities for Indians in much of the West
gave promise of more to come. So, too, did the president's appointment
of Oscar Chapman as Secretary of the Interior in 1949, a move that
brought universal applause from Indian organizations everywhere and
that represented one of the best appointments during the Truman administration. Chapman's nomination encouraged the belief that some
order might be established in the Bureau of Indian Affairs, which had
seemed to function haphazardly since John Collier's resignation in 1945.
Moreover, in March 1950, the president appointed Dillon S. Myer, renowned for his achievements as head of the War Relocation Authority,
as commissioner of Indian Affairs. That action also suggested that justice and order would replace what too often in the past had appeared
to be indifference or vacillation. The future promised great hope but
would deliver disappointment, in part because of Myer.
The future would also deliver additional disappointment to those
who advocated civil-rights legislation, but the record of Congress in
1949-1950 was poor. For the Negro specifically, Congress had passed
nothing substantial, although the House had approved an anti-poll-tax
bill in 1949 and a toothless FEPC bill in 1950. Neither measure had
had a chance in the Senate. The president's determination of priorities,
the ineffectiveness of patronage in securing loyalty to the administration's program, the midwestem-southem Democratic coalition, and the
senatorial rule on cloture had combined to produce defeat on civil
rights. The responsibility was broad, and both parties had to share it.

10

OF PATRONAGE,
HOUSING, AND LAW

While Congress debated and procrastinated on civil-rights legislation, the executive and judicial branches took steps of their own to
serve the cause of justice and equality. Three of the key issues were
patronage, housing, and equality before the courts.
Patronage was of particular importance to black Americans. Of
the racial minorities, only they had developed enough interest and
political power to gain serious consideration on appointments. Consequently, the pressure on President Truman to name Negroes to federal
office mounted after the civil-rights battles of 1948. Louis Lautier
pointed out in January 1949 that the report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights was "comprehensive," except for its silence on
the subject of the virtual exclusion of blacks from important federal
jobs. Indeed at the beginning of 1949 only six black men held presidential appointments that required Senate confirmation. 1
Although Truman was apparently not eager to nominate Negroes
for important federal positions, neither was he necessarily opposed to
doing so. Moreover, he was often willing to appoint some whites who
were considered sympathetic to Negroes. These included the designations of Tom Clark to the Supreme Court; Charles Fahy to the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia; James P. McGranerya former Pennsylvania congressman who had represented a largely
black area-to a district judgeship; and Howard McGrath-the sponsor of the administration's civil-rights program in the Senate-to replace Clark as attorney general. Yet appointments of sympathetic
whites would not allay Negro interest in black appointments.
The testing ground for Truman's sincerity in 1949 came in the
area of a judicial appointment. Pressure here grew strong in 1949 be-
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cause of the creation of twenty-seven new federal judgeships and the
increasing demonstration of the talents of Negro lawyers in civil-rights
cases. As early as May 1949, NAACP President Arthur B. Spingarn
urged the appointment of the association's chief counsel, Thurgood
Marshall, to a district judgeship, a recommendation strongly endorsed
by Spingarn's nephew, White House aide Stephen J. Spingarn. Marshall would have to wait a dozen years for a seat on the federal bench,
but the rumor grew, as the summer passed, that President Truman
was willing to consider a black for the regular federal judiciary. 2
Negroes in Philadelphia were particularly active in pressing for a
federal court appointment. An important element in the politics of a
pivotal state, Philadelphia's Negroes-who were endowed with a number of able lawyers and represented by one of liberalism's leading
apostles, Senator Francis J. Myers-held that such an appointment
would be a test of the senator's and the president's sincerity with regard
to civil rights. Although several names were mentioned, the strongest
support from Philadelphia rallied behind Raymond Pace Alexandera nationally prominent black attorney-for nomination to the District
Court for Eastern Pennsylvania. 3
The Negro most often thought of for judicial appointment by Truman, however, was not Marshall nor Alexander, but William H. Hastie.
Hastie had a record of government service unmatched by _any other
American Negro. During the Roosevelt years he had been assistant
solicitor of the Interior Department, district judge for the Virgin
Islands, and civilian aide in the War Department. He had also been
dean of Howard University's Law School, and had served the president
ably as governor of the Virgin Islands and as a campaigner in the 1948
election. Truman, in fact, had been so pleased with Hastie's role in
the campaign that he spontaneously wrote him, "We won a great victory because we defined the issues and carried them to the people.
Your part in that victory was no small one and I really do appreciate
it."4 Truman would soon have occasion to express his appreciation
tangibly.
Hastie had been mentioned for a judicial appointment in 1945,
and the question had been raised again in 1949, when a number of
people recommended him for the Supreme Court. The White House
had also received endorsements of him for other judicial posts. Hastie
had considerable support for appointment to the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals, including endorsements from the presidents of the Trenton, New Jersey, and Wilmington, Delaware, branches of the NAACP
and from a Philadelphia luminary, former Attorney General Francis
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Biddle. This plainly put Hastie on a collision course with Philadelphia's Negroes, who were disturbed by the rumors that Hastie might
receive an appointment in their vicinity, partly because he had no connection by birth, training, or residence with the area. The Philadelphia
Negroes were also displeased because they believed that a Negro district judge could do more for race relations than an appellate judge.
And there were other problems. The New Jersey Bar Association
thought that an appoinhnent from its state was in order, and Delaware
made a campaign for the appointment of Daniel F. Wolcott. 5 Apparently the White House did not seriously consider these bids.
Pennsylvania's Democratic leaders were under fire. They wanted
a Negro appointment to satisfy the state's black voters and to lend
credibility to the liberalism of the nation's Democrats. Senator Myers
requested and received an appointment with Truman for himself and
National Committeeman David L. Lawrence for September 28 to discuss the circuit and district court nominations. He also asked that the
president "postpone any action he may contemplate until after our
visit." What they discussed was not revealed, but about this time
Myers hinted to Philadelphia's Negro attorneys that Hastie would receive one of the two judgeships. Moreover, on October 5 the president
wrote Francis Biddle of his high opinion of Hastie, who was "under
serious consideration" for the third circuit bench. 6
Also interesting are the nomination papers for Hastie that were
prepared for Truman by Attorney General McGrath. An unsigned
note dated October 13 and attached to the summary of Hastie's qualifications shows the words "McGranery" and "Alexander for Dist Ct"
crossed out and, below them, left standing, "Clear Sen Meyers [sic]
before sending up." 7 This suggests that Myers had proposed McGranery's promotion and Alexander's nomination, since that move would
have been politically helpful to the senator in Philadelphia. If so, it is
probable that the White House convinced Myers that it was important
to appoint Hastie-that a national :6.gure in a post more prestigious
than district judge would in the long run mean more to Negroes, the
party, and the nation. Whatever happened, local interests had lost out
to national concerns.
On October 15 Hastie was appointed to the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals on an ad interim basis and was nominated for Senate confirmation for permanent appointment. Negroes were generally pleased
with Hastie's appointment to the highest judicial position ever held by
a black American. As the Chicago Defender wrote, "The long cherished
dream of Negro representation on the United States Supreme Court

Quest and Response

208
came nearer realization [with Hastie's designation] than at any time in
our history. . . . The new appointment bears out the fact that President
Truman is mindful of his pledges to the American people."8
The Hastie matter was not yet finished. He had to win Senate
confirmation, and there he encountered trouble. A number of senators
were opposed to any Negro appointment, but additionally, Chairman
Pat McCarran of the Senate Judiciary Committee held up approval
until July 1950 because of charges that the judge had been a member
of several Communist-front groups. The White House fully backed
Hastie. Neither in terms of prestige nor politics could it afford to lose
this struggle. President Truman asked Vice-President Barkley to deal
with one of the objectors-a fellow Kentuckian, Senator Garrett L.
Withers. Barkley reported that Withers had satisfied himself that
Hastie was acceptable. The White House also sent to the vice-president eight pages of material received from the Americans for Democratic Action, emphasizing Hastie's anti-Communist views and his
loyalty to the Democratic party.9 The judge was finally confirmed, and
Negroes received their most prestigious appointment to that date from
a president.
Hastie's was only one of a number of significant Negro appointments made or considered during Truman's second term. One appointment soon after the second term commenced was that of Mrs. Anna
Hedgeman to be a general assistant to Federal Security Administrator
Oscar Ewing. In the spring of 1949 Dr. Ralph Bunche, the head of
the UN's Trusteeship Division, was offered a position as assistant secretary of state, but refused it because of financial considerations and the
racial discrimination prevalent in the nation's capital. As Bunche put
it, "There's too much jim crow in Washington for me-I wouldn't take
my kids back there." Toward the end of the year Interior Secretary
Oscar Chapman offered to recommend his old friend Walter White
for nomination as governor of the Virgin Islands, which the NAACP
secretary declined because he wanted to work in broader areas of
responsibility .10
During 1950·pressure developed to fill some of the new District of
Columbia judgeships with Negroes. National Bar Association President Thurman L. Dodson pointed out that only one of the thirty-eight
judges in Washington was black. Now that three more judgeships had
been authorized for the city, he hoped that "at least two of the proposed appointments will be colored." Dodson specifically suggested
consideration of Assistant United States Attorney Andrew J. Howard,
Jr. In March 1950 the White House received John Sengstacke's protest
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about "what appeared to be a by-passing of the Negro in the administration's program." The letter arrived while Truman was in Key
West, but David K. Niles wrote to the prominent Negro publisher
"that the passage of time will make clear that there is no intentional or
unintentional by-passing of Negroes in the administration's program."
Niles also pointed to the appointment of Congressman William L.
Dawson as vice-chairman of the Democratic National Committee and
Sengstacke's own membership on the President's Committee on Equaiity of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services. 11
By summer Truman decided to add another Negro to the District
of Columbia bench. In August he nominated Emory B. Smith to be a
judge of the Municipal Court. Judge Smith died, however, after
thirteen days in office, so Truman named Andrew J. Howard, Jr., to
fill his place. Similar appointments were made periodically, so that
they were becoming less of a curiosity. Dr. Ambrose Caliver was
named assistant commissioner of the Office of Education, and Mrs.
Edith Sampson as an alternate delegate to the UN General Assembly
during the summer of 1950. In September came the appointment of
Daniel W. Ambrose, Jr., as government secretary for the Virgin Islands,
and in November Professor Robert P. Barnes of Howard University
was named to the board of the National Science Foundation. Indeed,
even before these 1950 appointments, the White House could point to
seventy Negroes in policy-making, executive, or racial-relations positions in federal agencies and to five foreign-service officers, including
three in Europe. In addition, there were eleven holding presidential
appointments, including five judges, one ambassador, a collector of
internal revenue, and four members of boards or committees. 12
By the end of the Truman administration the Democrats claimed
to have placed Negroes in ninety-four key positions. There was substance to Louis Lautier's statement in 1950 that "President Truman
had the courage to go beyond the traditional political plums which
went to colored persons during the Harding, Coolidge, Hoover and
Roosevelt administrations." It is true that Truman did not go far
beyond, but it required gumption and political astuteness to take a
couple of steps beyond his predecessors-gumption to get out of the
mold and to run athwart racism in Congress, astuteness in terms of
Negro votes and America's world image. Moreover, it marked an upturn in the types of appointments given to Negroes that was to continue over the years, with the Eisenhower administration setting additional precedents in the appointments of J. Ernest Wilkins as assistant
secretary of labor in 1954, E. Frederic Morrow as special assistant to
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the president in 1955, and Archibald J. Carey as chairman of the Committee on Government Employment in 1956. 13 By 1967 there would be
Negroes in the cabinet and on the Supreme Court. If these were gestures, they were substantial ones, not only in themselves, but also in
giving the lie to old ideas about Negro capabilities and in increasing
legitimate demands for more blacks in government and for their acceptance by whites. The door was opening slowly, but it was opening.
Another door opened during the Truman administration, and that
concerned legal restrictions on the ownership and use of property by
minority people. Minorities keenly felt the effects of segregated housing, not only because it was a blow to their pride, but also because it
stifled opportunities for decent housing, schooling, and employment.
Local laws had enforced housing segregation before 1917, but in that
year, in Buchanan v. W ailey, the Supreme Court declared such laws
to be in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Segregationists circumvented that decision by inserting covenants into property deeds
that bound the owners not to rent or sell their property to members of
minority groups. The courts usually sustained these covenants as valid
limits on property use. The employment of restrictive covenants became so widespread by the 1940s that racial minorities and many Jews
found themselves restricted not only to living in ghettos but to living in
ghettos that had little chance of expanding. The restrictive covenant
was complemented by the general practice among realtors of refusing
to show property in white, so-called Christian neighborhoods to members of minority groups. This in turn was reinforced by the Underwriting Manual of the Federal Housing Administration, which thoroughly discouraged integrated housing. 14
By 1945 the foundations of a massive legal challenge to restrictive
covenants were laid. Not only had the tensions of ghetto living become
aggravated during the war, but the intention of minorities to escape
the prison of the ghetto and their ability to finance their intention had
grown. Four cases-two in the District of Columbia and one each
from Wayne County, Michigan, and St. Louis, Missouri-were instituted in the courts. The NAACP, along with interested lawyers in the
localities involved, decided to carry the cases to the Supreme Court.
The association was also interested in using the cases as a testing
ground for sociological as well as legal evidence on racial questions.
Other groups soon joined in the effort. In 1947 the American Jewish
Congress filed a brief that struck out at the covenants, and Indians
began testing the restrictions in California. By the end of 1947 a dozen
organizations representing blacks, labor, Jews, Japanese-Americans,
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Indians, and various churches had filed briefs in the restrictive-covenant cases, and other groups planned to do so. 15
Developments within the federal government encouraged and assisted this activity. In September, Interior Under Secretary Oscar
Chapman wrote to Attorney General Tom Clark, strongly urging that
a federal amicus curiae brief be filed in the cases. The report of the
President's Committee on Civil Rights ( PCCR) called for a "renewed
court attack, with intervention by the Department of Justice, upon
restrictive covenants." Many racial, religious, and civil-rights organizations also asked the department for action. The day after the PCCR's
report was made public, the Justice Department decided to file an
amicus curiae brief in the cases. A motion for intervention was filed
in November by Attorney General Clark and Solicitor General Philip
B. Perlman. 16
By the time the cases came before the Supreme Court in oral argument in January 1948, eighteen amicus curiae briefs had been filed.
They contained a wide range of arguments against restrictive covenants: the denial of adequate living space; the indignity of segregation; the artificially high prices; the breeding of delinquency, disease,
and vice; incompatibility with the Bill of Rights and the doctrines of
Christianity, democracy, and brotherhood; and the adverse impact on
foreign affairs. 17
Most striking was the government brief entered by Clark and
Perlman. Their basic legal argument was that "judicial enforcement of
racial restrictive covenants constitutes governmental action in violation of rights protected by the Constitution and laws of the United
States from discrimination on the basis of race or color." It was further
contended that enforcement contravened the common-law principles
"governing the validity of restraints in alienation." The legal points
were supported by statements of the attorney general, the solicitor general, and other government officials that restrictive covenants were
prejudicial to the implementation of government policy as expressed
in legislation, executive pronouncements, and international agreements,
and to the operation of government programs. This in tum was
buttressed by a strong sociol9gical argument as to the social, economic,
health, and psychological effects of the covenants, based on government reports and on such works as Gunnar Myrdal's An American
Dilemma, Charles S. Johnson's Patterns of Negro Segregation, and St.
Clair Drake and H. R. Cayton's Black Metropolis. The government's
sociological view bears repeating not only for itself, but because the
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argument would often be repeated in future cases in one form or
another.
Poverty is, of course, a major cause for the dilapidated, overcrowded, unsanitary, and inadequate homes in which the
mass of colored people now live, but it is residential segregation in severely limited areas which accentuates these conditions and bars their alleviation. . . .
It is perhaps almost superfluous to add that ... the combination of inadequate housing with racial segregation has
most unfortunate economic, social, and psychological effects.
Colored people are forced to pay higher rents and housing
costs by the semi-monopoly which segregation fosters. The
incidence of crime and juvenile delinquency is much greater
and the occurrence of death and disease among Negroes is
substantially increased. And to the corrosion which such congestion and inadequate living conditions work upon any
poorly housed individual's mental health, as a citizen and
human being, there must be added the peculiarly disintegrating acid which enforced segregation distills to harm not
only the victim alone, but the whole fabric of American life. 18
The Supreme Court's opinions were rendered May 3, 1948, when
all four of the cases were decided in favor of the appellants. Chief
Justice Fred Vinson, speaking for a unanimous court, said that no court
may use its power to enforce racially restrictive covenants designed to
achieve housing segregation. Restrictive covenants in themselves were
not illegal if voluntarily entered into and enforced. The rub in these
cases was that "but for the active intervention of the state courts, supported by the full panoply of state power, the petitioners would have
been free to occupy the properties in question without restraint." This
was a clear violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 19
The victory seemed sweet to America's minorities. The AfroAmerican gave the Shelley v. Kraemer decision, as it was commonly
known, the newspaper's boldest headlines in years and gloried in the
fact that the Supreme Court had affirmed "the right of each man to live
anywhere in this country he wishes." The Defender wrote that the
court "has made, perhaps, the greatest contribution to American
democracy that is within its power to make." In recounting the many
people supporting the test cases, the black press gave high praise to
Truman, Clark, and Perlman. As the Afro-American put it, "It's mighty
comforting to know that we have friends." 20
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Yet the Shelley v. Kraemer decision was only the beginning of the
fight. Many state officials still enforced restrictive covenants, and the
courts had to reiterate the new rule on covenants and expand it to
cover all minorities. Segregationists sought other ways to restrict the
use of property by minorities. Violence and intimidation, against both
-buyers and sellers, to prevent property transfers were not uncommon.
Bittersweet reasoning was also used, as the question was often asked,
"Why do Negroes object to living together in one area, when Italians,
Irish, Japanese, do not mind?" One attorney retorted, '1t's the difference between romance and rape. What you choose willingly is romance-forced on you it's rape!" Other legal avenues to support segregation were sought, most frequently the collection of damages from
property owners who broke restrictive covenants. In the District of
Columbia and the five states where this approach was used between
1949 and 1952, only Missouri and Oklahoma upheld awards for damages. The question came before the Supreme Court in 1953 in Barrows
v. Jackson. Speaking for the court in a six-to-one decision, Justice Sherman Minton said that damage awards by courts constituted state action
in support of restrictive covenants and therefore was in violation of
constitutional rights. 21
Federal policy itself was an important obstacle to the expansion of
minority housing. The maze of discouraging federal regulations and
practices was a blatant exercise in discrimination, the end result of
which was perpetuation of segregation despite court decisions against
restrictive covenants. To combat discrimination in housing, civil-rights
groups placed much pressure on the Federal Housing Administration.
In 1947 the FHA gingerly relaxed its practices by establishing a Racial
Relations Service to assist minorities and by eliminating racial terms
and recommendations of restrictive covenants from its Underwriting
Manual. Nevertheless the manual still referred to "incompatible
groups" and social factors in discussing neighborhoods and property
values. In February 1949 the agency announced that it was altering
its rules "to eliminate type of occupancy based on race, creed or color
as a determining factor in the approval of mortgages for FHA insurance." The NAACP, however, declared it was "not an effective policy
change."22
Meanwhile the spotlight shifted to Congress, where public-housing legislation was under consideration. As previously noted, Republican Senators John Bricker and Harry Cain offered an amendment forbidding racial and ethnic discrimination in public housing constructed
under the measure. The amendment was lost, largely because liberals
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feared that the bill with the amendment would be defeated-an argument that sounded the death knell for much antidiscrimination legislation during Truman's second term. Congress passed the bill in June.
The Housing Act of 1949 was a victory for the administration in that
it authorized additional low-rent housing, but the law was seriously
compromised in the eyes of blacks, because it did not forbid discrimination or give the poor people dispossessed by slum clearance priority
in moving into new public housing. 23
Federal Housing and Home Finance Administrator Raymond M.
Foley was pressed to implement nonsegregated public housing administratively. He believed, however, that to do so would hurt the program's effectiveness in the South and would create additional opposition to future housing legislation, which already had an abundance of
opponents. Foley therefore followed the policy of permitting local
housing officials to decide the nature of their programs, which was a
slight improvement over earlier policies that encouraged segregation.
In response to this policy, and to civil-rights pressures, nine states and
a number of cities by 1950 prohibited discrimination in public housing.
The total impact, however, was limited by the coming of the Korean
War. In response to the need for economy in the use of materials and
funds and to pressures from foes of public housing, new construction
was considerably restricted. 24
During the fall of 1949, at the behest of civil-rights groups and
apparently the Justice Department, the White House urged housing
finance officials to liberalize their rules. Housing and Home Finance Administrator Foley worked out rules to stop his agency from
supporting restrictive covenants with federal lending authorizations,
but withheld implementation until the Veterans Administration decided to follow the same policy. David Niles suggested to President
Truman that he bring Foley and Veterans Administrator Carl Gray,
Jr., together on lending policies. Truman acted immediately by telling
Gray to try to work out a consistent policy with Foley, and the two
officials soon devised mutually acceptable policies. Foley's policy, announced on December 2, was that "no property will be eligible for
FHA mortgage insurance if, after a date to be specified [later] and
before the FHA insured mortgage is recorded, there has been recorded
a covenant racially restricting the use or occupancy of the property." It
was announced that the Veterans Administration was taking like action
on veterans' mortgages. The agencies also specified that a restrictive
covenant could not be inserted as long as the federal insurance con-
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tinned in force. The effective date was set for February 15, 1950; and
in 1951 the policy was extended to repossessed FHA-insured housing. 25
The new mortgage-insurance policy was a step in the right direction; but, like the elimination of judicial enforcement of restrictive
covenants, it did not solve the problems of minority housing. Minority
peoples still were not free to settle where they could afford to, because
of zoning laws, intimidation, a variety of self-enforcing or extra-legal
contractual devices, and the discouraging tactics and chicanery of
many administrators and most realtors. Nevertheless the pressure for
open housing and better housing continued, as did the Truman administration's responses. The Racial Relations Service reached out to
soften the attitudes and strengthen the programs of several federal
agencies and even of some builders. The Housing and Home Finance
Administration (HHFA) staffed its Division of Slum Clearance and
Urban Redevelopment with several specialists on race relations, and
the Public Housing Administration and the Federal Housing Administration also added a large number of minority advisers in Washington and in the field. Another development was the appointment, in
1950, of Col. Campbell C. Johnson to the National Capital Housing
Authority, the only Negro on the one-hundred-man body. Johnson set
as his prime goal the desegregation of public housing in the District of
Columbia. In 1952 his resolution to that effect was passed, and by
1954, 87 percent of Washington's public housing had been desegregated.26
Black pressure against segregation in housing was unrelenting. In
1951 the NAACP called upon the government "to cease and desist
from aiding the development of housing on a racially discriminatory
basis." The Chicago Defender's "National Grapevine" column asked
pointedly a year later why the government insured the borrowed
monies of private builders who excluded blacks from their projects
and why segregation was not abolished in public housing that received
federal assistance. When FHA Commissioner Franklin D. Richards
resigned in 1952, Robert C. Weaver of the National Committee Against
Discrimination in Housing and Walter White asked President Truman
to take the occasion as an opportunity to change the racial policies of
that agency. Philleo Nash, who had succeeded David K. Niles as Truman's adviser on minorities, pointed out that less than 2 percent of
FHA projects was available to Negroes, compared with up to 35 percent of public housing projects. He urged his boss to charge the new
commissioner with increasing the amount of FHA housing open to
Negroes, to have the FHA's position on restrictive covenants reviewed
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by the Justice Department, and to establish better communication with
the HHF A on integration of FHA operations with programs of defense
housing and slum clearance. Truman's response was "This looks all
right."27 Of course, the question was, could much be accomplished by
the various agencies concerned with housing in the seven months left
of Truman's administration?
Some things did happen. The FHA stepped up its interest in redressing the racial imbalance in housing after Commissioner Richards's
resignation. It added more racial advisers, prepared detailed surveys
of demand for minority housing in larger cities, and directed field
offices to set goals for minority housing and financing. In October the
VA announced that it would demand fair treatment for all veterans in
regard to home insurance and that its local offices would stop using
the term "Negro" on home-loan appraisals. Furthermore, Housing
Administrator Foley apparently agreed to two other policies recommended by the National Committee against Discrimination in Housing. The first was that all public housing owned and operated by the
federal government would be open on a nondiscriminatory basis,
although by January 1953 this policy had been ordered only for defense housing. The second was to guard against displacement of the
poor by slum-clearance projects. In that area Foley, in January, issued
a statement of procedures designed to assure that urban redevelopment and slum-clearance projects "will not result in decreasing the
total living space available in any community to Negro or other racial
minority families."28 The statement was golden; but implementation,
depending as it did upon a new, opposition administration, was tinny.
It was clear that federal housing programs and actions during the
Truman administration brought little satisfaction to minorities. What
then was achieved? The percentage of Negroes who owned their own
homes increased from 23 to 34 from the 1940s to the 1950s. In 1940
Negroes occupied 44,754 of 134,056 units of federal public housing,
but in 1951 they occupied 181,431 of 656,693 units. In other words,
more space was available to blacks, but proportionally less than eleven
years earlier. The Supreme Court decisions in Shelley v. Kraemer and
Barrows v. Jackson allowed, however limited the occurrence, for the
development of integrated private housing. The decisions also permitted the expansion of ghettos, which resulted in alleviation of crowding for some minority peoples. It was a pathetic improvement, however; a step from misery to slightly less misery. 29
The HHFA and the VA reversed their position from one of encouraging segregation in private housing to one of barely tolerating
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open occupancy. On public housing, President Truman proudly noted
that by 1950, 177 projects were unsegregated, an eight-fold increase in
eight years. This was part of an upward trend, with 210 open by 1952,
297 by 1954, and 341 by 1955. Moreover, the number of states that
had some racially open public housing grew from nineteen in 1952 to
twenty-seven by 1955, and the number of communities rose from 70
to 131. Another set of figures indicates that of the 136,043 federal
housing units lived in by blacks in June 1953, 102,988 were completely
segregated, 26,984 were wholly integrated, and the rest partly integrated-a contrast with total segregation in 1945.30
Despite the Truman administration's growing concern, by 1953
the housing problems of minorities were still severe. There was insufficient decent housing available to racial minorities. So little public
housing was replacing the units demolished in slum clearance that
blacks could justifiably charge that urban renewal was really Negro
removal. Resistance from realtors and from potential sellers and
neighbors, coupled with vigilante violence, continued to frustrate residential integration. Ghettos remained ghettos, however much they
expanded, and the contiguous areas that slum dwellers spilled into
were usually slums too. Prices were high as sellers took advantage of
an artificially tight market. Federal housing policies, even if turned in
a more favorable direction, would take a long time to become even
somewhat effective. 31 In short, the Truman administration, except for
accomplishing a modicum of desegregation, only arrested the spread of
the cancer of inadequate minority housing instead of shrinking it.
More substantial were the results of court action during the Truman years. Many cases in behalf of minority rights had already been
won before the president's 1948 civil-rights message to Congress. Most
of these, however, were part of the prologue to what was to come. Increasingly, minorities took to the courts to seek their rights, and with
growing success. In 1948 the Supreme Court reiterated that systematic
exclusion of blacks from juries was unconstitutional. The court also
sustained a Michigan law providing for equal accommodations in
transportation, held that Oklahoma could not deny access to statesupported institutions for legal education on racial grounds, and undermined the foundations of California's Alien Land Law. In the lower
federal courts, it was ordered that the swimming pool in Montgomery,
West Virginia, and the public golf courses of Baltimore, Maryland, be
opened to Negroes. The California Supreme Court invalidated the
state's law against interracial marriages as a violation of the federal
Constitution's equal-protection clause. 32
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The year 1949 saw many victories in state and lower federal courts
in a broad range of civil-rights cases, but 1950 was a year of resounding legal achievements. That year the Supreme Court decided three of
the twentieth century's most important civil-rights cases-Henderson,
Sweatt, and McLaurin. The Henderson case was of longest standing.
In 1942 Elmer W. Henderson had been denied service in a railway
dining car, and his complaint had, over the years, wended its way up
to the high bench. The Interstate Commerce Commission in 1949 prepared a motion to affirm the position that segregation of Negroes in
diners was not discriminatory. The document was sent to Solicitor
General Philip Perlman for his signature, but he rejected the motion as
being based on unsound law. 33
Indeed Perlman went a step further and in October 1949 :filed an
amicus curiae brief in support of Henderson. The solicitor general
sought invalidation of an ICC order approving segregated arrangements in dining cars, not only because he thought it was contrary to
law but because it worked against the social and personality development of Negroes and weakened the moral values of whites. Perlman
also called for reversal of the separate-but-equal doctrine of Plessy v.
Ferguson ( 1896) in order to dismantle the legal structure that worked
"a denial of rights and privileges and immunities antagonistic to the
freedoms and liberties on which our institutions and our form of government are founded." He based his brief not only in law but also in
the works of leading social scientists, which further buttressed the use
of sociological materials in civil-rights cases. In April 1950 Attorney
General McGrath joined Perlman in arguing the case before the Supreme Court, thereby making it clear that the Truman administration
was in dead earnest in striving to narrow the gap between America's
preachings and its practices. 34
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court had accepted the Sweatt and
McLaurin cases for argument. In Sweatt's case a Texas court had
ordered the state to provide racially equal facilities for legal education.
The black law school that was subsequently established was rejected
by Sweatt as not affording equal training. McLaurin had compelled
the University of Oklahoma to adinit him to graduate study, but the
university's officials had segregated him within classes, the library, and
the cafeteria.
These two cases were of great importance, because they represented the redoubled postwar assault of Negroes on segregated education and their refusal to accept devious ways of meeting court orders.
The work of minorities had already led to the opening of a number of
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institutions. In 1948 the University of Arkansas Medical School was
opened to Negroes, and the University of Delaware admitted black
graduate students to courses not offered at the state's Negro college.
That same year, New York became the first state to enact a law barring
discrimination on grounds of race, religion, or national origins in the
admission of students to nondenominational educational institutions. 85
Minority groups hoped that the Sweatt and M cLaurin cases might
lead to overturning the separate-but-equal rule, thereby giving a more
solid basis to future legal challenges. The issue was sharpened early
in 1950 when Solicitor General Perlman filed an amicus curiae brief in
behalf of Sweatt and McLaurin, contending that equality could not be
reached under the separateness of the Plessy doctrine. The massive
1950 legal challenge to segregation by Negroes and the government
indicated that, as Louis Lautier wrote in his syndicated column, "not
since the Dred Scott decision in 1857, has the United States Supreme
Court been faced with a more far-reaching question." 86
In the quiet of its cavernous chamber the court rendered decisions
in the Henderson, Sweatt, and McLaurin cases on June 5, 1950. Justice
Harold Burton, speaking for the high bench in an eight-to-zero decision, held that segregation in dining cars ran contrary to the Interstate
Commerce Act and was therefore illegal. Chief Justice Fred Vinson
also spoke for a unanimous court in his opinions on the other two cases.
Regarding Sweatt, he ruled that the law school established by Texas
for Negroes did not afford equality of legal instruction. "We hold that
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
that petitioner be admitted to the University of Texas Law School."
That clause was also applied to the McLaurin case, where the court
judged that physical separation of a Negro within the University of
Oklahoma impaired and inhibited the student's ability "to study, to
engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in
general, to learn his profession." The cases had been won, but without
the court's having grappled with the challenge to the Plessy doctrine.
The available law was so clear, as Justice Burton indicated in his
Henderson opinion, that "we do not reach the constitutional or other
issues suggested." Yet it was obvious to many observers that the court
could not stall forever on the separate-but-equal issue. As the NAACP's
chief counsel, Thurgood Marshall, asserted, "The complete destruction
of all enforced segregation is now in sight."37
Minorities had taken great strides forward during the postwar
period in their resort to the courts. Yet, with or without government
support and despite favorable court decisions, the results were less
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tangible than they seemed to be. For example, some railroads still
sought to segregate patrons in dining cars, although with less success;
and segregation continued unimpaired in aspects of interstate transportation such as station facilities. The ICC did not show itself to be
interested in rooting out passenger segregation until 1955, and even
then compliance was not thoroughgoing and its rules did not apply to
intra-state modes of transportation. 38 Nevertheless Elmer Henderson's
crusade helped to reduce racial separation in interstate transportation
and laid the foundation for the assault waves that by the middle 1960s
eradicated segregation from almost all aspects of public transportation
in America.
As for black optimism in 1950 on the elimination of segregation in
schools, it seemed realistic at the time, considering the trend of judicial
decisions. Court orders had jarred the foundations of school segregation and cut holes in its roof. Further jarring and cutting followed the
Sweatt and McLaurin decisions, as in 1950 nine southern and border
states loosened some of their restrictions on the enrollment of Negroes
in publicly supported colleges and universities. Hope for additional
gains was high, especially for the biggest triumph of all-the reversal
of the separate-but-equal doctrine and achievement of integrated
schooling on all educational levels.39 And progress was made suit by
suit, court order by court order, until finally, in 1954, the Supreme
Court reversed P"lessy v. Ferguson. It was to be after that, however,
that the hard-core problem-implementation of integration in the face
of massive resistance and de facto segregation-was to become obvious.

11

INTEGRATING THE MILITARY

Solicitor General Perlman's amicus curiae briefs in the Supreme
Court cases of 1950 were eloquent testimony to the administration's
commitment as well as being legal landmarks in furthering integration
in America. But the most stunning achievement of the Truman era in
the field of civil rights involved desegregation of the armed forces,
which could not have been accomplished if the president had not
appointed and unwaveringly supported his Committee on Equality of
Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, which was established as a result of Executive Order 9981 on July 26, 1948.
The committee, popularly known as the Fahy Committee, was a
distinguished group by the standards of any time or place. As chairman, the president appointed former Solicitor General Charles H.
Fahy, a Georgia-born Catholic who, in the words of David Niles, was
"totally reconstructed on the subject of race." Other members included
William E. Stevenson, president of Oberlin College; Dwight R. G.
Palmer, president of General Cable Corporation; business executives
Alphonsus Donahue and Charles Luckman, neither of whom played a
major role in the committee's activities; John H. Sengstacke, publisher
of the Chicago Defender; and Lester Granger, head of the National
Urban League. E. W. Kenworthy, a newspaperman and free-lance
writer, was subsequently named as executive secretary. 1
There were some objections to the composition of the committee.
Granger was appointed over the protests of Secretary of the Army
Royall, who was irritated because of Granger's "unjust criticism" of
himself and of the army. Royall believed that the army's treatment of
the Negro was "equal to that of the air force and superior to that of
the navy," which was true only if segregation was considered nondis221
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criminatory. One black scholar also objected subsequently to the ratio
of two blacks to three whites on the actual working committee, a ratio
that was nothing short of revolutionary in the 1940s. 2
Although Fahy's presence in Europe during the fall of 1948 prevented the committee from getting under way officially until January
1949, the groundwork for cooperation between the military and the
committee was established in October 1948. Upon his return, Fahy
also conferred with the president concerning the modus operandi of
the committee, suggesting that it should adopt a persuasive rather than
a coercive attitude toward the military in seeking implementation of
the president's order. Truman agreed, assuring Fahy of his own active
support. The committee already knew its ultimate goal; for although
the presidential order had called, somewhat vaguely, for the establishment of equality, the president had flatly stated in his news conference
of July 29, 1948, that the order meant the eventual end of segregation.
Truman meant business and did not consider his creation a political
gimmick. In his remarks to the opening session of the committee on
January 12, 1949, and in the presence of James Forrestal and the three
service secretaries, the president demanded "concrete results-that's
what I'm after-not publicity on it" and promised, if necessary, "to
knock somebody's ears down" to get the job done. 3
The committee also had the support of Forrestal and of his successor, Louis Johnson, who replaced the ailing secretary of defense in
March 1949. Indeed, on April 6, Johnson issued a directive to the service secretaries in which he proclaimed as general policy the equality of
treatment and opportunity in the armed forces, noting in particular
that "individual merit and ability" would determine enlistments, retentions, promotions, assignments, and attendance at schools. Moreover,
although some all-black units might be retained, Johnson continued,
"qualified Negro personnel shall be assigned to fill any type of position
... without regard to race"-a statement clearly at variance with existing army policy. In conclusion, Johnson directed the three services to
submit, not later than May 1, 1949, a report of their "detailed implementation" of this policy. 4
The Fahy Committee was delighted. "It is much better to have
the military do these things on their own hook," Kenworthy noted,
"rather than to have a presidential directive which will raise all kinds
of hob on the Hill." Moreover, in testimony before the committee, the
military had "revealed itself somewhat tepid" about the president's
policy, but Johnson's statement "means man-to-man integration way
beyond the limitations" of existing army policy. 5
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The committee was already optimistic about progress in the air
force and the navy. As early as November 1948 the air force had devised a new personnel policy that prepared the way for eventual integration of nearly all units. Although some high-ranking air-force officers, like many in the navy and army, opposed integration, Air Force
Secretary Stuart Symington did not. Symington, whose attitude on
racial matters was enlightened, even if his language was not, informed
both the president and the committee in the opening session in January
1949 that "our plan is to completely eliminate segregation in the air
force," promising to take his "fine group of colored boys" and integrate
them 100 percent throughout all subdivisions. 6
The air force presented its new program in testimony to the Fahy
Committee in January 1949, a program that fell short of complete integration but one that the committee considered a "great advance" over
existing policy. The group, however, had two objections to the program-the discretionary authority of local commanders to determine
which Negroes should be assigned to racial units and the stipulation
that no integrated unit should be more than 10 percent black. The air
force subsequently deleted the two limitations, then submitted its new
personnel policy to the secretary of defense in response to his directive
of April 6. The Fahy Committee had scored its first victory. 7
The air-force program, announced publicly on May 11, 1949, was
promising. It pledged equality of treatment and opportunity and
specifically prohibited "strength quotas of minority groups in the air
force troop basis." Paraphrasing Johnson's order of April 6, it also
stated that all matters affecting personnel would be determined on the
basis of individual merit, although some all-black units might be
continued. Secretary of Defense Johnson accepted the policy and announced, as an indication of good faith, that the first step in the airforce program of integration would be deactivation of the 332d Fighter
Wing, an all-black tactical group, and distribution of its personnel
throughout the air force. 8
With its objections met, the Fahy Committee decided to postpone
further recommendations to the air force until it could investigate the
results. The committee was not disappointed. By January 31, 1950,
the number of integrated units was 1,301, leaving only 59 predominately black, which contrasted strikingly with 106 all-black and 167
integrated units in June 1949, when the policy had gone into effect.
The air force had accomplished what many had deemed impossible,
for the program was working without any serious racial incidents, thus
disposing of one of the army's big bugaboos.
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In an investigation of air-force installations in the latter part of
January 1950, committee members saw blacks and whites working,
eating, and living together in relative harmony. 9 Moreover, black officers were commanding white as well as black enlisted men without any
apparent animosity on either side, thus disproving another favorite
army bogey. Such command, however, was only token in the air force,
primarily because of the small number of black officers-only 351, a
pathetic 0.6 percent of the officer corps. 10
The navy was equally cooperative with the committee, although
there was some opposition to any liberalization of poljcy. One navy
captain, for example, found it impossible to accept the navy's current
program of integration, arguing that "the armed forces should fight it
step by step, and accept only the degree of non-segregation which is
forced upon them-and that the heads of the armed forces should
propose no plan which enhances its principles." He concluded his
memorandum with a warning: should desegregation in the navy continue, "I predict wholesale resignations and retirements from the navy,
if not open mutiny. Command of white officers and men by Negroes
would have equally dire results."11
Fortunately, the captain's attitude did not reflect that of the high
command, particularly the civilian leadership, which had moved
gradually toward integration since 1944. In fact, the navy was so satisfied with its racial policies that it responded to Johnson's directive
of April 6 by insisting that an examination of navy practices and procedures revealed no inconsistencies with Johnson's prescribed policies.
The secretary of defense, however, disagreed and rejected the navy's
statement, recommending that the Fahy Committee indicate "informally" to the army and navy those steps necessary "to bring their
policies into line" with those of the president and himself. 12
The committee quickly recommended that the navy ( 1) inaugurate a program aimed at recruitment of Negroes for general ratings,
to dispel the widespread belief that blacks were assigned only to the
Stewards Branch; ( 2) recall several Negro officers to active duty; ( 3)
grant chief stewards the grade of chief petty officer; and ( 4) launch an
educational program to persuade talented Negroes to enroll in the
naval ROTC program. The navy's revised program, submitted to the
secretary of defense on May 23, included all of the committee's recommendations as well as the additional promise to integrate the training
facilities of the Marine Corps. The committee, with the backing of the
president and the secretary of defense, had scored again. 13
The navy wasted little time in launching its new program. In his
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report of December 22, 1949, Under Secretary of the Navy Dan Kimball revealed that all black Marine Corps recruits were going through
training on an integrated basis, although some still went into all-black
units after basic training. The navy had vastly expanded its recruitment program. Five black officers had been recalled to active duty,
and the U.S. Navy Occupational Handbook contained pictures of
blacks and whites working together, as would the new edition of Life
in the Peacetime Navy. Moreover, to attract more Negroes into the
ROTC program, the navy had enlisted the aid of the Urban League.
The navy had also changed the status of chief steward to chief petty
officer, as requested by the committee, as well as having elevated
stewards first, second, and third class to the status of petty officers.
Kimball was quite sanguine about it all. "The results attained during a
comparatively brief period," he noted in conclusion, "indicate forcibly
that racial tolerance is spreading and it is only a question of time until
it will no longer present a problem within the navy."14
The Fahy Committee was inclined to agree, though it was disappointed that few Negroes were qualifying for the ROTC program.
It was also disappointed that by March 1950 there were only seventeen
black officers on active duty. But there had been unmistakable progress
elsewhere. At the close of the war, almost 95 percent of the Negroes in
the navy were in the Stewards Branch; by 1950, that percentage was
reduced to 57.4, with the rest scattered throughout general service.
Moreover, Kenworthy reported in 1950 that "in schools and in general
service, Negroes work, eat and sleep under integrated conditions,
ashore and afloat." The committee's investigation of naval facilities
also revealed the absence of racial friction, which added another
weapon to the committee's arsenal in its running battle with the army. 15
And it was the army that almost brought the Fahy Committee to
the point of despair. Army Secretary Royall's initial reaction to the
presidential order of July 26, 1948, was to suggest an experimental
integrated unit in each of the three services, which both the air force
and navy rejected as meaningless in view of their own existing integrated programs. His reaction to Louis Johnson's directive of April 6,
1949, was similarly evasive, and self-satisfied. On April 21 he informed
Johnson of the army's opinion that its practices and procedures were
"sound in the light of actual experience" and also met the intentions of
the president's executive order. Royall declared that all Negro personnel had equal opportunity to obtain promotions and to attend service schools; but this, as the Fahy Committee put it, "did not accurately
reflect the existing situation." For example, as of August 1949, there
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were no authorizations for Negroes in 198 of a total of 490 active occupational specialties. Even more revealing, again as a result of the
army's segregation policy, there were black quotas only for 21 of 106
service courses offered in the spring of 1949. Royall's report and the
army's racial policy, which even fell short of the Gillem report, were
patently unacceptable; and the secretary of defense directed the army
to try again. He also requested the Fahy Committee to forward its
recommendations to the army for consideration. 16
The Fahy Committee was well prepared after months of investigation, and it quickly forwarded a package proposal to the army. Although the recommendations deliberately avoided calling for the
immediate end of segregated units, because of the administrative problems involved and the obstinacy of army staff officers, they established
the principle of equality and, ultimately, of integration. In particular,
the committee proposed that the army open all positions and all service
schools to all of its personnel, regardless of race; that it rescind the
Gillem Board policy of limiting Negroes to black units and overhead
installations, and assign all personnel on the basis of individual ability;
and that it abolish the Negro quota of 10 percent. If accepted and
faithfully executed, the proposals obviously meant the establishment
of widespread integration, which the army at this juncture refused to
accept. 17
On May 26, 1949, Royall dispatched his second reply to Secretary
Johnson. In essence, the report ignored the recommendations of the
Fahy Committee and countered with misleading information and a
reaffirmation of the status quo. By this time, Louis Johnson's patience
was wearing thin. On June 7 he returned the army's second proposal
to Secretary Royall, expressing his sympathy with the "grave problem"
confronting the army but remaining convinced that it had yet to meet
the basic intent of his and the president's directives. Johnson asked for
a third statement of policy, advising the army to "consider very carefully the informal suggestions of the Fahy Committee, which, I understand, have been made available to you."18
A series of long, wearisome meetings with representatives of the
army followed. The Fahy Committee now had the army on the run;
and though its ultimate success depended upon the continued support
of Johnson and the president, for the moment the committee had the
backing of both. It also received a more sympathetic hearing when
Gordon Gray replaced Royall as secretary of the army in June 1949.
As a result of its extensive investigation of army records as well as the
information provided in testimony, the committee was prepared to
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hoist the army on its own petard in the discussions that followed. For
years, the army had insisted that it was neither a social laboratory nor
an institution of prejudice. Segregation was necessary, ran the timeworn argument, to achieve maximum utilization of manpower and to
maintain morale. But the committee had carefully examined the
army's own evidence and had concluded otherwise.
At this point it was clear, even to the myopic army, that segregation was administratively inefficient and did not achieve maximum
utilization of talented blacks, which the committee's proposal of assignment to any unit on the basis of ability would permit. When the army
contended that Negro units had performed poorly in combat, thereby
implying that blacks were inherently cowards, the committee countered with the army's evidence that segregated units, primarily because
of educational disadvantages in civilian life, contained far too many
men in the lowest intelligence classification. White men with similar
classification also fell short of expectations, and it naturally followed
that integration would solve part of the problem. The committee had
bested the army on its own ground, and for the first time the army had
its back to the wall. Moreover, the success of integration in the navy
and the air force testified eloquently against the army's argument that
desegregation would cripple service morale and create severe racial
friction. Stripped of its traditional defenses, the army resorted to the
argument of morality, contending that segregation protected black
officers and enlisted men from competition with superior whiteswhich spoke volumes about the army's interest in achieving maximum
efficiency. The committee could not resist the temptation to point out
that the president desired equal opportunity, not preferential treatment, for Negro soldiers. 19
Discussions with the army continued from June through September 1949, with Army Secretary Gray seeking to arrive at some compromise with the committee. In a meeting with members of the committee on September 16, Gray and Vice Chief of StaH Wade H. Haislip
agreed in substance with the committee's first three recommendations;
the fourth, the 10 percent quota on black soldiers, would be held in
abeyance for further consideration. In essence, the army appeared to
agree to open all positions and all service schools, without regard to
race, and to assign graduates of army schools to any unit that required
their skills. This represented a major breakthrough. Fahy was pleased
with such "great progress," as he expressed it to the president, although
he made it clear that the committee wanted to review the army's new
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proposals before they were forwarded to Secretary of Defense Johnson
for approval. 20
But the army now tried to outmaneuver the committee. On September 30 Johnson announced his acceptance of the army's third set of
recommendations. Although Fahy and his associates had not seen or
approved the army's final draft, Gray's report to Johnson left the impression that they had. As a further irritation, the army was evasive on
the committee's third suggestion, to the point that it seemed merely a
reaffirmation of the Gillem Board recommendation that qualified blacks
could be assigned to overhead units at largely white installations. Fahy
found this unacceptable. In a memorandum to Truman on October 11,
he noted that the effect of the army's qualification of the committee's
third recommendation would largely nullify the other two. Simply put,
if the army continued to restrict blacks to segregated units and to a
few overhead assignments, the opening of all occupational specialties
and training schools meant practically nothing. Fahy promised the
president that he would continue discussions with the army to solve
this problem as well as that of the quota. 21
The army's attempt to circumvent the committee surprised no one,
but Johnson's acceptance of the army's proposal did. In view of his
staunch position up to this point, it seemed inexplicable, although his
commitment was never as firm as that of the Fahy Committee. 22 Perhaps Johnson was simply tired of it all. Perhaps he was beginning to
share the army's fear that desegregation would lower combat efficiency
at a time of severe cold-war tensions. Or perhaps he accepted the report in good faith without questioning Secretary Gray's implication
that it had the committee's approval, for liaison between Fahy and
Johnson had never been close during these trying months. Perhaps it
was a question of alternatives. Johnson's decision to accept the army's
third proposal concerning equalization of opportunity should be considered in the context of the equally difficult problem of successfully
unifying the armed services. The grumbling over unification in 1947
and 1948 had turned into a vocal, bitter issue in 1949. Secretary of the
Navy John L. Sullivan had resigned in April, when Johnson abruptly
canceled construction of a new aircraft carrier-an action that led to
the celebrated "revolt of the admirals." The navy was also opposed to
the largesse granted to the air force, which even exceeded the president's requests. Although the army was generally satisfied with its
position in the new defense arrangement, it was most unhappy about
the pressure for integration; and Johnson wanted the army's support
in the interservice battle.23
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Whatever the case, Johnson now had a third problem, for his acceptance of the army's racial policy triggered a storm of protest from
civil-rights advocates, who had generally exhibited patience during the
summer as the army fought off the Fahy Committee. Moreover, the
announcement came at that moment when it became apparent that
the first session of the Eighty-first Congress was not going to do anything about the administration's civil-rights program. Roy Wilkins, A.
Philip Randolph, and Grant Reynolds sent telegrams of protest to the
White House, while the Americans for Democratic Action publicly
denounced Secretary Johnson's "sellout on jim crow in the army." The
Amsterdam News viewed the order as "an act of insult and insubordination"-an insult to fifteen million black Americans and insubordination to the president.24
When Secretary Johnson spoke in New York City in December,
the Committee Against Jim Crow in Military Service and Training
picketed the building, protesting Johnson's "wholesale faking." The
Chicago Defender thought enough of the story to give it a screaming
front-page headline. The Call ( Kansas City) demanded a showdown.
Truman "has indulged the army, his stubborn child, long enough,"
cried the editor. 'We call upon him now to order the secretary of the
army either to comply in letter, spirit and completeness with his executive order ... or to find himself another job. If the navy and the air
force can abolish segregation, so can the army."25
Truman had no intention of firing Secretaries Johnson and Gray,
for he was having enough difficulties because of interservice rivalry.
He also had no intention of compromising at this point. He had promised to support the Fahy Committee, and support it he did. In his news
conference of October 6, 1949, he sought to blunt some of the sharp
criticism by labeling the announcement of September 30 as only a
"progress report," pointing out that the committee would continue to
make recommendations to achieve "what we contemplated in the beginning"-eventual integration of the army. In the same month Truman rewarded Charles Fahy with an appointment to the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals, which Fahy accepted on the provision
that he be allowed to complete the work of the committee. "Whatever
arrangements you choose to make on your taking office as judge will be
entirely satisfactory to me," Truman responded, and then added in
longhand: "You've done a grand job on the Civil Rights Board."26
Fahy had indeed done well; but the committee's job continued to
be a thorny one, for the army was not through with its opposition. The
army's Division of Personnel and Administration subsequently defied
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the president, the Fahy Committee, and Secretary Gray on October 27,
when it issued a "clarifying" statement regarding the order of September 30 that effectively precluded the assignment of black personnel to
a white unit. When Secretary Gray learned of the clarification, he was
furious and quickly declared it a violation of his recently announced
policy; he also explained that black specialists "would be assigned to
some white units," which did not mean, however, "that existing Negro
units will be broken up or that Negro personnel of these units will be
scattered throughout the army."27
The Fahy Committee, however, was satisfied neither with the
order of September 30 nor with Gray's explanation of the clarification;
so an impasse developed. Representatives of the army now became
even more intransigent. On November 8 Fahy had to remind Secretary
Gray that the assigned liaison officers had refused to consult with the
committee for several weeks concerning the assignment of qualified
blacks to white units and the removal of the quota. Gray's reply was
conciliatory, though he pointed out that the committee had yet to devise
a formula that, in the absence of the 10 percent quota, would afford
assurance against a disproportionate number of blacks in the Army. 28
In short, the army feared that removal of the quota would result
in a dramatic increase in black enlistments and upset the racial balance
that it worshiped. At this point, the army was in the process of rewriting Circular 124, its official statement on racial policy, to bring it into
line with the order announced on September 30. On November 21 two
high-ranking officers delivered it by hand to the White House for approval. There, David Niles bluntly informed the "messengers" that
White House acceptance hinged upon the Fahy Committee's approval;
another circumvention would not be possible. The committee itself
threatened to issue a public denunciation if the army released its revision of Circular 124 without the committee's approval. 29
The army had met its match. The breakthrough came on December 27, following a long conference between Gray and Fahy, when the
secretary of the army agreed essentially with the committee's position
on assignment of qualified black personnel to white units. Fahy was
pleased. "I feel we are much closer to agreement than at any time in
the past," he informed his associates, "and I am very hopeful ... we
can reach entire agreement."30
Fahy's optimism was well placed. On January 14, 1950, the committee approved the army's second revision of Circular 124, which involved some compromise in language to permit "gradual" integration
but stipulated that black manpower would be utilized in accordance
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with its skills and qualifications and would be "assigned to any ... unit
without regard to race or color." On January 16, 1950, the committee
informed the president that it was in agreement with the army's new
racial policy; and the army released the new Circular 124 to all commands the same day. Unfortunately, for public consumption as well as
for the committee's own sense of satisfaction, the victory was soured
slightly when Lt. Gen. E. H. Brooks, the army's director of personnel
and administration, volunteered the gratuitous opinion that army Jim
Crow might go "in two years or fifty years," a statement that accounted
in part for the mixed reactions of civil-rights advocates to the new
policy. 31
If some were dubious about the army's latest policy, Secretary of
Defense Johnson was not; and he quickly proposed to the president
that he abolish the Fahy Committee. Clark Clifford and David Niles,
however, pointed out to the president that the committee and the army
had yet to agree on the matter of the quota. The White House then
urged Fahy to reach an agreement with the army as soon as possible;
and on January 30 Fahy conferred with Gray, advising him of the
committee's intention to resubmit its recommendations and supporting
evidence in favor of abolishing the quota. 32
But Fahy was unaware of the latest dilemma facing Secretary
Gray, who was caught between the demands of a newly created army
board, an organization of which the army seemed fond, and those of
the Fahy Committee. In the fall of 1949 a board of general officers,
headed by Lt. Gen. S. J. Chamberlin, began investigating the army's
racial policy. Early in February 1950 the Chamberlin Board presented
its report, which consisted mainly of the old saw concerning the limited
value of black personnel. In essence, the report paraphrased that of
the Gillem Board, recommending retention of segregation and the 10
percent quota. 33
This latest development was most delicate for Gray, and he chose
to take his problem directly to the president. An understanding was
soon reached. Gray agreed to drop the 10 percent quota on black enlistments on a test basis. "If, as a result of a fair trial of this new
system," he subsequently wrote the president, "there ensues a disproportionate balance of racial strengths in the army, it is my understanding that I have your authority to return to a system which will, in
effect, control enlistments by race." Truman jotted "approved" on the
bottom of the memo, and the Fahy Committee seemed to have its
victory. 34
Apparently, the Fahy Committee never knew of this agreement,
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but it made little difference anyway. Fahy was satisfied, and he went
along with the army's decision to announce its new instructions in
routine fashion without fanfare. The order went out on March 27,
1950, and the battle of the quota was over. On May 22 the Fahy Committee submitted to the president its formal report, entitled Freedom
to Serve, which expressed the hope that there would be, "within the
reasonably near future, equality of treatment and opportunity for all
persons in the armed forces with a consequent improvement in military
efficiency."35
The president was also satisfied. In accepting the report, he
praised the members of the committee for the time, energy, and commitment they had devoted to the "mission." "Every American who believes sincerely in the language of the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence," he noted, "owes them a debt of gratitude."
Freedom to Serve was indeed a landmark document, and the White
House saw to it that over seventy-five hundred copies were distributed
across the country. At the request of the secretary of defense, who felt
"rather strongly about having a watch-dog committee set over him,"
the president relieved the Fahy Committee of further responsibilities
on July 6, 1950, but kept in effect Executive Order 9981 in the event
that the future might require an investigation of military conformance
with the committee's recommendations. 36
The Fahy Committee's contribution requires no lengthy summation or spirited defense. The group had prodded the navy and the air
force into going beyond their limited programs of integration and into
adopting policies that would rapidly integrate existing units. As for the
army, it would not have dropped a policy of fairly rigid segregation in
favor of proposals for eventual integration without the committee's
existence and insistence. The president's firm backing was vital, of
course. In the last analysis, the triumph of the Fahy Committee represented a victory of civilian leadership over the military, although it was
not yet clear how decisive or how permanent that victory would be.
Lester Granger, for example, was not overly optimistic. In his column
in the Amsterdam News he indicted the army brass for its stubborn
resistance but praised Secretary Gray for his "conversion" to the committee's point of view. Granger labored under no delusions, however.
On September 28 he wrote Truman that the committee's proposals
"constituted a minimum rather than a maximum plan of action" and
urged the White House to exercise "constant vigilance" over the army. 37
E. W. Kenworthy was even more apprehensive. The committee
had expected the army to move with more deliberation than speed, but
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after six months there seemed scarcely any movement at all. In his
final memorandum to Judge Fahy on July 25, Kenworthy could "only
conclude from the little progress ... over the six months since the army
adopted the committee's proposals on January 16 that the army intends
to do as little as possible towards implementing the policy which it
adopted and published."38
In view of the army's tortoise pace, Kenworthy's gloom was understandable, but even at that moment the Korean War was forcing the
military to democratize its racial practices. And it was here that the
Fahy Committee's insistence upon the provisions for assignment of
black personnel to white units and for removal of the 10 percent quota
paid its highest dividends. Following the army's removal of the quota
in April, black enlistments rose sharply and continued to do so after
the outbreak of war in June 1950; by August, blacks constituted 11.4
percent of the army's total strength. Flooded with black recruits, some
local base commanders opted to integrate basic-training facilities,
which was permissible under Secretary Gray's order of January 1950.39
But the most visible change took place in Korea itself. From the
very beginning, personnel in the navy and air force were integrated.
In July an air-force spokesman reported the presence of black pilots in
mixed squadrons over Korea. Ensign Jesse L. Brown, the first black
pilot in the nation's history to fly naval combat missions, chalked up
an impressive record before being shot down. And it was sociologically
significant when a white pilot was awarded the Medal of Honor for his
courageous, but futile, attempt to save Brown's life, for it had usually
been the other way around. Nor did the marines hesitate long. Having
integrated basic-training facilities before the outbreak of the war, the
Marine Corps decided to integrate the fighting front as well. 40
The greatest integration, however, occurred in the army, primarily
because segregation was still the rule in July 1950 when American
troops first arrived on the Korean peninsula. But combat losses, accidental assignments, and the desire of some commanders to implement
Secretary Gray's order of January 1950 led to dramatic changes in the
first year of the war. The logic of the situation often required integration in order to maintain combat efficiency. Faced with the decimation
of several white units and lacking sufficient replacements, field commanders took the necessary step of assigning blacks to white combat
units. Such was the case with the Ninth Infantry Regiment, which
consisted of one overstrength black and two undermanned white battalions; the "force of circumstances" persuaded the commanding
colonel to assign the surplus blacks to white contingents. 41
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Similarly, when Maj. Gen. Clark L. Ruffner assumed command of
the Second Infantry Division, he discovered Negroes sprinkled throughout his combat regiments, a situation which he considered not only
logical but successful. But his corps commander, Lt. Gen. Edward M.
Almond, perhaps recalling his unhappy experiences with the all-Negro
Ninety-second Division in Italy during the Second World War, ordered
a return to segregation, which compelled Ruffner to resort to ingenuity
in order to maintain top combat performance. Obviously, the situation
demanded the development of a coherent policy; but high army brass,
as usual, was moving much too cautiously. 42
Although whites at home were generally unaware of the ad hoc
integration under way in Korea, which was proceeding without any
publicity from the army, readers of the black press were better informed. As early as July 29, 1950, the Amsterdam News editorialized
about the extent of integration in the first weeks of the war, although
the editor was premature in announcing that "Negro Gis are now distributed throughout the service as soldiers and men and not as Negroes."43 Many of the initial reports were confm,ed, because the fighting front itself was confused and because white correspondents were
concentrating on the American retreat toward the Pusan perimeter.
More reliable evidence arrived, however, after Negro correspondents
roamed across the front, ferreting out stories of integration and black
heroism.
One of the best was James L. Hicks, who seldom missed an integrated unit. '1n short," he concluded one lengthy dispatch, "name a
:fighting unit over here and I'll show you a colored soldier :fighting in it."
Black reporters focused particularly on the activities of the Twentyfourth Infantry Regiment, one of the few all-black combat units in
Korea. In September 1950 Hicks reported widespread sentiment on
the part of general officers of the Twenty-fifth Infantry Division, of
which the Twenty-fourth Regiment was a part, in favor of mixing the
colors of the three combat regiments. Actually, some mixing had been
under way for some time; and the commanding officer, Maj. Gen. William B. Kean, was in favor of complete integration in order to increase
the :fighting effectiveness of his division. 44
One of the reasons for the growing support for complete integration of the army was its reported success on the battlefield. The biggest boost came from Col. S. L. A. Marshall, the army's roving "efficiency expert" on infantry operations, who closely examined the performance of mixed units during the headlong retreat of UN forces from
the Yalu River in November and December 1950. It was his first
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experience with integrated units, and he was both surprised and
pleased. At the request of Gen. Walton Walker, commanding officer
of the Eighth Army, Marshall released his findings to the press. He
had nothing but praise for the combat performance of integrated units
of the Second Infantry Division, particularly of one company with a
black officer as second in command. "That company's stand was perhaps unequalled in American military history," Marshall concluded.
"It entered action with 125 men and withdrew only on regimental
orders with its tail up fighting like hell 24 hours later with only 34 men
not wounded."45
In short, integration was a success-or at least what Marshall saw
of it. Unfortunately, Marshall quickly received word from the headquarters of Gen. Douglas MacArthur in Tokyo that it frowned on
racial mixing. Distressed, the colonel flew to Tokyo, where he discovered a "completely negative" attitude on the part of high-ranking officers on the staff, who informed him, among other things, that the army
was not a "guinea pig" for those who desired social change. Although
Marshall was unable to gain an audience with MacArthur, subsequent
developments suggested that the attitude of MacArthur's staff reflected
the general's attitude as well. MacArthur later admitted that he had
done nothing about integration in the Far East because Washington
had sent him segregated units, which he assumed represented army
policy. 46 Actually, had he been concerned, he could have directed his
field commanders in Korea to use their own discretion, as they had
done anyway. Secretary Gray's order of January 1950 provided MacArthur with all the authority he needed, particularly in the emergency
situation that existed in Korea during the first year of the war. Moreover, it should be noted that MacArthur was not always as scrupulous
in following other hoary traditions of the army-or in obeying presidential orders, for that matter.
The ad hoc integration in Korea was heady stuff for those Negro
leaders who had fought military segregation for over a decade, although they continued to insist on nothing less than complete integration. Equally exhilarating were the first press reports of the fighting
capabilities of the all-black Twenty-fourth Infantry Regiment. On
July 29, 1950, the Afro-American ran banner headlines-"Colored
Troops Win First Victory For U.S. in Korea"-in reporting the regiment's capture of Yechon after a sixteen-hour battle. Other papers
gave it similar play, and a Massachusetts congressman took the floor of
the House to announce: "Communist propaganda took it on the chin
at Yechon when the Korean Reds were blasted by American Negro

Quest and Response

236
troops who believed-not only in the United States as it is, but in the
better nation that it will become when intolerance is also defeated."
The Call was ecstatic. Headlines in August proclaimed, "Negro Gl's
Hold Their Ground In Korea," "Negro Troops Capture Key Mountain
Peak," "24th Infantrymen Seize 'Little Cassino' In Three-Day Battle."47
But the euphoria was only of the moment. At .t he same time that
black America reveled in the heroism of the Twenty-fourth, disquieting reports of discrimination and white racism appeared in the Negro
press. As early as August 1950 the white commander of the black
Twenty-fourth was reported to have announced: "During the last two
wars your race has not done so well. I am going to make this the
fighting Twenty-fourth, not the frightened Twenty-fourth." And that
was only the beginning. In September, James Hicks reported the existence of racial conflict between white and black officers in the Twentyfourth and quoted the commanding colonel as having declared that
"colored people are yellow and they just won't fight." 48
Black morale sagged, both at home and in Korea, when correspondents revealed that a captain from division headquarters was interrogating officers and men of the Twenty-fourth, ostensibly to determine the feasibility of integration. Negro reporters, however, were
not far off the mark when they interpreted the captain's presence as an
attempt to discredit the Twenty-fourth in particular and black soldiers
in general, as well as to collect evidence for court-martial proceedings.
The growing doubt about the fighting effectiveness of the Twentyfourth received popular confirmation in an article in the Saturday
Evening Post in June 1951, where Harold H. Martin contended that
its record was indeed a poor one, but primarily because of black resentment of segregation; though lopsided, the article was in essence an
argument in favor of integration. 49
Meanwhile, the NAACP had become involved in a matter that
literally involved life and death, for accusations of cowardice in 1950
were only a prelude to the initiation of widespread court-martial proceedings against black officers and men. One of the first reported cases
concerned Lt. Leon Gilbert, a company commander in the Twentyfourth, who was convicted of cowardice and refusal to obey orders in
the face of the enemy. President Truman, however, intervened early
in this particular case and commuted the sentence from death to twenty
years. As the number of convicted blacks rose in the fall of 1950, the
NAACP became alarmed. Thurgood Marshall, the organization's head
counsel, announced that the association would defend anyone who
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requested aid; and letters came in, eventually reaching a total of
thirty-nine. 50
Marshall was also concerned because of what appeared to be gross
discrimination, for not only did some sentences appear excessive, but
during the same period only two whites were convicted for violations
of army regulations. To find out for himself, he decided to visit Japan
and Korea to interview those involved. But MacArthur's headquarters
denied his first request, and it took a direct appeal from Walter White
to General MacArthur to obtain approval of the mission. Incredibly
enough, MacArthur later admitted his ignorance of the number of
sentencings in the summer and fall of 1950 and conceded that it might
have been excessive. On January 11, 1951, Thurgood Marshall left for
the Far East, where he spent the next five weeks investigating the
circumstances surrounding the convictions. From Tokyo, he cabled
that the "suspicions of racial discrimination in most of these cases is
well grounded.'' 51
While Marshall was investigating in Japan and Korea, his associate, Jack Greenberg, represented convicted Cl's before the judge
advocate general in Washington, and Walter White appealed directly
to the president. In particular, White argued that both white and black
troops had broken under fire, but "after the colored soldiers won their
first major battle at Hill 303, there seemed to be a determined effort to
offset favorable publicity and try to discredit the colored soldiers." In
all probability, more than discrimination was involved in the charges;
but the upshot was that the NAACP was successful in winning a few
suspended sentences in addition to reductions of prison terms for the
rest. Obviously, the penalties were excessive if nothing else. 52
Another result was that Thurgood Marshall became completely
disillusioned with the MacArthur myth, although the general had never
been a favorite of blacks anyway. Upon his return from the Far East,
Marshall indulged in several choice criticisms of the general, which
may have had some connection with the decision of Congressmen
Dawson and Powell to boycott MacArthur's "farewell address" to Congress in April 1951. Finally, it should be noted that blacks were not
the only minority to suffer mass injustice during the Korean War. According to the Amsterdam News, ninety-four Puerto Ricans were convicted for disobeying an order to attack in November 1952.53
While the NAACP fought for the rights and reputations of courtmartialed Negroes, black leadership continued to agitate for complete
integration in the armed forces. In January 1951 Walter White wired
all of the service secretaries, urging them to take "immediate steps to
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eliminate segregation and discrimination from all phases of military
life." On February 28 White and A. Philip Randolph led a delegation
of Negro leaders to the White House, where they presented the president with a list of six "requests," which included additional black appointments to government positions, establishment of an executive
FEPC, elimination of segregation in the nation's capital, and abolition
"once and for all" of racial segregation in the army. The Negro press
agreed with the strategy of exploiting the exigencies of another war
to create a better America, and it contributed its share of criticism and
pressure. 54
Other civil-rights advocates were active. Senator Hubert Humphrey, distressed with the army's segregation of the recently activated
-and integrated-Minnesota National Guard, informed army brass,
"You've got to decide who you want trouble with, the southerners or
us." On June 25, 1951, Senators Humphrey and Lehman also wrote a
joint letter to Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall, asking for
specific evidence concerning the extent of integration. Actually, by
May 1951, the statistics were impressive-at least in comparison with
those of the previous year-for now 61 percent of the infantry combat
companies in the Eighth Army were operating on an integrated basis.
Moreover, in March 1951 the army had announced that it had achieved
complete integration of training facilities in the United States; and the
navy reported the absence of segregation in all units, including those
of the Marine Corps, although one navy spokesman concluded, "We
haven't hit the millennium yet."55
In March the army spokesman had given the impression of a harmonious, coherent, and progressive policy of integration; but the army
actually had a confused program, at best, throughout the winter and
spring of 1951. To army brass, the absence of the quota was the big
problem. By February 1951 the percentage of Negroes in the army
stood at 12 percent, as compared with 4 percent and 6 percent, respectively, in the navy and the air force. And by May the percentage
of Negro troops in Korea had reached 13.5, although less than one-half
were actually serving in combat units. The problem was that the number of Negroes in the army exceeded the available "Negro spaces,"
and the only solution was to restore the quota or to integrate further.
Nor were Negroes the only concern during the war. From July 1,
1950, through March 31, 1952, the army inducted some twenty-seven
thousand Puerto Ricans, about twice as many as were necessary to
maintain Puerto Rican army units. Here, the fear of racial friction was
subordinate to the obvious language problem, for most of the recruits
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spoke only Spanish. The army eventually came up with a partial solution when Selective Service cut the Puerto Rican quota and when the
army itself established language schools. 56
Some army officers were already prepared to accept the logic of
the situation. In December 1950 the inspector general, noting that integration had created no racial friction, contended that the army must
ultimately accept full integration. Predictably, others were apprehensive. The fundamental barrier to integration, noted one high-ranking
officer to the chief of staff, was the "social problem." "Solution of this
must be one of evolution within the communities of the United States,
and is not a problem that can be dissolved or solved by army effort
alone." Nonetheless, he recommended that the Chamberlin Board reconvene in February 1951 to study the army's racial policy in light of
recent developments on the battlefields of Korea. 57
The Chamberlin Board, however, found the tug of tradition too
powerful. Although the three general officers concluded that integrated units had fought well in Korea, with a corresponding decrease
in racial friction, they resisted both logic and military efficiency in
recommending reimposition of the 10 percent quota and retention of
the segregated system. For the moment, the army suspended the report. The army also polled a group of high-ranking officers with personal knowledge of integration in Korea. The majority supported integration, although only if the percentage of blacks in combat units was
rigidly regulated. 58 Still, the army marked time.
Clearly, there were those who were desperate, for the spontaneous
integration during the Korean War had unhinged the plans of those
officers who were determined to perpetuate segregation. The politics
of procrastination could not endure indefinitely. The assistant secretary of the army, Earl Johnson, was then in the process of recommending that all surplus Negro personnel be assigned to white units, which,
in the words of the acting chief of staff, would "in effect eliminate
racial units and would require complete integration within the army." 59
Confronted with external pressure and an internal dilemma, the
army, in March 1951, dispatched "an urgent requirement for information concerning the most effective utilization of Negro manpower"--or
as one person inelegantly explained, "The Army wants to know what to
do with all their niggers"-to a government-sponsored research team
of civilians under the auspices of the Operations Research Office of
Johns Hopkins University. 60 Operating under the code name of "Project Clear," the team of social scientists conducted extensive interviews
in Japan and Korea, and eventually in the United States as well. Al-
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though unable to meet the army's urgent deadline of July 1, 1951, the
investigators did come in with a preliminary report on July 13 and a
final report on November 1.
Project Clear all but destroyed any lingering, organized opposition
within the army to integration. It concluded that all-Negro combat
units were less effective than their white counterparts because of low
morale and because of the concentration of less-skilled and educationally disadvantaged personnel. When integrated, however, black
soldiers performed on a par with whites in the same units, without any
decrease in white morale. The conclusion was inescapable: "Integration enhances the effectiveness of the army," the social scientists contended; and its extension throughout the army was "feasible" without
reimposition of a racial quota. 61
Military integration had also become more palatable on the home
front. Some southern politicians were already resigned to it, while
others were willing to accept the word of high military and civilian
leaders concerning the inefficiency of segregation, a system that couJd
hardly be justified during time of war. Some white southerners, of
course, were never reconciled. Early in 1951 Congressman Arthur
Winstead of Mississippi proposed an amendment to the current selective-service bill to permit draftees the choice of refusing to serve in an
integrated unit, but the House easily throttled this last gasp of southern
opposition. 62
The preliminary report of Project Clear to the vice chief of staff on
July 13, and to the chief of staff and the secretary of defense on July 23,
came none too soon, for Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, who had succeeded MacArthur as commander of all UN forces in the Far East in
April 1951, was impatiently awaiting action on his request to integrate
all forces under his command. On July 20 Defense Secretary Marshall
confidentially advised Senators Humphrey and Lehman, who had been
pressing him for an official announcement in favor of integration, of
the army's intention to order integration of all units in Japan and
Korea and of deactivation of the Twenty-fourth Infantry Regiment.
Only the Fortieth and Forty-fifth Infantry divisions, then training in
Japan, would remain segregated, to be integrated later through the
normal :flow of replacements. On July 26, 1951, the army announced its
new Far Eastern policy, which was accompanied by General Ridgway's
own sweeping order. It was anticipated that within six months every
unit in the Far East would be thoroughly integrated. 63
Although Negro leaders felt a twinge of nostalgia as the colors of
the Twenty-fourth were permanently retired, they were jubilant over
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the new policy of the Far Eastern Command. Integration, of course,
did not come overnight to all units. A few local commanders continued
to resist it. Moreover, military efficiency demanded that much of the
integration occur gradually through the flow of replacements. According to the Department of Defense, the process was completed by May
1952, although even at that late date an all-black service unit cropped
up occasionally. "By Armistice time in Korea," Gen. Mark Clark later
observed, "our basic infantry squads were a hodgepodge of tongues
and people." As he pointed out, the average squad was composed of
"four white Americans, one Negro American, two and a half Koreans
and the remainder Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, Hawaiians, and American lndians."64
The army's order of July 1951 to desegregate units of the Far
Eastern Command did not affect its racial policies elsewhere, and for
the next few months the army continued to limp along without a consistent policy. When black correspondent James L. Hicks investigated
army posts throughout the United States in the summer and fall of
1951, he found no uniformity on racial matters. True, all basic-training
facilities were integrated, as the army had announced in March, but
on regular army posts he found both complete integration and "open
defiance" of the president. At Fort Belvoir, Virginia, for example, he
reported that both military and civilian personnel were "disgracefully
segregated" and that Fort Jackson, South Carolina, represented "one
of the best examples of large scale integration this writer has ever
seen." On the other hand, he discovered that the navy and the air
force had done well, although occasionally he stumbled across segregated facilities. 65
Clearly, the exigencies of war had led to integration of army forces
in Japan and Korea, but there was less urgency for similar action at
home, which permitted the brass in Washington to stall. Yet pressure
was present even here, both externally from civil-rights advocates and
internally as a result of too many black soldiers for the available
"Negro spaces." Once again, the Fahy Committee's insistence on abolition of the quota was paying off. In September 1951, for example, the
all-black units were thirty-four thousand men over strength-"a costly
and needless waste of manpower," according to a high-ranking officer
in Washington. Still the chief of staff and others were not prepared "to
rush integration" throughout the United States; and the commander of
army forces on the Pacific Coast, who had requested permission to
integrate, was informed that the army would not consider its next step
until it received the final report of Project Clear in November. By
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December 1951, confronted with increasing ad hoc integration and
with the evidence in the final report of Project Clear, the army could
delay no longer. Without publicity, the Department of the Army
ordered integration of all units, with considerable discretion as to time
and place left to base and regional commanders. 66
In the meantime, the same rate of integration, pragmatic or otherwise, had not occurred within units of the American command in
Europe. The presence of segregated units in Europe was an American
gift to the Soviet Union in the cold-war propaganda battle, for it was
painfully evident that black American soldiers were ostensibly preserving a freedom for others that they did not enjoy themselves. During the summer of 1951 Army Secretary Frank D. Pace, Jr., visited the
Austrian command of Lt. Gen. Stafford L. Irwin, who was finding the
Soviet propaganda all too true and much too embarrassing. "I want
to integrate," Irwin informed Pace; and the secretary soon gave his
approval. Irwin integrated his command so quietly that some high
Pentagon officials learned of it only after its completion. 67
Matters were quite different elsewhere in Europe, primarily because of the opposition of Gen. Thomas C. Handy, who commanded
American forces in France and Germany. Despite the dramatic
changes in the army's racial practices as a result of the Korean War,
General Handy was dragging his feet, barely meeting the requirements
of Secretary Gray's order in January of 1950 concerning the assignment of qualified blacks to overhead positions. In the summer of 1951
Army Assistant Secretary Earl Johnson dispatched Professor Eli Ginzberg to Europe to inform Handy of the army's desire to integrate all
forces. Ginzberg met considerable resistance and even disbelief, and
he reported to Washington that a majority of Handy's officers believed
that integration would not come in '1ess than a hundred years.'' 68
This would not do, and pressure had to be applied. Secretary Pace
and Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins requested General Handy to submit his plan for integration to Washington for approval, well aware
that Handy had no plan. Finally, in December 1951, General Handy
came up with a policy that fell short of the Pentagon's expectations,
for the general was prepared only to integrate combat units. Most
Negroes were in service units, and Handy's policy would therefore
perpetuate segregation indefinitely. 69
While these negotiations continued behind the scenes, the existence of widespread segregation in the European command became a
matter of public knowledge as a result of the revelations of Claude A.
Barnett, director of the Associated Negro Press. Following a short tour
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of Europe in January and February of 1952, Barnett returned to denounce the army's integration policy in Europe as a "farce." The
Negro press was concerned. "Our brass hats in Europe," fulminated
the Chicago Defender, "are either unaware of the new orders for
integration in the Defense Department or they are stubbornly defying
these orders. Something is wrong, radically wrong." Something was
wrong, as Barnett's subsequent articles indicated. In one column, for
example, he quoted extensively from General Handy's letter of February 7, which was a response to Barnett's earlier query concerning the
general's racial policies. Handy revealed that all detachments of
women in Europe were integrated, but that only about two thousand
out of a total of thirty thousand Negro soldiers were then serving in
integrated units. In order to desegregate units designated as all-black,
Handy contended that he needed orders from Washington. 70
At best, his argument was a circumvention in view of what had
already transpired. In any event, he soon had his orders, which called
for integration of combat units within a year and of service units
within one to two years. On April 1, 1952, General Handy announced
his new policy, carefully noting that "the Department of the Army has
directed this command to initiate a .. . program of racial integration."
There were no complications. By September, the Seventh Army reported visible progress, particularly in its combat units, with blacks
composing 9 to 12 percent of the rifle companies-a percentage that
most commanders sought to maintain. Though progress was slower in
the service companies, the army in Europe hoped to complete its integration program within another year. And everyone expressed pleasure, at least publicly, with the results. "They are fine soldiers now,"
asserted one general officer in describing the performance of black
soldiers previously part of a segregated and ineffective battalion,
"working harder and more efficiently than they did when they were all
together in one group.'' 71
The movement to integrate the military also had several tangential
effects. One involved segregation of dependent children in schools on
military bases. A Negro correspondent in June 1951 called attention to
the rigid segregation at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, where white children were educated on the post and black children were bussed to
jim-crow schools in surrounding communities. Others quickly queried
Defense Department officials, who sought to avoid the issue by explaining that local communities operated most of the schools in question, and in the South, of course, segregation was the law. It came as a
surprise, then, when the elementary school at Fort Bragg opened in
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the fall of 1951 on an integrated basis and with one black face among
the faculty. 72
It was a complicated situation. Local authorities operated and
staffed most of the schools for military dependents, with the military
itself controlling the remainder. Actually, in October 1951 the military
operated only six schools in southern states, of which four, including
the one of Fort Bragg, were now desegregated. Those operated by
local authorities in the South, however, constituted the majority-and
the dilemma. State law required segregation; and if the military itself
assumed control and ordered integration, it might result in the withdrawal of teachers, loss of accreditation from state agencies, and additional expense. 73
There were also political considerations. Southern politicians
were already unhappy with the integration of the four army schools
and struck quickly in September and October of 1951 to restore the
purity of the South's sacred system. At that point, Congress was considering a bill to provide federal aid to schools in critical defensehousing areas. When the bill moved from committee to the floor of the
Senate, however, . it contained a stipulation that the commissioner of
education should operate these schools in conformance with the laws
of the state in which the federal property was located. In brief, the bill
would turn back the clock and require resegregation of the four
schools.74
Incredibly, the bill rolled through both houses of Congress without any organized opposition and was presented to Truman on October
20. The "buck" stopped at the White House. Although both the Department of Defense and the Federal Security Agency, despite certain
misgivings, urged the president to sign the bill, and although liberals
in the Senate had permitted its passage by a simple voice vote, Truman
refused to accept it.75 In his veto message of November 2 the president
observed that the bill would restore segregation of schools on military
bases then operating successfully with integrated programs, which
"would constitute a backward step in the efforts of the federal government to extend equal rights and opportunities to all our people." After
noting the progress in the achievement of equality of opportunity in
the federal civil service and the armed forces, he explained that not all
schools on federal property were integrated, for the government always
considered "pertinent local factors"; nonetheless, the government must
move forward. In concluding, he placed the issue in the context of the
cold war. 'We have assumed a role of world leadership in seeking to
unite people of great cultural and racial diversity for the purpose of
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resisting aggression, protecting their mutual security and advancing
their own economic and political development," he contended. 76
The president had held the line, but the problem of school segregation on most military bases in the South persisted throughout the
campaign year of 1952. Finally, as a result of pressure from Senator
Humphrey and Clarence Mitchell, director of the NAACP's Washington bureau, Assistant Defense Secretary Anna Rosenberg decided to
force the issue. In a letter of January 10, 1953, to Commissioner of
Education Earl J. McGrath, she pointed out that such segregation violated the policies both of the Department of Defense and of the president. The authority to integrate, she continued, rested not with the
Defense Department but with McGrath's agency. McGrath's reply
was all that integrationists could want. If the department ordered
integration of school facilities, he responded, the Office of Education
would comply and provide "other arrangements" to teach the children
if local authorities in the South found it impossible to circumvent segregation laws. 77 McGrath's letter not only hinted at the difficulties
involved but also revealed the reluctance of the Defense Department
to issue such a directive.
That reluctance continued into the Eisenhower administration.
Shortly after taking office, the new president promised to look into the
matter; and within a week the White House disclosed that it had directed that segregation cease at all schools operated by the military.
The order was almost meaningless, for it affected only Fort Benning,
Georgia; local authorities operated the remaining twenty-one school
systems for dependents in the South. 78 No matter what the degree of
its commitment to civil rights may have been, the Eisenhower administration was confronted with the same thorny problems as the Truman
administration had been.
In a lengthy memorandum to Eisenhower of May 1953, Secretary
of Defense Charles E. Wilson carefully explained the situation. Local
educational agencies in the South could not desegregate the twentyone schools without changing state laws, and the federal government
could not assume control without jeopardizing the entire school program. In conclusion, after a paragraph of equivocation, Wilson recommended a target date of September 1955 for inauguration of integration, hoping that the procedures could somehow be worked out. Perhaps he and others also hoped for a favorable decision from the Supreme Court on the school desegregation cases then pending before
the tribunal. In any event, the court's decision in May 1954 to strike
down segregation as unconstitutional removed all complications and
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permitted integration of schools located on military bases, although
black children who lived in off-base housing in the South continued to
attend segregated schools. 79
The Eisenhower administration also inherited another tangential
problem of integration. Since 1949, when the Fahy Committee had accepted the navy's program of integration, criticism of that service was
minimal. In October 1951, however, Clarence Mitchell of the NAACP
protested the segregation of restrooms, water fountains, cafeterias,
and other facilities for civilian employees at southern naval stations.
The navy's reply was totally unsatisfactory, and the matter continued
to simmer as the 1952 election campaign approached. 8° Finally, in
May 1952, Lester Granger wrote to Secretary of the Navy Kimball,
expressing his shock at the navy's departure from "its recently fine
record of equal opportunity" and labeling its policy for civilian employees as a "backward step." Although conciliatory in tone, Kimball's
response exposed the navy's opposition to integration of civilian facilities. "[We] cannot permit, direct or enforce any course of action
which might jeopardize the fulfillment of the mission of the shore establishment," he explained. "The navy must, therefore, in a very realistic
way recognize the customs and usages prevailing in certain geographical areas of our country. In these areas to which I refer, the navy ...
must conform with these usages and customs, some of which, incidentally, are backed up by Iaw."81
Although official policy allowed local commanding officers to use
their own discretion, Kimball's explanation clearly indicated that the
navy expected them to retain segregation of civilian facilities at southern naval stations. Dissatisfied, Granger mailed all correspondence
to Donald Dawson, a White House assistant, who forwarded it to
minority expert Philleo Nash, who in tum shuffied it to the president's
naval aide and requested an early conference with the admiral. There
the matter rested, despite a strongly worded telegram to President
Truman from the NAACP during its annual convention in June, which
argued that Kimball's refusal to integrate civilian facilities was "an
incredible assault upon the magnificent stand you have taken against
racial bigotry."82 Apparently, the president was never informed of the
issue, and the administration completed its tenure in office without
taking any action.
The NAACP, however, had not forgotten. During the early
months of the Eisenhower administration, Walter White and Congressman Powell applied pressure, which Navy Secretary Robert B. Anderson resisted by repeating the myth that to defy local custom would

Integrating the Military

247
"inevitably lead to disruptive employee relations, poor community relations, and an ultimate breakdown of efficiency accompanied by lower
production." But Eisenhower had pledged to end segregation in federal facilities, and Anderson soon got the message. On August 20,
1953, he announced the administration's program for "complete elimination" of racial segregation of civilian employees on the twenty-three
out of forty-three southern naval stations that were still practicing the
policy. In November, Eisenhower announced the integration of all
naval stations, except for those at Newport News and Charleston,
where gradual desegregation was scheduled for completion in January 1954. Walter White was pleased, although he disliked the gradualism. "All that needs to be done," he complained, "is to remove the jimcrow signs which should be a matter of minutes."83
The navy's poor showing on this issue prompted black critics to
peer closely at other navy practices, for up to this point the army had
virtually monopolized their attention. They grimaced at what they
found. Between 1950 and 1953, during the Korean War, the percentage of black seamen in the Stewards Branch had remained constant
at about 50 percent, while the total percentage of Negroes in the navy
had declined. Moreover, the Stewards Branch was actually a segregated outfit, with 98 percent of its personnel either Negro or Filipino. 84
Navy Secretary Anderson, however, was no longer insensitive to
black complaints, and in September 1953 Lester Granger was brought
in to an advisory position. As it turned out, the appointment was practically meaningless, for the navy rejected his suggestions, pa1ticularly
those concerning the Stewards Branch. In March 1954, however, the
navy did abandon its practice of recruiting blacks specifically as messmen and inaugurated the policy of putting all personnel through the
same basic-training program. But this would affect only the future;
and on June 25, 1954, Granger resigned in disgust, protesting that "the
only way to end segregation is to break up the whole branch, consolidate it with the commissary group, and then gradually parcel out the
men on a greater extent of integration." Thereafter, the navy's pace
was painfully slow; and as late as 1963, 23 percent of all black personnel in the navy was still concentrated in the food-service field, despite
a substantial increase in black enlistments. 85
On the other hand, the army, which had fought integration so
tenaciously, began to look better and better; and its civilian leadership
took pride in the results. On January 19, 1953, the day before he left
office, Army Secretary Frank Pace wrote to Walter White, expressing
the opinion that "one of the outstanding accomplishments of this period
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has been the army's marked success in the integration of Negro personnel." In conclusion, he thanked White and his associates for their
"understanding and constructive assistance to the Department of the
Army during this period." At this point, it was only a matter of time.
In August of 1953, as the Korean War dragged to a close, the army
reported that it was 90 percent integrated, with only ninety-six allblack units remaining, which would be phased out in the usual manner.
In July 1954 the percentage of integrated units stood at 98, with only
fifteen all-black complements, each of less than company size. On
October 30, 1954, the army closed the book, reporting that all units
were integrated except for an occasional small detachment, which
represented a "transient" condition. 86 Henceforth, blacks would be
roughly in the same category as other American minorities-a category
in which discrimination was unofficial and often individual-but at
least they no longer suffered the special indignity of segregation.
Once the army had abolished segregation, it became the most
egalitarian branch of the service, if only because of the number of its
black officers and men. In 1962, for example, the Commission on Civil
Rights found that blacks composed over 11 percent of army personnel,
8 and 7 percent respectively of the air force and marines, but less than
5 percent of the navy. 87
Perhaps integration of the armed forces was not "the greatest thing
that ever happened to America," as Truman viewed it in 1953 in a
private conversation; but few events in the twentieth century surpassed
it in importance for white as well as black America. Truman's pride
was justifiable, for he could point to some impressive statistics in addition to integration itself. For example, during his administration, the
number of Negro graduates of West Point increased dramatically and
compared favorably with the number in subsequent classes as late as
1969. Actually, the five black cadets who emerged from West Point in
1951 represented only a beginning, but in the next fifteen years that
number was equaled only in 1955, a class that matriculated during the
Truman administration, and was not exceeded until after 1965.88
Moreover, when James C. Evans released the Defense Department's progress report on integration in 1954, he observed that equal
opportunity for civilian employees in the department lagged behind
that in the military. Fifteen years later the situation was apparently
no better. In 1969 Carl T. Rowan indicted all three presidents of the
1960s for permitting the department to become "the biggest racial
discriminator in employment." Rowan contended that of 523 top level
positions in the department, Negroes held only 3, of which 2 were
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really "civil rights" jobs, comparable in some ways to the race-relations
advisers of the Roosevelt era. 89
Black leaders during the 1960s could legitimately wonder what
had happened to the bright new world of 1954. The Eisenhower administration, after completing what remained of Truman's integration
program, allowed the issue of equal opportunity in the military to
drift, although, incredibly enough, Eisenhower later took credit for
integrating the armed services. Black leadership itself contributed to .
the drift by easing the pressure. Not until 1962, when President John
F . Kennedy appointed his Committee on Equal Opportunity in the
Armed Forces, did another administration undertake a serious examination of America's racial policies in the military. In the same year
the Commission on Civil Rights conducted a parallel survey. The commission found discrimination in occupational assignments, particularly
in the navy, and in recruitment and promotion procedures. Discrimination in off-base housing continued to be a serious problem, while
segregation still remained in a few NCO clubs and in many social activities. Even more distressing, segregation still existed for children of
black military personnel in many off-base schools in the South. 90
When the Defense Department reported the end of segregation in
1954, it also pointed to certain remaining "problem areas," including
the lack of opportunity and the presence of discrimination in college
ROTC programs, reserve forces, and National Guard units. Here
again, practice lagged behind promises. As late as 1968, for example,
not one predominantly Negro college had a naval ROTC program,
which explained in large part why the navy had only 330 black officers
that year. 91
The National Guard, however, continued to be the big offender.
When the head of the National Guard Bureau reported in December
1964 that "token integration had been achieved in all National Guard
units," it was certainly no more than that. In February 1964, for example, five states had no black guardsmen whatever, while seventeen
states reported fewer than ten. Actually, only 1.5 percent of all National Guard units in the country was Negro, partly because blacks
themselves expressed little interest and partly because of discrimination and "token integration." In short, little was accomplished in the
ten years following the Truman administration. 92
Finally, a statistical comparison documents another part of the
story. In 1945 blacks represented only 0.7 percent of all officers in the
army; the percentage rose to 1.7 in 1949 and to 2.9 at the end of the
Korean War. But in 1962, it stood only at 3.2 percent. In other words,
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the percentage of black officers in the army increased by more than 2
percent during the Truman administration but only by 0.3 percent in
the next eight years. Similarly, in 1954 the percentage of Negro officers
in the air force was 1.1, up 0.5 percent from 1949, but eight years later
the percentage stood only at 1.2, an increase of 0.1 percent. During the
same period, the percentage in the navy went from 0.1 to 0.3, and in
the marines from 0.1 to 0.2 percent. 93 In short, the military was only
marking time.
The war in Vietnam did bring improvement, along with suffering
and dying. In March 1966, for example, the three major service academies combined had only 52 black students. In 1968 there were 116, although47 had just entered. The war also undoubtedly contributed to the
promotion of Col. F. E. Davison to brigadier general; but as only the
third black American to reach the rank of general, after B. 0. Davis, Sr.,
in 1940 and B. 0. Davis, Jr., in 1954, the promotion seemed to prove little.
More encouraging were the promotion of Daniel James to brigadier general in the air force in 1970 and the promotions in 1971 of Samuel L.
Gravely, Jr., to rear admiral and of Oliver W. Dillard, James F. Hamlet,
and Roscoe C. Cartwright to the rank of brigadier general in the army. 94
In 1968 Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford released additional
evidence of black gains in the military. Contrasting the situation in
1948, when President Truman issued his executive order, with that in
1968, Clifford revealed that the number of officers in all branches of the
service had more than quadrupled. The army went from 1,306 black
officers in 1948 to 5,637 in 1968, the navy from 4 to 330, the Marine
Corps from 1 to 180, and the air force from 310 to 2,417. 96 The statistics did represent improvement, but they were also misleading, for
they failed to include percentages for the number of black officers in
comparison with the total. Moreover, if compared with the percentages immediately after the Korean War, those of 1968 would not have
appeared out of the ordinary.
If anything, Clifford's report unintentionally illustrated the need
for greater improvement on the part of the military, particularly the
navy and Marine Corps. Moreover, although the military was still the
most integrated aspect of American society and probably the most harmonious as well, the war in Vietnam resurrected grave charges of discrimination on the part of whites and revealed the disruptive presence
of racism, black and white alike. The military thus threatened to become a reflection of the tension and torment of American society in
general, whereas in 1953 it had stood as a beacon that illuminated the
road to progress in domestic affairs.

12

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY

President Truman's Executive Order 9981 of July 26, 1948, which
called for the establishment of equality of treatment and opportunity
in the armed forces, had resulted in the most dramatic civil-rights victory of his administration. Its companion order, 9980, designed to
achieve the same results in federal civilian employment, was less spectacular and less successful. The order reaffirmed the federal policy of
employment without discrimination because of race, color, creed, or
national origin and called for the appointment of a fair employment
officer in each executive agency, who would receive complaints, establish operating procedures, and redress legitimate grievances in consultation with the agency head. The order also established a Fair Employment Board in the Civil Service Commission, whose functions
were to synchronize the program, to serve as a watchdog, and to provide a court of last resort. Although the FEB lacked enforcement
powers, which distressed civil-rights advocates, it could appeal directly
to the president when an agency refused to reverse or to alter a policy
of obvious discrimination. Primary responsibility for the operation
and success of the program, however, rested with each department or
agency, while the FEB's main function was appellate. 1
From the beginning of its operations, the FEB contained congenital weaknesses, as a comparison with the Fahy Committee reveals.
Although both were largely advisory in nature and had to rely primarily upon persuasion, the similarities ended there. For one thing,
discrimination in government agencies, except for certain segregated
facilities and agencies in the South, was hard to uncover, much less to
prove. As the FEB pointed out, "Actual discrimination may be so
subtly disguised under ostensibly correct procedure that it is difficult
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to identify or clearly establish."2 On the other hand, the military's
policy of discrimination-particularly segregation of troops, limited
specialty training, and observance of a racial quota-was there for
everyone to see. In short, the Fahy Committee's task, though admittedly difficult, was clear-cut, while the FEB had to establish procedures
to eliminate discrimination that supposedly did not exist.
Moreover, the Fahy Committee had to negotiate only with representatives of the three services, while the FEB had to contend with
scores of departments and agencies. The very size of the federal
bureaucracy, with its amorphous character, complicated the board's task
in suggesting procedures for the hearing and disposition of grievances.
Yet the FEB may have compounded the problem. For example, the
board rightly concluded that the diversity of the federal establishment
required some flexibility, but its suggested operating procedures were
unduly complicated. The board recommended that an employee initiate his complaint with his supervisor. If dissatisfied, he should present his case in writing to the deputy fair employment officer in his
organization and, if still unhappy, then to the fair employment officer
of the department, thence to the head of the department, and finally
to the Fair Employment Board itself. Such a procedure was not only
cumbersome but one that would tax the patience of Job. The board,
however, did permit departments to reduce the number of appeal
steps.3
Although this procedure carefully preserved the chain of command, the FEB might have adopted the less tidy but more effective
approach of the 1960s, which permitted a complainant to appeal directly to the board. The FEB eventually realized the complicated
nature of the process of appeal, and in May 1951 it simplified the
procedure. At the same time, it established procedures for disposition
of complaints filed by civil-rights organizations representing numerous
employees and applicants. 4
In contrast with the Fahy Committee, the FEB also labored under
almost complete ignorance about the number of Negroes and other
minorities employed in federal civilian agencies. As a result of military
studies involving the most efficient utilization of manpower, the Fahy
Committee had no dearth of statistical evidence. But there were no
corresponding figures or studies relating to civilian employment for
the period since the end of Roosevelt's FEPC in 1946, a gap which the
FEB considered one of its "greatest obstacles."5
There were still other differences between the Fahy Committee
and the FEB. The former, for example, was determined from the out-
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set to do something about segregation in the military, while the latter
never declared its outright opposition to segregation in civilian agencies, unless it adversely affected the "equality of economic opportunity
of such segregated employees." Admittedly, segregation in federal
employment in the South was a more difficult problem than segregation
in the army, for no single board could possibly scrutinize all government agencies nor could it hope to secure compliance in the South of
the late 1940s and early 1950s. Yet the report of the board in December 1951 conspicuously failed to mention or discuss segregation in any
way. And when the report used the word "integration," it meant only
the integration of minority personnel into new job classifications. In
November 1951 the board sought to determine the presence and extent
of segregation in sixty-two federal agencies. Forty-five reported no
segregation whatever, although these reports were not necessarily reliable. The remaining seventeen revealed a checkered pattern of segregation, ranging from one to several segregated units consisting primarily of messengers, mailmen, and chauffeur.s. There was progress,
but segregation in federal civilian employment existed as late as 1965.6
The Fair Employment Board also differed both in its modus operandi and its type of personnel from the Fahy Committee. The members of the latter had been appointed by the president and reported
directly to him, which insured the continual involvement of the White
House staff in the Fahy Committee's running battle with the army.
The Civil Service Commission, however, appointed the members of
the FEB, which meant that the White House received reports from the
board only after they had cleared the Civil Service Commission.
Moreover, the personnel differed in degree of commitment. Men
with a mission composed the Fahy Committee, while the FEB appointees, although prominent, seemed less certain of where they
wanted to go. Guy Moffett, a government personnel expert, was the
first chairman of the board. The other members included Fred C.
Croxton, a former conciliator in the Labor Department; Daniel W.
Tracy, former assistant secretary of labor and president of the AFL
Brotherhood of Electricians; Dr. Ethel C. Dunham, former medical
research director of the Children's Bureau; Judge Annabel Matth,ews,
formerly a member of the Board of Tax Appeals; Eugene Kinckle
Jones, general secretary of the Urban League; and Jesse H. Mitchell,
president of the Industrial Bank of Washington. 7 Although both Jones
and Mitchell were Negroes, their counterparts on the Fahy Committee
-John Sengstacke and Lester Granger-were much more involved in
the civil-rights struggle in the postwar years.
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Certain members of the White House staff were never happy with
the FEB's performance. For example, in December 1950 the Fair
Employment Board came up with a self-satisfied report, contending
that the civil-service record on fair employment was "extremely good"
and that "considerable progress has been made and that continuing
progress may be expected." David Niles could not have disagreed
more. "Last year we had a similarly mild and ineffectual report," he
complained to fellow White House assistant Donald Dawson. "Could
we let the board know that next year we will be wanting a report with
enough substance to become a public document?" Niles further suggested that the board ought "to plan some more affirmative steps of its
own." Philleo Nash and Martin L. Friedman concurred with Niles's
evaluation of the report and urged Dawson not to make it public.8
Inexplicably, however, Dawson misinformed the president in a
memorandum of December 28. In describing the report, he neglected
to mention the distress of Niles, Nash, and Friedman and raved about
the "considerable progress" and the "extremely good" record of the
federal civil service. Indeed, Dawson's memorandum was more enthusiastic than the FEB report itself, and the president could be forgiven when he subsequently praised the board's performance in several public addresses. The following year the FEB did prepare and
publish a report on Fair Employment in the Federal Service, which
was superior to past reports, though Martin Friedman still maintained
that "they don't have much to brag about in my opinion.''11
The FEB seemed to approach its task both gingerly and leisurely.
In March 1949, for example, the board issued comprehensive instructions to federal departments and agencies concerning regulations and
operating procedures. But when it reported to the Civil Service Commission in September, the board noted, without expressing dismay,
that some agencies were still involved in revising their procedures in
response to the directive of March. 10 At that pace, some agencies
would accomplish nothing.
The FEB's policies seemed to compound endemic difficulties. In
February 1950, for example, a Denver field representative of the
Budget Bureau reported that the performance of the civil service,
which had made "no headway under the stimulus of Executive Order
9980," contrasted sharply with the advancement of civil rights in the
armed services. Part of the problem was procedural, he contended, and
he suggested that the Civil Service Commission appoint regional fair
employment officers to scrutinize the policies of area agencies and to

Equal Employment Opportunity

255
receive complaints directly from applicants for or employees in federal
employment. 11
Although this proposal had some virtue, the FEB was apparently
more concerned with the niceties of the organizational chart than with
a full-scale assault on discrimination. The board replied that any interposition of authority on its part would "dangerously" weaken the
"chain of direct responsibility." The FEB did concede, however, that
the use of the same person as fair employment officer and chief personnel officer in an agency created "embarrassing problems of split
objectives and responsibilities" and recommended that the fair employment officer be relieved of all other duties. 12
There were also problems over which the FEB had no control.
The board had to contend with the "rule of three," a civil-service regulation that permitted the appointing officer to select one of the top
three applicants from the Civil Service register. In the application of
this rule, the board warned, "lies a vast potentiality of discrimination
unless it is used with sole regard to merit and fitness"; and in one case
involving several Negroes, the board found a clear-cut example of
racial discrimination. But such examples were difficult to prove. 13
Perhaps the most critical limitation on the board's ability to function properly was its meager budget, which had to be sliced from the
operating funds of the Civil Service Commission. The budget restricted the board in the number of days that it might meet, so that by
the end of 1951 it had met formally only 121 times since its organization in October 1948. Its expenditures were even more revealing. In
four years of operation, the FEB spent slightly over $100,000, a figure
that included all salaries and expenses not only for regular members
but also for an executive secretary, an examiner, and a clerk-stenographer. Confronted with this financial straitjacket, the FEB was never
able to establish effectively a "constructive" or "preventive" program.
Therefore its major contribution was "corrective" in hearing the appeals that survived the arduous climb up the chain of command. 14
Despite these limitations and weaknesses, the board and various
agencies functioned effectively in many instances. In December 1951,
the FEB reported that 488 complaints had been filed in the twenty-seven
agencies that employed 97 percent of the total personnel in federal
service. In nearly 60 percent of the cases, no discrimination was found
to exist. The FEB itself heard sixty-two appeal cases, finding discrimination in thirteen. The board and the fair employment program continued to function in the Eisenhower administration, and by July 30,
1954, the number of formal complaints had reached 865, of which 12.6

Quest and Response

256

percent required corrective action. 15 Thus, Truman's executive order
provided some machinery-however inadequate-for a fair employment policy and insured its continuity into another administration.
The statistics of the Truman administration tell only part of the
story, for the very existence of the presidential order and the Fair
Employment Board prompted some agencies to comply. Some agencies responded to the spirit of the order and diligently worked for a
nondiscriminatory policy, while others responded when civil-rights
organizations, armed with the presidential statement demanding a fair
employment program, applied pressure. The Post Office Department
was a case in point. Early in 1948 Senator William Langer and the
NAACP demanded a Senate investigation of discriminatory practices
in southern postal facilities, and an investigator subsequently found
several instances where eligible Negroes were passed over for appointment and promotion. The FEB quickly issued a directive to correct
the situation. Following its own hearings, the FEB also advised post
offices in New Orleans, San Antonio, and Memphis to employ Negroes
as clerks. 16
The presidential order also precipitated the end of segregation in
the cafeteria of the Government Printing Office, the last federal agency
in Washington to integrate such facilities. Although the cafeteria committee of the Printing Office balked and voted against integration, the
public printer, observing that segregation conflicted with the announced policies of the administration, took the matter in hand and
ordered the integration of cafeteria facilities effective July 25, 1949.
Thus ended a bitter struggle that had begun during the administrations
of William Howard Taft and Woodrow Wilson.17
There were less happy results elsewhere. The commissioners of
the District of Columbia ignored the presidential directive, apparently
with the acquiescence of the FEB, which interpreted 9980 as inapplicable to the District. The Department of Agriculture remained generally unreceptive to pleas for the employment of blacks in positions
with higher ratings in its Washington office, thereby preserving its
poor record in regard to race relations. Field officers of the Department of the Interior in Alaska apparently refused to hire Negroes
except when other labor was unavailable, although the department's
overall record was often praiseworthy. 18
In 1950 the Afro-American indicted the Census Bureau on six
counts of racial discrimination, which included not only its discriminatory hiring policies and its overall operations in the South but also the
terminology the bureau employed in taking the census and its defini-
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ti.on of what constituted a Negro. On the other hand, both the FEB
and the Bureau of the Budget insisted upon the elimination of photographs and other identifying devices ( unless necessary for statistical
purposes) on employment forms, and the Bureau of Immigration and
Naturalization also abolished the practice of stamping "black" on the
passports of Negro Americans. 19
One of the toughest problems concerned the Treasury's Bureau of
Engraving and Printing, which had traditionally discriminated against
minority groups. Although the bureau employed some twenty-five
hundred Negroes in 1949-which represented 50 percent of its total
work force-fewer than twelve worked in clerical, supervisory, or
administrative capacities. But that was only part of the picture. From
1938 to 1950 the bureau recruited seventy-five apprentice plate printers. Although Negroes competed in the examinations, they received
no appointments, despite having higher scores than some whites who
were subsequently appointed. In fact, in the entire history of the
bureau, no Negro had ever served either as an apprentice plate printer
or as a journeyman, and the future promised more of the same. 20
Yet, the shortage of plate printers was as obvious as the discrimination, and in 1949 civil-rights advocates turned a spotlight on the
darker side of the bureau's operations. As a consequence, the Fair Employment Board held hearings in January and February 1950 to investigate the growing pyramid of complaints. Reporting on February
23, the FEB held that discrimination did exist and recommended that
the Bureau of Engraving and Printing should not only hold its competitive examination, which it had recently scheduled for March 15,
but should also inaugurate a continuous in-service training program. 21
At this point, the Bureau of Engraving and Printing was prepared
to agree with the FEB, but Congress now complicated the picture. In
February 1950 bills were introduced in both houses to limit competitive apprenticeship examinations to veterans and to permit any veteran
in the country to participate, whereas the Treasury Department had
restricted the examination to those already employed in the Bureau of
Engraving and Printing. Although the congressional bills seemed innocuous enough, being ostensibly designed to favor veterans and to
checkmate the closed-shop approach of the bureau, the real purpose
seemed to be an attempt to preserve the lily-white complexion of the
journeymen and the printer's union, which, incidentally, supported
the legislation. Congressional advocates even made the bill retroactive
to March 1 in order to nullify the results of the bureau's March 15
examination, which, given the number of eligible Negroes, would al-
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most surely have resulted in black appointments. The House Committee
on Post Office and Civil Service moved with indecent haste to gain
passage of the bill, which Congressmen Dawson and Marcantonio denounced on the floor. Amid charges of discrimination and bigotry, the
bill passed the House on May 1 but died later in the Senate. 22
In the meantime the White House and the Treasury Department
had agreed upon a policy of delay. The department held the exam
on March 15, then sat tight, waiting for Congress to adjourn before
announcing the results and the new appointments. 23 The strategy
worked, and in January 1951 seventeen Negro veterans began apprenticeship training in the Bureau of Engraving and Printing. It was a
victory definitely worth boasting about, but apparently the results
were not permanent. In November 1953 the Pittsburgh Courier devoted a scathing editorial to the bureau-which still "resolutely sets its
face toward the fading sun of Kluxism"-for terminating the apprenticeship program in May 1953, thus restoring the all-white complexion
of the printing crew. 24
There was, however, steady and permanent progress in the Department of State, again as a result of Executive Order 9980 and black
pressure. Throughout the postwar period, civil-rights advocates had
repeatedly agitated for more prestigious appointments, for the chronic
complaint centered around the low ratings of most Negroes in federal
service. And if one sought prestige, the Department of State was the
place to serve. The pressure campaign on the Department of State
began in earnest in 1950, when Professor Rayford W. Logan of Howard University published a series of articles in the Courier. Logan
made one thing very clear. The department's policy was one of near
exclusion, particularly in the Foreign Service, where there were only
thirty-three Negroes serving in any capacity.25
Since the onset of the cold war, the department had been extremely sensitive to the charge of discrimination, particularly where
neutral and underdeveloped nations were concerned; and the Korean
War increased the department's sensitivity. Black leaders decided to
exploit this vulnerability. On February 28, 1951, twelve prominent
Negroes, headed by Walter White and A. Philip Randolph, presented
the president with six "requests," two of which called for additional
black appointments to policy-making positions at home and to diplomatic posts abroad. 26
On April 13 a smaller Negro delegation met with Secretary of
State Dean Acheson and found him somewhat responsive to the group's
requests. During the conference he outlined the department's employ-
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ment policy at great length and balked only at the committee's request
for the appointment of a black assistant secretary of state, explaining
that the earlier offer to Ralph Bunche had been based entirely on his
ability, not on the color of his skin. He also invited the group to discuss the department's employment policies in greater detail with the
director of the Office of Personnel.27
The last suggestion may have been a political improvisation, but
it turned out to be one of lasting benefit. The group met with Haywood P. Martin, director of personnel, on April 19, 1951; and the discussion led to regular conferences thereafter with Martin and his successor, E. N. Montague, which continued into the Eisenhower administration. In March 1952 A. Philip Randolph wrote to Acheson, thanking the secretary and his subordinates for their "splendid attitude" and
"cooperative efforts" during the conferences and for the promises of
additional appointments. Randolph was usually hard to please, as the
president had discovered long before.28
Perhaps the most significant appointment was that of John A.
Davis in May 1952 as consultant to the State Department's personnel
office. Other appointments, however, signified the department's intention to brighten its image both at home and abroad. By June 1952
thirty-four American blacks were working abroad in the Point Four
program, although twenty-six were concentrated in Liberia, the traditional "home" for Negroes on foreign service. The department's personnel director, however, continued to labor diligently to overcome
resistance both from within the State Department and from other
countries to the appointment of skilled black personnel. 'We are on a
spot," Montague confessed at one point to Joseph C. Green, the American ambassador to Jordan, in stating his desire to appoint more
Negroes to Arab nations. 29
In a progress report of March 1953, Montague summed up the
results of the department's efforts over the past two years to attract
more Negroes. Nearly sixty Negroes were employed in prestige positions in the Foreign Service, seventeen of whom were serving in traditionally noncolored posts. One held the rank of ambassador, predictably to Liberia. There were also seven Orientals in the service. Moreover, the department had at least fifteen blacks in positions of high
rank in the Washington office. It was not nearly enough. Indeed, it
was only a beginning, and Montague indicated that he would keep
pushing ahead. ''The cold war and the present Korean war," he contended, "both make it incumbent upon the department to make sure
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that racial issues are not allowed to confuse the basic issues of totalitarianism vs. democracy." 30
Other government agencies, under less pressure from Negro leaders, were less responsive to the spirit of the president's order. Some
indulged in tokenism. In August 1951, for example, the Justice Department added a third black lawyer to its staff of thousands. Others
seemed more concerned. In the fall of 1951 Secretary of Labor Maurice
Tobin reminded the annual convention of the National Council of
Negro Women that the number of black federal employees was approximately 300 percent greater than in 1940. That statistic, however,
might have been less impressive if it had been computed on the basis
of 1945, the end of the war. 31
The president, too, sent in some distinguished nominees, including
a few white liberals, to sensitive positions. Although the NAACP had
petitioned the president to name a Negro to the vacancy on the threeman Board of Commissioners for the District of Columbia, Negroes
were nonetheless pleasantly surprised with the civil-rights performance
of his white appointee, F. Joseph Donohue, who took a forthright stand
against segregation in the District. They applauded, too, when Truman named Governor Luther W. Youngdahl of Minnesota as a judge
of the District Court for the District of Columbia. They had not forgotten the governor's staunch fight to integrate the Minnesota National
Guard and to enact FEPC legislation in his home state. 32
The president also chipped in a few black appointments in 1951.
In September he named Dr. Channing Tobias as an alternate delegate
to the United Nations and Earl W. Beck, former head of the Jackson
County, Missouri, home for Negro children, as recorder of deeds-the
traditional slot for Negroes in the District of Columbia. Truman had
worked with Beck when he was an administrator in Jackson County,
and the appointment of his old colleague seemed to present no problem. The nomination, however, hit a snag when the Senate hearings
revived old charges of Beck's mism;magement of the children's home;
and Beck's feeble testimony only aggravated the problem. Under fire,
Truman refused to withdraw the nomination, and the upshot was a
stinging defeat for the president. Not only did the Senate refuse to confirm Beck's appointment but, more important, Congress subsequently
passed a bill that invested the District commissioners, rather than the
president, with the power to appoint the recorder of deeds. 33
Truman also came under fire for other appointments in 1951.
When he named Robert Ramspeck as chairman of the Civil Service
Commission in March 1951, civil-rights advocates were dismayed. As a

Equal Employment Opportunity

261

former congressman from Georgia, now to be responsible for supervising the operations of the Fair Employment Board, Ramspeck was
suspect, to say the least. Apparently, most critics failed to examine his
credentials. As chairman of the House Civil Service Committee,
Ramspeck had fashioned a reputation for concern with the merit system in federal employment. Indeed, the act of 1940, which provided
for extensive reform of the civil service, not only bore his name but
also included a provision prohibiting discrimination in federal employment. As it turned out, Ramspeck was one of the administration's
happier appointments. 34
Ramspeck might not have become an object of public controversy
had it not been for the appointment of another southerner, Millard F.
Caldwell, Jr., to head another key operation-the administration's
civil-defense program. Lumped together, the appointments suggested
that Truman was pursuing a policy of southern appeasement. As a
former governor of Florida, Caldwell had gone beyond the usual
requirements of southern politics in matters of race relations. He had
consistently championed segregation, to the point of disagreeing emphatically with the Supreme Court's decision outlawing the white primary and of masterminding the southern regional-schooling concept
to circumvent the Supreme Court ruling on jim-crow colleges. 35
At the very least, the appointment of Caldwell was politically
inept, for it sparked the heaviest concentration of fire from civil-rights
advocates of any appointment during the Truman administration.
Nearly every major Negro paper in the country devoted blistering
editorials to the subject. In a manner reminiscent of the early 1960s, it
also prompted worried queries concerning the priorities governing
various bomb shelters. Some wondered if Caldwell would insist upon
segregation, and the Defender warned that "any racial nonsense in a
life and death crisis could create far more trouble than an atomic bomb
dropped by those mad Russians." One critic pointedly noted the absence of any centrally located bomb shelter in Harlem and the ineffectiveness of the warning sirens in the area. 86
Caldwell's appointment also aroused the ire of the NAACP, which
had been in Truman's camp since 1947. On February 21, 1951, the
association dispatched a public letter to the president, in which it conveyed the unanimous vote of the board of directors in favor of dismissing Caldwell. And on February 28, when Walter White and other
black leaders met with the president, White used the occasion to indicate their displeasure over the appointment. In his letter inviting civilrights organizations to a meeting in May, White confessed his distress
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over the administration's apparent desire to appease "discredited
Dixiecrats and other reactionaries." Furthermore, one member of the
NAACP's board of directors resigned from the New York Advisory
Council of Civil Defense to protest the appointment of the "white
supremacy" advocate. 37
Partly because of his appointments and partly because of his refusal to create a Korean War FEPC by executive order, the president
was in the most serious trouble with the disciples of civil rights that
he had been in since 1946, when he had responded with the appointment of his Committee on Civil Rights. The response in 1951 was less
dramatic and less successful, although it eventually stilled some of the
criticism. In March, Caldwell spoke in Philadelphia, where he assured
his audience of the impossibility of constructing "an effective civil
defense on the basis of race, creed, or color.... We must get down to
brass tacks with the folks next door, whoever they are. An A-bomb
does not discriminate." In April he invited the NAACP and the National Urban League to participate in a conference on civil defense.
The NAACP rejected the offer, however, to the dismay of some
Negroes, whose fears about Caldwell were slowly dissipating. President Truman also sought to reassure the black community when he
appointed Mary McLeod Bethune to the civilian-defense council that
advised Caldwell. 38
The storm eventually blew over, but it left in its wake a readiness,
almost an eagerness, to castigate the president on other matters. Black
leaders, for example, contended that the president himself was violating the spirit of 9980 when he neglected to appoint more Negroes to
important positions. When David Niles resigned as the president's
minority adviser in May 1951, the Chicago Defender, "at the risk of
sticking our nose into this situation again," demanded a black appointment. Truman picked Philleo Nash, a white, but an excellent choice.
When Truman appointed a white ambassador to Haiti, blacks complained that no Negro had represented the United States in Haiti since
the administration of William Howard Taft.39
But the most consistent criticism centered on Truman's failure to
appoint more Negroes to prestigious judicial positions, particularly to
vacancies in New York and the District of Columbia. In his column
in the Chicago Defender in June 1951, Walter White summed up all
his grievances concerning various appointments and wondered, in conclusion, "if Mr. Truman has completely forgotten his gratitude in 1948
and if he is going to continue to reward those who fought him and
ignore those who supported him." Others felt similarly betrayed, al-
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though most critics were generally careful not to forget William
Hastie's appointment to the Court of Appeals. 40
In fact, the appointments of Hastie and others in 1949 and 1950
provided a partial explanation of the president's problem in 1951. A
revolution of rising expectations, prompted in part by Truman's response to the needs of American minorities, was threatening to engulf
the administration. Blacks were demanding more of Truman than they
had of any previous president. Their complaints, of course, were legitimate, for there were enough qualified Negro lawyers to fill several
judicial posts. At this point, however, Truman had no credit in his
bank account with the Senate, which had already bounced some of his
white nominees for federal judgeships.
Perhaps the most serious threat, however, to the effectiveness of
9980 and the government's fair employment program stemmed from
another presidential executive order issued in March 1947. As a result
of a rash of charges concerning Communist activity within the federal
government and of the growing estrangement of the United States and
the Soviet Union, Truman had issued Executive Order 9835 on March
21, 1947, which directed the Civil Service Commission to investigate
the loyalty of all employees in the federal establishment. Although the
president and the commission attempted to provide procedures to protect the innocent, the investigations that followed inevitably infringed
upon the civil liberties of countless employees. 41
From the beginning of the loyalty program, black leaders also
feared that it would threaten the civil rights of minority employees of
the government. The president sought to allay these fears, insisting
that the order "was most carefully drawn with the idea in view that the
civil rights of no one would be infringed upon and its administration
will be carried out in that spirit." But Walter White believed otherwise. In a telegram to the president in November 1947, he expressed
the NAACP's regret and surprise over the absence of a Negro lawyer or
scholar on the Civil Service Commission's twenty-man loyalty board.
Quoting from his telegram to Commission Chairman Harry B. Mitchell,
White gave a hint of what was to come when he argued that "prejudiced officials could utilize false charges of disloyalty against minorities
to eliminate them from government employment. This is particularly
true of the Negro minority since some officials regard as 'subversive'
any insistence by a Negro that he be given same rights and opportunities as other citizens."42
Some members of the White House staff were also concerned. "In
connection with civil rights," John L. Thurston observed in 1947, "the
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attitude is widespread within the government that it is dangerous to
have a 'liberal' thought." By April 1949, Stephen J. Spingarn had decided that "the consuming fear of communism has led many sincere
persons into the belief that ... change ( be it civil rights or a compulsory national health program) is subversive and those who urge it are
either Communists or fellow travellers."43
The issue remained submerged during most of the 1948 campaign,
but surfaced on the front page of the Courier shortly before election
day. The Courier revealed that as a result of the loyalty order, numerous Negro postal employees were under investigation, generally because of past and present activities in the field of civil rights. In
particular, one postman in Santa Monica had been suspended because
of his association with some suspect organizations while picketing a
local store that refused to employ Negroes. The NAACP quickly came
to his aid and secured his reinstatement in short order. Others were
less fortunate, and Negroes feared a wholesale purge in the Post Office
Department. And the chairman of the loyalty board, Seth W. Richardson, was less than reassuring when he admitted that prejudiced persons
could institute charges without permitting the accused the protection
of regular court procedures. 44
A pattern of discrimination was soon obvious. Some government
investigators considered that an employee was suspect if he possessed
recordings by Paul Robeson. One interrogator even had the audacity
to ask an employee who was under investigation if she had written a
letter to the Red Cross protesting the segregation of blood. In protesting to the president in November 1948, Walter White expressed his
dismay with the "increasing tendency on the part of government agencies to associate activity on interracial matters with disloyalty." In
particular, he noted that investigators were asking government employees if they associated socially with other races. Moreover, some
Negroes were currently under investigation "because they have actively
opposed segregation and discrimination in their places of employment
or in their communities." White urged the president to appoint a
special committee to restudy the whole loyalty program. 45
Another correspondent put his finger directly on the problem. "If
the F.E.P.C. order for the federal government is to be enforced it will
be necessary for either individual federal employees or their organizations to bring instances of discrimination before the F.E.P.C. Board for
review," he pointed out to the president. "In light of the record established by the loyalty probers, I am afraid that government employees
who will have the temerity of bringing such cases of discrimination

Equal Employment Opportunity

265
... will run the risk of losing their jobs under a 'disloyalty' brand." In
short, if an employee utilized Executive Order 9980 to report evidence
of discrimination, he might automatically become suspect under 9835.
This was particularly possible in the postal department where the
personnel chief also served as fair employment officer and chairman of
the department's loyalty board. 46 It was a tragicomedy. While the
president preached the cause of civil rights in America, the gnomes of
some loyalty boards scurried throughout the bureaucracy equating the
issue with communism.
The evidence of discrimination in the Post Office Department continued to mount in 1949. In January an officer of the all-Negro National Alliance of Postal Employees reported that of the 120 to 135
employees facing disloyalty charges, 66 were Negroes and 43 were
Jews. Congressman Andrew Jacobs had similar figures, and he wrote
to the president in March, asking why 128 of 139 persons suspected of
disloyalty were Negroes or Jews. The president's secretary replied,
quoting extensively from an explanatory memorandum from the head
of the Civil Service Commission, which denied the insinuation of discrimination but did not dispute the figures. There could be no discrimination, the memo maintained, because employee records contained no mention of race. The answer missed the point, for many
Negroes and Jews had once belonged to civil-rights organizations that
were ensconced on the attorney general's list of subversive groups.
Moreover, some names and addresses made it possible to identify people as to their race or religion. 47
No one in the administration seemed to be particularly concerned.
In 1950 Carl Murphy of the Afro-American complained in a letter to
the president that no Negro served on any of the 150 government
loyalty boards, and he requested some black appointments to insure
fair procedure and proper questioning. The White House forwarded
the request to the Civil Service Commission for a response. The chairman of the Loyalty Review Board, Seth Richardson, could see no
reason why a "proper" Negro should not serve on the board, but neither
could he visualize any "particular purpose" in such a move, for "any
element relating to race which creeps into any loyalty hearing is purely
accidental and entirely out of harmony with our procedures and would
stand no chance of survival as the program proceeded." The White
House's response to Murphy, nearly two months after his protest, was
clearly a brush-off and emphasized that the commission, not the president, was responsible for appointments to the loyalty boards. 48
Although Truman subsequently became concerned about possible
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excesses in the loyalty program and about the deteriorating morale of
federal employees, the onslaught of McCarthyism forced the administration into a defensive position. Moreover, no evidence exists of any
presidential concern for the fact that Executive Orders 9835 and 9980
sometimes worked at cross purposes. Indeed, Truman may never have
realized it. During his news conference of March 2, 1950, his response
to a reporter's question concerning a possible conflict revealed his
failure to understand the import of the query. 49
During the Truman years the number of employees actually fired
because of "excessive" zeal on civil rights or because of past or present
membership in suspect civil-rights organizations was miniscule. But
no one will ever know how many resigned under pressure or out of
fear, how many applicants were rejected because of past or present
affiliations, or how many employees refused to report examples of discrimination for fear of a counterinvestigation of their own loyalty.
These intangibles, these fugitive statistics, suggest a much larger and
even less wholesome story.
Although minority-group leaders appreciated the president's appointment of a Fair Employment Board in civil service and although
they found large portions of the loyalty program distasteful, they
never allowed their appreciation or their concern to divert them from
the main goal of securing an FEPC to scrutinize and enforce fair employment practices outside the governmental bureaucracy. A. Philip
Randolph, in particular, continued to agitate for what he considered
the black man's most important goal-economic equality and opportunity in America. With the refusal of Congress to pass FEPC legislation, Randolph, Walter White, and others shifted their attention to
the White House. Although the mass militancy that Randolph had
exploited so effectively in 1940 and 1941 was absent in 1950 and 1951,
the Korean War seemed to provide the necessary leverage. On July 26,
1950, Randolph wired the president, urging that he "issue an Executive Order similar to President Roosevelt's 8802 ... as an integral factor in the mobilization of manpower against North Korean Communist
aggression." As the military situation in Korea deteriorated throughout the summer of 1950, Randolph, White, and Lester Granger sought
to persuade government officials of the necessity for maximum utilization of human resources-which meant the fair employment of minorities in defense industries. 50
On August 10, 1950, as UN forces fought a desperate holding
action in southeastern Korea, black leaders representing a dozen organizations met with Stuart Symington, head of the National Security
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Resources Board, and Secretary of Labor Maurice Tobin to urge a fivepoint defense program, with a presidentially created FEPC at the top
of the list. On August 15 Symington also conferred with Urban League
officials, who advocated similar action. Although Symington agreed
with the necessity for some sort of manpower policy, nothing happened
for over two months, despite Walter White's concerned inquiries. By
mid October, White could only assume that the Korean War and the
approaching congressional elections had something to do with the
delay. 111
Actually, from mid August to mid October 1950, the proposal was
stalled in the Department of Labor. Suddenly, the department came
off dead center, and the last two weeks of October saw a flurry of
activity and a series of meetings with Negro leaders. The result was a
draft of an executive order that took a manpower rather than an FEPC
approach to the problem. The draft was quickly forwarded to the
White House, which was reportedly scheduled to issue or say something on October 30. 52 Again, nothing happened. Perhaps the forthcoming congressional elections had something to do with the White
House decision not to act. It is more plausible that the delay was
connected with the continuing war in Korea. For at that moment UN
forces were streaming across North Korea, following their dramatic
break-out of the Pusan perimeter and their amphibious landing at
Inchon in September; and General MacArthur was soon publicly to
predict an early end to the war. Indeed, he had already privately assured the president of victory during a conference at Wake Island. And
the end of the war would obviate a manpower policy, at least in the
administration's eyes.
Meanwhile officials of the Department of Labor held a conference
on November 29 with Negro leaders, who "rejected" a proposed executive order because it failed to include any centralized administration
or any provision for enforcement. Unhappy with the Labor Department, they planned next to seek an appointment with the president,
although they could not have been overly optimistic at that point.
Once again, however, the misfortunes of war abroad promised to aid
minorities at home, for UN forces in Korea had suffered a drastic reversal as a result of MacArthur's ill-advised rush to the Yalu River in
late November 1950. Chinese troops were now flooding into North
Korea, threatening to drive UN forces completely from the peninsula.
On December 14, as Truman prepared to declare a national emergency, Randolph appealed to him to include an executive order establishing an FEPC in his proclamation. The following day, Truman in-
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formed the American people of the "great danger" to the United States
as a result of the grave tum of events in Korea and announced the
appointment of Charles E. Wilson to head the new Office of Defense
Mobilization. And on December 16 he declared a national emergency,
without, however, mentioning the FEPC. 53
Yet Negroes were hopeful at this point. On December 27, 1950,
faced with the prospect of a longer war and with the incessant pressure
of civil-rights organizations, the Department of Labor forwarded to
the White House a proposed executive order that called for the establishment of a fair employment practices committee with adequate
powers of enforcement. In his covering letter, Secretary of Labor
Tobin observed that "for some time to come the federal government
will be spending billions of dollars for defense purposes. It is unthinkable that the federal government should permit these funds to be
expended without imposing on those favored with government business the obligation to refrain from unsocial discriminatory employment
practices and without providing effective means of enforcing such an
obligation." The National Security Resources Board also submitted its
own version of a "Manpower Resources Board," and predictions of
early White House action quickly appeared in the Negro press. 54
Although encouraged, Walter White, Randolph, and others were
also wary, for they were old hands at dealing with the government and
its various devices of delay. Moreover, they knew that the White
House had referred the Labor proposal, as was customary, to the
Bureau of the Budget for approval and that persistent pressure had to
be continued. Thus, on January 4, 1951, they met with Stuart Symington and Charles Wilson and received the enthusiastic support of both.
Wilson in particular indicated that he would strongly urge issuance
of the executive order immediately. 511 The next stop was the president.
On January 9 White, Randolph, Tobias, and Granger-indeed, the
major Negro leaders of the day-requested an audience to discuss
"certain policies for our government to adopt in this war crisis which
we consider of vast and vital importance to the unity and strength of
our country." But the White House was not receptive and urged a
conference with Mobilization Director Wilson, which Randolph rejected. The White House was developing a case of nerves, however,
and briefly considered a presidential statement to the people explaining that the Budget Bureau was studying several FEPC proposals and
comparing them with existing statutes to determine their legality. 56
Instead, on January 17, 1951, Truman issued a National Manpower Mobilization Policy, which called for "the maximum develop-
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ment and use of our human resources." Among other things, the policy
urged all executive agencies to provide assistance to private industry
in "promoting maximum utilization of the labor force including women,
physically handicapped, older workers, and minority groups" and
promised to invoke government manpower controls to assure success
of the program. But the program was largely voluntary and was even
less satisfactory than an FEPC without enforcement power, for it left
to the discretion of various government agencies how and to what
extent they would encourage employment of minorities. The policy
prompted a question during the president's news conference the following day. Asked if he intended to create an FEPC for war industries,
Truman ducked the question with a piece of irrelevancy; then he
dispatched a follow-up query with a quip, to the delight of the reporters present. 67
But Negroes were neither amused with the attempt at humor nor
mollified with the manpower policy. Several editorials appeared in
the black press, crisply demanding the establishment of an executive
FEPC; and the National Newspaper Publishers Association, meeting
in executive session in Atlanta, made the sentiment unanimous. Moreover, Randolph and other Negro leaders kept insisting upon an audience with the president, but the White House staff kept referring them
elsewhere. 58
The next step in the administration's campaign of conciliation and
circumvention was a series of seven executive orders, issued between
February and October 1951. The first order, appearing on February 2,
authorized the Departments of Defense and Commerce to exercise
their wartime powers in the handling of defense contracts. It also specified: "There shall be no discrimination in any act performed hereunder against any person on the ground of race, creed, color or national origin, and all contracts hereunder shall contain a provision that
the contractor and any subcontractors thereunder shall not so discriminate." Six subsequent orders extended these provisions to an additional nine executive departments and agencies.119
The orders, however, provided neither for adequate enforcement
nor for a committee to oversee the contracts; and thus they were inadequate as means to eliminate discrimination in defense employment.
Moreover, although Roosevelt's FEPC had expired in 1946 as a result
of the Russell amendment, the requirement in his executive order ·of
1943 that all government contracts contain a nondiscrimination clause
remained in effect throughout the Truman period. 60 At best, Truman's
inclusion of a nondiscrimination provision in his executive orders sim-

Quest and Response

270
ply reaffirmed and revitalized the stipulation of 1943 and served as a
gentle reminder to executive agencies to do what had been required
of them since the Second World War. Politically, it seemed to represent a concession to the politics of civil rights and an attempt to divert
pressure and criticism elsewhere.
Predictably, the order of February 2 did not pacify Negro leaders.
Following a conference early in February with Charles Wilson, who
agreed to issue a public statement in favor of a strong FEPC but only
after presidential approval, they renewed their request for an appointment with the president. Reportedly, the buck-passing stopped at the
White House; and by this time, the Negro group was weary from
riding the bureaucratic merry-go-round. The White House finally relented and scheduled the meeting for February 28. Truman's staff prepared carefully for the confrontation, briefing the president on the six
points that they expected the group to present. In response to the
request for an executive order creating an FEPC, the president would
reply that although everyone was demanding such action, only he
seemed aware of the problems with regard to authority and budget.
When the Bureau of the Budget found the answer to various statutory
restrictions, the president would act. As expected, the twelve Negro
leaders submitted the six requests to Truman on February 28, and the
president presumably responded according to plan.61
Although pressure for an FEPC continued to mount, the White
House remained silent and unresponsive. It was painfully clear that
the administration was deliberately stalling. For example, when a
rumor circulated outside the government that Charles Wilson intended
to act shortly on an FEPC, the Bureau of the Budget, which had been
"studying" the executive order for at least a month, inquired of the
White House if the story was authentic. In particular, the people in
the bureau wanted to know if they should "change their signals" or
"continue to study" the Department of Labor's proposed executive
order. The White House quickly phoned the Budget Bureau reporting
"no change of signals.''62
The "signals" clearly called for indefinite delay, but the reasons
for the administration's procrastination were much less obvious. The
ostensible reason was the Russell amendment of 1944, which prevented
the president from expending any funds for an agency that had been
created by executive order and had been in existence for more than
one year, unless Congress specifically authorized or appropriated such
expenditures. The amendment was aimed directly at Roosevelt's FEPC
and had contributed to the committee's demise in 1946. There was, of
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course, no direct prohibition against the establishment of such a committee. The critical problem was how to finance it, and this constituted
one of the administration's greatest concerns. 63
Civil-rights advocates, who had also studied the amendment,
argued that even a strict interpretation of the amendment did not preclude the establishment of a committee for one year, which the president could finance from his emergency fund. Congress, however, kept
a tight rein on the emergency fund and repeatedly slashed presidential
requests, even during the Korean War. More important, the Russell
amendment also stipulated that the one-year provision applied to any
newly created committee that performed a function "substantially the
same or similar" to that of a previously established committee; and
the Department of Labor's proposed executive order would presumably fall into this category. In other words, the proposed committee
apparently had already had its year. Civil-rights advocates also argued
that Congress had not challenged the Fair Employment Board's right
to function or to expend funds, but they had overlooked the fact that
the limited budget of the FEB, financed from the regular operating
funds of the Civil Service Commission, had hobbled the board from
the beginning. 64 The administration could also have retorted that
Congress was much less sensitive to the establishment of fair employment practices in federal civil service than to coercive measures applied
to private employers with government contracts.
Certainly there were problems. When Labor Department representatives met with Negro leaders on November 29, 1950, they carefully explained the restrictions to the delegation; but the recital of
difficulties failed to convince the black attorneys present, who offered
convincing arguments in opposition. Apparently the Negro group converted the Department of Labor, for its proposed executive order sent
to the White House on December 27, 1950, provided for a strong
FEPC, to be financed either from the president's emergency fund or
from appropriations under the Defense Production Act of 1950. But a
presidential assistant, in his analysis of the order-which seemed to
contain a tone of irritation with the Labor Department, perhaps because the heat was now on the White House-professed to see statutory as well as financial problems. 65
The analysis, apparently written by David Niles, was not encouraging, and Negroes soon blamed "Devious Dave" for the "snail's
pace" of the proposed order. They were convinced that an FEPC was
legally and :financially possible because of legislation supplemental to
the Russell amendment of 1944. This was their best argument, for the
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Independent Offices Appropriation Acts of 1945 and 1946 permitted
the establishment of interagency committees without congressional
authorization or approval if they were engaged "in authorized activities of common interest" that required no additional compensation or
appropriation. And it was under the authority of this supplemental
legislation that Truman eventually created his Committee on Government Contract Compliance in December 1951.66
So there was a road around the Russell amendment, but the administration chose not to travel it for almost a year after the Labor
Department had proposed an executive order. Civil-rights advocates
wanted to know why, although they had their own ideas. They were
convinced that the administration was deliberately appeasing Dixiecrats in order to unify the party in preparation for the election of
1952. The appointments of Ramspeck and Caldwell seemed part of
this pattern, as did the president's subordination of the civil-rights
issue in his State of the Union message in 1951. So, too, did restoration
of patronage to the congressional delegation from Mississippi. 67
Yet the "unity" argument as applied to the campaign of 1952 is
not convincing, because Truman subsequently took an even stronger
stance on civil rights in 1952 than he had in 1948. True, the administration sought unity in 1951, but primarily because of the Korean War.
On December 9, 1950, as UN forces were retreating pell-mell down the
peninsula, Under Secretary of State James E. Webb urged the president
to alter his tactics in his civil-rights battles with the South. Noting the
necessity for "national unity in these perilous times," Webb observed
that many southern Democrats expended much of their time and
energy in "defensive operations" against the administration's civilrights program. To enHst southern support during the emergency, he
then suggested that the president adopt a "rattlesnake formula"-which
meant that in matters disagreeable to the South, the president would
not "strike" without warning, thus leaving southern legislators free to
consider other matters of vital national interest. 68
The unity theme was most obvious in the president's annual message to Congress on January 8, 1951. Speaking at a momept when it
was debatable if UN forces in Korea would be able to stem the Red
tide, the president devoted the bulk of his message to the war and the
alleged Soviet threat elsewhere in the world, and his major legislative
requests revolved around the international situation. He closed with a
ringing peroration for unity, requesting everyone to "put our country
ahead of our party, and ahead of our own personal interests." Presumably as part of his own contribution to national unity, he did not spe-
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cifically request the enactment of civil-rights legislation-the first time
he had failed to do so since 1948. Yet in issuing a clarion call to
freedom-loving people everywhere, he could not completely ignore
those who were deprived of it at home. Tucked in near the end of his
address was the entreaty that "we must assure equal rights and equal
opportunities to all our citizens."69
Truman was keenly aware of the problems that he faced in the
winter and spring of 1951, if others were not. In an off-the-record meeting on May 21 with several members of the Americans for Democratic
Action-including Francis Biddle, Joseph L. Rauh, James B. Carey,
Hubert Humphrey, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Reinhold Niebuhr, and
Col. Campbell C. Johnson-the president carefully explained the reasons for the delay in creating an FEPC and promised action at the
earliest possible date. He emphasized that the civil-rights issue was
only part of the liberal program, and that the total program had to
survive the campaign of 1952. It also had to survive 1951, as did those
measures necessary for the war effort; the president was particularly
worried about the pending appropriations and manpower bills. Those
in attendance went away convinced of Truman's continuing commitment to the liberal cause and sympathetic with his political difficulties.
"He has his head in the lion's mouth," Campbell Johnson noted later,
"and this is no time to tickle the lion." 70
Truman's fears were not imaginary, for by May 1951 his program
was in deep trouble with Congress. For one thing, he had requested
authority for temporary reorganization of federal agencies concerned
with the national emergency; but when the bill appeared on the floor
of the House, southerners professed to see an administrative maneuver
to establish an FEPC by executive order. On March 13 Truman suffered his first outstanding legislative defeat of 1951 when the House
rejected the bill. The coalition of southern Democrats with Republicans was at work. Of the 169 votes for the bill, 161 were Democratic,
while 181 Republicans and 46 Democrats, mostly from the South, voted
against it. The same coalition also reduced his request for low-rental
housing from fifty thousand to five thousand units and cut other requests severely.71 Congress was in a vengeful as well as a tight-fisted
mood.
In view of the House vote on executive reorganization, the conservative coalition obviously suspected the president of not operating
according to Webb's "rattlesnake formula"; and some evidence suggests that the administration did plan to strike without warning on an
FEPC. In his 1951 budget message Truman requested an appropria-
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tion of $25 million for his emergency fund to use at his discretion "for
emergencies affecting the national interest, security, or defense which
may arise at home or abroad." The request was a dramatic increase
over the usual $1 million appropriation for the fund, and southerners
suspected that Truman had an executive FEPC in mind. 72
They may have been right. Truman's request for the unusually
large appropriation also included the provision that none of the funds
could be used to finance a function or project for which the administration had submitted a budget request that Congress had subsequently
denied. Interestingly enough, Truman's budget message included an
appeal for congressional establishment of an FEPC, but the budget
itself contained no request for appropriations for such a committee,
although such requests had been included in past budget messages.
Thus, by omitting any request for appropriations for an FEPC, which
Congress would inevitably reject, the president could use his emergency fund to finance the committee. If this was White House strategy, the House on the Hill thwarted it. On May 4 the conservative
coalition shattered any hope of financing a fair employment committee
created by executive order when it slashed the president's request from
$25 million to $1 million. 73
If the administration harbored a secret strategy, it had to be kept
from everyone, including civil-rights advocates. Truman was in a
dilemma, for Negro leaders refused to accept the "unity" argument as
a satisfactory explanation for inaction on an executive FEPC. Throughout the spring and early summer of 1951, the drumfire of criticism and
the application of pressure continued. Telegrams and letters poured
into the White House. Civil-rights organizations pleaded for executive
action, and the Negro press denounced the president in stinging editorials.7~
Through it all, Truman remained publicly imperturbable. In his
news conference on June 21, for example, he simply refused to comment on the matter. The campaign for an executive order peaked on
June 25, 1951, the tenth anniversary of Roosevelt's issuance of 8802 and
the first anniversary of the Korean ·w ar. Truman was reminded of
both when sixteen national civil-rights, labor, and liberal organizations
wired the White House, urging a new FEPC "to assure to every American, regardless of race, religion, or national origin, an equal opportunity to contribute his utmost skills and talents to the production of
the tools and weapons so urgently needed by our armed forces, and to
demonstrate to the peoples of the world that the United States is the
exemplar as well as the exponent of democracy." Governors of seven
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states and mayors of eight cities also proclaimed June 25 as Fair Employment Practices Day.75
It was an impressive outburst of sentiment and unity, but the
president refused to respond. Moreover, the volume and tone of the
protests dropped off in the fall, particularly after Truman vetoed the
bill that would have required segregation of schools for military dependents in southern states. Nonetheless, the administration came off
dead center near the end of October when Truman told Charles
Murphy to draft an order "along the World War II line" so that he
could "issue it as soon as possible." And on December 3, 1951, after
Congress had adjourned and after the Korean w·ar had shown decided
improvement, the president issued Executive Order 10308 from his
vacation home in Key West, Florida. 76
In his covering statement, the president explained that the order
was designed to correct a deficiency in the government's program of
nondiscrimination in defense contracts. Although a clause to that effect was included in each contract, the system lacked uniform regulation and inspection. The order thus invested in each contracting
agency of the federal government the primary authority to secure compliance from the contractors in the private sector. To oversee the operation, the president created the Committee on Government Contract
Compliance, which would "examine and study the compliance procedures now in use and ... recommend to the department and agency
heads changes that will strengthen them." Truman also explained that
"as part of its functions, the committee may confer with interested
persons"-a euphemism which meant that the committee could hold
hearings but lacked the power of the subpoena.77 By investing his new
committee with the cumbersome and inelegant title of "Committee on
Government Contract Compliance," Truman was seeking to avoid not
only the political onus of the letters "FEPC" but also any comparisons
with Roosevelt's committee because of the statutory restrictions of the
Russell amendment.
It took only a glance to reveal the inadequacies of Executive
Order 10308. For one thing, it placed primary responsibility on the
contracting agency, which meant not only a dispersal of responsibility
and authority but also left enforcement to the discretion of federal
officials who may have been less than enthusiastic about the program.
In this respect, the order paralleled 9980 and the operating procedures
of the Fair Employment Board. Similarly, the Committee on Government Contract Compliance ( CGCC) had only advisory and recom-
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mendatory functions. Without the power to issue cease-and-desist
orders, its major contribution would be hortatory and educational.
The scope of the CGCC was also much more restricted than that
of Roosevelt's FEPC. Truman's committee was authorized to deal only
with government contractors and subcontractors, whereas the FEPC
had had powers to examine discrimination in transportation, labor
unions, and other economic activities. Of course, this was not simply
an oversight, for in drafting the new order the administration was extremely careful to avoid anything that might conflict with the Russell
amendment. 78 Caution was clearly necessary, for the CGCC could not
afford to become ensnarled in a legal hassle or placed in political
limbo. From the moment of its creation, the committee was suspectto some because it seemed to promise so little, to others because it
lacked congressional approval and seemed to threaten the sanctity of
private enterprise.
Finally, the CGCC was financially hampered. Its expenses came
from the regular budgets of the five government agencies represented
on the committee, and the public appointees on the CGCC served
without pay. Furthermore, its staff was too small to engage in effective
investigation of complaints. To illustrate the problem, the personnel
of Roosevelt's second FEPC included fifty-six professional people and
sixty-three clerks, in contrast with only six professionals and four clerks
attached to Truman's committee. 711
Yet the CGCC was not completely impotent. It could publicize
instances of discrimination through hearings and press releases. It
could recommend action to Charles Wilson, director of defense mobili~
zation, and, through him, to the president. The committee could also
urge the federal contracting agencies, who held such power, to cancel
contracts with private employers who continued to discriminate against
minority groups on government projects. Unfortunately, no government contracting agency during the Truman administration ever canceled a contract because of failure to observe the nondiscrimination
clause, despite abundant evidence in some cases. In fact, in 1969 the
Courier reported that the government had never revoked a contract
solely on the grounds of racial discrimination. 80
The White House, however, did not conceive of the CGCC as an
idle gesture or as a political pacifier. Impressed with the success of
the Fahy Committe in persuading the military to establish procedures
to end segregation in the armed forces, the administration hoped to
achieve the same result with the CGCC through cooperation and consultation with private employers who held government contracts. This
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expectation, though misplaced, pervaded the White House staff. When
press secretary Joseph Short explained the order to reporters in Key
West, he noted that it should be compared with the executive order
establishing the Fahy Committee, which had "pointed the way toward
ending discrimination in our fighting forces." The hope of similar success in employment was also symbolized in the appointment as chairman of the CGCC of Dwight R. G. Palmer, who had served as a member of the Fahy Committee. In his letter of appointment to Palmer,
the president recalled his "significant contribution" to the Fahy Committee and expressed confidence that "the techniques of close cooperation with the departments that you and your associates worked out
in that earlier committee will provide a sound basis for the new program."81
Given the obvious weaknesses, both internal and external, of the
CGCC, no one could expect unanimous applause from the black community. Actually, the reaction of civil-rights organizations was mixed,
while white southern opinion was uniformly critical. To J. William
Fulbright of Arkansas, the presidential order appeared as a "diversionary movement" to take the public spotlight off the tax-collection scandals, and to Senator Walter F. George, as the opening gun in Truman's
campaign for reelection in 1952. On the other side of the racial spectrum, the strongest criticism came from leaders of the NAACP. Clarence Mitchell of the association's Washington bureau was depressed
because of the order's lack of enforcement power, and Walter White
contended that the administration could have issued a more effective
order. Elmer Henderson of the American Council for Human Rights
was similarly disappointed. 82
Yet there was also impressive support in black editorials, for Truman had surprised many editors who no longer expected or demanded
executive action. The Courier, for example, saw it only as "half-a-loaf
FEPC" but the best Truman "could do under the circumstances." The
Afro-American, although it also desired a stronger committee, argued
that Truman had "again demonstrated the courage and steadfastness
of purpose which will characterize his place in history." Even Lester
Granger, who seldom overlooked an opportunity to criticize tl1e president, found much to applaud in the CGCC. Undismayed by the committee's lack of enforcement power, he contended that the "negotiative
and consultative process . . . can often yield more important results
than ... legislative or judicial fiats." 83 Perhaps he, too, was speaking
with the authority of his experience on the Fahy Committee.
Even those who were most disappointed with the order, however,
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were willing to concede the possibility of accomplishment if the president appointed the right people to the CGCC. Here, the administration indicated its seriousness of purpose. The committee consisted of
ten members, four of whom were ex officio representatives of the Departments of Defense and Labor, the Atomic Energy Commission, the
General Services Administration, and the Defense Materials Procurement Agency. In addition to Palmer as chairman, the president also
appointed James B. Carey of the CIO; Irving M. Engel of the American Jewish Committee; George Meany of the AFL, who soon resigned
because of the pressure of time and was succeeded by Boris Shishkin;
Oliver W. Hill, a Negro attorney and former member of the Richmond
City Council; and Dowdal H. Davis, general manager of the Kansas
City Call. 84 Thus, the six working members of the committee included
two Negroes and two Jews, though, typically, an Anglo-Saxon chaired
the committee.
Despite the caliber of its membership, no one was inspired with
the first six months of the committee's operation. In June 1952 Clarence Mitchell accused the CGCC of taking no "concrete action on discrimination in employment" and submitted various recommendations
to expedite matters. And in fact, the committee seemed to be moving
with glacial speed. It did not hold its first meeting until February 19,
1952, at which time Palmer emphasized the advisability of not issuing
any press releases and of avoiding all publicity until the committee
had gathered extensive data. That decision meant that the CGCC
would not use the power of public exposure to prompt conformance
with the nondiscrimination clause. Although the committee examined
a few complaints of discrimination in the spring, it was not until April
that an executive secretary was appointed. And not until November
did the committee finally decide upon what size contracts should be to
contain nondiscrimination clauses.85 This seemingly leisurely pace inevitably created the impression of indifference and inactivity.
Actually, the committee clearly understood its function and what
it could hope to achieve. Restricted both in authority and by time as to
what it could accomplish during the last year of the Truman administration, the CGCC concentrated on the future, attempting to ensure a
stronger program through a number of recommendations based on a
thorough study of the entire contract process. As far as private contractors were concerned, the CGCC "found the nondiscrimination provision almost forgotten, dead and buried under thousands of words of
standard legal and technical language in government procurement
contracts." Although the committee reported that some employers had
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attempted to fulfill the spirit of the nondiscrimination clause, most
saw it "as just another contractual clause of relatively minor importance
and have made little, if any, attempt to adhere to its standards."86
Nor did the government contracting agencies have anything to
boast about, for they were partly responsible for the indifference of
private contractors. In the course of its year in operation, the CGCC
studied the contract and compliance procedures of twenty-eight government agencies and found only two that had made any real effort to
determine the extent of compliance. Admittedly, the problem in part
was one of inadequate staffing and financing. It was also one of indifference and opposition, for the committee discovered three federal
agencies that failed to include nondiscrimination clauses in their contracts, which was in direct violation of all executive orders. That
"neglect" was quickly corrected. Moreover, after consultation with
representatives of the Office of Defense Mobilization, the Bureau of
Employment Security, the Bureau of Apprenticeship, the Maritime Administration, the Office of Education, and the Veterans Administraton, the committee confessed only "a meager degree of success in its
attempts to persuade these key agencies to establish the principle of
equal employment opportunity as one of the basic operating criteria of
their programs." The Office of Defense Mobilization, however, finally
promised to include a strong statement against discrimination in its
regular policy directives. But the District of Columbia balked, refusing
even to include the nondiscrimination clause in contracts, because it
claimed to operate under the legislative branch of the government
where presidential executive orders had no authority. 87
Throughout the year the committee also held discussions with official representatives of the twelve states and several cities that had fair
employment commissions, discussions that again illuminated the fact
that discrimination respected no geographical, industrial, or ideological
boundaries. Various members made spot checks across the country,
including a visit to Texas to assess the extent of discrimination against
Mexican-Americans. Yet the CGCC, as was true of other agencies and
organizations involved in attempts to establish equal employment opportunities, concentrated primarily on discrimination against Negroes,
for that was where most of the pressure, the numbers, and the problems existed. Seeking advice and information, CGCC members also
contacted experts in various universities and municipal commissions
and took testimony from several civil-rights organizations. 88
Discrimination was everywhere, particularly against black Americans, and the statistics told only a small part of the story. From Feb-
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ruary to December 1952, the CGCC received only 318 complaints, but
that was considerably more than the total of 40 received by the government contracting agencies. The committee could only conclude that
most workers knew nothing of the nondiscrimination clause or of the
procedures for registering grievances and that most contracting federal
agencies lacked uniform machinery for handling complaints. The
CGCC could not doubt the existence of widespread discrimination
after a few of its own investigations. A survey of three industrial plants
in West Virginia, for example, revealed only 130 Negroes employed in
a work force of 12,000, and most of the 130 were custodial workers. 89
The Committee on Government Contract Compliance was active,
it was concerned, and it did persuade and press some employers to
adopt more enlightened hiring policies. The very existence of the
committee automatically prompted some compliance. And there were
impressive gains in minority employment during this period, which
stemmed, however, from influences in addition to the administration's
fair employment policies. Certainly the increased need for civilian and
military manpower during the Korean War and the incessant pressure
of civil-rights organizations played prominent roles in dropping the
unemployment rate of black Americans in 1951 and 1952. In fact, not
until 1969-during another war-would the rate again be as low. 90
Yet the major contribution of Truman's Committee on Government
Contract Compliance rested primarily on whatever influence it might
exert on the future. This the committee realized from the beginning
of its operations, and it designed its final recommendations for the
benefit of the next administration.
In its report to the president on January 16, 1953, the CGCC presented twenty-two recommendations for action on the part of federal
executive agencies, Congress, local governmental units, private employers, and labor unions. Although the Eisenhower administration
implemented some of the committee's suggestions, others seemed consigned permanently to limbo. Of greater significance was the simple
fact that Truman's establishment of the CGCC made it impossible for
subsequent administrations to ignore the necessity for similar programs. In August 1953 Eisenhower created the President's Committee
on Government Contracts, which the Kennedy administration in turn
replaced with the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity.91
Truman's CGCC thus ensured the continuation of a government
fair employment program, but it could guarantee nothing else, least of
all any improvement. In 1961 the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
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reported that employment patterns of government and nongovernment
contractors alike generally reflected the racial mores of the local community or region. 92 Thus, while minority groups benefited from fair
employment in federal civil service and from increased opportunity in
the armed services, they continued to suffer from discrimination in the
private sector of the economy. In 1969, for example, the Department
of Defense awarded contracts to several southern firms, despite evidence that they practiced discrimination and despite reservations on
the part of the government's Office of Federal Contract Compliance. 93
The persistence of discrimination on the part of employers and
labor unions and the continued indifference of some government agencies throughout the 1950s and 1960s thus provide the perspective by
which to judge the actions of the Truman administration. As a result
of Truman's Fair Employment Board and the Committee on Government Contract Compliance, fair employment policy became a permanent part of the federal system. Unfortunately, the government has yet
to translate that policy into consistent and meaningful fair employment
practices.

13

DEFEAT IN CONGRESS

''Vote Republican, Nov. 7, and End Truman Double-Talk" went
the punch line of a Republican campaign tract in October 1950. Prepared by Val Washington, Negro assistant to the chairman of the Republican National Committee, the pamphlet represented the party's
major effort to capture Negro votes in the congressional elections of
November 1950. Entitled Civil Rights Double-Talk-The Egg That
Truman Laid, the leaflet made a few telling points as well as the usual
campaign distortions in indicting the president and the Democratic
Congress for inaction on racial discrimination in America. 1
Although Val Washington may have believed that he had scored
significantly by recounting certain select senatorial votes, particularly
those on cloture, Walter White was nearer the mark in his column in
the Chicago Defender. White argued that the key vote on civil rights
in the Eighty-first Congress concerned the Barkley ruling, which would
have permitted the application of cloture to a motion as well as to the
measure itself. Moreover, the defeat of the Barkley ruling led directly
to the adoption of the Wherry-Hayden "compromise," which made
cloture even more difficult. On these votes, the Republican record was
shaky at best. Although White endorsed neither party, his resurrection
of the Barkley vote was primarily a criticism of the Republican-Dixiecrat coalition that had stymied so much progressive legislation. 2
In truth, the Republican party was hard pressed to find strong
black support anywhere in the country. For the first time in memory,
the Call endorsed Democratic candidates so as to provide President
Truman with a working majority in both houses of Congress. The
Chicago Defender indicted the "coalition of tory Republicans and
Dixiecrats," who "succeeded in gagging and diverting every serious
282
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attempt to match the promises with performances." It seemed to the
Defender that "President Truman has been unyielding in his demand
for action on civil rights and we should elect a Congress that will support his program." And the president gave indications that he would
continue the fight. Although Truman followed the customary presidential practice of not compaigning for Democratic candidates in an
off-year election, he did deliver one highly partisan speech in St. Louis
in which he pledged his party to renewed efforts for better education
and health "for all our citizens, without discrimination on account of
race, creed, or color.''3 It was that kind of commitment that prompted
many black Americans to remain with Truman throughout 1950.
On the eve of election day, an Associated Negro Press (ANP) poll
predicted widespread black support for Democratic candidates. 4 There
were good reasons, both historical and contemporary, for such loyalty
to the Democratic party. Senator Joseph R. McCarthy's campaign
against communism in the government may have persuaded some independent white voters to support Republican candidates; but Negroes
were more concerned with "bread and butter" legislation, which the
Democratic party had championed since 1933. Moreover, although
Congress had not enacted any of the major presidential requests for
civil-rights legislation, Truman himself had come through with several
significant appointments and with two key executive orders, one of
which at that moment was leading to integration of the military in
I{orea. His appointees in the Department of Justice had also filed amicus curiae briefs in several significant court cases between 1948 and
1950.
The congressional elections of 1950 fulfilled the ANP forecast, if
not the hopes of civil-rights organizations for additional friends in
Congress. An analysis of the black vote in ten northern cities revealed
continued support for all Democratic candidates, except in Baltimore,
where Senator Millard Tydings won only 23 percent of the Negro vote
in contrast with Truman's 54 percent in 1948. The combination of the
Maryland senator's poor record on civil rights and Senator McCarthy's
vicious campaign against him all but made Tydings's reelection impossible.5
To most black Americans, however, Senator Tydings's defeat was
one of the few happy results of the congressional elections. In a record
turnout for an off-year election, the American voters increased GOP
membership by twerity-seven in the House and by five in the Senate.
Although the Democratic party still held a paper majority in both
houses, the senatorial margin of two members was the smallest since

Quest and Response

284

the period 1931-1933. In the House, the voters whittled Democratic
strength to 235. Of equal importance, the elections also resulted in
defeats for some who had usually supported civil rights. In the Senate,
the Democrats lost both of their leaders when Congressman Everett
Dirksen defeated Majority Leader Scott Lucas, and James H. Duff
retired Majority Whip Francis Myers. 6
The postmortems were painful. Although Lucas had never inspired the black community, the Afro-American feared that his defeat
would result in the selection of Georgia's Richard Russell as the new
majority leader; the editor also growled about the increased strength
of the conservative coalition. The Journal and Guide was even more
depressed, noting that "Republicans, siding with southern Democrats,
can keep civil rights legislation from leaving committee or defeating it
unmercifully on the .floor." The Chicago Defender, however, professed
to see light amidst the gloom of the election returns. "Some of the
stalwarts of the Truman administration bit the dust but the Democrats
still control both houses of the Congress," the editor rationalized. He
also took a close look at local elections around the country and noted
happily that "there were more Negroes elected to public offices
throughout the nation than at any time in our memory."7
The pessimism following the November elections was justilled, for
the Eighty-second Congress got off to a poor start on January 3, 1951,
the opening day of the first session. In the House of Representatives,
the Republican-Dixiecrat coalition succeeded in repealing the "twentyone-day rule" and in restoring the power of the Rules Committee to
control the .flow of proposed legislation. By a final vote of 244 to 179,
the coalition rebuffed the administration's forces and demonstrated beyond doubt where power resided in the new House. Of the 244 votes
in favor of the Rules Committee, 152 were by Republicans and 92 by
Democrats, mostly from the South. The government could muster only
136 Democrats, 42 Republicans, and one Independent. Although the
administration could still utilize the petition method or the "Calendar
Wednesday" approach to by-pass the Rules Committee, the loss of the
twenty-one-day rule was critical. Since its adoption in 1949, the rule
was invoked eight times to circumvent the Rules Committee and get
bills on the .floor, most of which were "must'' measures of the administration. The proposals for Hawaiian and Alaskan statehood and the
bill to outlaw the poll tax, which passed the House during the Eightyfirst Congress, were in this category. As the New York Times editorialized, it was "A Bad Beginning."8
Matters were no better in the Senate on opening day, when Demo-
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crats were scheduled to elect a majority leader and a whip to replace
Lucas and Myers. Earlier, when asked if he had any preferences,
Truman said no; that was the Senate's decision. Truman's refusal to
become involved was the only realistic course open to him. Given the
conservative coloration of the Senate, the choice of a majority leader
was probably not vital. Nonetheless, it was a bitter moment when
Senate Democrats named Ernest W. McFarland of Arizona and Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas as majority leader and whip, respectively.
Both had consistently opposed civil-rights legislation, and both had
bolted in 1949 and voted against the Barkley ruling.9
Civil-rights advocates were never enamored with Lucas and
Myers, but the combination of McFarland and Johnson was altogether
distasteful. The NAACP reacted quickly and denounced both as foes
of civil-rights legislation. The Afro-American saw them as part of the
"unholy alliance" in control of both houses of Congress. The Chicago
Defender had explained away the results of the congressional elections
of 1950, but it could not ignore the action of the Republican-Dixiecrat
coalition in the House in restoring the power of the Rules Committee
and the action of Senate Democrats in the selection of McFarland and
Johnson. These two developments, the editor now confessed, "may
very well destroy the fair deal program of the administration and particularly the civil rights measures." It was Congressman Powell, however, who expressed publicly what most muttered about privately.
"There will be no civil rights in this session of Congress," he announced
flatly in an article in the Amsterdam News. "They will not even be
considered. There will be no progressive nor liberal legislation enacted. As far as homefront democracy is concerned, the 82nd Congress
is not even interested."10
The developments in both houses inevitably came up in the president's news conference the following day. With reference to the restored power of the Rules Committee, Truman could say only that
Congress made its own rules and that the administration would proceed in the normal manner with its legislative requests. In response to
a question concerning his opinion of McFarland and Johnson, he replied that he was "very fond" of McFarland, to whom he had already
sent a congratulatory letter, and that Johnson was also a friend.11 Even
had he preferred other leadership, he had no choice but to sound
pleased with the results.
Faced with a more conservative Congress, with a perilous situation in Korea, and with the need for war appropriations, Truman chose
not to indulge in a mock battle over civil-rights legislation. In his State
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of the Union message on January 8, 1951, he stressed the theme of
unity and mentioned civil rights only in passing, without specifically
urging the enactment of any legislation. In his news conference of
January 11, a reporter observed, "Some people are assuming that civil
rights has been put aside for a while?" Given the phraseology of the
question and the expectations of civil-rights organizations, Truman had
no alternative but to answer no, though, significantly, he did not elaborate on his answer. 12
He had more to say in his budget message on January 15. The
Korean situation demanded wise utilization of all available manpower
resources, he argued, and the nation could not afford to discriminate
against minority groups. "Following the federal experience with a
Committee on Fair Employment Practice in World War II," he continued, "eight states and a number of cities have established successful
regulatory commissions to deal with employment practices. I again
recommend that the Congress enact legislation to establish a Federal
Fair Employment Practice Commission to prevent discrimination in
interstate industries."13
That was the extent of it, and Negroes were not overjoyed. The
Journal and Guide, for example, called attention to the presidential
statement giving priority to defense measures and to his omission of
any demand for civil-rights legislation. But the paper understood some
of the realities facing the president and the country. "More than any
other president," the editor maintained, Truman had "courageously"
demanded action on equal-justice legislation, "but he is a good enough
politician and ex-soldier to know when to 'retire to previously prepared
positions.' That is exactly what has been done. He has retired from the
conflict over citizenship equality." The editor concluded that Truman
might be an adroit politician, "but in the eyes of true believers in freedom, he has circumscribed his stature as a statesman by abandoning a
program he once gave top priority to himself.''14
Although everything in 1951 seemed to conspire against enactment of equal-justice legislation, civil-rights organizations went
through the traditional motions of raising a ruckus. Once again, they
gave top priority to revision of the Senate's cloture rule and passage of
an FEPC. As the Afro-American explained, the fear of economic lynching had replaced the old terror of physical lynching as the "real enemy"
of black Americans. Indeed, the editor gave the FEPC priority over
everything else, including the current contests in courts across the
country to break segregation in education, primarily "because educa-
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tion will serve of little purpose if all the doors of opportunity to use
that training remain closed."15
The legislative priorities of civil-rights organizations accurately
reflected the emerging economic and social patterns of American Negroes. Physical lynching of blacks was primarily a rural, southern preoccupation and had dropped significantly in the postwar years. Moreover, as a result of black migration to northern and western cities, economic opportunity in industry was now the foremost need. By 1951
only a handful of northern Negro leaders believed that an FEPC was
not the most pressing issue, although some argued that for political
reasons it should be used primarily as a club to force other-less controversial-civil-rights measures through Congress. Congressman William Dawson was in the latter category, and this probably explained
why the NAACP began looking to Adam Clayton Powell to lead the
fight in the House. 16
Congress went through the motions of considering civil-rights legislation in 1951, but so desultorily as to irritate nearly everyone. Although the usual bills were dropped in the hopper, including two
Senate and seven House bills for an FEPC, nothing reached the floor
of Congress during the first session. In fact, Senator Humphrey and
eight of his liberal colleagues did not introduce their FEPC proposal
until June 25, which testified eloquently to their own lack of optimism.
The leisurely pace of Congress and the priorities of the president
prompted the Defender to print a scorching editorial warning Democrats that the Negro vote was the captive of neither party. "The civil
rights program of the administration has been hidden so well in Washington that Sherlock Holmes couldn't find it," the editorial continued.
"The emergency has been used as a smokescreen to evade the issue."
After a few choice criticisms of Congress and the president, the editor
concluded that "the record of the Democrats is not inspiring although
we must confess that the current Republican leadership gives us the
creeps." Some papers did not bother to comment, concentrating instead on the need to increase integration of public and private facilities
across the country.17
Of course, passage of an FEPC required revision of the senatorial
rule on cloture, and the Senate did take a half-step in this direction.
During the first session, four proposals for revision were introduced,
and the Senate Rules Committee agreed to hold hearings. Although
Senator Wherry believed that the Wherry-Hayden compromise of 1949
was workable if Democrats would get out their votes, he was willing to consider revision to permit a working majority to invoke cloture.
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But the leaders of both parties were unwilling to make an issue of it.
In October the Senate Rules Committee heard the testimony of representatives of the usual organizations-including the NAACP, the
ACLU, the CIO, ADA, the American Council on Human Rights, the
American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish Congress, and
others-but the committee failed to report any of the proposals to the
floor. Moreover, Senator McFarland flatly refused to hold the Senate
in session until it had considered civil rights. 18 The best Congress
could do positively for black Americans in 1951 was to pass a bill in
September authorizing the coinage of fifty-cent pieces "to commemorate the lives and perpetuate the ideals and teachings of Booker T.
Washington and George Washington Carver." Given the pressing
needs of black America, the bill was only an insult. 19
Confronted with an unresponsive Congress, the civil-rights coalition began to crumble in 1951. In April, Walter White had issued a
call to fifty national church, fraternal, labor, civic, and minority-group
organizations to participate in a civil-rights conference in Washington
on May 22 and 23. As a build-up to the conference, White issued several statements critical of the president and Congress, arguing that the
president was stalling on administrative action and that Congress was
engaged in "a wilful sit-down strike against civil-rights."20
Yet when the conference convened on May 22, only sixty-seven
delegates representing thirty-one organizations were present. It was a
far cry from the conference of January 1950. In his opening remarks,
Walter White tried to make up in spirit for what the meeting lacked in
numbers, and his criticisms of the president were the sharpest of his
career. The conference concentrated primarily on the enactment of
legislation, and its three "demands" included revision of the Senate's
cloture rule, passage of an FEPC, and legislation to protect servicemen
from assault by civilians. Yet most politicians cast only a passing
glance at the conference; no one seemed intimidated. 21
Part of the problem stemmed from past success. For example, as
Japanese-Americans readjusted successfully to American society, aided
by the government's payments of wartime claims, they began to inch
away from their earlier commitment to the coalition. As overt antiSemitism decreased and as the problems of the new state of Israel
increasingly attracted Jewish attention in America, the traditional
Jewish organizations seemed less militant about civil-rights legislation.
Moreover, the restoration of the power of the House Rules Committee
in January 1951 had a discouraging influence on the American Jewish
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Committee, whose report of legislative inaction in 1951 sounded almost
like an epitaph.22
Finally, there was no mass militancy anywhere, and without it,
intimidation was virtually impossible. In 1941 A. Philip Randolph
could point to spontaneous, grass-roots uprisings in the black . community everywhere outside the South as evidence that Negroes would
no longer tolerate discrimination in defense industries. Although some
feared that the masses had grown soft and complacent, others observed
that the employment situation in 1951 represented a dramatic improve~
ment over that of 1941, not only because of the Korean War but also
because of the fair employment laws and ordinances in several states
and cities and because of a more tolerant attitude generally. The fact
that no Negro leader seriously considered a mass march or demonstration in 1951 was persuasive evidence that such strategy would probably
have backfired. The only threat that seemed to carry any political
weight was the Negro vote of 1952; but the growing evidence that
Senator Taft, never a favorite of minority groups, would be the Republican nominee in 1952 allowed many Democratic politicians to
ignore it. Thus, neither the president nor the Eighty-second Congress
had much to worry about in the way of reprisals. 23
Yet any verdict on the first session would be incomplete without
mentioning what it prevented, for the session consisted primarily of a
holding action on civil rights. For example, as the military became
increasingly integrated in Korea in 1950 and 1951, southerners in the
House backed the Winstead amendment to permit draftees the choice
of refusing to serve in integrated units. The House, however, rejected
Winstead's contention that integration would lead to race riots and
knocked his proposal out of the selective-service bill by a vote of 178
to 126.24
Southerners also feared integration of Veterans Administration
hospitals in the South, and Congressmen John D. Rankfo of Mississippi
sought to head it off when he sponsored legislation to construct an allNegro hospital in honor of Booker T. Washington in Franklin County,
Virginia. Opposed on the floor by Congressmen Dawson and Powell
and by messages from the NAACP and the Veterans Administration,
the bill lost by the comfortable margin of 223 to 117. The defeat was
all the more noteworthy because of the fact that identical bills had
passed the House during the Eightieth and Eighty-first Congresses,
only to die in the Senate.25
But Congress missed on one count. On November 2, 1951, Truman
vetoed a bill that would have required the federal government to oper-
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ate schools for military dependents in conformance with the laws of the
state in which the facilities were located. The intent of the bill was
clear, for it would have meant resegregation of four military schools in
the South and no possibility of integrating such institutions in the
future. "Step by step we are discarding old discriminations; we must
not adopt new ones," the president explained in his veto message. Inexplicably, congressional liberals had raised no serious, concerted objections to the measure; and the Chicago Defender, for one, wanted to
know the whereabouts of Humphrey, Lehman, Douglas, Aileen, Taft,
Morse, and Ives when the bill went through the senatorial committee
on which they served.26
The bill itself was only of passing importance; but Truman's veto
had a much larger meaning, which was evident in the unrestrained
chorus of Negro approval. The demand for an executive FEPC and
for equal-justice legislation had diminished appreciably in the fall of
1951; and the civil-rights coalition, then in the process of coming apart,
was apparently about to concede defeat. Truman's veto revived hope
everywhere and symbolized everything that had been sought and
achieved over the past decade. The 1952 Negro Year Book put it in a
capsule: "President Truman's veto message is unprecedented in this
generation."27
On October 20, 1951, the last day of the first session, Truman did
something that was unprecedented in American history when he announced the appointment of Gen. Mark W. Clark as the first United
States ambassador to the Vatican. Roosevelt had taken the initial step
in 1939 when he appointed Myron C. Taylor, without Senate approval,
as his personal representative to the Pope. Despite protests from several Protestant churches and clergymen, Taylor had remained on until
January 1950, when he submitted his resignation to Truman. The Vatican let it be known that it would be delighted with the appointment of
an ambassador but would frown upon another personal representative.
Most major Protestant organizations, however, were opposed to either
course and deluged the White House with appeals not to replace
Taylor. Even a Sunday-school class of the First Baptist Church of
Washington, D.C., which Truman attended, submitted a petition to the
president. Pastor Edward H. Pruden was embarrassed about it, but
Truman urged him not to worry, for "it is simply a part of the duty of
the presidential office to listen to everybody's viewpoint."28
But Pruden was also opposed to any representation at the Vatican,
and he urged Truman to meet with a large Protestant delegation to
hear their point of view. Noting the strong opposition from American
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Protestants, black and white, liberal and conservative, Pruden declared
that he knew "of no matter on which there has been such unanimity of
feeling among Protestants of every shade and variety . . . and . . . a
large section of the Jewish community has also expressed itself . . . as
being strongly opposed to Vatican representation."29
The prospect of an ambassadorial successor to Taylor thus brought
to the surface the fears of many Protestants and Jews about the political nature of the Vatican and the principle of separation of church and
state in America. It also provided bigots with another issue that they
could use in berating the Truman administration, which had been subjected for some time to irrational accusations of selling out to the
Pope. 30
Truman waited until the storm subsided, then announced Clark's
appointment as ambassador on October 20, 1951. Presumably to lessen
opposition, Press Secretary Joseph Short released a statement explaining the appointment on the grounds of "diplomacy and humanitarianism." "It is well known that the Vatican is vigorously engaged in the
struggle against communism," the statement expounded. "Direct diplomatic relations will assist in coordinating the effort to combat the Communist menace." If that was the president's purpose, he might well
have heeded an idea of members of the White House staff, who had
suggested a roving ambassador to represent the president at the seats
of all major religions around the Soviet periphery. During his news
conference on October 25, Truman testily noted that the proposed
nomination in no way conflicted with the principle of separation of
church and state. Although he stated that the appointment had not
created as much "hullabaloo" as he had expected, protests poured
into the White House and the State Department. Within ten days of
the announcement, the former had received five thousand letters and
telegrams and the latter around ten thousand, most of them opposed. 31
No appointment during the Truman years aroused as much general
opposition.
The affair also threatened to damage his already deteriorating relations with Congress. Senator Tom Connally, who would handle the
appointment as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, announced his personal opposition to Clark because of his strategy in the
Italian campaign during the Second World War; the Texas senator was
particularly distressed about the high rate of casualties suffered by a
Texas division in that campaign, which to him revealed Clark's unfitness for high office. Connally promised to pigeonhole the nomination
permanently, if and when the president submitted it to the Senate.
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Truman did not offer Clark a recess appointment, because that would
have required the general to retire from the army, so the appointment
was held over for the second session in January. But the continued
protests, including the threat of a Protestant march on Washington,
prompted Clark to withdraw his name on January 13, 1952, and
prompted Truman to back off during the remainder of his administration.32
Opposition to an ambassador to the Vatican was not the only backlash of 1951 and 1952. More serious as far as racial and religious tolerance were concerned, for the present as well as the future, was the
fresh outbreak of white "Christian" violence against Negroes and Jews.
In October 1951 the Anti-Defamation League reported the results of
several polls that showed a significant decline in racial and religious
bias. From a wartime peak of prejudice in 1945, the League reported
a "dramatic" drop of 40 percent by 1950 and 1951. Moreover, despite
the tense situation internationally, "scapegoating of the minority groups
seems to have considerably lessened."33 The report may have been
valid for the country as a whole, but the steady pressure for integration in the postwar period and Truman's insistence on equal justice for
everyone was difficult for many whites to accept. In 1951 their inability to adjust to the alterations in traditional racial patterns emerged,
sometimes in childish behavior, at other times in ugly manifestations
of racism. Some luxuriated in the symbols of a bygone era, while
others seized upon extralegal means to preserve the status quo.
The most widely used symbol of protest by 1951 was the Confederate flag. An owner of a flag company in Virginia reported that there
were IIlOre Confederate flags in that state in 1951 than during the Civil
War. In September the largest flag company in the world, located in
New York City, revealed that it was unable to meet the demand for
Confederate flags, which exceeded that for Old Glory. From the
nation's capital came a similar report. In Fordyce, Arkansas, highschool students donned Confederate hats, flew rebel flags, and marched
to "Dixie," while using Confederate money as legal tender at the school
store. The New Yorker magazine carried one advertisement that urged
its readers to purchase the Stars and Bars to "show where you stand."
The annual convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars became acrimonious when southern delegates insisted upon placing the Confederate emblem over the American flag. 34
Although initially disposed to attribute such behavior to retarded
adolescents, Negro leadership began to take it seriously, especially
when the rebel flag cropped up consistently on military vehicles. In
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September the Courier reported that in one army convoy that was returning from "Exercise Southern Pine" over half of the vehicles were
flying the flag. Again, according to "reliable sources," the paper revealed that Negro paratroopers stationed in North Carolina refused to
jump from a plane with a rebel flag painted on its nose. Apparently,
the stories contained more than a grain of truth, for in October the
Defender commented on an air-force warning to all commands that
display of the Confederate flag was a violation of military regulations.
Walter White, too, pointed out that there was widespread display of
the flag in military units in Germany, Japan, and Korea. 35
Although the flag fetish was physically innocuous, it had serious
psychological and political implications, which the Negro press sought
to comprehend. The Defender saw the flag fad generally as "rebel
nonsense," but the paper feared that it might lead to racial violence.
The Courier asked: "Is the revival of the Confederate flag a harmless
'mystical fad,' a reaffirmation of the dogma of the old and defeated
South, or is it symbolic of a growing resentment of Trumanism? That's
a top question today."36 Undoubtedly, various factors · were involved,
and "Trumanism" was clearly one of them. In the late summer and fall
of 1951 a flood of newspaper articles commented on the political storm
brewing in the South. Truman was the issue, partly because of his
stand on civil rights and partly because of the supposed socialistic
trend of his administration; and southerners were threatening to secede
from the Democratic party unless the president stepped down in 1952.37
The flag fad was at least a peaceful protest, but other manifestations of a white backlash were not. The thrust of the Truman administration since the Shelley case of 1948 toward further integration in
public and private housing brought to the surface all of the economic
fears and social prejudices of lower-class whites. In July 1951, as a
Negro couple prepared to occupy an apartment in all-white Cicero,
Illinois, a mob of four thousand to six thousand whites broke through
a National Guard barricade and set the building afire. Called out by
Governor Adlai Stevenson in anticipation of trouble, the guardsmen
eventually restored order, but not before twenty-three soldiers, policemen, and rioting whites had been injured. No Negroes were involved,
and not until the 1960s would they respond in kind. 38
The riot in Cicero received worldwide attention. Visiting in Singapore, Governor Dewey was irritated to discover that "an incident of
racial prejudice involving a few hundred people ... is front page news
in Singapore and elsewhere, and is considered worthy of a four-column
photograph on the front page." But Cicero was more than an isolated
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incident or a passing phenomenon. After the riot, the Associated Negro
Press noted that the population of Cicero was generally first- and
second-generation Bohemian, of whom about 80 percent were Catholic.
The ANP also observed that some of the recent violence in and about
Chicago had occurred in Catholic areas, much to the distress of the
local Catholic clergy and leading Catholic laymen. 89 Cicero thus became the prototype of an increasingly familiar story of a minority
group whose time had arrived pitted against another whose time was
yet to come. The oppressed of the past had become the oppressor of
the present.
A Cook County grand jury subsequently indicted those who had
aided the black couple in renting the apartment, accusing them, among
other things, of "conspiracy to injure property ... by causing a depreciation in the real estate market by renting to Negroes." The day after
the indictment, the Department of Justice intervened and impaneled a
federal grand jury, which eventually indicted and convicted three
policemen, including Cicero's chief of police, for violating the civil
rights of the couple. The chief had threatened the couple when they
attempted to occupy the apartment, and then had denied them police
protection when whites had threatened to riot. Truman later publicly
praised his officials for preventing "a gross miscarriage of justice."40
Although undoubtedly the most flagrant illustration of white violence in 1951, Cicero was also a harbinger of other extralegal action,
particularly the use of bombs to intimidate various minorities. In
Dallas, a series of bombings of Negro homes prompted the president of
the city's Council of Negro Organizations to announce that the city
faced its most crucial moment. In Miami, minorities suffered a "reign
of terror" as bigots bombed Jewish synagogues and a Negro housing
project. In California, simultaneous time bombs destroyed the three
homes of a Negro, a Jew, and a Mexican-American.41
Tragedy had to happen. On Christmas Day 1951 the bombing of a
Negro home in Mims, Florida, took the lives of Harry T. Moore and his
wife. A school principal in Brevard County, Moore had long been on
the firing line of civil rights, which made him a "marked man," as the
NAACP later put it. In the postwar years Tuskegee Institute had
sighed with relief as the annual lynching rate continued to drop, but
the single lynching reported in 1951 failed to tell the story of racial
violence. Lynching "has gone out of style," Tuskegee noted, to be
replaced by other forms of intimidation. Walter White put it more
tersely: "The bomb has replaced the lynchers' rope."42
The death of the Moores became the rallying point in 1951 and
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1952, as had the blinding of Isaac Woodard in 1946. Walter White
quickly wired Attorney General McGrath, requesting an appointment
to discuss cooperative efforts to curb terrorism in Florida and to solve
the Moore murders. On January 8, 1952, representatives of eighteen
organizations met with McGrath to urge a full-fledged federal investigation. The Department of Justice was active, examining the series of
racial crimes in Florida and eventually winning a federal grand jury
indictment of those allegedly involved in the bombings of a Negro
housing development in Miami. But those who murdered the Moores
were never apprehended. 43
The white backlash thus added another dimension to the problems
facing Truman in 1951. The best he could do-given the war, the need
for unity, the composition of Congress, and the backlash-was to maintain a holding action and to keep the issue of civil rights before the
American public. Thus, as on previous occasions, he attempted to exploit the educational possibilities of the presidency through a series of
low-keyed public addresses and formal messages. For example, on
March 1, 1951, he sent a message to the fourth annual Conference on
Civil Liberties, in which he expressed the hope that the Eighty-second
Congress would not adjourn without enacting his civil-rights program.
He also pointed with pride to the "tremendous gains" in civil rights
since the report of his committee in 1947, particularly in education,
housing, employment, and use of public accommodations. 44
In dedicating the Carter Barron Amphitheater in Washington, in
May, Truman discussed the faith of the country's founders, a faith
expressed in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.
"We must believe in the faith of our fathers," he said. "We must believe in human rights and civil rights for every man, be he yellow, red,
black, or white." On July 4, in a radio broadcast commemorating the
175th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, he opened by
stressing that the United States was based on a new idea, the idea that
all men were created equal. He noted, "We have made great strides in
broadening freedom here at home. We have made real progress in
eliminating oppression and injustice and in creating security and opportunities for all." In conclusion, he urged greater effort to achieve
liberty for everyone. 45
But Truman did more than orate; he took action that symbolized
what he expected of America. In August 1951 the Sioux City, Iowa,
Memorial Park Cemetery denied burial to Sfc. John R. Rice, a Winnebago Indian killed in Korea. Mrs. Rice, a non-Indian, had purchased
the lot, unaware of a restrictive clause limiting burial to Caucasians.
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Officials of the cemetery therefore halted the ceremony after the conclusion of military rites, and the casket remained in front of the open
grave. The story was front-page news the next morning, and Harry H.
Vaughan, the president's military aide, called it to Truman's attention.
Truman's reaction was decisive and irate. In an angry telegram to the
mayor of Sioux City, the president pointed out that "national appreciation of patriotic service should not be limited by race, color or creed."
A similar telegram went to officials of the cemetery, who quickly apologized and offered a free lot for Rice's burial. Through Harry Vaughan,
however, the president had already arranged for burial in Arlington
National Cemetery, and Mrs. Rice accepted the "greater honor."46 Rice
thus became the second serviceman of a minority group to be buried
under similar circumstances in Arlington National Cemetery, following
Felix Longoria, the Mexican-American from Texas, who had won such
burial honors as a result of Lyndon Johnson's intervention in 1949.
The White House mail ran heavily in favor of Truman's action. In
January 1952 General Vaughan telephoned the mayor of Phoenix when
he learned of a private cemetery's refusal to bury a Negro killed in
Korea, and the mayor took action to resolve the matter locally after a
dispute of nearly six weeks. 47
During these trying months of congressional inaction, the president also initiated a conference and established a commission, both of
which helped to keep alive the issue of discrimination, to involve additional people in the civil-rights struggle, and to emphasize those areas
in need of correction and improvement. In August 1949 Truman had
called for a Midcentury White House Conference on Children and
Youth, and after several preliminary meetings on the local and national
level, he scheduled the main event for December 1950. Sponsored by
personnel of the Children's Bureau and chaired by Oscar Ewing of the
Federal Security Administration, the conference attracted over five
thousand delegates and guests from home and abroad. In addition to
several technical addresses, there were thirty-five working groups and
thirty-one panels at the conference, in which Protestants, Catholics,
Jews, and Negroes participated.
The delegates were concerned about discrimination, particularly
the effect of racial segregation on the "healthy personality development" of school children. The platform endorsed the "full program" of
the President's Committee on Civil Rights and urged that prompt steps
be taken "to eliminate all types of racial and religious segregation, and
that this conference through its most appropriate channels appeal
immediately to the federal government to abolish segregation in the
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nation's capital, making Washington an example to the world of a
truly working democracy without discriminatory practice on the basis
of race, creed, color, or national origin."48
The president took more important steps in late 1951. In addition
to creating the Committee on Government Contract Compliance, he
also issued an executive order on December 29 establishing the President's Commission on the Health Needs of the Nation. Consisting of a
chairman-Dr. Paul B. Magnuson, formerly of the Northwestern University Medical School-and fourteen members, the commission was
directed to investigate comprehensively every aspect of the nation's
health problems. Although the president admitted that he hoped the
commission's findings would dissipate some of the "bitter attacks" on
his proposals "to bring adequate health care to all our people," he emphasized the total freedom of its members to come in with any conclusion or recommendation. He also brushed aside the American Medical
Association, whose president had publicly denounced creation of the
commission. 49
The commission's investigation was impressive by any standard,
and its final report of five published volumes constituted a mine of
information. Indeed, volume three contained nearly three hundred
pages of statistics, including many white-nonwhite comparisons. In
1949, for example, the death rate for nonwhite children under one year
of age was nearly double that of whites, as was the death rate for
adults between the ages of forty-five and sixty-four. 50
Of equal importance was the commission's propaganda value as a
result of public hearings involving nearly four hundred witnesses in
eight major cities. The commission later expressed its belief in the
"tremendous educational value" of the hearings and its gratitude to the
press for "the full and impartial manner in which it covered these sessions." Much of the testimony was revealing. In St. Louis, for example,
only sixteen of twenty-nine general hospitals admitted Negroes, and of
the sixteen only seven were integrated. In Los Angeles County, of the
6,920 licensed physicians, there were only 74 Negroes, 11 MexicanAmericans, 42 Japanese-Americans, and 7 Chinese-Americans. For Indians everywhere, the death rate from tuberculosis was more than ten
times greater than for whites, and in Texas the disease took seven
Mexican-Americans for every Anglo. 51
In its final report to the president, the commission made several
recommendations involving minority groups. In personal health service, the commission argued for "services to all persons who are declared eligible, with no discrimination as to age, race, citizenship, or
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place or duration of residence, and with no means test at the time care
is needed." Concerned about the shortage of hospital beds for American minorities, the commission unequivocally advocated integration
of all hospital facilities, since segregation "detracts from the efficiency
and quality of care." For migratory labor, which generally involved
Mexican-Americans, it recommended that Congress allocate additional
funds and develop a cooperative plan with state and local agencies to
provide better health facilities. Perhaps most significant of all, "to
meet the need for additional Negroes in the health professions," the
commission urged the establishment of special programs to improve
preprofessional and professional opportunities. In particular, "the dual
system of education in some parts of this country has made it impossible for many Negroes to receive the high quality secondary and college education needed to qualify them for professional training. The
discriminatory bars which start at the secondary school level and run
all the way through post-graduate training, internship, and hospital
affiliation must be removed wherever they exist."52
President Truman accepted the commission's report on December
18, 1952, grateful for its "fresh and constructive approach" and hopeful
that it would be adopted during the next administration. On January
9, 1953, as he prepared to leave office, he sent a special message to
Congress transmitting the commission's recommendations and urging
their enactment, stressing especially the proposal for federal grants-inaid for state and local action in developing comprehensive personal
health services. 53
Truman's oratory and actions in 1951 did not persuade the second
session of the Eighty-second Congress that there was an urgent need to
enact civil-rights legislation. And the administration was therefore not
about to indulge in a sham performance and put it on the "must" list
for 1952. In suggestions for the president's State of the Union message
on January 9, 1952, only the Departments of Justice and Commerce
included recommendations for such legislation. Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer was particularly worried about the Soviet Union's "powerful propaganda appeals to the non-white population of all
continents, citing discrimination against minority groups in the United
States. The most effective answer we can give to this propaganda is to
continue to improve the position of minority groups in this country."54
Although fully aware that Congress would balk, Truman went
through the ritualistic motions in his State of the Union address of
calling for action "toward the wider enjoyment of civil rights." After
reciting the progress of the executive branch in providing equal treat-
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ment and opportunity in the armed services, in the civil service, and in
private nrms with government contracts, he again called upon Congress
to permit civil-rights legislation to be brought to a vote. He was
pleased that the Senate had scheduled early action on home rule for the
District of Columbia, and he hoped for prompt adoption of legislation
granting statehood to Hawaii and Alaska. In his budget message, delivered to Congress on January 21, he renewed his request for appropriations to nnance a fair employment practices commission. He noted
that with the establishment of his Committee on Government Contract
Compliance, the executive branch had acted, "within the limits of its
present powers, to see that discrimination ... does not prevent workers
from getting jobs which use their highest skills. Further progress toward this objective will require action by Congress."55
Although the State of the Union message was stronger than its
counterpart of 1951, it fell short of black expectations. In probably its
most critical editorial of the president since the campaign of 1948, the
Afro-American counted only 104 of 5,300 words devoted to "the burning issue of civil rights. He sadly missed an excellent opportunity to
come out slugging." Walter White had also expected more and warned
both parties of the political hazards in soft-pedaling the issue in the
election year of 1952. The Chicago Defender never got over the president's "weak statement." In a biting editorial, the Defender saw it "as a
disappointing shock to those who had expected an outspoken declaration in face of the reign of terror in Florida which has claimed the
lives of three citizens, the wounding of a fourth and the bombings and
attempted bombings of Jewish synagogues, a Negro housing project
and a Catholic church."56
But civil-rights organizations were not prepared to surrender.
They had known defeat before-indeed, they lived with it-and the
approaching presidential campaign of 1952 provided a psychological
boost. Upon the invitation of the NAACP, nine hundred delegates
from thirty-nve states who represented filty-two national organizations
met for the 1952 Leadership Conference on Civil Rights on February
17 and 18 in Washington. In one of the major addresses, Walter White
praised Truman for his courageous actions in the past but expressed
concern about recent presidential backsliding. The conference, however, concentrated mostly on Congress and the campaign politics of
1952. Once again, the delegates insisted upon passage of civil-rights
legislation and revision of the senatorial rule regarding cloture. "The
failure of Congress to restrain the bigots among us through enactment
of civil rights measures," the conferees declared, "has brought about a
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wave of mob violence, bombing, shootings and 1egal lynchings' and has
already proved costly to our nation in world prestige and in human
life." In conclusion, the delegates drew the only weapon left in the
civil-rights arsenal, threatening to "carry this vital fight into the precincts where the people of America live and vote. We shall not rest as
long as any American is daily forced to face the humiliation of racial
discrimination and segregation."57
Yet neither party in Congress made even a half-hearted effort in
1952. In January the Senate Rules Committee approved a resolution to
revise the cloture rule to permit two-thirds of those present, rather than
two-thirds of the total membership, to invoke cloture; but the Senate
took no action after the measure was reported on March 6. FEPC
shared the same fate, although Truman gave it an occasional plug. The
Senate Labor and Public WeHare Committee, with Senators Taft and
Nixon dissenting, did approve an FEPC with strong enforcement
powers. The measure would have created an Equality of Opportunity
in Employment Commission, a euphemism to avoid the hostility engendered by the symbols FEPC, but the Senate ignored the bill. 58
The Senate did heed the president's request for home rule for the
District of Columbia, when it passed a bill on January 22, 1952, that
provided considerable autonomy to residents of the District. The bill
then went to the District of Columbia Committee in the House, the
graveyard of previous proposals because of southern domination of the
committee. Truman did his best to marshal public opinion behind the
measure. In a special message to Congress on May 1 transmitting a
reorganization plan, he went out of his way to urge home rule. "Local
self-government is both the right and the responsibility of free men,"
he contended. 'The denial of self-government does not befit the national capital of the world's largest and most powerful democracy."
Again, when Truman signed the bill on June 9 that transferred the
power to appoint the Recorder of Deeds from the president to the District commissioners, he explained that he approved it only because it
advanced the "even more important principle" of home rule. But the
House committee lived up to its reputation and refused to report the
bill on home rule. Indeed, despite the entreaties of Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson and despite subsequent Senate bills for
home rule, the House District of Columbia Committee was consistently
able to prevent final action. 59
The Eighty-second Congress did enact legislation on one of the
recommendations included in the president's special civil-rights message of February 1948, but it was almost an afterthought in a bill
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whose primary purpose was to discriminate. In June 1952 Congress
passed the Immigration and Nationality Act, or the McCarran-Walter
Immigration Act as it was popularly called. The act revised and codified all laws relating to immigration and naturalization, but its main
thrust was to continue most of the discriminatory provisions of the
National Origins Act of 1924 as well as to introduce a few new ones.
In March, for example, the NAACP had protested one provision that
restricted immigration from the British West Indies to one hundred per
year. In the past, immigrants from the islands had simply been admitted under the regular British quota, and the fact that most were
black was enough to convince practically everyone of the racial intent
of the new provision. 60
The president vigorously protested the bill. In a sharply worded
veto message on June 25, Truman expressed praise for only a few of its
provisions. Noting that the bill completely eliminated race as a barrier
to naturalization and permitted at least a minimum quota to all nations
of Asia, he reminded Congress and the nation that he had '1ong urged
that racial or national barriers to naturalization be abolished. This was
one of the recommendations in my civil rights message to the Congress
on February 2, 1948." Then he continued, "But now this ... provision
comes before me embedded in a mass of legislation which would perpetuate injustices of long standing against many other nations of the
world, hamper the efforts we are making to rally the men of East and
West alike to the cause of freedom, and intensify the repressive and
inhumane aspects of our immigration procedures. The price is too
high, and in good conscience I cannot agree to pay it." Although he
agreed with the necessity of a quota, he objected first to the overall
limitation of immigrants; more ought to be admitted. To the president,
however, the "greatest vice" of the immigration quota system, which
was perpetuated in the bill of 1952, was that it discriminated, "deliberately and intentionally, against many of the peoples of the world."
Such a practice violated America's traditions and ideals, the pronouncement of the Declaration of Independence that all men are created
equal, and "repudiates our basic religious concepts, our belief in the
brotherhood of man." Further, in the bill's regulations for entry, deportation, and administration, the president found provisions "worse
than the infamous Alien Act of 1798."61
Civil-rights exponents were pleased with the president's veto.
"Against the advice of several frightened associates," editorialized the
Amsterdam News, President Truman "courageously" vetoed the "infamous" bill. To the Afro-American, "all the credit goes to the presi-
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dent. The measure . . . was designed with racial discrimination as its
clear intent and purpose," for it represented the "Hitlerian master-race
doctrine" and "must not be allowed to stand unchallenged on federal
statute books."62
The plaudits were deserved, but the sighs of relief were premature. Within two days, the president suffered a stinging defeat, and the
nation a major embarrassment, when Congress in an ugly, reactionary
mood voted to override the veto. In the Senate, twenty-five Democrats
and thirty-two Republicans voted to override, while only eighteen
Democrats and eight Republicans stood by the president. The Senate
vote barely exceeded the required two-thirds, and a switch of two
votes would have made the difference. It was therefore infuriating
that Majority Leader McFarland and Majority Whip Johnson voted
against the president, and it was altogether simple justice that President Lyndon Johnson should later carry through President Kennedy's
campaign to revise the law. 63
In one area of concern, the American Indian, President Truman and Congress did cooperate occasionally on legislation. But most
of the controversy in 1951 and 1952 revolved around the policies
of the new Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Dillon S. Myer. When
Myer took office in 1950, he announced his intention of withdrawing
the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) from the management of Indian
affairs, as much and as soon as possible. This was not the first time
that a proposal had been made or a hope expressed about winding up
the affairs of the bureau, which had become a miniature federal government and an ever-expanding bureaucracy, indulging in such diverse
activities as health, education, welfare, forestry, general construction,
land management, banking, road maintenance, grazing, electric power,
irrigation, tribal organization, and so forth.
Myer's first point of business was to bring some order to the BIA's
operations, which had suffered from a parade of commissioners and
acting commissioners since the resignation of John Collier in 1945. Although a well intentioned, efficient administrator, Myer quickly ran
into trouble with Indian organizations, tribes, and advocates. Lacking
the human touch and outwardly indifferent to Indian sensibilities as
well as to some of their rights, he proposed policy without consulting
the tribes involved and sometimes without sufficient thought in regard
to normal due process. Thus, in 1952 he sponsored legislation that
would have permitted employees of the bureau to carry firearms and to
make arrests, without benefit of a warrant, for violations of regulations.
The Association on American Indian Affairs denounced the proposal as
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a declaration of cold war, one that would "probably set Indian relations
back at least half a century." Although Myer subsequently explained
that the bill would only give bureau employees the same authority as
federal marshals and would simply restore power that had inadvertently been withdrawn from bureau agents in an act of 1948, Congress
would have none of it and backed away from the proposal. Myer
further invited suspicion when his accession to office in 1950 resulted
in several resignations, both voluntary and forced, of some influential,
dedicated, and highly respected members of the BIA. 64
He got into trouble in 1951 with the appropriation bill for the Interior Department, which contained a restriction prohibiting the use
of federal appropriations or tribal funds for the acquisition of land or
water rights in four western states. Oliver La Farge, president of the
Association on American Indian Affairs, pronounced it "discriminatory
in the extreme." The president of the National Congress of American
Indians agreed, and he informed Truman that "this country has never
forbidden any group of people to purchase land, except in some few
cases where war hysteria and prejudice has dictated such laws with
respect to certain Orientals." Although he recognized that Truman
could not veto the entire appropriations bill, he requested that the president publicly express disapproval of this particular provision. Truman
chose, however, to sign the bill without comment. 65
But it was Myer's proposed revision of the federal code of regulations as it applied to Indians that provoked the most concerted opposition. The revision required tribal leaders to pursue grievances through
a prescribed chain of command, presumably to cut down on the number of Indian pilgrimages to Washington, and permitted the commissioner to reject an attorney with whom the Indians had made a contract
if "reasonable cause" existed to indicate that the attorney had solicited
the contract. Myer, of course, was concerned with "ambulance chasing," whereby attorneys had become wealthy through representation
of Indian claims; but the new rule clearly infringed upon the right of
Indians to choose their own attorneys.
Indian advocates were outraged. Far from seeking the withdrawal of the BIA, they contended, Myer was attempting to establish
a dictatorship. The Association on American Indian Affairs saw the
new code as tending to "destroy those beginnings of self-expression
and self-government that have given the Indian people and their
friends some hope for an Indian future of unrestricted, unsupervised,
constructive citizenship." A special committee of the American Bar
Association opposed most of the proposals. In fact, the New York
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Times could find no one, except Myer, in favor of the new regulations.
In an article in the New Republic in May 1951, former Interior Secretary Harold L. Ickes denounced Myer as "a Hitler and a Mussolini
rolled into one." And in August he wrote a long letter to Interior Secretary Oscar Chapman, in which he devoted four pages to the proposed
revision. Myer was setting himself up as a '1ittle tin Hitler" and as
the "Commissar" of Indian affairs, Ickes complained to his friend and
protege, and "he should be scourged from his office as an unfaithful
public servant who has been persistently recreant to his trust." The
old curmudgeon was in fine form. Chapman was not about to fire his
subordinate, but he did the next best thing and countermanded the
new regulations over Myer's objections. 66
The controversy over Myer's inept attempts to streamline the
bureaucracy and to prevent injustice to the Indians by indulging in
some of it himself tended to obscure his main goal of eventual liquidation of the BIA and the integration of the Indian into the mainstream
of American society. Since 1948 the Truman administration had
moved consistently in the direction of integration of all minority
groups; and the Democratic platform of 1952 not only pledged continued efforts to advance "the health, education, and economic wellbeing of our American Indian citizens" but also expressed the belief
that "the American Indian should be completely integrated into the
social, economic and political life of the nation." 67
For the Indian, the administration's program thus had two prongs
-the one was exemplified in the ten-year attempt to rehabilitate the
Navajo and Hopi tribes, to help those who could not help themselves,
and to make the reservation as self-sufficient as possible; the other involved releasing tribes from federal jurisdiction and seeking to integrate Indians into the American economy. For this task, Myer seemed
eminently qualified as a result of his experience with the War Relocation Authority in reintegrating Japanese-Americans into the economic,
if not the cultural, life of America. The reservation Indian was not
only culturally different but he also lacked the necessary skills for
economic advancement in an alien world. Yet something had to be
done. The reservations could not support the existing Indian population, and the Indian birth rate was far greater than the national
average.
Myer had no master plan, although he could utilize the program
developed by William Zimmerman in 1947, which proposed a rough
timetable for the release of various tribes over the next twenty-five to
fifty years. Myer believed that any master plan would be "one of the
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worst mistakes we could possibly make" in view of the diversity of
Indian wealth, education, and acculturation. Instead, his approach was
piecemeal. When Truman signed a bill in August 1951 that provided
for the disposition of claims granted to the Ute Indians, he noted that
the award "has made it possible for the Indians to put their own affairs
in order and to prepare themselves for the fullest participation in the
affairs of our nation." 68
Myer also sponsored and supported legislation that would transfer criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indians from the federal to the
state governments. The first was the Bosone bill of 1950, which provoked a storm of protest from Indian advocates who feared exploitation by the states and premature attempts at integration. Although the
bill never cleared the Senate, Myer continued his efforts to arrange for
transfers of authority and reported in March 1952 that legislation for
this purpose was pending. But that bill, and legislation to remove discriminatory policies toward Indians, did not pass until the Eisenhower
administration. In 1953 Congress removed the federal prohibition
against serving liquor to Indians and transferred criminal and civil
authority over several tribes to various state governments. The two
houses also agreed to a resolution that expressed the desire for further
transfers of authority and directed the secretary of the interior to prepare legislation to accomplish this. The "termination" program appealed to Congress not only because it seemed logical but also because
it would result in decreased federal expenditures, which delighted the
penny pinchers. 69
The Indians and their white advocates were understandably distraught, although all too often they seemed to want it all their own way
-more federal mouey, less federal control, and no state supervision or
authority whatever. "Termination" became a dirty word on the reservations, and it had adverse effects on the Indian, if not on the federal
pocketbook. Between 1953 and 1957, for example, the Indians lost
roughly 12 percent of their trust lands through unwise sales to nonIndians. There were other unfortunate results, and eventually the
Department of the Interior all but halted the "termination" policy,70
a decision officially endorsed by President Richard Nixon in 1970.
Nor was the last part of Myer's program to integrate the Indian
much more successful. The administration seemed to have only two
alternative solutions to the problem of the increasing Indian population-to ask Congress for even larger appropriations to purchase additional land for the reservations or to ask for smaller sums to develop
economic skills and to relocate Indians in jobs on and off the reserva-
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tion. Myer and the Truman administration chose the latter course and
initiated a modest program in 1951, which included provisions for
transportation to the city and financial support for participants until
they received their first paychecks. In his budget message of January
21, 1952, Truman request a $15-million increase for the BIA, of which
roughly $7 million was "to conduct a constructive program to provide
the Indians with training and off-reservation relocation opportunities
and to help them to make satisfactory adjustments in new locations.''71
But if the program ever had a chance of success, Congress jeopardj.zed it with pitiful appropriations. As late as 1957, Congress had
increased the appropriation only to $3.5 million, about half of what
Truman had requested in 1952, and the results were mixed at best. In
moving to the city, Indians discovered what Negroes had known for
decades, that both employers and unions discriminated against minorities. In 1961 the Commission on Civil Rights reported that "employment opportunities for Indians appear to be as restricted as they are for
Negroes." Forced to live in slums, Indians aggravated the problems of
already overburdened cities, often without any benefit to themselves.
Some returned, disheartened, to the reservation; some successfully adjusted to the new life of the city; and a few resorted to crime. The
increasing urban population also brought about other complications.
When new, activist Indian leaders appeared in the late 1960s, they
sometimes found their attempts to formulate unified programs jeopardized and their cries of "red power" muted by the conflicting demands of the reservations and the urban Indian population. 72 In any
event, because of discrimination on the part of whites and because of
the cultural and educational handicaps of Indians, the relocation policy
initiated during the Truman administration might have failed even
with generous congressional support. But Truman at least could have
said that his administration had attempted to solve a problem that is
still very much a part of America and which still defies solution.
The Truman administration also grappled with the grievances of
another minority, the Mexican-American, though it came late to the
problem and never made a large commitment. The administration's
interest was engaged initially because of the farm-labor program,
which involved many migratory Mexican-Americans and Negroes as
well as contract and illegal labor from Mexico. As a result of a labor
shortage during the Second World War, the Roosevelt administration
had negotiated a series of agreements with Mexico for the importation
of braceros for seasonal work in the United States. The wartime program expired in 1947, but the Truman administration had heeded the

Defeat in Congress

307

pleas of growers and arranged new contracts with Mexico from 1947
to 1949. Employers of farm workers also exploited "wetbacks"-Mexican nationals who crossed the border illegally-and by 1949 a sharp
domestic controversy had developed. In 1949 the government apprehended and returned about three hundred thousand illegal entrants,
and in 1950 the number reached half a million. 73
The growers insisted upon the necessity of bracero and wetback
labor. American workers were unreliable, they contended, and sometimes deserted the fields at harvest time. Indeed, they might even
strike when the crops were ripe, which was tantamount to un-Americanism. They also argued that Americans disliked the stoop labor required in harvesting certain crops, and Mexicans were much more
productive anyway. It was a theme that would become monotonous,
although it was always persuasive to some. In 1947 growers in Texas
complained that resident labor refused to work in the fields and urged
an expanded bracero program. An investigator, however, noted that
for a ten-hour day, seven-day week, the worker received $17.50. Yet if
he happened to be a veteran, he could draw unemployment compensation of $20.00 per week for fifty-two weeks. A choice between the two
was not difficult to make. The growers and their representatives in
Congress also urged Truman to permit the use of wetbacks and to order
immigration agents not to return them to Mexico. 74
The spearhead of the opposition to the bracero program as well as
to the exploitation of wetback labor came from LULAC, the League of
United Latin American Citizens. Organized in the late 1920s, the
organization peaked in membership in 1940, although it had never had
much influence. During the war, in contrast with the phenomenal
growth of the NAACP, LULAC dropped dramatically in membership.
By 1951, however, it had about regained the membership of 1940, but
it still lacked a strong professional core because of the tendency of
middle-class Mexican-Americans, particularly those who were lightskinned, to disappear into Anglo society. In the postwar period the
organization concentrated on improving educational advantages of
Mexican-Americans and in curbing the invasion of workers from Mexico. The latter concern was understandable, for Mexican labor inevitably caused a drop in the wage scale for Negroes and MexicanAmericans engaged in the same work. The president's appointment of
his Committee on Civil Rights, which dipped briefly into the problem
of migratory labor, convinced some L ULAC leaders that they had a
friend in the White House. When wetbacks Hooded across the border
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at El Paso in 1948, LULAC leaders deluged the president with appeals
to tighten border security. 75
In its opposition to wetbacks and the bracero program, LULAC
had some influential allies. Foremost in the group was the AFL's National Farm Labor Union, headed by H. L. Mitchell, who insisted that
the domestic labor supply was ample to meet harvesting needs. He also
maintained that Mexican nationals lowered wages for American labor,
and he denounced their use as strikebreakers. The CIO agreed. So, too,
did the NAACP; and in October 1949 Roy Wilkins fired off a letter to
Truman protesting the use of Mexican nationals to break a farm strike
in California. The Community Service Organization ( CSO) was also
establishing chapters in various California cities to organize MexicanAmericans into a power bloc at the polls. One of its voluntary leaders
was a young migratory worker named Cesar Chavez, who eventually
dropped out of the CSO because of its lack of interest in organizing
farm workers. 76
In the initial stages of the domestic controversy, the growers
seemed to have the president's ear. When in 1949 Senator Clinton
Anderson of New Mexico complained about the alacrity with which
immigration authorities were returning wetbacks to Mexico, Truman
seemed persuaded that the growers needed additional labor. H. L.
Mitchell informed him of the denial of civil rights to American agricultural labor, but Truman responded: "No information had come to
me prior to the receipt of your letter concerning any violation of the
civil rights of agricultural workers. I am referring your letter to the
attorney general for such action as appears warranted, and I believe he
undoubtedly will request further facts concerning the instances you
cite."77
By the summer of 1949, however, the administration was aware of
the increasing complexity of the problem. One government official,
noting the growing power of LULAC, warned that Mexican-Americans
"have not, as yet, become Balkanized into a minority political bloc as
they have been Balkanized in slum areas. They are, however, by the
inexorable exigency of circumstances, being driven more and more to
such extremity." He urged that Truman either establish a commission
to investigate the problems of Mexican-Americans or that he assuage
their leadership with some appointments to governmental positions.
As early as June 1949 White House assistant David Niles advised the
president to formulate a more just and consistent policy. In particular,
he stressed the necessity of considering together the questions of illegal
migration and the welfare of three million Mexican-Americans. Tru-
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man agreed with the suggestion and urged assistants to come up with
some answers. In November 1949 Truman revealed that the Department of Labor was considering the advisability of a presidential commission, and the public response to the news was favorable. In addition to domestic pressure, the administration also had to worry about
the Mexican government, which had been making noise about not
renewing the 1949 agreement ( which expired in 1951) unless the
United States established additional safeguards to protect Mexican
nationals in the bracero program. 78
Faced with pressure at home and abroad and lacking any clearcut proposals for solving the problem of migratory labor, the president
established a five-member Commission on Migratory Labor on June 3,
1950. Maurice T. Van Hecke, professor of law at the University of
North Carolina, was named as chairman. Although no Mexican-American was included on the commission, an omission that undoubtedly
reflected their relative lack of political muscle, the appointment of
Robert E. Lucey, Catholic Archbishop of San Antonio, was the next
best thing, for he possessed knowledge and experience of the problems
of Mexican-Americans in Texas. In its covering announcement, the
White House explained the commission's tasks, which included the
related questions of the "social, economic, health, and educational conditions among migratory workers in the United States," the problems
resulting from the bracero program, and the extent of wetback infiltration. 79
After twelve public hearings and numerous conferences with federal and state officials and with representatives of Mexico and Puerto
Rico, the Commission on Migratory Labor reported to the president in
April 1951. The commission recommended, above all, the establishment of a Federal Committee on Migratory Farm Labor to coordinate
all federal activities concerned with itinerant farm workers. It also
urged Congress to strengthen the penalties for use of wetback labor, to
enact minimum-wage legislation for farm workers, to extend collective
bargaining and unemployment compensation to agriculture, to provide
minimum standards for housing for migratory workers and appropriations for federal assistance, to supply school aid to migratory children,
to amend the Public Health Service Act to provide matching grants to
states for health programs, and to restrict the employment of schoolage children.
The commission also recommended that the United States systematically reduce its dependence on foreign labor until it was no longer
required. When additional labor was needed, first preference should
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go to American citizens in Puerto Rico and Hawaii. Finally, although
the commission found it difficult to measure accurately the effect of
foreign workers on the wages of American workers, it did report some
interesting statistics. From 1947 to 1950, for example, employers of
farm workers in Texas, "blessed" with an abundance of braceros and
wetbacks, reduced wages 11 percent, while in California, where there
were fewer of both, wages rose 15 percent. 80
Farm employers found large portions of the report unpalatable, as
did some influential newspapers in the Southwest and on the Pacific
Coast. Nor were many congressmen impressed with the commission's
entreaties for additional legislation. On June 30, 1951, Congress passed
a Mexican labor importation bill, sponsored by Representative W. R.
Poage of Texas and Senator Allen J. Ellender of Louisiana, which
established procedures to permit the administration to negotiate a
renewal of the bracero program that would be agreeable to Mexico.
But it included little else; and therefore LULAC, the CIO, and the
AFL were all unhappy. William Green urged a presidential veto,
noting that the Poage-Ellender bill "discriminates against American
workers employed in large scale agriculture and provides no means of
setting standards of wages or working conditions for our own citizens."
Green also pointed out that the bill contained no provision for penalizing growers who employed wetbacks and that it permitted the employment of braceros in food-processing plants, which would have the effect
of destroying AFL unions. 81
Nor was the White House staff enthusiastic about the bill. In a
memorandum to the president, David Stowe saw "no clear cut statement of the advantages of veto versus signature as you requested.
However, we are all agreed on the deficiencies of the bill and on measures to correct this situation."82 Truman finally decided to sign the bill,
but only because it contained the conditions necessary for renewal of
the bracero program with Mexico and only after the Democratic
leaders in Congress promised to take immediate action during the first
session to correct its de:6.ciencies.
In his message of approval, Truman pointed out that although the
bill permitted a new agreement with Mexico, it represented "very
limited progress, which hardly touches our basic farm labor problems."
He urged legislation to penalize those who employed illegal entrants,
to authorize the Immigration and Naturalization Service to inspect
fields without a warrant, and to appropriate funds for an increase in
border personnel for purposes of inspection and detention. He also
promised to submit a supplemental budget request to enable the Labor
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Deparbnent's Farm Placement Service to expand labor-market studies
and to determine the possibility of reducing American dependence on
foreign labor. In conclusion, he observed that various executive deparbnents were also examining other recommendations of his Commission on Migratory Labor, including provisions for improvement of
housing, education, health, and social security for migratory workers.83
Clearly, the president was no longer thinking primarily of the
interests of American farm employers. His shift was evident in his
letter to the president of Mexico in which he pointed out that congressional leaders had promised additional legislation, which would result
in improved working and living conditions for American and Mexican
farm workers alike. Further, he proposed that their new bracero agreement be limited to six months, a time restriction that would force
Congress to come through with the promised legislation. 84
Truman kept his part of the bargain and negotiated the new
agreement, which went into effect on August 11, 1951. Not surprisingly, however, Senators McFarland and Johnson failed to guide the
promised legislation through the first session of the Eighty-second Congress. But the six-months limitation had part of its intended effect.
Faced with the expiration of the bracero program on February 11,
1952, mindful of Truman's threat not to renew it again unless Congress
acted, and worried about what growers in Arizona and Texas would
think, Senator McFarland urged quick action and presented Truman
with a bill early in March 1952, which he signed.
The so-called wetback bill made it a felony to employ or harbor
illegal immigrants, and it authorized immigration agents to search factories and fields without a warrant-both of which were provisions that
the president had requested. The House, however, cut the requested
appropriations for expanding the operations of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service; and Truman briefly considered a special message, until the Senate restored the funds. But neither house acted upon
the proposal to establish a Federal Committee on Migratory Labor,
although the Senate Labor Committee reported such a bill. Nor did
Congress heed requests for increased appropriations to enable the Justice Department to expand its activities in trying to curb the flow of
illegal labor. Yet the wetback bill of 1952, coupled with the Eisenhower administration's "Operation Wetback" in 1953 to strengthen
border supervision, did result in a significant decline in the use of
wage-depressing illegal Mexican nationals within the United States; but
not until the Kennedy-Johnson administrations would the government
move to terminate the bracero program. 85
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Congress also took its time in dealing with other recommendations
of the President's Commission on Migratory Labor, although Truman
also chose not to give them high priority in 1952. An interdepartmental
task force comprising various executive administrators elected to defer
requests for major legislative action on most of the recommendations
until more technical studies were available. But the president did
take the first step in his budget message of January 21, 1952, when
he requested legislation to prevent "unscrupulous agencies and labor
contractors" from exploiting workers in operations that crossed state
lines. He also promised that the Department of Labor would step
up its efforts to enforce the anti-child-labor provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act. Concerned about the inadequate education of
children of migratory workers, he requested funds to permit the Office
of Education to study possible solutions in cooperation with the states.
It was not much, but it represented a beginning. The administration
also sought to aid Puerto Ricans under the contract programs, and in
1952 some twenty thousand of them were flown to the United States
for seasonal farm work. The Labor Department also launched a migration program for industrial workers for the purposes of providing employment for Puerto Ricans in various industrial cities in the United
States and, at the same time, dispersing migrants to prevent additional
concentrations like that in New York City. 86
When the Eighty-second Congress adjourned on July 8, 1952, it
could boast of few accomplishments in the field of civil rights. In
August 1951 it passed a bill that pennitted Americans who had voted
in Italian elections in 1946 and 1948 to reclaim their citizenship, which
affected only a handful. In 1952, five days before adjournment, Congress also approved a bill that granted to federal employees of Japanese ancestry the seniority, grade, and pay that they would have had
"except for certain World War II security measures," which affected
another handful. 87
That was it. The record of the Eighty-second Congress on civil
rights clearly fell short of the achievements of its two predecessors,
although the Eightieth and Eighty-first had little to boast about either.
Congress had enacted legislation to settle the claims of American Indians and Japanese-Americans, to remove racial barriers from naturalization, and to provide more self-government for the territories. But
the major demands of black America remained unfulfilled. From 1942
to 1952 a total of seventy FEPC bills had been introduced in both
houses. Only one, the toothless McConnell bill of 1950, ever got
through the House, while the Senate only fought over motions to con-
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sider FEPC. Beginning in 1942 the House also passed several antipoll-tax bills, but Senate filibusters or threats thereof killed them all.
The House approved statehood bills for Hawaii and Alaska, but the
Senate balked. Neither house passed an antilynching bill during the
Truman administration, although the House had approved bills in
1922, 1937, and 1940. It was a sad record; and the big stumbling block
was the senatorial rule on cloture, which permitted southern Democrats and a handful of conservative Republicans to dictate what the
Senate should consider. Yet congressional and White House liberals
would also have to share the responsibility, for they were too often
disposed to sacrifice civil rights for welfare, economic, and foreign
policy legislation. Time had about run out on the Truman administration. It was also running out on America, although too many congressmen seemed not to know enough to care.

14

A FINAL STAND

On March 29, 1952, speaking to the party faithful at the annual
Jefferson-Jackson Day dinner, Harry Truman surprised his audience
when he ended his spirited defense of the Democratic party and of his
administration with the announcement that he would not seek reelection in 1952. 1 In view of the political liabilities of the administrationthe accusations of corruption and communism in government and the
growing unpopularity of the stalemated war in Korea-his withdrawal
understandably failed to provoke many cries of anguish or pleas to
reconsider from the Democrats of the nation.
White southerners were pleased. Ever since 1948, when Truman's
candidacy and a strong civil-rights plank had resulted in the Dixiecrat
rebellion, Truman had been a constant irritant to the South. The opposition stiffened to the point where, in February 1952, the Alsop brothers
predicted that his candidacy would destroy the Democratic party in
the South. Early in March a Gallup poll of the region showed Eisenhower receiving 62 percent of the vote, with 30 percent for Truman
and 8 percent undecided. With Truman as a candidate, even Senator
Taft looked good in magnolia country; Taft was reported to be attracting 46 percent to Truman's 42 percent, with 12 percent undecided.
Such vigorous and widespread southern opposition may very well have
influenced Truman to remove his divisive presence and permit the
party to unify for the campaign of 1952. Above all, Truman was a
good party man as well as one who believed that the Democratic party
was large enough to envelop diverse views. Predictably, his declaration of withdrawal virtually halted all southern talk of "taking a walk"
in 1952. 2
If Truman's decision to step aside provoked delight from many
314
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southerners and relief elsewhere, most Negroes were dismayed. It was
one thing to criticize him for not endorsing all of their demands, but it
was quite another to imagine him out of the White House. The Journal
and Guide melodramatically declared that justice, mercy, and a belief
in human dignity "died when he decided to yield his right to aspire to
another term." The Call was certain that the next president would not
be as forthright on civil rights as Harry Truman. The Courier, although still unreconciled to Truman personally or to a Democratic
president generally, reported that no part of the American electorate
"was more shocked and befuddled" when Truman withdrew than
Negroes, who "rightly or wrongly ... regarded Mr. Truman as their
great white hope."3
Negro Democrats were concerned not only because they personally preferred Truman but also because they had fears about who
might take his place. Since the first of the year, they had taken the
precaution of scrutinizing avowed candidates, pretenders, and sleepers
in the event that Truman chose not to run. They were unhappy with
what they saw. Early in the year, the only active Democratic candidate
was Senator Estes Kefauver, the "crimebuster" from Tennessee whose
coonskin cap was a baleful reminder of his southern origins. To
Negroes, the key to a candidate's attitude on civil rights was his position on the FEPC, and Kefauver fell short in advocating only a voluntary, persuasive approach. As the Afro-American put it, although
Kefauver was no Dixiecrat, his progressivism would "not stretch far
enough to permit his endorsement of a truly workable federal fair
employment practices act." Walter White was also less than elated,
but he knew enough to look at the man as well as at his senatorial
voting record. In examining the senator's votes, White noted that although he had a "bad" record on civil rights, he had nonetheless voted
to sustain the Barkley ruling on cloture in March 1949. Moreover,
Kefauver was a symbol of the changing South, a "wise and morally decent" man who realized the political and humanitarian considerations
of the day. Yet, although Kefauver subsequently promised to abide by
the Democratic plank on civil rights, this was not enough to attract the
support of civil-rights organizations. 4
Kefauver was suspect, but Senator Russell of Georgia was altogether unacceptable, and the latter's victory over Kefauver in the
Florida presidential primary in May generated fears in blacks of a
potent southern drive to capture a leading spot on the Democratic
ticket. In fact, Russell had already been mentioned as a possible
running mate with Governor Adlai Stevenson of Illinois. And by the

Quest and Response

316

time that Truman announced his decision, most Negro Democrats had
concluded that the Illinois governor was the only palatable Democrat,
although he had not indicated his availability. As a result of his egalitarian rhetoric, his decisive action in quelling Cicero's white riot in the
summer of 1951, and his repeated requests that the Illinois legislature
enact an FEPC with enforcement powers, Stevenson seemed eminently
qualified. The pages of the Negro press were replete with glowing
tributes about his attitude and ability, and Walter White was impressed with his "excellent record" in Illinois. Among the major Negro
papers, only the Courier was hypercritical, contending that Stevenson
was "no worthy opponent for whomever the Republicans nominate,
whether it be Taft, Eisenhower or MacArthur."5
It soon became apparent, however, that Stevenson might be a
weak reed upon which to hang the hopes of black Americans. For one
thing, he steadfastly insisted that he was running only for reelection as
governor of Illinois, and Negroes could not afford to be caught without
a candidate. Further, and more important, he too had become suspect
on the critical issue of an enforceable FEPC. In various interviews, he
indicated that he supported a strong FEPC for the state of Illinoiswhich, however, might not be the answer for every state-but that the
states should solve the problem. At the same time, he insisted that the
problem was so fundamental as to warrant a federal approach in the
event that states took no action, and he insisted that the party should
not retreat from the Democratic civil-rights plank of 1948. Beneath
such obfuscation and evasion rested the indisputable fact of his opposition to a federal FEPC with strong powers of enforcement. Nor were
Negroes pleased when he announced that the main domestic issues in
the presidential campaign would be inflation, national solvency, and
abuses by those in public office. 6
By May, hints of desperation were cropping up in the statements
of Negro leaders. On May 3 Clarence Mitchell of the NAACP observed that most of the avowed candidates were "far below the standards" of Harry Truman on civil-rights legislation; only Senators Humphrey and Brien McMahon of Connecticut had "fully acceptable records," but neither was likely to be the nominee. By this time, however,
a new candidate with attractive credentials had entered the race. On
April 22 W. Averell Harriman, currently the Mutual Security director,
announced his availability and quickly endorsed the president's position on civil rights, advocating a strong federal FEPC and criticizing
senatorial filibusters on civil-rights legislation. Campaigning against
Kefauver in the presidential primary in the District of Columbia, Har-
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riman also espoused abolition of segregation in Washington's public~
school system. On June 17, within a month of the Democratic convention, Harriman crushed Kefauver by a ratio of four to one, and in the
Negro wards his victory was even more stunning. This was enough for
the leadership of the "nonpartisan" NAACP. Keynoting the annual convention of the association, which was meeting in Oklahoma City, Roy
Wilkins declared that Harriman was the only suitable candidate for
Negro Americans. In urging enactment of an FEPC with enforcement
powers, Wilkins argued, Harriman was supporting the only type "that
is worth a hoot." Yet it was a gloomy convention, for everyone realized
that Harriman probably lacked the support to win the nomination.7
If Negroes were concerned about the Democratic presidential
nomination, they were deeply distressed about developments in the
Republican party. The spirited opposition to Truman in the South
apparently persuaded several influential Republicans, most notably
Senator Karl E. Mundt of South Dakota, of the possibility that there
would be heavy Republican inroads into the southern vote in 1952.
Accordingly, in the spring of 1951 Mundt openly advocated Republican cooperation with southern Democrats to achieve a conservative
victory in 1952. In May 1951 a delegation of Negro Republicans urged
the Republican National Committee, meeting in Tulsa, to disavow
Mundt's "shocking gospel"; but Chairman Guy Gabrielson refused to
consider it a committee matter. 8 In February 1952 the Call denounced
the Republican plan to campaign extensively in southern states, as did
the Afro-American in March, when Gabrielson promised active solicitation of southern votes, no matter who the Republican candidate
might be.9
The nominee of the Republican party was the other problem facing black Americans. When Senator Taft announced his candidacy in
October 1951, the reaction of most Negro leaders and commentators
was predictable. The Afro-American, for example, was firmly opposed
to Taft, because of his alleged sympathy with the reactionary wing of
the party. Noting that Taft's supporters included Mundt, Wherry,
General MacArthur, and Senator Joseph McCarthy-"the Wisconsin
'big lie' technician"-the editor also contended that Taft's voting record "clearly indicates that he belongs to that bewildered element in
this nation that is desperately afraid of the future." When Taft spoke
in Kansas City in November, the Call denounced both Taft, for his
endorsement of a voluntary FEPC, and the "Uncle Toms" in the audience who applauded him. When the senator seemed to espouse segregation in public schools in a speech to Negro students at North Caro-
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lina State College in December, Negro leaders were outraged. Nor
was Taft a favorite of the black rank and file. In 1950, when he defeated his undistinguished Democratic opponent for the Senate by a
commanding margin of some 430,000 votes, he lost the Negro wards in
Ohio by nearly two to one. Taft was clearly unacceptable because of
his refusal to endorse an enforceable FEPC and because of a generally
conservative record on "bread and butter" issues. In an article in the
Afro-American, William V. Shannon crisply summed up the black response to Robert Taft: "'Honest Bob' has led the colored people and
others interested in civil rights through a long and wearisome game of
Blind Man's Bluff, always coming out at the same place: nowhere.''10
Nor were civil-rights leaders overcome with gratitude and relief in
the next few months when Governor Earl Warren, Harold E. Stassen,
and General Eisenhower indicated their availability for the Republican
nomination. No one took Stassen seriously, Warren was tagged with a
loser's image as a result of 1948, and neither generated any warmth in
Negro voters. As the NAACP put it, "Warren has given lip service to
civil rights but has failed to deliver in his home state of California."
That left General Eisenhower, which to most civil-rights leaders left
much too little. It required no taxing of the memory to recall his testimony in 1948 before the Senate Armed Services Committee, when he
opposed current demands for integration of the military on the grounds
that blacks were ill prepared to compete with whites in integrated
units and that legislation could not persuade people to like other people. Since then, he had not publicly disavowed his testimony nor had
he 'revealed his specific beliefs on anything; therefore the Afro-American reveled in the wisecrack: "I like Ike, but what does Ike like.''11
Some Negro Republicans did endorse the general. A black leader
among Kansas Republicans made a pilgrimage to Abilene to check
Eisenhower's record with Negro residents, who apparently had memories stretching back to Ike's boyhood days. Satisfied with what he
heard, the Negro leader launched a campaign through the Midwest to
attract convention support for the general. Walter White was unimpressed, though he struggled to find something good to say. He recalled that during World War II Eisenhower had been "genuinely concerned about instances of gross injustice against Negro soldiers" and
had "acted swiftly to correct cases of mistreatment when they were
called to his attention. Unfortunately, he was reluctant to hit the evil
at its roots-the segregated system.'' White hoped that he had "grown
in wisdom and courage.'' But the general's continued silence was discouraging; and on April 20, 1952, the NAACP found him unacceptable.
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The Afro-American was impatient. "General, where do you stand on
civil rights?" demanded the editor. "Are you for an integrated army?
Do you favor compulsory FEPC and federal aid to education? Do you
think the federal government should enact legislation against lynching
and poll taxes? Speak up, General! Speak up."12
Eisenhower spoke up on June 5 from Abilene, Kansas, in his first
"political" press conference. In his opening statement, he stressed his
philosophical agreement with the Republican declaration of principles
of February 6, 1950, in which Republican members of Congress and
the national committee had proclaimed the main domestic issue as
"liberty against socialism." The endorsement was surprising, for one of
his current advisers, Senator Lodge, had opposed the declaration in
1950 because of its extravagance in labeling Truman a socialist and
because of its failure to support strong civil-rights measures. In response to a question concerning FEPC, the general emphasized states'
rights, vigorously opposed a compulsory federal FEPC, and even refrained from endorsing one with persuasive powers only. Although
Eisenhower subsequently indicated that military segregation had to
go, the political damage had been done as far as civil-rights advocates
were concerned. 13
Negroes thus had much to fret about as the conventions made
ready to meet in July 1952. Four years earlier, as the two parties prepared to nominate Truman and Dewey, both of whom were acceptable
to many civil-rights advocates, black leaders were able to concentrate
on the platforms. In 1952, however, it was distressingly clear that on
civil rights Taft and Eisenhower were not Thomas Dewey, and Stevenson and Kefauver were not Harry Truman. Given the views of Taft
and Eisenhower and the inclination of many Republicans to campaign
vigorously in the South in 1952, a modest civil-rights plank in the
Republican platform was foreordained.
On July 10, after several days of behind-the-scenes bickering over
a civil-rights plank, the Republican convention unanimously adopted
its platform. On civil rights, the party retreated from its 1944 and 1948
positions. After condemning "bigots who inject class, racial and religious prejudice into public and political matters" and the "duplicity
and insincerity of the party in power in racial and religious matters,"
the plank insisted that states should exercise primary responsibility and
timidly promised supplemental federal action on lynching and poll
taxes, "appropriate action" on segregation in the District of Columbia,
and appointment of qualified persons to federal positions. On FEPCthe nub of controversy in both parties-the Republicans equivocated,
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advocating legislation "to further just and equitable treatment in the
area of discriminatory employment practices," which should not, however, "duplicate state efforts to end such practices; should not set up
another huge bureaucracy." Other planks called for home rule for the
District of Columbia, statehood for Hawaii and Alaska, eventual statehood for Puerto Rico, and a pledge to aid the American Indian in
achieving full citizenship and equal opportunity. Although Negro delegates to the convention had originally threatened a floor fight, they
backed off when Eisenhower's supporters pointed out that such a move
might increase the conservative strength of Senator Taft. By this time,
most Negro delegates were in Eisenhower's comer, and the argument
made sense. The Republicans then turned to the nominations, deciding
upon Eisenhower after a bitter battle with the Taft forces, and selecting Senator Richard M. Nixon as his running mate. 14
If the skimpiness of the civil-rights plank was predestined, so was
the Negro response. Rarely was there such agreement, as a drumfire of
criticism rolled from the Negro press. To the Call and various ANP
correspondents, it was "weak," "watered down," "diluted," and a "disappointment." The Journal and Guide viewed it as a naked appeal for
southern votes. The Courier, struggling to say something favorable,
was forced to conclude that "it must be a considerable disappointment
to all who looked for a straightforward espousal of punitive federal
fair employment legislation." In a front-page column, the editor of the
Afro-American charged that "the Republican party appears to have
written off as lost forever the traditional support of colored voters."15
This, of course, was an exaggeration, for neither party could permanently ignore the Negro vote, although the Republican platform of
1952 clearly reflected less concern for the black vote than had its 1944
and 1948 counterparts.
The nominations of Eisenhower and Nixon and the equivocal
civil-rights plank placed the Democrats in an advantageous position on
the issue. Unfortunately for civil-rights advocates, such developments
also played into the hands of those Democrats who had been urging
some type of compromise since the beginning of the year. Indeed, following Eisenhower's emphasis on states' rights in his statements at
Abilene, Senator Humphrey saw no reason to "harden" the Democratic
plank of 1948. Even prior to Eisenhower's statement, Democratic National Committee Chairman Frank McKinney had announced plans to
draft a civil-rights plank that would be acceptable to all factions of the
party. Some liberal Democrats, however, were not listening to the
voices of compromise. Averell Harriman was making a major issue of
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the president's civil-rights program; and Herbert Lehman was playing
the Humphrey role of 1948, insisting upon no retreat whatever. 16
But it was Harry Truman who headed the fight against any compromise on civil rights. He now had a record to defend, and defend it
he did. On May 17, 1952, speaking to one thousand cheering and applauding members of the Americans for Democratic Action, he assailed
the "dinosaur wing" of the Republican party and sparked hope for a
Democratic victory in 1952. In the course of the address, he emphasized the necessity for firmness on civil rights, hoping that his position
would be the basis of the plank in the Democratic platform of 1952.
Although pleased with the "good progress" since 1948, he stressed the
need for enactment of the civil-rights legislation recommended in his
special message of February 1948. 17
Although the speech was largely a partisan performance, Truman
refrained from injecting politics into his discussion of civil rights, except to refer to the forthcoming Democratic platform. And the press
chose to emphasize that aspect of the address. The New York Times
reported that it "threw cold water'' on McKinney's hopes for compromise at the Democratic convention. The Washington Star believed
that it "wrecked" McKinney's plan while launching a determined drive
for a vigorous civil-rights plank. 18
Yet it was Truman's speech on June 13 to the graduating students
of Howard University that represented the capstone of his oratorical
efforts, an address bereft of partisanship and devoted entirely to civil
rights. Using the report of his Committee on Civil Rights as a reference
point, the president summed up the progress of the past five years. He
was happy that the report and his civil-rights program had given "voice
and expression" to the "great change of sentiment" throughout the
country. "They are the trumpet blast outside the walls of Jericho-the
crumbling walls of prejudice. And their work is not yet done. We still
have a long way to go."
He then turned to the record. Noting that only five states retained
the poll tax as a prerequisite for voting, he urged abolition. Observing
that local, state, and federal authorities had moved vigorously to protect the security of persons, he pressed for a federal antilynching law
to complete the program. He was pleased with the court decisions
permitting Negro students to attend previously all-white colleges and
universities. In housing, the Supreme Court's decision outlawing enforcement of restrictive covenants was a "major step" along the road of
progress. So was his public-housing program, under which 177 projects
were open in 1950 "to families of all races and creeds." He took special
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pride in the progress of the federal government, including the work of
his Fair Employment Board and his Committee on Government Contract Compliance. He also reminded his audience that eleven states
and twenty cities now had fair employment laws on the books. Observing that some of America's "greatest generals" believed in the
necessity of milita1y segregation, Truman pronounced it "plain nonsense." He praised Gen. Matthew Ridgway for integrating the Far
Eastern command and referred to the recent order calling for integration of American forces in Europe. "From Tokyo to Heidelberg these
orders have gone out that will make our fighting forces a more perfect
instrument of democratic defense."
Yet, he concluded, the country needed voluntary, local, and state
action. It also needed the civil-rights program that he had recommended to Congress in 1948. "I am not one of those who feel that we
can leave these matters up to the states alone, or that we can rely solely
on the efforts of men of good will," he asserted. The federal government had to fulfill the promises of this country's great historical documents. "The full force and power of the federal government must
stand behind the protection of rights guaranteed in the federal Constitution.''19
It was the most impressive speech on civil rights of his career-or
the career of any president for that matter-and black Americans were
quick to applaud. The reaction of the Negro press was generally twofold. On the one hand, the editors praised Truman for the most candid
presidential statement on civil rights in the country's history. They also
interpreted his address as a repudiation of those who were pleading for
compromise at the Democratic convention. 20 And Truman intended
such an interpretation. Asked during his news conference on June 19
if his speech reflected what he expected in the civil-rights plank, he
quickly replied: "Yes, and if you will read the message of 1948, you
will find just what it ought to be. There hasn't been any change on
my part."21
Nor were Truman's efforts only rhetorical. Although he declined
to endorse publicly any of the Democratic aspirants for the presidential nomination, he and his staff made a determined effort to influence
the language and direction of the platform, particularly the civil-rights
plank. For several weeks, his aides had been forwarding various drafts
of the proposed platform to John McCormack, chairman of the platform committee. Philip Perlman, Truman's solicitor general, was also
working closely with the committee, reputedly as his personal reprcsentative.22
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In the negotiations that followed, Truman and the White House
staff decided upon a civil-rights plank calling unequivocally for "enforceable" federal legislation dealing with employment, lynching, and
the poll tax. It also included a provision aimed at senatorial filibusters
and the arbitrary actions of the House Rules Committee. "In order
that the will of the American people may be expressed upon these and
other vital legislation proposals," the statement read, "we believe that
action should be taken at the beginning of the 83rd Congress to improve congressional procedures so that votes may be had and decisions
made after reasonable debate without being blocked by a minority in
either House."23
As expected, the civil-rights plank was the major bone of contention within the resolutions committee. After days of wrangling, the
apostles of compromise-particularly John Sparkman, John McCormack, William Dawson, and Brooks Hays-won some concessions. For
his conciliatory efforts, Dawson also won the enmity of his black colleague in the House, Adam Clayton Powell, who denounced Dawson
as well as the plank. When the platform reached the convention floor
around midnight on July 23, fears that there might be a fight did not
materialize. Northern liberals had already agreed not to contest the
plank, and southerners lost all opportunity to do so when .Sam Rayburn, permanent chairman of the convention, indulged in some fast
gavel work. As southerners rose to protest the plank, Rayburn called
for a voice vote and quickly declared the platform accepted. 24
Although the civil-rights plank fell short of Truman's demands, he
was willing to accept it. He praised it in a fighting speech to convention delegates on July 26. "They weasel on civil rights," he stated in
referring to Republicans. "Read their civil rights paragraph, and then
read our paragraph on civil rights, and see which one you want." Later
in the address, he also promised to "carry on the fight for the full protection of civil rights to all of our citizens in all parts of the country,
without regard to race, religion, or national origin."25
Yet lost in most of the news stories heralding the compromise and
in the reports of Powell's bitterness was the fact that the civil-rights
plank of 1952 represented an advance over that of 1948. Truman had
won more than he had lost, and most civil-rights advocates were satisfied with the final product. For example, Walter White called it "a
signal victory for the forces of liberalism in the party" and noted that
despite some imprecision in language, the plank substantially embodied the demands of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights. In
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short, White said that it represented a "distinct advance" over its
counterpart of 1948.26
Although Truman's demand for a statement calling for "enforceable" federal legislation was sacrificed to the politics of compromise,
the plank did favor federal legislation "effectively" to secure equal
rights, a statement roughly parallel to that of 1948 "guaranteeing" those
rights. Moreover, although the provision urging improvement of procedures to permit majority rule to prevail in both houses was not included in the plank itself, it was included in a separate category immediately preceding the statement on civil rights. To the NAACP, this
was the "one item which marks the great advance over 1948," for legislation was impossible without revision of Rule XXII on senatorial cloture. The platform statement also embraced the arbitrary power of the
House Rules Committee to bottle up legislation of which it disapproved. The item, concluded the association, was thus "the milk in
the coconut."27
There were other improvements over the 1948 plank. In 1952
Democrats placed equal employment opportunity first on their list of
legislative priorities, whereas in 1948 they had referred first to the
right of full political participation, or, in other words, abolition of the
poll tax. Nor did the party ignore the advances in civil rights of the
past four years, pointing proudly to the progress "made in securing
equality of treatment and opportunity in the nation's armed forces and
the civil service and all areas under federal jurisdiction." The plank
also complimented the Justice Department for "successfully arguing in
the courts for the elimination of many illegal discriminations." In a
separate category, the party also took pride in the new status of Puerto
Rico and pledged continued support for its growth and development.
Finally, the plank of 1952 was broader and embraced minority
groups that had previously been ignored. In addition to reiterating
earlier pleas for Alaskan and Hawaiian statehood, increased self-government for the territories, and home rule for the District of Columbia,
the platform advocated "improvement of employment conditions of
migratory workers and increased protection of their safety and health."
Another long section promised a fair deal for the American lndian. 28
Although Congressman Brooks Hays subsequently refused to compare the two Democratic platforms-because "the background was so
different"-he did concede that they were similar, noting also that the
southern rebels of 1948 would never have accepted the plank of 1952.
The latter confession naturally brings up the question of why the South
was more agreeable four years later. There is no simple or single
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answer. Hays suggested a partial explanation when he maintained,
perhaps correctly, that the Dixiecrats took a walk in 1948 because the
plank specifically commended Truman for his "courageous" position on
civil rights. 29 In 1952 neither the White House nor anyone else insisted
upon a comparable statement, which represented the major concession
to the South in the party platform. In addition, Truman was not a
candidate for reelection, and the "traitor" to the South was therefore
not a major issue. The Dixiecrats had also suffered the pain of defeat
in 1948, thereby learning the virtue of working within the two-party
system. Finally, all of the avowed, serious candidates for the Democratic presidential nomination-except Averell Harriman, who had
little chance-were either equivocal about or opposed to strong federal
civil-rights legislation. The nomination of Adlai Stevenson for the
presidency was thus palatable to many southerners, and the choice of
John Sparkman of Alabama as his running mate was frosting on the
cake.
In contrast with 1948, then, the attitudes of the candidates, and
not the civil-rights planks, were probably the major concern of those
on the firing line for equal justice. No longer fearful of massive southern defections, Democratic leaders were now worried about losing the
votes of northern Negroes and their white allies. Adam Clayton Powell
had already promised not to campaign for the national ticket, calling
for a boycott of the election unless Stevenson took a stronger position on
civil rights. And the Illinois governor was taking his time in catching
up with the views of Harry Truman and the Democratic platform. On
July 30, when reporters asked if a president should use the authority of
his office to influence senatorial revision of Rule XXII, Stevenson equivocated, indicating that he needed further study. Nor would he endorse
an enforceable FEPC, as Truman had consistently demanded. On
August 4 Stevenson was even more hesitant, when he noted that "it
would be a very dangerous thing indeed to limit debate in a parliamentary body in a democracy" and concluded that "perhaps the Senate
would be better able to discuss that and adjust it than I would."30
The pressure on Stevenson became intense. On August 4, sixteen
Eisenhower supporters, including Henry Cabot Lodge, issued a statement declaring that a Republican victory in November would expedite
passage of an FEPC with "adequate" enforcement powers. Although
the general had not embraced the promise, several Negro Republicans
were convinced that eventually he would do so. Truman was also
making things uncomfortable for the governor. During a news conference on August 7, when asked his opinion of Stevenson's view on do-
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ture, Truman interrupted to snap, "I am standing on the Democratic
platform."31
Stevenson soon capitulated. Addressing the New York Democratic
convention on August 28, he urged revision of Rule XXII and promised,
if elected, to use presidential influence to encourage Congress "to shake
off its ancient shackles." He also endorsed an enforceable FEPC. It
was enough for Congressman Powell, who declared himself "thoroughly satisfied." So was the NAACP. The association insisted that it
was endorsing no one, but its board of directors passed a resolution
noting that Stevenson had taken the "most forthright" position on civil
rights, particularly because of his views on senatorial cloture and
FEPC. Although "impressed" with Eisenhower's sincerity and pleased
with his recent pronouncements against segregation in the military
and the District of Columbia, the board regretted his failure to support
the two key issues that Stevenson had recently endorsed. 32
The NAACP, however, was unhappy about the "unsatisfactory
records" on civil rights of the vice-presidential candidates. The opposition to Sparkman began shortly before his nomination, when Adam
Clayton Powell and most Negro delegates, learning of Stevenson's
preference for the Alabama senator, stalked from the convention floor.
Sparkman's nomination also prompted Walter White to wonder how
the party could nominate a candidate who apparently opposed the
civil-rights plank of the platform. Yet Sparkman was not about to repudiate what was partly his handiwork, and within hours after the
convention, he publicly reaffirmed his support of the plank. 33
Civil-rights spokesmen and organizations, however, were virtually
unanimous in their intial opposition to both candidates. Although
Nixon's voting record on civil rights was better than Sparkman's, it was
nothing for a nonsouthemer to boast about. Moreover, Sparkman was
more progressive on "bread and butter" issues, and impartial observers
were declaring a draw between the two. Late in September the Negro
press discovered something that both had in common. Both had signed
racially restrictive covenants in purchasing homes in Washington, and
cries of alarm again appeared in the Negro press. By this time, however, most of the Negro newspapers were in the process of lining up
with Stevenson, and a double standard in judging the vice-presidential
candidates was soon evident. Because Sparkman was from Alabama,
one black editor rationalized that he had "many habits customary for a
southerner.... He is not riding under false colors. Nixon is a northerner. He should have a far better record than Sparkman, but he
hasn't."34
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Negroes found other palatable things about Sparkman. One editor
argued that only on the issue of an enforceable FEPC was the Alabaman "a captive of the region of the country he represents." A columnist saw signilicance in Sparkman's southern Methodist background,
for southern Methodists "have always led in programs of interracial
cooperation." And over and over again, blacks were predicting that
Sparkman would be another Harry Truman, another Hugo Black, or
another Judge Waring. 35
The predictions of a possible conversion on Sparkman's part were
based almost entirely on speculation, although he was surely not the
same politician who had declared in Mobile in April 1950 that he was
opposed to civil rights-"always have been and always will be." In
addition, the mixed reaction of the white South to the StevensonSparkman ticket prompted second thoughts from many Negroes. In
September, Governor James Byrnes of South Carolina declared for
Eisenhower because of Stevenson's switch on a compulsory FEPC.
Apparently, Byrnes had little faith in Sparkman's attitude or influence.
Moreover, by October, fifty-six southern papers had endorsed the
Eisenhower-Nixon ticket, in contrast with only twenty-nine for Stevenson and Sparkman. "The fact that southerners are turning to Eisenhower," wrote C. A. Franklin, "is evidence enough that John Sparkman
is not a bad fellow. If he were a Dixiecrat, he could hold the southern
die-hards, but those who voted for Thurmond in 1948 are now supporting Eisenhower and Nixon, not Stevenson and Sparkman."36
In the fall campaign both Stevenson and Eisenhower vied for the
northern Negro vote, and both emulated Truman by speaking in
Harlem. But Eisenhower's unwillingness to endorse an enforceable
FEPC or revision of the senatorial rule on cloture, coupled with the
southern strategy of the Republican party in 1952, had its price. Negroes were not coming out to hear the general. One black correspondent traveling with the Eisenhower entourage observed that "if there
is going to be a wholesale swing of colored voters to the Republican
column this year, it will go down as the best kept secret of the cent ury. "37
Yet the major obstacles to Republican inroads into the black vote
were the past accomplishments and the present contentiousness of
Harry S. Truman. Republican attacks on his administration for
bungling concerning Korea, for corruption, and for communism, as
well as Stevenson's frantic attempts to dissociate himself from the
administration's liabilities, goaded Truman into another hard-hitting
campaign. And it was Truman, not the nominees of either party, who
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attempted to make civil rights one of the major issues of 1952. He introduced civil rights into the campaign in his Labor Day statement,
released on August 28, in which he declared, "We must end the discrimination which has cast shadows on some parts of our great record
of freedom." In his Labor Day address in Milwaukee, he also praised
Stevenson for his efforts in promoting the cause of civil rights. 88
Truman launched his major campaign late in September, a whistlestop performance in which he delivered 211 speeches and traveled
18,500 miles by rail. After a whirlwind tour of the West, he headed
north, where he first stressed civil rights in Buffalo on October 9.
Thereafter to the end of the campaign, he emphasized civil rights in
several addresses and sprinkled references to the issue in others; and
his approach of 1948 paled by comparison. 39 On October 11 Truman
entered Harlem to receive the Franklin D. Roosevelt Memorial Brotherhood Medal for the second time and to deliver his major civil-rights
address. Aside from its partisanship, the speech was largely a paraphrase of his Howard University address in June. 40
Infuriated because of Eisenhower's endorsement of Senator Joseph
McCarthy and others who had vilified Gen. George C. Marshall, Truman struck hard at the Republican presidential candidate. In Brooklyn,
he criticized him for opposing the use of federal power for an effective
FEPC. Occasionally, he landed some low blows, as when he repeatedly
maintained that Eisenhower still favored segregation in the military,
despite the general's assertions to the contrary. 41
Truman also tried to embellish Sparkman's record on civil rights.
In Philadelphia, he reminded his listeners that the Alabaman had
promised to support the Democratic platform, and added, "John Sparkman is an honorable man and he will honor that pledge." Speaking on
Chicago's South Side on October 29, he informed his black audience
that Sparkman had had a hand in writing the Democratic platform,
which contained "the strongest civil rights stand ever taken by a major
political party in this country." He also used the occasion to praise the
Fahy Committee for its role in integrating the rnilitary. 42
In fact, Truman's relatively brief message of October 29 was especially noteworthy, if only because of his choice of words. In the early
years of his administration, he had consistently denounced discrimination and pleaded for equal justice; but not until after the 1948 campaign had he struck specifically, and then only occasionally, at segregation in his public comments. And when he referred to its absence or
to its eradication, he had generally used the words "nonsegregated,"
"unsegregated," or "desegregation." His speech on Chicago's South
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Side, however, was studded with at least a dozen uses of "integration,"
"integrated," and "integrating." The change in vocabulary was thus
symptomatic of the change in the thrust of his administration after
1948.
There were also suggestions of higher priorities. The Republican
emphasis on Korea, corruption, and communism was attractive to many
Americans who wanted relief from it all. But Harry Truman also had
three issues-prosperity, civil rights, and foreign policy-as he contended in a major speech in Detroit on October 30. On civil rights, he
declared that his administration had "awakened the conscience of the
nation. Instead of falling backward into a period of race hate and
prejudice after World War II, we went forward. We are steadily
breaking down the barriers of prejudice throughout our economic, cultural, and political life. We still have a very long way to go, but this
progress is for me one of the great satisfactions of my whole lifetime." 43
Never before had he given civil rights such preference. Nor was
it simply a passing thought. Speaking over nationwide radio on election eve, he referred again to the three campaign issues. "This election
may decide whether we shall go ahead and expand our prosperity here
at home or slide back into a depression," he argued in his short address.
"It may decide whether we shall preserve and extend our civil rights
and liberties, or see them fall before a wave of smear and fear. Above
all, it may decide whether we shall finally achieve lasting peace or be
led into a third world war."44
To most black Americans, Truman had hit the major themes of
1952. As a deprived minority, Negroes were intensely concerned with
continued prosperity, progress in civil rights, and world peace. In general, they agreed with Truman that American involvement in Korea
was necessary to prevent a third world war. Understandably, as a vulnerable minority, they were never enamored with the wild accusations
about subversive elements in government. The charges of corruption,
admittedly true in some instances, had never touched the president,
and the Call denounced as "Pure Bosh" the argument that Ike's election would enthrone honesty in government. 45
In a reversal of 1948, all of the major Negro papers, except the
Pittsburgh Courier and the Daily World (Atlanta), endorsed the
Democratic ticket, as did all of the major Negro magazines. 46 The
endorsements demonstrated that the identification of black leadership
with the Democratic party had grown stronger during the Truman
administration, in considerable part because of Truman himself. Few
black editors agreed with the Courier when it contended that for all

Quest and Response

330

of his fine words, Truman had really done nothing fundamental for
Negroes. And they could not see much of an issue in the paper's indictment of both FDR and Truman for appointing white advisers on race
relations nor in the Courier's statement that "Stevenson will turn this
job over to his ghost writer, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., of Harvard, who
knows as much about Negroes as the King of Norway."47
Three considerations were paramount to most Negro editors in
1952. One was Harry Truman, whose record on civil rights was unequaled by any president and whose campaign for justice and equality
in the fall of 1952 was impressive by the standards of any time or place.
Stevenson would continue the commitment, some reasoned, if only
because of Harry Truman. A second consideration involved the civilrights planks of both parties and the attitudes of Stevenson and Eisenhower. In 1948, some Negro papers had concluded that both Truman
and Dewey were solid on civil rights. Some of the more conservative
black editors could thus endorse Dewey for economic reasons without
fear of what might happen to civil rights. It was not that easy in 1952,
for the two presidential candidates differed significantly on the gut
issues of an enforceable FEPC and revision of cloture. Stevenson had
embraced both, but reluctantly and only after pressure from Truman
and Negro leaders, while Eisenhower refused to commit himself to
either. 48 The situation also had its irony; for although the analyses of
Negro editors were essentially correct, Eisenhower did speak more
vigorously for civil rights in certain northern cities than Dewey had
in 1948.
Then, there was also the "I like Ike" sentiment in the South for
which Eisenhower was not primarily responsible, even though he was
appealing to the region for support. For years, various Republican and
southern Democratic leaders had been exchanging wistful glances,
and Strom Thurmond's candidacy in 1948 had only momentarily suspended the flirtation. Ike's conservative position on several issues added
a fillip to the romance, and as Dixie increasingly embraced the general
during the fall of 1952, Negro editors became correspondingly more
frigid. To Franklin of the Call, Ike was a "changeling," one who simultaneously courted Negroes in the North and James Byrnes in the South.
The Afro-American pointedly noted that its friends did not include
"the Dixiecrats whom Ike loves"; and the Amsterdam News, although
it endorsed Republicans Irving Ives and Jacob Javits for reelection,
could not support the general because of his forays into the South. 49
This year differed from 1948, in that the opinion of most Negro
editors corresponded to that of a majority of black Americans. In a rec-
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ord vote, Negroes Hocked to the polls to cast 73 percent of their vote for
Stevenson and Sparkman, a 4 percent increase over Truman's percentage of 1948. Stevenson's higher percentage resulted from the return of
Wallace voters to the Democratic party as well as from the defection
of some Negro Republicans. But the Negro vote as the balance of
power was completely ineffective in the face of an Eisenhower landslide. Although Stevenson received twenty-seven million popular
votes, Eisenhower won nearly thirty-four million votes and defeated
Stevenson decisively in the electoral college by a margin of 442 to 89.
In the South, Eisenhower cut heavily into the normal Democratic vote
and even carried a few states-the first Republican to do so since 1928.
Ironically, the Negro vote as a balance of power did operate in South
Carolina, and probably in Louisiana, and Negroes thus had the satisfaction of denying Governor Byrnes the pleasure of delivering South
Carolina to Eisenhower. It also increased their awareness of the importance of the southern black vote, and black leadership thereafter
placed even higher priority on voter registration in the South. 50
Although there were predictions that Indians were on the warpath
and that 1952 was the first presidential election in which their vote
would be noteworthy, they had no effect on the presidential outcome
in any state. The newly enfranchised Indians of Arizona, however, did
contribute to the defeat of Ernest McFarland by Barry Goldwater;
and in Colorado, they provided the margin for Wayne Aspinall's election to the House of Representatives. Indians were also capable of
reading the signs of the times, and thereafter they too placed greater
emphasis on voter registration. Between 1952 and 1956 the Indians of
New Mexico increased their registration from less than 8 percent to
more than 24 percent. Elsewhere in the West there were additional
increases in the number of Indians registered. 51
Black Americans took Eisenhower's victory in stride. The Call
urged everyone to close ranks behind the general, although it expected
less progress on civil rights in the ensuing four years. The Journal and
Guide agreed, seeing no reason for hysteria and subsequently expressing confidence that civil rights would not lose ground under Ike's
stewardship. The NAACP observed that Republicans now had to produce, and it expected "Republicans to stop their shadowboxing on
civil rights, now that they are in power, and do something about revision of Rule 22 to restore democracy to the Senate."52
Stevenson received few accolades from civil-rights leaders, and the
bulk of their favorable comments following the election was reserved
for Harry Truman as he prepared to leave the White House. In the
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eyes of most white Americans, Truman may have appeared to be discredited, but black Americans saw him in a different light. Glowing
tributes appeared in the Negro press, and personal letters flowed into
the White House. 53 On November 14 the National Newspaper Publishers Association (NNPA) presented a plaque to Harry S. Truman,
"who has awakened the conscience of America and given new strength
to our democracy by his courageous efforts on behalf of freedom and
equality for all citizens." And in the weeks that followed, he received
similar recognition from the American Council on Human Rights and
from the American Jewish Congress, which granted him the Stephen
S. Wise Award for 1952.54
But Truman was not resting on such laurels. Indeed, during the
campaign, he had appointed Clifford R. Moore as a United States commissioner, the first Negro to hold such a position since Reconstruction
days. Upon receipt of his award from the NNPA, he promised to continue working for implementation of the report of his Committee on
Civil Rights, "for it is part and parcel of the principles for which I have
always stood, and for which I will aways stand as long as I live." On
November 16, when laying the cornerstone of the new temple of the
Washington Hebrew Congregation, he used the occasion to denounce
bigotry and to emphasize the importance of religion in the life of the
nation. Upon the death of William Green, he publicly praised the AFL
leader for his fight against discrimination in employment. When he
participated in the dedication of a Presbyterian church in Alexandria,
Virginia, he reminded the gathering that the most important function
of the church was to "wage a ceaseless war against injustice in our
society. The churches in particular are a force which should fight for
brotherhood, and decency, and better lives for all our people."55 Unfortunately, America's churches were lagging far behind the president.
He also kept the faith in his remaining messages to Congress and
the country. On January 7, 1953, he sent his last State of the Union
message to the Hill. As it was no longer his place or prerogative to
present a legislative program, he concentrated on the challenges and
achievements of his administration. On civil rights, he expressed satisfaction that the barriers to equality were crumbling "in our armed
forces, our civil service, our universities, our railway trains, the residential districts of our cities-in stores and factories all across the
nation-in the polling booths as well." The progress was unmistakable
at all levels of government and in many private spheres as well. "There
has been a great awakening of the American conscience on the issue
of civil rights," he concluded. "And all this progress-still far from
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complete but still continuing-has been our answer, up to now, to
those who questioned our intention to live up to the promises of equal
freedom for us all." He included the same sentiments, and some of
the same phraseology, in his farewell address to the American people
on January 15. And in his annual economic report to Congress on
January 14 he noted that the elimination of discrimination was a "continuing objective of national policy."56
In admitting in his State of the Union address that progress on
civil rights was "far from complete," Truman certainly would have conceded that elimination of discrimination in the District of Columbia
was one of the remaining tasks. In fact, he confessed as much during
the campaign of 1952. The Republican plank on civil rights had
pledged "appropriate action to end segregation in the District of
Columbia"; and in campaigning on the issue, Eisenhower had accused
Truman of procrastination and had promised immediate action of his
own. Irritated, Truman replied in a speech in Newark on October 21,
1952, warning the general that more was involved than "waving a
wand." He also pointed to the progress in Washington, especially the
trend toward integration of theaters, hotels, restaurants, colleges and
universities, private elementary and secondary schools, and public
parks and playgrounds. He had not done more, he maintained after
the election, because he had lacked the authority. 57
It was indeed a complex situation. Race relations had been the
District's most difficult problem in the years after the Second World
War, as well as one of the administration's greatest embarrassments in
the rhetorical battles of the cold war. As racial barriers began to crack
elsewhere in the country during the postwar period, Washington's
segregationists strengthened its walls of prejudice, so that by mid 1947
their triumph seemed complete. Thereafter, however, they too fought
a delaying-and slowly losing-battle. Although the report of the
President's Committee on Civil Rights in 1947 called national attention
to the disgraceful discrimination in the capital, breakthroughs began in
1948. As a result of Shelley v. Kraemer in May 1948, residential segregation showed some signs of erosion. The census of 1950 revealed that
housing accommodations for blacks had spread into an additional 459
residential blocks, while those reserved exclusively for whites dropped
from 2,041 to 1,956. This indication of progress was compromised by
the District's urban renewal program, which generally meant that
Negroes were removed even though adequate facilities were not available elsewhere, thus forcing many black families to double up in ac-
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commodations that were already inadequate for a single household. 58
In short, too often urban renewal signified Negro removal.
More important than Shelley v. Kraemer was the report in December 1948 of the National Committee on Segregation in the Nation's
Capital, which contained enough statistical material to convince anyone with an open mind of the necessity for drastic improvement. It
also gave a shot in the arm to those private organizations, including
the NAACP, CORE, the American Friends Service Committee, the
Urban League, and the Jewish Community Council, which had long
fought the city's racial tyranny. So, too, did integration of the president's inaugural festivities of January 1949. In the years that followed,
the struggle to democratize Washington was fought in Congress, the
courts, and in the offices of large corporations, the District administrators, the National Capital Park and Planning Commission, the Department of the Interior, and the White House itself. 59
The District commissioners were initially unsympathetic to the
drive for integration and equal treatment, having ignored Truman's
1948 directive calling for nondiscrimination in federal employment.
Perhaps their reluctance stemmed from the unpleasant facts that Congress controlled the city's purse strings and that southerners dominated
the congressional committees. Whatever the case, the commissioners
eventually made concessions under pressure from the Interior Department and the White House.
The main struggle in 1949 and 1950 involved integration of recreational facilites. The matter was unusually complicated because of indistinct lines of authority. Although the Department of the Interior
still operated and supervised some of the parks and playgrounds, most
of them were under the control of the District Recreation Board, which
Congress had created in 1942 with authority to develop a comprehensive recreational program. In carrying out this mandate, the board
established a policy of racial segregation for many of the facilities,
particularly swimming pools. The Recreation Board did so with the
knowledge and apparent support of the National Capital Park and
Planning Commission, which functioned as a part of the Department
of the Interior. In fact, the board insisted that it had segregated certain areas because the planning commission's map of the District specifically designated them as black or white. Prodded by Under Secretary Oscar Chapman, Secretary Julius Krug in 1949 launched a campaign to integrate all recreational facilities in the District. Krug also
applied pressure on the planning commission, which removed the
racial designations immediately. 60
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Now the Recreation Board changed its story, insisting that it had
full authority under the act of 1942 to determine racial policies. At this
point, the president intervened and summoned the three District commissioners to the White House, where he informed them of his desire
that all public facilities in the capital be integrated. Although he admitted that the change in policy could not be precipitant, he wanted it
pursued "actively and progressively." The commissioners agreed and
immediately contacted the chairman of the Recreation Board, who
stated that it was only possible to commit the board to the "progressive
elimination of segregation."61
On June 14, 1949, the District Recreation Board rejected the Interior Department's motion to end segregation in playgrounds immediately and adopted another motion which pledged "realistic" efforts
toward removal of segregation consistent "with the public interest,
public order and effective administration." The board also unanimously
agreed to permit the use of public schools and community buildings
for interracial meetings. Although Negroes were displeased and
agreed with the Negro board member's denunciation of the settlement,
the Washington Post hailed it as "a discreet but a statesmanlike compromise." The board did seem to be moving in the right direction. It
had already opened all tennis courts; and when the Interior Department had offered to transfer jurisdiction of its pools and golf courses,
if operated under integrated conditions, the board was agreeable as far
as the golf courses were concerned. 62
But integrating Washington's swimming pools was another matter,
for the Recreation Board was clearly opposed to interracial swimming.
Civil-rights organizations, however, insisted upon integration, pointing
out that whites in the District could utilize forty-one public, private,
and commercial pools, while blacks had only four at their disposal.
Until 1949, because of white opposition, blacks had not attempted to
swim in four of the six integrated pools operated directly by the Interior Department. One day in June, however, fifty Negro youths were
refused admittance to the Anacostia pool, and an incident occurred
that evening. To avoid bloodshed and to buy time, Secretary Krug
closed the pool for the rest of the season. 63
In the off-season the administration intensified its efforts, although
Secretary Krug wavered occasionally, apparently once agreeing to segregate some pools, then denying that he had agreed, which prompted a
Washington publisher to call him a "God damn liar."64 Truman also
requested an additional appropriation for construction of an interracial
pool approximately a mile from Anacostia, but its location in the heart
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of the ghetto was obviously intended to produce voluntary segregation.
The Interior Department imported Professor Joseph D. Lohman of the
University of Chicago to improve the human touch of capital policemen, who were partially responsible for the Anacostia incident. Lohman subsequently kept in close contact with Philleo Nash of the White
House staff. In April 1950 the new secretary of the interior, Oscar
Chapman, offered all six pools to the Recreation Board if it would
operate them on an integrated basis-an obvious ploy to emphasize
the segregation policies of the board and to illustrate his own unwillingness to compromise. 65
Chapman was convinced that blacks and whites could swim together without having riots occur in their wake. In a form letter late in
May 1950, as he prepared to open all six pools on an integrated basis,
he noted the success of integrated swimming in the military and quoted
the Fahy Committee's conclusion that integration decreased racial
friction. Nonetheless, the local press predicted riots and bloodshed,
and the Recreation Board anticipated catastrophe. But Chapman was
right. In September he informed the president that the season had
been successful. The department's six pools had accommodated some
90,000 blacks and 146,000 whites without incident. He was also pleased
with the disappearance of racial barriers in a number of Washington's
privately owned restaurants, hotels, and places of amusement. So was
Truman. He found such progress "very heartening" and complimented
Chapman for a "wonderful job" and for setting an example "which
may clear up situations in other cities."66
The experiment was significant, for it undermined the major argument of the bigots and the fainthearted alike. The Washington Post,
confessing its earlier fear of trouble and its wrong-headedness in opposing Chapman, now conceded that "nonsegregated swimming is here
to stay." Indeed it was, although for the moment the Recreation Board
held grimly to segregation of pools under its jurisdiction. The following year the Interior Department's integrated pools again operated
without incident. Chapman was clearly the man of the hour; and
Walter White devoted one of his columns in the Defender to the secretary's persistent efforts to desegregate the District, beginning with his
contribution to Marian Anderson's concert at the Lincoln Memorial
in 1939.67
During the remainder of the Truman administration, Chapman
and the Recreation Board were at loggerheads. The board's promise of
"gradual" integration seemed farcical. By June 1952, it had integrated
only 9 additional playgrounds, all in residential areas in transition from
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white to black occupancy, while 128 facilities remained segregated.
Supported by a Justice Department brief, Chapman filed suit in district court in March 1952, demanding the withdrawal of sixty recreational areas from the jurisdiction of the Recreation Board unless integrated immediately. Although the judge ruled against Chapman, time
was running out on the board. Within a year it voluntarily voted to
integrate the pool at Rosedale playground, which was a jump over a
major psychological hurdle; and desegregation of other facilities soon
followed. 68
By 1951 the trend toward elimination of segregation was faintly
visible nearly everywhere in Washington. The District commissioners
were evincing increasing sympathy; and in 1950 they appointed a
Negro-another "first"-to the three-member boxing commission. Truman's commissioners also broke precedent in naming two blacks to the
nine-member Citizens Advisory Council, established to study reorganization of the District government. Moreover, Truman's appointment
of Joseph Donohue as a District commissioner undoubtedly strengthened the resolve of his colleagues, for Donohue was as outspoken
against segregation as they were silent. In 1951, with the support of
the chief of the fire department, the commissioners assigned several
black firemen to undermanned white companies. But the chairman of
the House District Committee hastened to indicate his displeasure, as
did the firemen's union, and the commissioners backed off. The situation was touchy because of the close living conditions of the firefighters.
Even when the District commissioners, at Eisenhower's instructions,
issued a desegregation order in November 1953, they expressly excluded the fire department. 6 9
The halting, painful progress was also evident in the voluntary
desegregation of privately owned facilities, although most hotels in the
District continued to refuse black guests. But there was noticeable
progress in the theaters. In 1952 the National Theater, which had
closed in 1948 rather than integrate, reopened under new management
on a nondiscriminatory basis. Although several other legitimate theaters were open to all patrons, the downtown motion-picture theaters
still excluded blacks, unless they happened to be foreign dignitaries.
The restaurant situation, too, was improving, but not without pressure.
As a result of extensive picketing over many months, several department stores and dime stores integrated their lunch counters. By 1952,
at least sixty-four downtown restaurants and lunch counters were serving black customers. 70
In the struggle to integrate eating facilities in the city, the federal
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government had taken the lead, first in government cafeterias and then
in Washington's National Airport. But the ultimate victory could not
have been won without the persistence of concerned citizens of the
District. The legal fight to integrate restaurants began shortly after the
National Committee on Segregation in the Nation's Capital discovered
the "mysterious" disappearance of the civil-rights acts of 1872 and 1873,
which had been passed by the popularly elected District Assembly.
The acts made it a misdemeanor for owners of restaurants and certain
other public accommodations to refuse service to any well-behaved,
respectable person because of his race or color. In 1901 Congress had
codified all laws for the city but had omitted the acts of 1872 and 1873
without expressly repealing them. In May 1949 lawyers of the District's
chapter of the National Lawyers Guild presented evidence of the validity of these laws to the District commissioners, requesting the board
to provide for future enforcement of them. 71
The commissioners conducted a leisurely investigation of their
own, then instructed their lawyers to institute a court case upon receipt
of complaints. By this time, civil-rights advocates in the District were
well prepared. In September 1949 they organized the interracial Coordinating Committee for the Enforcement of the D.C. Anti-Discrimination Laws to rally the interested and to initiate test cases. The chairman of the committee was the aged and courageous Mary Church
Terrell. In company with two other blacks and a white member of the
Friends, she sought and was refused service at one of the Thompson
restaurants in Washington; and the case of District of Columbia v.
John R. Thompson Company was soon in the courts. In July 1950 a
judge of the District Municipal Court ruled that the "lost" laws had
been repealed by implication and were therefore unenforceable. 72
The case then went to the Municipal Court of Appeals. In May
1951, by a vote of two to one, the judges declared the act of 1873 valid.
Because the Thompson Company immediately appealed to the Circuit
Court of Appeals, the District commissioners announced their intention to ignore the issue until its final disposition in the courts. In the
meantime, while the case languished in the higher court, Mary Church
Terrell and other members of the committee kept up the pressure on
Washington restaurants through sit-ins, pickets, and boycotts. 73
Mrs. Terrell's committee gained a potent ally in June 1951 when
the Department of Justice entered the case. Oscar Chapman, always
sensitive to racial events in the District, was apparently the first to
notice the Thompson case, and in October 1950 he had called it to the
attention of Solicitor General Philip Perlman. The case was then in the
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Municipal Court of Appeals; and Perlman promised to participate in
the appeal, regardless of the court's decision. He was as good as his
word. He first filed a memorandum, and when the Circuit Court accepted the case, he was ready with an amicus curiae brief which had
been prepared with the assistance of Philip Elman and T. S. L.
Perlman. 74
Contending that the "lost" laws were valid and still enforceable,
Philip Perlman cited three reasons for racial discrimination in the capital being a matter of serious concern to the nation. First, the government had an established policy of nondiscrimination concerning its
employees and therefore "particularly deplores discriminations of any
kind against its employees because of color, religion, national ancestry,
or other irrelevant fact." Second, Washington was the seat of the embassies and legations of foreign countries, and their officials and visiting citizens would receive an "exaggerated" and "misleading" impression of racial discrimination in America as a result of the intolerance
of the District. Last, "and perhaps most important," the brief contended, "the existence of racial discrimination in the nation's capital
constitutes a serious flaw in our democracy. The need to eliminate this
gap between ideals and practices represents a challenge to the sincerity
of our profession of the democratic faith." 75
It was Perlman's fifth and last amicus curiae brief in a civil-rights
case, and it encouraged civil-rights leaders to hope for a favorable decision.76 In January 1953, however, the Circuit Court of Appeals, by a
five to four vote, ruled the acts of 1872 and 1873 invalid on the grounds
that the District Assembly lacked the authority to enact legislation and
that the code of 1901 had implicitly repealed them anyway. It was a
tortured decision with which Judge Charles Fahy strongly disagreed.
In a dissenting opinion, concurred in by three of his colleagues, the
former chairman of Truman's committee for equality in the military
struck hard in favor of the legitimacy of the "lost" laws, which he
thought were by no means simply "derelicts of the past."77
It was now up to the Eisenhower administration and the Supreme
Court. In February 1953 the new secretary of the interior, Douglas
McKay, urged Attorney General Herbert Brownell to file a petition in
the Supreme Court seeking to reverse the decision. Brownell was
agreeable. He first "suggested" to the court that it advance the case,
then he selected Philip Elman, who had assisted Perlman, to present
the administration's amicus curiae brief. In June 1953 the Vinson court
unanimously upheld the law of 1873 but left in doubt the legal status
of the 1872 act, which had also applied to hotels in the District and
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which may have been repealed by the law of 1873. Moreover, in deciding in favor of the legality of the 1873 law, the court thereby upheld
the right of Congress to delegate its legislative power-as it had done
to the District Assembly-and thus gave a big boost to the advocates of
home rule. 78
The Thompson case was one of the most significant events in the
history of race relations in the District. The head of the Thompson
restaurants immediately indicated his willingness to abide by the decision, and others soon followed. By December 1953 every restaurant
was reported open, and the police were enforcing the new policy. Because of the ambiguity of the court's opinion about the 1872 act, however, the hotel situation was chaotic; but it, too, would soon change. 79
The Thompson case also spotlighted an embarrassing paradox.
While privately owned facilities were becoming increasingly integrated, Washington's public-school system remained rigidly segregated.
Moreover, the schools for black children were invariably inferior. In
1947, for example, the District's expenditure per black student was
$120.52, compared to $169.21 per white. Classrooms in the ghetto were
overcrowded, while space in white schools went unused. Additional
appropriations from Congress in 1949 had no meaningful effect on the
disparity, which threatened to widen. The first court cases instituted
in the city thus concentrated on the glaring inequities and focused on
the desperate need for equal facilities. Most organizations backing the
protests also avoided a direct attack on segregation itself. 80
But sentiment in favor of integration was rising. The President's
Committee on Civil Rights had vigorously denounced the situation in
the District, pointedly noting that "the core of Washington's segregated
society is its dual system of public education" and that "reasonable
equality" was impossible under segregated conditions. In 1948 Segregation in Washington devoted a chapter to the subject, and in 1949 the
Catholic hierarchy in Washington was concerned enough to order integration of all parochial schools in the District. Catholic University was
already integrated, and American University partially so. By 1952 the
public school situation was so chaotic and citizens' groups were so
aroused that even the fainthearted now conceded the inevitability of
integration "in our time."81
In 1952, too, the case of Bolling v. Sharpe, which dealt with the
District's segregation of public schools, was before the Supreme Court,
in company with four other cases involving segregated public schools
in Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware. For the first time,
the court had agreed to hear suits concerning segregation in elemen-
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tary and secondary schools, and the result would be the historic decision of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka. Faced with this threat,
some southern states had been moving with indecent haste to try to
equalize expenditures and facilities, but the NAACP's staff of lawyers
and professional consultants were well prepared for this ploy. Indeed,
in the Sweatt case of 1950 the NAACP had attacked all forms of segregation on the grounds of its adverse psychological effects. So had
Solicitor General Perlman in the Henderson case of the same year.
Moreover, in 1951, when a federal district court in South Carolina had
ruled in favor of segregation, the association had offered expert testimony, much of it first assembled for Truman's Midcentury White
House Conference on Children and Youth in 1950, to illustrate the
damaging psychological effects of racial segregation. 82
Not everyone was confident that the Supreme Court would render
a favorable decision or that it would expressly reverse the separatebut-equal doctrine. The Courier found such a likelihood remote and
denounced the NAACP for its frontal assault on Plessy v. Ferguson. In
particular, there was suspicion that in the Shelley, Sweatt, McLaurin,
and Henderson cases, Chief Justice Fred Vinson had gone as far as his
intellectual and environmental equipment would permit. Vinson's
delay in hearing the cases seemed to add credence to the fear. Even
White House Assistant Philleo Nash thought it "unlikely that the court
will need to go as far as the constitutional question in order to dispose
of the cases," although he added that the government ought to. prepare
for that possibility. 83
Nor was the NAACP sanguine at the outset. In fact, the legal staff
was initially unhappy with the cases it was representing before the
high tribunal. The five cases had resulted by "sheer accident," Thurgood Marshall later recalled, and had developed on the local level with
no master plan involved. The cases had upset the association's timetable. After successfully assaulting segregation in professional and
graduate schools, the NAACP had planned next to attack its presence
in colleges and universities, then finally in secondary and elementary
schools. The five cases before the Supreme Court in 1952, however,
represented a giant leap to the elementary level, where most of the opposition to integration was concentrated. "We were kind of peeved,"
Marshall concluded. "We didn't want it, but we had it."84
The Supreme Court postponed argument on the cases until December 1952, ostensibly to allow sufficient time for the filing of briefs
in all five suits. The delay also conveniently, and probably wisely, removed the cases from the politics of a presidential campaign, which
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both the court and the Department of Justice may have had in mind.
At this point, the Truman administration entered the case. Although it
has been suggested that Solicitor General Perlman opposed a government brief in the elementary-schools cases, a statement seemingly at
variance with his record, he was no longer involved as a result of his
resignation earlier in the year. Instead, Attorney General James P.
McGranery, after visiting the White House and receiving Truman's
approval, 85 filed an amicus curiae brief on December 2, 1952. He and
Philip Elman were its signatories.
In his thirty-two page brief, McGranery struck hard at racial discrimination and its adverse effects both at home and abroad. Observing
that Washington was "the window through which the world looks into
our house," he placed the argument in the context "of the present
world struggle between freedom and tyranny.... Racial discrimination provides grist for the Communist propaganda mills, and it raises
doubts even among friendly nations as to the intensity of our devotion
to the democratic faith." He then quoted Secretary of State Dean
Acheson, who had informed him that because of racial discrimination
during the past six years, "the damage to our foreign relations attributable to this source has become progressively greater."
The brief granted that the court might not need to reach the question of the validity of the separate-but-equal doctrine, but that if it
did, Plessy v. Ferguson should be reexamined and overruled. For, as
the government had already pointed out in the Henderson, Sweatt, and
McLaurin cases, the doctrine was "wrong as a matter of constitutional
law, history and policy.... In sum, the doctrine ... is an unwarranted
departure, based upon dubious assumptions of fact combined with a
disregard of the basic purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, from
the fundamental principle that all Americans, whatever their race or
color, stand equal and alike before the law."
In conclusion, Attorney General McGranery suggested that if the
court overturned the Plessy doctrine, it "should take into account the
need, not only for prompt vindication of the constitutional rights
lated, but also for orderly and reasonable solution of the vexing problems which may arise in eliminating segregation." In a footnote, however, he called for immediate integration where "the separate schools
are also physically unequal and inferior." He also suggested that the
court might want to consider a second round of argument to determine
a timetable for implementing integration, a recommendation which the
court subsequently heeded. 86
The McGranery brief contained neither psychological evidence

vio-
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about the debilitating effects of segregation nor an insistence that the
separate-but-equal doctrine be overturned in these particular cases before the court. The NAACP took care of those arguments in its own
brief and its oral presentation. Yet McGranery had vigorously insisted
that segregation was unconstitutional and had no place in American
life, thus reminding the court that eventually it would have to tangle
with the basic question involved. The attorney general also informally
requested permission to present an oral argument, but the court apparently rejected the plea on grounds that are as yet unclear. 87
Not until June 1953 did the Supreme Court speak, and then only
with muffied voice. On the same day as the Thompson decision, the
court asked for more information and evidence from the participants
in the Brown case, and it rescheduled argument for later in the year.
This time, it also requested the new attorney general, Herbert Brownell, to submit both a brief and an oral presentation. Although initially
discouraged, the NAACP lawyers soon concluded that a victory of glittering proportions was possible. Moreover, the death of Chief Justice
Vinson in September 1953 persuaded some to hope for a more sympathetic replacement, and Thurgood Marshall later contended that
Vinson would have caused "trouble."88 Perhaps, but when Eisenhower
quickly offered Earl Warren an interim appointment, they could not
have breathed much easier, for Warren's libertarian attitude was a
well-kept secret, as Eisenhower himself would shortly discover.
Attorney General Brownell was now on the spot, for he was having
difficulty with the requested brief. The Eisenhower breakthrough in
the South in the election of 1952 had further encouraged those Republican strategists who were urging a permanent political alliance with
Dixie. A strong brief in favor of desegregation would damage that
possibility. Yet, some Republican leaders were still committed to the
doctrine of equality and were also impressed with the Negro vote in
the North. Above all, no one, apparently not even Brownell, knew
exactly where Eisenhower stood on the question. 89
The result was a compromise brief, a cool, dry, 188-page exposition prepared under the direction of Assistant Attorney General J. Lee
Rankin and Philip Elman. Its purpose, Brownell explained to curious
newsmen, was to present "an objective non-adversary discussion of the
questions stated in the court's order of reargument." In short, it equivocated. Although the Brownell brief insisted that the Supreme Court
had the authority to pass on the question of segregation and that the
"primary and pervasive purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment . . .
was to secure for Negroes full and complete equality before the law
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and to abolish all legal distinctions based on race or color," the brief
avoided all discussion of the separate-but-equal doctrine and refused
to recommend any action to the court. "Attorney General Brownell's
brief was a side-step," wrote columnist Doris Fleeson indignantly. "He
told the court it had the power to decide the case. He did not-in contrast to Attorney General McGranery for the Truman administrationtell them they ought to decide it against segregation."90
Justice William 0. Douglas was also irritated with the briefs evasiveness. When Assistant Attorney General Rankin presented oral argument to the court, Douglas interrupted to ask if it was the department's
position "that the court could decide the question either way?" Then,
and not before, did the Justice Department indicate its position. "No,"
Rankin replied, "the court can find only one answer"-which was that
the Fourteenth Amendment did not permit segregation on the basis of
color. He added that the department associated itself with the views
of former Attorney General McGranery, which the Brownell brief had
ignored. 91
On May 17, 1954, Chief Justice Warren, speaking for a unanimous
court, announced the epochal decision of Brown v. Board of Education
of Topeka, which broke the back of legalized segregation in America.
Because of the inconclusiveness of the historical evidence concerning
the intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, the court had
concentrated on the psychological effects of segregation. Citing the
intangible but persuasive arguments and evidence introduced in the
Sweatt and M cLaurin cases, and referring in footnotes to psychological
studies published between 1944 and 1952, Warren announced that
segregation "has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The
impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of
separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of
the Negro groups. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a
child to learn." Therefore, he noted, "whatever may have been the
extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson,
this finding is amply supported by modem authority. Any language in
Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected. We conclude
that in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal'
has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal."
The Brown decision prohibited segregation in all states, and a separate
opinion also ruled it unconstitutional in the District of Columbia.92
No one will ever know what the decision might have been had
Chief Justice Vinson lived. But as Milton R. Konvitz has written, the
decisions of the Vinson court in 1950 in the Sweatt, McLaurin, and
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Henderson cases "put the explosives under the Plessy decision" and
laid the basis for the Brown opinion. And all of the decisions, he contended, were made possible through the activities of the NAACP,
numerous other civil-rights organizations, and, "most important of all,
the United States, represented by the Solicitor General and the Department of Justice.''93
The Brown decision of 1954 was indeed a fitting climax to the
egalitarian thrust of the Truman administration and a worthy tribute
to those who assisted, and occasionally prodded, the president and his
successor in their attempts to eradicate injustice in America. As a columnist for the Chicago Defender noted shortly before the court convened in December 1952: "The high court will not decide the school
segregation issue before Mr. Truman says his goodbyes at the White
House. But whatever the outcome, it will be remembered as the president's final courageous official blow to strengthen democracy at home
and peace in the world."94
Yet if the Brown decision was an end, it was also a beginning.
Although some civil-rights advocates permitted the euphoria of the
moment to blind them to the problems of the future, others were
acutely aware of what was ahead. In an editorial in February 1953 the
Journal and Guide correctly predicted the end of legalized segregation
in American life. But the editor also reminded his readers of the years
of discrimination in which residential lines "have been drawn almost as
tightly as precinct or county boundaries. Removing the discriminatory
school segregation statutes will not scramble the population. The
school populations will remain geographically situated within the
boundaries that have been painstakingly established by segregation
laws and practices during the past 85 years. The process of change in
this area of race relations will be painfully slow."95 It would also be
"painfully slow" in other areas as well, although at this point the
Eisenhower administration clearly had the initiative. Unfortunately
for America, it rarely chose to pursue it.
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ASSESSMENT

Although the adaptation of minorities to American life has been
varied, by the 1930s most immigrant groups had attained or approached
equality of opportunity and rights. It was a different story, however,
for those who because of color, geographical origins, or religion differed
considerably in their backgrounds from the vast majority of Americans.
The 1930s marked a change in the trends affecting most of the
nation's minorities, largely because of the New Deal's efforts to ameliorate their plight. Discrimination and segregation, however, were still
standard principles in 1940 in the United States. Only Jews, chiefly because of their European background and advanced skills, were close to
the economic and political means of American life. The condition of
most Negroes, Indians, Mexican-Americans, and Oriental-Americans
was still pitiful.
The Second World War brought substantial changes in the position of the minorities. All except Japanese-Americans profited from the
prosperity generated by war production, and military service benefited
many of the nonwhites who wore the nation's uniform. By 1945,
minority-group employment and income stood at record levels, more
opportunities for advancement had appeared, further skills had been
acquired, and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People was emerging as a major political force. Equally important,
minority-group leaders resolved not only that their people should keep
what they had gained but that they should press harder for equality.
In this they sought, with some success, to ally with one another and
with sympathetic elements among the majority of Americans.
There were some signs that civil-rights gains would continue in
the postwar period. After Franklin Roosevelt's death in 1945, the new
346
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president, Harry S. Truman, urged Congress to establish a permanent
FEPC and appointed Irvin C. Mollison to the Customs Court, the highest judicial position at that time for an American Negro. Yet, hope
soon receded for minorities. They not only experienced cutbacks in
jobs but had to compete in the shrinking job market with returning
soldiers and sailors. With increasing unemployment and rapid demobilization came mounting racial tensions. Particularly in the South and
West, many returning minority-group servicemen faced indignities,
intimidation, and even violence. Urban housing, already cramped because of large-scale migration to the cities, worsened as demobilization
progressed. Despite strenuous efforts by civil-rights lobbyists, all civilrights measures before Congress failed, except for the Indian Claims
Commission Act of 1946.
It was violence, however, the unwarranted assaults on blacks in
1946, that regenerated civil-rights progress. Outraged, Negro leaders
demanded action; and they were suppo1ted by a surge of concern
among whites. The Department of Justice and the White House sought
to curb attacks on nonwhites. Because of the inadequacy of federal
laws, however, the government had only a paper sword to wield in the
form of investigations and prosecutions, but that at least harassed alleged assailants. Pressure was also brought to bear on southern governors to uphold state laws. Whether these actions, and the nation's
shocked reaction to the assaults, were primarily responsible for the
calming of tensions remains arguable. Nevertheless, racial violence
declined during the latter part of 1946 and remained on a low level for
five years.
In effect, 1946 was a turning point, if only because of a conjunction of pressure from indignant civil-rights groups with rising White
House determination to forestall a reoccurrence of the racial violence
and intolerance that had marred the post-World War I period. And
this was set against the willingness of public opinion for some action
on civil rights. The immediate result was the scrutinizing of the whole
range of minority problems, mainly through the instrumentality of
the President's Committee on Civil Rights, which Truman appointed
late in 1946.
There is no need here to itemize the actions of the Truman administration or the civil-rights advances in the various sectors of American
life. The results can be discussed by categories. The president became
the prime educator for the need to secure the rights and dignity of all
citizens, and he strove to make opportunity and treatment more nearly
equal for minorities in the civil service and the armed forces. He
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worked, though with little success, for enactment of a cohesive civilrights program and, with greater success, to block legislation that
would jeopardize minority interests. Truman also made occasional
appointments of minority-group members to public offices and sought
to heighten self-government in America's territories. The federal government became increasingly sensitive to complaints about discrimination in discharging public services. The Justice Department encouraged law officers everywhere to give an even break to minority peoples
and intervened, through its amicus curiae briefs, to gain favorable
court decisions in civil-rights cases. Like Truman, the department
came to accept the argument that segregation and discrimination were
inseparable problems, for segregation was a pattern that fostered and
perpetuated discrimination. The Supreme Court, building on earlier
decisions that had combated the widespread disenfranchisement of
nonwhites and segregation in Pullman cars and interstate buses, responded in a series of cases that withdrew the legal bases for restrictive
covenants, unequal school facilities, and segregated railway dining
cars. Progress also occurred on state and local levels, as an increasing
number of laws and ordinances struck at discrimination in hiring, public housing, schooling, and the use of public facilities. Some change
came in private areas, as minorities increasingly participated in a wider
variety of activities and jobs. Noteworthy was the extent to which
civil rights and minorities became acceptable themes in literature and
public discussions; and highly significant were Hollywood's changing
image of the Negro and the breakthrough of blacks in organized
athletics.
These developments, together with advances in social-security
benefits, minimum-wage levels, and health programs, constituted a substantial step forward. Minorities, particularly Negroes, occupied a
place in government planning and programs as they never had before.
They saw heartening responses to their pressures and, from time to
time, even tangible results. The pace of change and encouragement
had quickened beyond what their leaders had envisaged in 1945.
Progress came about for a number of reasons. Thanks considerably
to wartime gains, minority groups-especially Jews and Negroes-now
had the money, inspiration, organization, and leaders to fight for advancement. And they had the goals. America's wartime propaganda
had held these goals on high; and this reinforced and refined what
minority citizens had been telling themselves for years. Moreover, the
spate of books and articles on minority problems, beginning in 1940,
had well publicized their plight and potential. Migration, especially of
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blacks to the North, and the growing number of minority-group citizens who could vote honed their sensitivity to the possibility of change
and heightened their political power. Minorities were all the stronger
because of their informal postwar coalition and because of the greater
concern of white liberals and a number of religious and labor leaders,
who acted sometimes out of principle and sometimes in search of quid
pro quo. In short, minorities had gained a secure foothold in the foothills of American democracy, enabling them to exert pressure that
could be felt in the cold high range of the nation's institutions.
Crucial to effective minority pressure was the fact that government was more than ever receptive to it. Harry S. Truman was a man
intent upon further securing constitutional guarantees to all Americans-a man who wanted to do, as he often said, "the right thing."
Here, too, was a president who increasingly turned to advisers who
were not only sympathetic to the quest for equal rights and opportunities, but were also keenly aware of the political advantages, at home
and abroad, of assisting that quest. At home, the administration would
gain more leverage with congressional liberals, the bedrock of support
for the Fair Deal legislative program. The administration's stand on
civil rights also strengthened it in vying for liberal and minority-group
backing in Truman's bid for nomination and election in 1948. Abroad,
America was under serious attack from international communism and
from the emerging nonwhite nations because of the gap between its
principles and practices in racial matters. As the cold war developed,
the Truman administration sought to blunt communism's exploitation
of the issue in order to enlist allies from among the new nations, or at
least to keep them uncommitted.
The application of nonwhite pressure and the frequently positive
response to it during the Truman years were aided by the increasing
disposition of some white, Christian Americans to favor progress for
minority groups. They were sickened by the brutality of Nazism and
had accepted the egalitarian teachings of political liberals and leftists.
Many Americans, especially among the young, read of the plight of
minorities; some of them came increasingly in contact with Negroes,
Jews, Mexican-Americans, Indians, and Oriental-Americans and found
that they were in no way diminished or threatened.
The upshot was not a revolution in the lives of America's minority
peoples, but by the end of the Truman administration substantial
progress had been made. Although Congress had not enacted a fair
employment practices law, by 1953 twelve states and thirty cities had
adopted such legislation, though it was of varying effectiveness. The
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general conclusion of studies of fair employment legislation was that
where it was enforced, it had an impact in reducing racial and religious discrimination in employment. 1 Of course, the labor requirements of the Korean War, President Truman's wartime National Manpower Mobilization Policy, and especially his Committee on Government Contract Compliance supplemented the work of fair employment
agencies and private groups, such as the Urban League.
Generally favorable employment needs and public and private
pressures for fair hiring practices created an unusually favorable job
situation for minorities. Employment and income rates after World
War II remained considerably higher than prewar levels. The coming
of the Korean War opened opportunities even wider, and minorities
experienced relatively little trouble in finding jobs of some kind. As of
1953, only 4.1 percent of the nonwhite labor force was unemployed,
compared to 2.3 percent of whites. Median nonwhite family income
rose from $1,614 to $2,338 between 1947 and 1952; and that income
grew in its percentage of median white family income from 51 to 57a record. There was also a great shift in the occupational categories of
black Americans, from 19.3 percent in 1940 in professional, white collar, skilled, and semiskilled work to 37.1 by 1950.2
Other advances were evident by the end of the Truman administration. Racial minorities benefited from social-welfare measures, such
as the 1950 amendments to the Social Security Act, which liberalized
payments and . covered additional workers, and health and minimumwage programs. Some progress was made in opening eating places,
hotels, parks, and theaters to minorities, although it was uneven and
small in terms of the number of people affected. Some unions eliminated or relaxed their discriminatory practices. With little fanfare, the
American Medical Association and many medical specialist societies
dropped racial bars to membership; and by 1953 twenty-seven medical
associations in six southern states and the District of Columbia had
black members, whereas none had had any in 1947. Only one state
nursing association refused Negro members by 1954. The nonwhite
life-expectancy age jumped from 53.1 in 1940 to 61.7 in 1953, compared
to 64.2 and 69.6 for whites over the same period. The gap was still
monstrous, but it was closing.3
There were dramatic changes in schooling, too. The percentage of
nonwhites from ages five to nineteen who were enrolled in school rose
from 68.4 to 74.8, and of whites from 75.6 to 79.3, between 1940 and
1950. The median of school years completed increased during the
decade from 5.7 to 7 for nonwhites and from 8.7 to 9.7 for whites; and
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the percentage of nonwhites in high school and college rose from 16.7
in 1940 to 20.6 in 1950. Indeed, Woodson and Wesley report that the
number of Negroes in institutions of higher education had increased
between 1940 and 1950 from 23,000 to 113,735. Partly because of fear
that the Supreme Court would force integration in schools, southern
states greatly expanded the outlay for Negro education between 1940
and 1952, with the per-pupil expenditure in nine states rising from
$21.54 to $115.08, and capital outlay per pupil increasing from $.99 to
$29.58, although the dollar increases for white schools were a bit larger.
The gap in twelve southern states in the number of years of college
training received by white and black teachers narrowed, however, and
the dollar increase in average salaries for teachers was slightly larger
for Negroes, rising $1,902 compared to $1,846 for whites. 4
Furthermore, owner-occupied dwellings of nonwhites increased
from 23.6 to 34.9 percent between 1940 and 1950, compared to 45.7
and 57 percent for whites. A veritable revolution occurred in the military services, accelerated by President Truman's actions and the Korean
War, which was revealed primarily in greater desegregation, integration, and opportunity, but also in racial proportions of manpower
strength. In the army the percentage of black officers grew from 1.7 to
2.9, and of enlisted men from 9.6 to 12.3, between 1949 and 1953; airforce figures showed an increase in black officers from 0.6 to 1.1 percent, and of Negro enlisted men from 5.1 to 8.6 percent. The marines
and the navy went from virtually no black officers to precious few; and
although the percentage of black enlisted men in the navy declined, it
rose substantially in the Marine Corps-from 2.1 to 6.5. 5 In short, desegregation of the military was one of the most significant breakthroughs in civil rights in the twentieth century.
That more was not accomplished during the Truman years was
disappointing and regrettable in terms of social justice and national
welfare. Plainly, not enough whites were willing to go much further in
combating discrimination and its effects through private actions or the
work of state and local governments, and minorities did not possess
sufficient strength to force more progress. The spur of civil-rights advocates was compelling, but the bridle of their opponents was almost
proportionately discouraging. As black men struggled to rise economically, politically, and socially in the postwar period, they found themselves increasingly in competition with whites, many of whom felt such
confrontation threatening and impossible to accept. Little more could
have been expected of Congress, which did little, and of the Supreme
Court, which accomplished much. The White House might have dared
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more-for example, a thoroughgoing attack on discrimination in the
civil service and in the rendering of public services, additional appointments of minority-group officeholders and actively sympathetic whites,
and the earlier formation of the Committee on Government Contract
Compliance (with better financial support). Yet although Harry Truman often moved by fits and starts and left something to be desired, he
was the first president to have a civil-rights program, the first to try to
come to grips with the basic problems of minorities, and the first to
condemn, vigorously and consistently, the presence of discrimination
and inequality in America. His endeavors, courage, and accomplishments far surpassed those of his predecessors, and at a time when it
would not have been difficult to have treated the civil-rights problem
with soft soap alone. The record of the Truman years showed the
strength of the American system in that progress was made; but it also
revealed society's weakness in its inability, in a whirlpool of conflicting
interests and pressures, to move forward either rapidly or wisely
enough.
Nevertheless, the position of minorities in 1953 had improved.
Jews rarely gave signs of feeling like an aggrieved or besieged minority.
Oriental-Americans had moved forward on all fronts, so that today, for
example, Japanese-Americans are more middle class than the white
majority in terms of education and accomplishment. To be sure, most
Indians and Mexican-Americans could complain that matters had not
changed markedly for them; and the Puerto Ricans, who had flocked
to the mainland to gain their fortunes, had received little. The largest
minority by far-black Americans-had gained considerably, however
inadequate their advances appear today.
In 1923 had minority leaders been told that the following year
their people would possess what they did in 1953, it would have seemed
a fantastic achievement. But what black, brown, and red Americans
actually enjoyed in 1953 fell far short of fulfilling their aspirations.
They too were children of the American heritage. Franklin Roosevelt
made the same golden promises to them that he did to whites, and
Harry Truman singled out the racial minorities for attention in 1948.
The minority peoples knew, as they had witnessed during depression
and war, what government could do when it applied its power. They
saw the life styles of whites as depicted in motion pictures, advertising,
and television. The lessening of discrimination, segregation, and violence was fine as far as it went; so was the increase in opportunities,
income, and freedom. But these were not enough, and they were not
all that the nation could give. It was clear that America had an obliga-
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tion to grant more in order to provide the equality under law that it
had for generations been promising. Moreover, in view of the cold
war, the emergence of nonwhite nations, and the need for domestic
stability, the United States could not afford less than full payment of
its promises to all citizens-throughout the country, and soon.
Yet, by 1953, the omens were mixed. A new president had made
promises, but Congress gave no signs of being less intransigent than in
preceding years. Moreover, the civil-rights coalition had been seriously
weakened as anti-Semitism diminished and Jews became increasingly
caught up in the affairs of Israel and as Japanese-Americans became
better integrated into society. During the 1950s, much of the energy of
Democratic liberals was spent in combating McCarthyism and, after
1952, in efforts to regain political power. Many civil-rights advocates
flagged in their work, stung by repeated charges of communism and
even harassment by government agencies. 6 Minorities also were hindered by the repeated declarations that in a prosperous nation, they
too must be prospering. Blacks found themselves increasingly alone in
the civil-rights struggle; and Indians, Mexican-Americans, and Puerto
Ricans were seldom in a position to help themselves, much less to help
revivify the civil-rights coalition. During the Eisenhower years, some
progress was made in education and home ownership. There were also
the desegregation decision in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka,
rudimentary civil-rights legislation in 1957 and 1960, and advances in
completing integration in the armed forces. The pace of progress, however, had plainly fallen off.
Had the civil-rights changes brought about during the years from
1945 to 1954 continued at least at the same pace, the adjustment of the
races after the Brown decision might have been a happier story. But
progress slackened. The rate of nonwhite unemployment rose to range
between 7.5 and 12.6 percent-more than twice that of whites-between 1954 and 1962. The proportion of nonwhite income to white
slid below that of the Korean War average, and the dollar gap in incomes widened alarmingly. The stark fact was that black, brown, and
red Americans were not keeping pace economically. 7 Violence and
intimidation were still standard commodities in race relations in many
areas, and the political rights of most southern blacks were violated.
Indeed, massive resistance to civil-rights gains rose in the South after
the Brown decision. 8 Ghettos and reservations continued to exist with
scant improvement. De facto segregation was as oppressive as legal
segregation, and plenty of the latter still remained. The government
under Dwight Eisenhower after 1954 was less effective, if not less con-
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cerned, with meeting minority problems than under Truman; and
interest among white citizens declined. Traditional Negro leadershipprimarily middle-class oriented-seemed too often during the Eisenhower years to sit back and wait for something to happen, but little did
happen for the mass of blacks. Perhaps W. E. B. DuBois's "Talented
Tenth" of the race had found satisfaction; but, contrary to expectations, they were not doing enough to raise their less happy brothers
with them. Until the mass of Negroes, and indeed of Indians and
Spanish-speaking Americans, was better educated and was afforded
opportunities for decent work and dignified living, minority problems
wol).1.d remain a cancer in American life.
Yet the gains of the period 1945 to 1954 were not wasted. Not only
did they represent some improvement in the conditions of minorities,
but, more important, they contributed to consolidation of their goals
and to the building of a base of power and skills, at least for blacks.
Moreover, every small gain had bolstered hope for the achievement of
greater gains. Indeed, by 1954, Negroes had the goals, the pride, and
much of the tactics and financing necessary to enable them to press the
struggle. Particularly, they had the potential leadership of their young
people, a group that had been teethed on the rhetoric of black militancy and equal rights during the preceding fifteen years. Black aspirations had been spurred by what had been achieved by 1954 and by the
example of what most whites and the more affiuent nonwhites enjoyed.
Because these aspirations were not reasonably met, frustration was the
accomplishment. And as frustration grew after 1954, blacks drew increasingly on the skills, pride, and potential leadership that they had
developed during the years after World War II; and in doing so, they
lent support to the later development of similar movements among
Indians, Mexican-Americans, and Puerto Ricans. America had let
them down, but it had also provided them with the resources and spirit
to press forward vigorously, on many fronts, by the 1960s and 1970s.
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Here is a thorough treatment of every important aspect of minority affairs
during the Truman administration. The authors trace the significant
developments in the quest for minority rights from 1945 to 1953, show
the interrelatedness to the struggle waged by America's racial minorities,
and assess the role of the Truman administration in that struggle.
The quest of minority peoples for civil rights was a scattered , meager
movement until the beginning of the Second World War. Minority group
members were segregated , intimidated, poverty-ridden , and undernourished, and their struggle suffered from these weaknesses. This situation
changed to an unprecedented extent during the years between 1945
and 1953.
Under President Harry S. Truman , the executive branch of the
federal government listened to minority groups as never before and often
responded to their entreaties and pressures . Civil rights' victories were
won in the courts . Education levels rose and employment opportunities
increased. Legal segregation began to crumble, and the campaign for
better housing inched forward . Alliances were forged among racial
minorities, Jews, organized labor, and political and religious liberals.
Sizable elements among the minority group ranks developed a
modicum of economic power and political influence for the first time
during the Truman administration. This rudimentary power was among
the bases for civil rights ' and racial developments after 1953.
Although the civil rights ' story of the Truman administration is one
relating mainly to blacks, this study deals with other minority groups,
including Native Americans, Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans,
Japanese and Chinese Americans, and Jews. Based on extensive
research in primary source materials, it is a balanced , in-depth analysis
of the power of minorities in eliciting change. It is a valuable addition to
the study of social and political history.
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writing by a midwesterner.
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